Cindy J. FRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 11-1192.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 16, 2012.
73
But there is a different kind of abstention that applies here. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal court may not grant “injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with” state judicial proceedings pending at the time that a federal complaint is filed. See O‘Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir.2008); Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635, 639-40 (6th Cir.1990); see also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1084 (6th Cir.1981) (concluding that “even minimal interference with [ ] a state proceeding” requires abstention). Instead, a federal court must dismiss such a suit if “important state interests are involved” in the pending state case and there “was [an] adequate opportunity” for the plaintiff to raise his grievances in state court. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass‘n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 435, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Shafizadeh‘s federal suit would grossly interfere with the state divorce case. He seeks an injunction to direct the judge who presided over the divorce to remove himself from the case. Shafizadeh also seeks declarations that the rules or practices applied in his case are invalid. Moreover, an important state interest was involved in the state proceeding—“the divorce of [Shafizadeh and Dugas], the proper division of their marital property, and the enforcement of the divorce court‘s orders.” See See Bunting ex rel. Gray v. Gray, 2 Fed. Appx. 443, 446 (6th Cir.2001); see also Parejko v. Dunn Cnty. Circuit Court, 209 Fed.Appx. 545, 546 (7th Cir.2006) (“The [state-interest] prong [of the abstention analysis] is satisfied because the federal courts have long recognized that domestic relations litigation . . . is an area of significant state concern. . . .“). Finally, there is no dispute that the state appellate process gave Shafizadeh an adequate opportunity to raise his grievances concerning Judge Bowles. Thus, the district court was right to dismiss Shafizadeh‘s complaint. See generally Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.1988) (“Younger abstention requires dismissal of the federal action“).
The district court‘s judgment is affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellant Cindy J. Fry appeals a district court judgment affirming the denial of her application for social security disability benefits. See
In March 2009, an administrative law judge (“ALJ“) conducted a hearing on Fry‘s claim for disability benefits, finding she had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the left knee, drug and alcohol addiction, and a major depressive disorder. Although these impairments are not equivalent to any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the social security regulations, the ALJ found she could not perform her past work. However, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ held Fry was not disabled because a significant number of light and sedentary jobs were available to her. The ALJ‘s opinion became the final decision of the Commissioner when
Fry filed a timely complaint seeking judicial review under
When deciding under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ‘s decision, we do not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility. Instead, we consider the ALJ‘s decision determinative if there is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support the ALJ‘s conclusion. The substantial evidence standard is less exacting than the preponderance of evidence standard. If the ALJ‘s decision is supported by substantial evidence, then reversal would not be warranted even if substantial evidence would support the opposite conclusion. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Fry does not dispute the ALJ‘s finding that she retained the functional capacity to perform the exertional demands of light and sedentary work. Instead, she argues the ALJ failed to give adequate deference to the opinion of Dr. Laurence Domino, her treating psychiatrist who indicated Fry‘s non-exertional impairments prevented her from performing even simple, unskilled tasks without supervision and other unspecified considerations. The opinion of a treating physician may be afforded “controlling weight” if it is consistent with the evidence and supported by sufficient clinical findings. Smith v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2007). However, an ALJ is not bound by a treating physician‘s conclusory opinion that a claimant is unable to work, Bass, 499 F.3d at 511, and may even discount the physician‘s opinion if there is substantial medical evidence to the contrary. Smith, 482 F.3d at 877.
Here, the ALJ discounted Dr. Domino‘s opinion because it was contradicted by objective clinical findings in his treatment notes, as well as by other evidence in the record. See Warner v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 391 (6th Cir. 2004); Walters v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 530 (6th Cir.1997). The medical evidence in this case, as the ALJ correctly noted, reveals that Fry‘s impairments are well controlled with therapy and medication. Indeed, Dr. Domino himself repeatedly “noted during the treatment period that [Fry] was stable on her medications with some episodes of anxiety and depression.” Moreover, Dr. Domino‘s opinion was inconsistent with other evidence, including the consulting report of Dr. Dennis Beshara, who reviewed the medical record in 2006 and determined Fry had the residual functional capacity to perform unskilled work. See Hardaway v. Sec‘y of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 922, 927 (6th Cir. 1987) (discounting treating physician‘s opinion and finding there was substantial evidence supporting the denial of benefits because “other consulting physicians” concluded the claimant was capable of working).
According to Fry, Dr. Beshara‘s opinion was inadequate because it was based on a review of the record before she began treatment with Dr. Domino. However, the ALJ properly considered Dr. Beshara‘s report as opinion evidence. See
Fry also argues that while her condition was periodically stable, that fact is insufficient to rebut the evidence of disability. However, “disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
We conclude the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for discounting the opinion of Fry‘s treating physician. See Bass, 499 F.3d at 511-12. Although Dr. Domino‘s opinions were contradicted by his own treatment notes, as well as by other record evidence, the ALJ did not completely ignore them. Instead, the ALJ gave Dr. Domino‘s opinions adequate deference by finding Fry had severe impairments that precluded her past work and significantly limited the kind of work she could perform. Id. at 512; Warner, 375 F.3d at 391-92. At that point, the burden shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that Fry could perform, her limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson v. Sec‘y of Health & Human Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir.1984).
While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, “a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs” is required to meet the burden. O‘Banner v. Sec‘y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir.1978). This standard requires more than the ALJ‘s intuition or conjecture that a claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. For this reason, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether a significant number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform, limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, where a vocational expert testified that over 13,000 light and sedentary jobs existed in Michigan‘s lower peninsula that an individual with Fry‘s residual functional capacity could perform. This testimony satisfied the Commissioner‘s burden of showing that a significant number of jobs were available to Fry, even if she could not perform her past work. See Harmon v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 291-92 (6th Cir.1999).
Accordingly, substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ‘s decision to accord less than controlling weight to Dr. Domino‘s opinion, as well as the Commissioner‘s determination that Fry is not entitled to disability benefits. The record contains no evidence supporting the limitations expressed by Dr. Domino and, to the extent Fry‘s impairments limit her ability to perform work activities, such limitations are adequately accounted for in the ALJ‘s determination. The judgment is AFFIRMED.