Lead Opinion
Carolyn Sue Christopher (“Carolyn”) petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming an order requiring her to pay postminority educational support on behalf of her child, C.C. See Christopher v. Christopher,
I. Procedural History
Carolyn and her husband, Charles Phillip Christopher (“Phillip”), were divorced by a judgment of the trial court in 2010. At the time of the divorce they had one adult child and two children under the age of majority, a son C.C. and a daughter Ca.C. On April 18, 2011, four days before C.C.’s 19th birthday, Phillip petitioned the trial court to order Carolyn to pay a portion of C.C.’s college expenses. Carolyn answered that she was financially unable to contribute to C.C.’s college education and that this Court’s holding in Bayliss authorizing awards of postminority educational support was unconstitutional.
After a trial, the court entered a judgment requiring Carolyn to pay 25% of C.C.’s college expenses of $9,435 per semester. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the college-expense award as a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion under Bayliss. Finding that Bayliss, as Supreme Court precedent, was binding, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, denying Carolyn’s constitutional challenge.
II. Standard of Review
The issue in this appeal is whether the Bayliss Court correctly interpreted Alabama law to authorize a trial court to award postminority educational support when application is made before the child attains the age of majority. “[0]n appeal,
III. Analysis
A. The meaning of the term “child" as a minor
The Alabama child-custody statute is functionally unchanged from its origin in 1852. “Upon granting a divorce, the court may give the custody and education of the children of the marriage to either father or mother, as may seem right and proper....” §30-3-1, Ala.Code 1975. The statute neither defines “children” nor designates when a child becomes an adult and thus ineligible for parental support.
“When interpreting a statute, a court must first give effect to the intent of the legislature....
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“... To discern the legislative intent, the Court must first look to the language of the statute. If, giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, we conclude that the language is unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction.”
City of Bessemer v. McClain,
The “plain and ordinary meaning” of statutory language may often be found in a dictionary. “What is a dictionary definition if not an assertion of that very meaning that an ordinary person would give a particular word?” Carpet Installation & Supplies of Glenco v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co.,
As further confirmation that the phrase “children of the marriage” refers to minors, we may look to the definition of “child” under the common law as applied in divorce proceedings. Customarily, “the [child-support] statute has been construed in aid of the common law and the original jurisdiction of equity for the protection, education, and well-being of the helpless infants that are drawn within the jurisdiction of the courts in such unfortunate controversies between parents....” Ex parte State ex rel. Tissier,
“[Statutes [in derogation or modification of the common law] are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared.” Arnold v. State,
At common law the parental-support obligation ceased at the age of majority. “A father is bound, by the common law, to support and educate his children during their minority.... ” Beasley v. Watson,
Before the 1980s, this Court uniformly defined “child” in the context of divorce as a minor. See, e.g., Hutton v. Hutton,
B. Departing from the ordinary and common-law meaning of “child"
In 1983 this Court recognized an exception to the ordinary and common-law definition of “child” as a minor in favor of a “majority trend” in courts of other states to require a noncustodial parent to support a disabled child past the age of majority. Ex parte Brewington,
Using as a springboard the substitution of “dependents” for “children” in Brewington, the Court in Ex parte Bayliss,
Courts, however, may not interpret statutes to compensate for omissions. “ ‘[I]t is not the office of the court to insert in a statute that which has been omitted[;] ... what the legislature omits, the courts cannot supply.’ ” Pace v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 578 So.2d 281, 284 (Ala.1991) (quoting 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 203 (1974)). See also Elmore Cnty. Comm’n v. Smith,
Indeed, we have held that “to change the statute under guise of construction, [is] an infringement upon the legislative prerogative.” Holt v. Long,
C. Departing from the statutory definition of age of majority
Although it is not “this Court’s role to assume the legislative prerogative to correct defective legislation or amend statutes,” Siegelman,
When the legislature reduced the age of majority from 21 to 19 in 1975,
TV. Stare Decisis
Stare decisis is the principle that, all things being equal, cases should be decided as they have been in the past. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (defining stare decisis as “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”). The Bayliss Court openly confessed its departure from this principle, stating:
*67 “The Latin phrase ‘stare decisis et not quieta movere ’ (stare decisis) expresses the legal principle of certainty and predictability; for it is literally translated as ‘to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). By this opinion, we are unsettling things that have been established by the appellate court of this State (the Court of Civil Appeals) that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of ‘all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption and child custody cases.’ Ala.Code 1975, § 12-3-10.”
