Christopher v. Christopher
145 So. 3d 60
Ala.2013Background
- Carolyn and Phillip Christopher divorced in 2010; at divorce they had two minor children and one adult child; after divorce Phillip sought an order (filed shortly before the son’s 19th birthday) requiring Carolyn to pay part of the son C.C.’s college expenses.
- Trial court ordered Carolyn to pay 25% of C.C.’s college expenses; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed based on this Court’s precedent in Ex parte Bayliss.
- Carolyn petitioned for certiorari and argued Bayliss was wrongly decided and that § 30-3-1 does not authorize postminority educational support.
- The Supreme Court granted review to consider whether Bayliss correctly construed § 30-3-1 and whether courts may order college support for children over the statutory age of majority (19 in Alabama).
- The Court held Bayliss was wrongly decided, overruled it, concluded “children of the marriage” in § 30-3-1 means minors, and reversed the Court of Civil Appeals; the opinion preserved final post-Bayliss orders but applied the overruling prospectively (with quasi-prospective relief for the parties before the Court).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-3-1 authorizes a court in a divorce to order postminority college support | Christopher: Bayliss wrongly expands § 30-3-1; “children of the marriage” means minors so no postminority authority | Phillip: Bayliss correctly interprets § 30-3-1 to permit postminority educational support when application made before majority | Court: Overruled Bayliss; § 30-3-1’s phrase refers to minors only and does not authorize post-19 educational support |
| Proper method to supply new social policy (separation of powers) | Christopher: Such policy is for the Legislature, not the judiciary; courts cannot legislate by construction | Phillip/Bayliss-era view: courts may interpret statute in light of evolving notions of justice and public interest | Court: Judicially creating postminority support usurps legislative function; courts may not supply omissions in statute |
| Whether legislative silence ratified Bayliss (acquiescence doctrine) | Phillip: Legislature’s long silence (24 years) amounts to acquiescence to Bayliss | Christopher: Acquiescence cannot convert judicial construction into statute; would violate Alabama constitutional lawmaking procedures | Court: Rejected acquiescence argument as unconstitutional; legislative inaction cannot validate a judicial amendment of statute |
| Retroactivity / relief to parties who relied on Bayliss | Phillip: (implicit) uphold existing orders; reliance interests | Christopher: relief from ongoing orders; challenge appropriate | Court: Protected final, already-entered Bayliss-based orders; overruling applies to future and pending nonfinal cases and afforded relief to prevailing petitioner (quasi-prospective application) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1989) (original Supreme Court decision authorizing postminority educational support — expressly overruled)
- Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294 (Ala. 1983) (recognized limited postmajority support for permanently disabled children)
- Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (U.S. 1940) (stare decisis is a policy principle, not an inexorable command)
- INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (U.S. 1983) (federal bicameralism and presentment principles; courts may not effectuate lawmaking functions)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (U.S. 1803) (judicial duty is to declare what the law is, not to legislate)