*68 “ ‘Although this Court strongly believes in the doctrine of stare decisis and makes every reasonable attempt to maintain the stability of the law, this Court has had to recognize on occasion that it is necessary and prudent to admit prior mistakes and to take the steps necessary to ensure that we foster a system of justice that is manageable and that is fair to all concerned.’ ”
Ex paite Capstone Bldg. Corp.,
Federal law observes the same principle. “[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” Helvering v. Hallock,
“Our problem then is not that of rejecting a settled statutory construction. The real problem is whether a principle shall prevail over its later misapplications. Surely we are not bound by reason or by the considerations that underlie stare decisis to persevere in distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on further examination, appear consonant neither with the purposes of the statute nor with this Court’s own conception of it.”
Reversing Bayliss and returning to the legislature the power to decide if postminority educational support should be authorized in a divorce case does not make new law but, instead, “vindicate^] the old one from misrepresentation.” 1 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries *70. Thus, our decision in this case is remedial, returning the stream of judicial power to its proper channel. “‘Courts do not and cannot change the law by overruling or modifying former opinions. They only declare it by correcting an imperfect or erroneous view. The law itself remains the same....’” G.P v. A.A.K.,
V. The Acquiescence Doctrine
When this case was before the Court of Civil Appeals, two judges expressly called for overruling Bayliss. See Christopher v. Christopher,
“Although [it] might have been true when Bayliss was decided almost 24 years ago [that the Court usurped the province of the legislature], had the legislature disagreed with our supreme court’s interpretation of § 30-3-1, it could have enacted a law modifying or abrogating the holding in Bayliss. However, it has chosen not to do so. Because the legislature has not acted on the holding in Bayliss in more than two decades, I believe that it has acquiesced to that holding. See Hexcel Decatur, Inc. v. Vickers,908 So.2d 237 , 240-41 (Ala.2005), and the cases cited therein.”
The argument for ratification by silence, though logically dubious,
Courts do not make law. No law can be enacted or amended apart from the constitutionally mandated procedure, known as bicameralism and presentment. See INS v. Chadha,
Any act of the legislature that does not follow the procedures required by the Constitution is, “as a law, wholly void, a mere nullity, and imposes no legal obligation on any body.” Moody v. State,
“ ‘One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.’ ”
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison,
In Bayliss, this Court rejected its longstanding construction of § 30-3-1 that “children of the marriage” referred to minors only. See supra § III. If we are now to apply the acquiescence doctrine to preserve Bayliss, then the Bayliss Court should also have applied the doctrine to preserve the multiple cases construing § 30-3-1 that it overturned. If 24 years of silence since 1989 are construed to impress upon Bayliss a legislative imprimatur, what shall we say of the 137 years before Bayliss in which the legislature never spoke in opposition to this Court’s then prevailing interpretation of “children” as minors? Invoking the acquiescence doctrine to prevent this Court from correcting its errors in Bayliss is self-contradictory.
VI. Prospective Application
“The determination of the retroactive or prospective application of a decision overruling a prior decision is a matter of judicial discretion that must be exercised on a case-by-case basis.” Ex parte Coker,
VII. Conclusion
The Bayliss Court failed to recognize the ordinary and common-law definitions of “child” as a minor, did not defer to the legislature’s designation of the age of majority, and failed to observe the canon of construction that courts cannot supply what a statute omits. Accordingly, we expressly overrule Bayliss. Because the child-custody statute does not authorize a court in a divorce action to require a noncustodial parent to pay educational support for children over the age of 19, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. Because we reverse the judgment on grounds of statutory interpretation, we do not reach the constitutional issues. See Moses v. Tarwater,
. Reading the phrase "children of the marriage” in § 30-3-1 as not limited to minor children would produce the absurd and unjust result that a court could assign custody of the adult children of a marriage to one of the divorcing parties, thus stripping the children of their adult status and reducing them to the status of minors subject by law to the direction and control of their parents. See 3A Sutherland § 69:9 ("Courts avoid any construction of statutory language which leads to an absurd result.”).
. “Any person in this state, at the arrival at the age of 19 years, shall be relieved of his or her disabilities of minority and thereafter shall have the same legal rights and abilities as persons over 21 years of age.” § 26-l-l(a), Ala.Code 1975.
. The legislature, of course, is free to amend a statute to incorporate a judicial construction. But its failure to do so does not mean it has so acted and does not prohibit the Court from correcting its own error. See Helvering v. Hallock,
. "If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within six days, Sunday excepted, after it shall have been presented, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it_” Ala. Const. 1901, art. V, § 125.
. The federal principle is the same. "Congress may legislate ... only through the passage of a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
. "Quasi-prospective overruling ... protects reliance on prior rules by applying the overruling decision to acts done or transactions consummated after the effective date of the decision. Unlike prospective overruling, however, when a court overrules quasi-prospectively, it affords relief to the instant parties.” Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. v. Towner,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
I write specially to provide further support for the Court’s reversal of Ex parte Bayliss,
I. Separation of Powers
A. Redefining the term “child’’ is a legislative, not a judicial, function.
“[W]e do not subscribe to the doctrine that the judiciary can or should usurp the
By changing the common-law definition of “child,” the Bayliss Court not only misread § 30-3-1, Ala.Code 1975, and ignored § 1-3-1, Ala.Code 1975, but also violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by usurping the legislative function of making law. As Judge Thomas of the Court of Civil Appeals wrote: “I am concerned that the decision in Ex parte Bayliss violates the doctrine of the separation of powers because the decision encroached on the core function of our legislature — the power to make laws.” Christopher v. Christopher,
B. The “conscience and feeling of justice” test is essentially legislative.
The Bayliss Court created an entitlement to postminority educational support “because of what we perceive to be just and reasonable in 1989.”
This curious language asserting a generic right to assess the “conscience and feeling of justice” of unascertained persons as a basis for judicial policy-making originated in a 1938 law-review article. See Rudolph Laun, Stare Decisis, 25 Va. L.Rev. 12, 22 (1938) (stating that a court is more likely to follow a rule of law from a prior case if “it corresponds to the feeling of justice of the population or that part of the population whose obedience is required by the rule involved in this ratio decidendi ”). In the months before Bayliss was decided,
In Bayliss, the “conscience and feeling of justice” test found majority support. Employing its own subjective assessment of the state of public opinion as a basis for judicial policy-making, the Court launched deeply into the legislative realm. Determining the current “conscience and feeling of justice” of the governed that would justify departure from settled law, however, surely is a legislative and not a judicial task. See Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921) (“[The judge] is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness.”). The Justice who authored Bayliss conceded that the Laun test was quite subjective:
“If I determine that the ratio decidendi — the underlying reason — for the rule of law would not hypothetically be consented to today by the conscience and the feeling of justice of the majority of all those whose obedience is required by that rule of law, then I will vote to change the rule of law. This test, of course, is not completely objective. There is a great deal of subjectivity in it. However, it is a standard that I use.”
Gorman Houston, Jr., Keynote Address to the Incoming Students at the University of Alabama School of Law, 18 J. Legal Prof. 5,13 (1993).
Professor Laun justified his “feelings” test for judicial innovation on the ground that judges were better lawmakers than legislators. “In consideration of the arbitrariness of many legislators who believe themselves to be legally omnipotent, it may with reason be claimed that judge-made law can be a much more adequate and stable form of law than statutes.” Laun, Stare Decisis, 25 Va. L.Rev. at 25. Laun’s preference for judicial lawmaking formed the philosophical basis of Bayliss and its malleable “conscience and feeling of justice” test.
C. Policy-making is a legislative function.
The “feeling of justice” test provided the Court a blank check to make or unmake law whenever it subjectively felt the public would approve of the change. Our system of constitutional government, however, expresses the popular will through electoral representation in the legislature, not through judicial assessment of the tide of public opinion. The determination of public policy as a basis for lawmaking is a legislative, not a judicial, function. Thus what this Court “perceive[d] to be just and reasonable in 1989,” Bayliss,
D. The “Evening Dress” Metaphor.
After announcing the overruling of eight cases based on the “feelings” test, the Bayliss Court offered as further justification for its decision a sartorial metaphor:
“In making this holding, we are not the first by whom this new [rule] is tried, for we have cases from other jurisdictions, referred to by Justice Holmes as ‘the evening dress which the newcomer puts on to make itself presentable according to conventional requirements,’ Book Notice, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233-34 (1880).”
E. Misconstruing precedent to serve policy-making goals.
A further rationale of the Bayliss Court for requiring a noncustodial parent to provide postminority educational support was that the State was a necessary party to every divorce proceeding and thus could independently assert its own interests in custody and support decisions.
“While the rights of the parties to the divorce action must be fully respected, the public occupies the position of a third party in a divorce action; and the court is bound to act for the public. Flowers v. Flowers,334 So.2d 856 (Ala. 1976); Hartigan v. Hartigan,272 Ala. 67 ,128 So.2d 725 (1961); Ex parte Weissinger,247 Ala. 113 ,22 So.2d 510 (1945).”
The cases cited for the proposition that noncustodial parents have a legal obligation to make educational support payments “for the stability of our government” are inapposite. Flowers v. Flowers,
Weissinger further quoted from Spafford “ ‘that in cases of this character questions of mere legal niceties in regard to pleading should not interfere with the meritorious consideration of the cause,’ ”
In Powell v. Powell,
These 19th-century courts, reflective of the Christian culture that originally animated our institutions, placed these procedural considerations in the larger context of protecting the sanctity of the institution of marriage.
“The institution of marriage, established by divine, and perpetuated and guarded by human, authority, constitutes the foundation of organized society, protects private and public morality and virtue, and moulds the character of the citizens of the commonwealth. While an agreement to marry is regarded generally as a civil contract, by its consummation contractual relations of a special kind are formed, and the status of the parties, and their duties to each other and to the public, are ascertained and fixed. Extraordinary and exclusive personal relations are created, to continue so long as both parties may live; and public interests are involved in the strict and complete observance of the marital vows and covenants. The marriage relation can not be rescinded or annulled by the mere volition of the contracting parties. Its preservation is deemed so essential to the public weal that it can not be dissolved except by the sovereign power, or by a court of competent jurisdiction for causes prescribed by law, on sufficient allegations and satisfactory proof.
“The settled policy of the state, founded on these considerations, prohibits a divorce being granted by consent or collusion, or on the confessions of either or both of the parties, or for want of pleading or mispleading, or laches in making defense.”
Powell v. Powell,
The public interest in a divorce case was to preserve the institution of marriage by allowing its dissolution for only the weightiest reasons. Public policy in the 19th
“By the loose practice, too prevalent, and the facility with which divorces are sometimes obtained, the courts may be, in a measure, responsible for the extending want of a due appreciation of the sanctity of the marital relation. Whether or not defense be made, the court should feel bound by the highest considerations of duty and public policy to watch the interests of the community, otherwise undefended and unprotected. The appearance or indication of consent, express or implied, or of collusion, should stimulate the vigilance of the court, and a closer scrutiny of the evidence.”
In Ribet v. Ribet, the Court further expounded on the community’s interest in preserving the marriage covenant.
“No one deserves to succeed in a suit to dissolve the bonds of marriage, that foundation upon which the whole framework of civilized society may be said to rest, who does not come into court without great blame; and it is the right and the duty of the court to be governed by the facts of the case going to establish its true character, no matter how they may be elicited. Bishop[12 ] says: ‘A maxim in these suits, therefore, is, that a cause is never concluded as against the judge; and the court may, and, to satisfy its conscience, sometimes does, of its own motion go into inquiry of matters not involved in the pleadings.’ ”
The preceding case history of the origins of the legal principle of a public interest in divorce proceedings shows that the statist concept attached to this hallowed history by the Bayliss Court misrepresented these precedents. The public interest in a divorce proceeding is not to further the interests of the State per se, as Bayliss claimed, but rather to safeguard the institution of marriage by ensuring that the parties fulfill their vows. Ribet and Powell do not stand for the proposition that the State as a third party has a right to compel parents to educate their children to serve the State, but rather that the government has an obligation to defend the “sanctity of the marital relation” from “loose practice” and easy divorce. The role of the court in acting for the public as a third party in a divorce action is to act independently of the parties, their pleadings, and evidence and to develop the case as needed to protect the institution of marriage — not to impose statist imperatives of higher education unrelated to preservation of the marital bond on families already reeling from divorce. By wrongly summoning an inapplicable principle of family law, the Bayliss Court distorted this Court’s precedents in service of its unwarranted excursion into legislative policy-making.
By mistakenly interpreting this Court’s precedents to convert a principle intended to protect the sanctity of marriage into an instrument to serve State power, the Bay-liss Court also failed to observe the God-ordained jurisdictional boundaries between the State and the family recognized in our law. See, e.g., Powell,
Under Bayliss, the trial court, in deciding whether to order payment for postminority college expenses, assesses “the child’s commitment to, and aptitude for, the requested education” and may also consider “the child’s relationship with his parents and responsiveness to parental advice and guidance.”
“The State, by and through its elected judges, should not be the director of education for children.... [T]he State is then put in the position of determining which child is entitled to receive support and which child is not. This, in essence, breaches a wall of separation between the State and the family that should be, and has been, ardently guarded throughout history.”
Ex parte Tabor,
The Bayliss Court entered into a realm of internal family decision-making that has constitutionally been recognized as insulated from State intrusion. “The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
“This Court has also recognized the fundamental nature of parental rights.” Ex parte E.R.G.,
Although parents who resort to the divorce courts voluntarily surrender a portion of their decision-making autonomy, that curtailment should be no greater than necessary to resolve the dispute at issue. Courts should be wary of further disturbing the residual affection and mutual sense of responsibility between parents that may yet survive the stress of divorce. Thus, arbitrarily intruding the State into parental decision-making, even after divorce, is unwarranted and is inconsistent with the recognition that “it is a natural parent, not the state, who has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of a child.” Meadows v. Meadows,
The Bayliss Court, intent on creating an entitlement to the payment of college expenses for adult children of divorced parents, did not pause to consider the weighty precedents that limit the power of government to supersede parental authority. “The metes and bounds that separate each branch of government is of great importance, but that barrier that separates government from family is of even greater importance and must be maintained if our rights are to remain secure.” Ex parte Tabor,
III. Conclusion
The assumption of legislative power by the Bayliss Court, coupled with its overreaching intrusion into the realm of parental decision-making, raises constitutional questions that underscore and complement this Court’s decision to overrule Bayliss and to reverse the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals.
. As examples of the overturned cases, see Cain v. Cain,
. Popular music has echoes of the Laun test. See Morris Albert, Feelings, on Feelings (RCA 1974) ("Feelings, nothing more than feelings .... ”).
. Post-Bayliss, the Laun test received favorable majority mention in other cases. See Prattville Mem’l Chapel v. Parker,
. When the judiciary engages in policy-making, it not only violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, but also enfeebles the system of representative government. ”[W]hen this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy.” Plyler v. Doe,
. Bishop on Marriage and Divorce § 314.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion, and I write specially to further state my reasons for concurring to overrule Ex parte Bayliss,
BOLIN, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I find Justice Shaw’s well written dissent highly instructive, and I agree with many aspects of it, both Parts I and II. I am more inclined, however, than is he to consider the term “children of the marriage” to be ambiguous and to use much of the authority and reasoning he employs in the service of construing that language.
That said, in the calculus I would employ, it would not be necessary to decide if those principles and authorities from Justice Shaw’s writing, alone, are enough to justify the interpretation of § 30-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, to which both of us would adhere. At worst, the question is a close one, and, in the end, the acquiescence doctrine ought be the deciding factor. My employment of the acquiescence doctrine would not be the employment of an “unconstitutional” means of modifying the statute in the years since Ex parte Bayliss,
Although the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is not always the most compelling of statutory-construction tenets available to us in a given case, we invariably have recognized this fact and have been cautious in applying that doctrine, rarely if ever turning to it as a primary tool and, instead, almost always using it as a tool of last resort. In this role, it has on occasion been a valuable tool. Recasting it in the
As significant as I believe are our decisions today regarding the Bayliss doctrine and the acquiescence doctrine, there are other aspects and/or consequences of today’s decision that I find problematic, some on an even more fundamental level than the foregoing. These other aspects and consequences of today’s decision include the following:
(1) Ex parte Brewington,
(2) The main opinion states that “[t]he ‘plain and ordinary meaning' of statutory language may often be found in a dictionary.”
(3)The main opinion states that, “[a]s further confirmation that the phrase ‘children of the marriage’ refers to minors, we may look to the definition of ‘child’ under the common law as applied in divorce proceedings.”
I do not know exactly what the term “common-law words” means; however, respectfully, I cannot reconcile the foregoing
(4) The penultimate paragraph in Part V of the main opinion ends with this statement: “The mere passage of time, therefore, has not diminished the power of this Court to reconsider Bayliss.”
I do, however, have a grave concern over the discussion beginning with the second paragraph of Part V (and parts of Part III) that precedes this statement and that indicates that adherence to the interpretation of § 30-3-1 in Bayliss would require acceptance of changes or additions made to the statute by the judicial branch in a manner that violates the separation-of-powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution that are cited in Part V.
Whether one considers Bayliss to have been rightly decided or wrongly decided, it was an examination of the meaning of statutory language and an exercise of the judicial function. From this case forward, I fear any decision by a court interpreting an enactment of our legislature that is overruled years later by a subsequent court will now be vulnerable to criticism as a decision by which the original court violated the separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in the Alabama Constitution. Moreover, because a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine implicates the subject-matter jurisdiction of our courts, that which heretofore has been considered mere judicial error, to be corrected by some subsequent overruling, now is susceptible not only to being viewed as a constitutional violation, but also to being reviewed as part of a void judgment. My concerns therefore extend to the impact of today’s decision on the principle of finality of judgments.
. Bayliss confronted and overcame the stare decisis effect of those pre-Bayliss decisions stating the general rule that the duty of support was applicable to only minor children. In almost every one of the 24 years since that time, there probably have been hundreds of decisions applying the specific holding of Bay-liss in this regard. In addition to an unknowable number of trial court decisions that undoubtedly now total in the thousands, the cases decided since Bayliss include dozens of decisions by this Court and hundreds of decisions decided by the Court of Civil Appeal applying or reiterating the holding in Bayliss.
. See also
. Section 1-3-1, Ala.Code 1975, is not at odds with our use of the plain-meaning doctrine (employed in light of contemporary word usage) and so many other longstanding and well established rules of construction other than resort to the English common law:
"The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature.”
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The issue in this case is whether Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-1, properly provides the trial court with the power to order the parties to a divorce to pay the - college
The petitioner, Carolyn Sue Christopher (“the mother”), and Charles Phillip Christopher (“the father”) were divorced in 2010. The father subsequently requested the trial court to order the mother to pay a portion of the college expenses of their child, C.C., who was reaching the age of 19 and enrolling in college.
I.
In determining the meaning of legislation, our inquiry first begins with its language, and, if the meaning of the language is plain, our analysis ends there. Ex parte McCormick,
“In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature. As we have said:
“ ‘ “Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.” ’ ”
Section § 30-3-1 states, in pertinent part: “Upon granting a divorce, the court may give the custody and education of the children of the marriage to either father or mother, as may seem right and proper....” It is undisputed that this Code section allows courts to order custody and payment for the education and support of the children of divorcing parents;
The operable portion of the Code section, I believe, is the phrase “the children of the marriage.” It does not refer to the custody or education of “a child” or of “minor children”; instead, the plain language “the children of the marriage” refers to the offspring of the divorcing par
The phrase “children of the marriage” is sufficiently clear to apply to the facts of this case. I would not isolate the word “children” from the rest of the phrase— “of the marriage” — to draw a definition of that single word, because it is the phrase as a whole that is determinative of its meaning. The main opinion turns to dictionaries that define the word “child” (outside the context of the phrase “children of the marriage”) but actually does not primarily focus on the definitions of that word. Instead, it draws its holding that the word “child” “unambiguously means a ‘minor’ ” from the definition of “parent-child relationship” found in Black’s Law Dictionary. I see no need to turn to dictionaries, however: it is natural, plain, ordinary, and common for parents to refer to their adult sons or daughters as “the children of their marriage.” Even the main opinion, in its first paragraph, refers to C.C., who is an adult, as the mother’s “child,” and the mother also does so in her certiorari petition. Petition, at 5. But if we were to engage in an analysis of the various definitions found in dictionaries, I note that the word “child” does not exclusively refer to minors. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary includes in the definition of “child”: “a son or daughter of human parents ... [a] DESCENDANT.... ” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2003) (capitalization in original).
It might seem odd that the legislature enacted a statute with language allowing a trial court to order divorcing spouses to pay for the educational expenses of an adult child of their marriage. Nevertheless, we must enforce the legislature’s will as expressed in the plain language of the text it enacted, lest we violate the separation-of-powers doctrine:
“It is true that when looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational way to interpret the words as stated will we look beyond those words to determine legislative intent. To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.”
DeKalb County LP Gas,
II.
Because I believe that the language of § 30-3-1 provides the trial court with the power to order postminority educational support, I must address the remaining issue raised by the mother, specifically whether the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision conflicts with Ex parte E.R.G.,
I believe that the Court of Civil Appeals thoroughly addressed that argument in its opinion. See Part II of Christopher v. Christopher,
“[WJhen divorced parents with equal fundamental parental rights become embroiled in a dispute as to the funding for that education, a court may resolve that issue without implicating the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process rights of either parent. If not, one parent could successfully override the fundamental rights of the other parent.”
Id. at 51 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
I have, in the past, expressed concern regarding the advisability of the government “operating in areas traditionally reserved to families or individuals.” Perdue v. Green,
“Some of the arguments made ... are premised on hypothetical situations, different from the facts before us, in which the Code section might be either unconstitutional as applied or seemingly unwise in its application. It goes without saying that we cannot strike down the application of the Code section ... merely because the Code section might be unconstitutionally applied in some other context.”
Ex parte Ankrom,
. The undisputed testimony at trial indicated that the mother and father had planned to pay for their children's college educations, had set up special savings accounts to do so, and had actually paid one older child’s college expenses.
. "In Alabama, a single (general and vague) statute[, § 30-3-1,] has been relied upon to empower the courts to award child support and custody while a divorce action ís pending, upon a judgment of divorce, after a divorce, and to modify prior custody and child support awards. The Alabama Legislature has not seen fit to replace or clarify that statute despite the thousands of child support cases decided each year in this state.”
1 Judith S. Crittenden & Charles P. Kindre-gan, Jr., Alabama Family Law § 24:3 (2008) (footnote omitted).
. The main opinion notes that the Michigan Supreme Court, in Smith v. Smith,
. It is not absurd that the legislature would provide the power to place the custody of, or to order the payment of support for, some adult children of divorcing parties, such as disabled children. See Brewington. Nor is it objectively absurd for the legislature to pro
. Because the language of the Code section is clear, there is no need to resort to the "common law,” which is superseded by § 30-3-1 or more recent Alabama caselaw, such as Brewington. See Ala.Code 1975, § 1-3-1 (providing that the common law of England, "together with” the "laws and institutions of this state,” shall be "the rule of decisions,” unless the common law of England is "inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state,” or has been "altered or repealed by the Legislature”).
. The main opinion explicitly overrules this Court's prior decision in Ex parte Bayliss,
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
I concur with Justice Stuart’s special writing, both as to my identical initial reaction to this Court’s decision in Ex parte Bayliss,