CHRISTOPHER M. PERRICONE, Appellant v. KATIE BETH PERRICONE, ET AL., Appellees
No. 11-25-00213-CV
In The Eleventh Court of Appeals
June 4, 2026
On Appeal from the 29th District Court, Palo Pinto County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. C51852
Appellant, Christopher M. Perricone, filed suit against twenty-four individuals for “Interference with Possessory Interest in Children and Related Claims” and with it a “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs” (Statement). See
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal, like other related appeals filed by Appellant, and there have been many,3 originates from Appellant’s and Appellee Katie Beth Perricone’s underlying divorce action and subsequent child custody filings.
The dilemma here stems from Appellant’s request to prosecute his suit against dozens of individuals free of charge. Initially, the district clerk filed a challenge to Appellant’s Statement, which the trial denied “for non-compliance” with Rule 145(e)(1). Warren thereafter filed a contest to Appellant’s Statement and, in his motion, asserted that Appellant’s Statement was fraught with material falsities and misrepresentations. With his motion, Warren submitted an unsworn declaration that the contents of his motion were true and correct, which included his full name, date of birth, address, and a statement that he “declare[d] under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing [was] true and correct.” See
In addition, Warren asserted in his motion that: (1) Appellant was providing no child support for the benefit of his children, having made only a partial payment in September 2021; (2) Appellant did not attach proof of the public benefits he received, as the form requires, after checking the boxes in the form for the receipt of food stamps, Medicaid, and WIC; (3) Appellant’s “disability” payments were from “VA disability,” as shown by his bankruptcy petition, and were approximately $90 more than Appellant listed in his Statement; and (4) Appellant owned a 2014 Tesla Model S that Appellant stated was “worth $0” in his Statement, although the Kelley Blue Book value for the vehicle was approximately $4,000–$7,000. Appellant responded to Warren’s motion, and the trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to consider Warren’s contest.
The hearing proceeded on July 23, 2025; Appellant appeared, participated, and had the opportunity to challenge Warren’s evidence and offer his own. At the conclusion of the hearing, and after it considered the evidence presented, the trial court sustained Warren’s contest and denied Appellant’s request to proceed in the case without the payment of costs. The trial court signed an order on July 25 and found that: (1) Appellant was “well-groomed, articulate, intelligent, educated, healthy and physically fit”; (2) Appellant presented no relevant or credible evidence to support his claim of indigence; (3) Appellant’s arguments and evidence were uncorroborated, conclusory, and lacking in credibility; (4) Appellant’s Statement contained numerous material misrepresentations; (5) Appellant received sufficient monthly income and additional revenue, income, and gifts from “an unidentified
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A party who claims that he is unable to afford the payment of court costs, including the cost of preparing the clerk’s record and reporter’s record, must file a “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs.”
The standard for determining indigency is whether the record shows that the declarant would be unable to pay all or any portion of the costs, or provide adequate security, if he truly desired and made a good-faith effort to do so. Higgins, 257 S.W.3d at 686 (citing Pinchback v. Hockless, 164 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942)); Rangel v. Rangel, No. 04-23-00931-CV, 2024 WL 2165372, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 15, 2024, no pet.). When evaluating a contested
We review a trial court’s decision to sustain a contest to a declarant’s alleged inability to afford the payment of court costs for an abuse of discretion. Strickland v. iHeartmedia, Inc., 668 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.); Emerson v. Holly Lake Ranch Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts and reaches a decision arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). There is no abuse of discretion if some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision or its decision is based on conflicting evidence. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).
III. Analysis
Appellant raises several issues, some of which mirror others, in which he argues that the trial court’s July 25 order is void. For purposes of simplicity and clarity, we construe Appellant’s arguments to be that: (1) Warren does not have standing to contest Appellant’s Statement; (2) the trial court violated Rule 145(e)(1)
A. Standing
Appellant contends that Warren does not have standing to contest his Statement. However, any party to the declarant’s underlying suit may file a motion contesting the declarant’s indigency request; the motion must be supported by sworn evidence, not merely allegations, and assert “that the [declarant’s] Statement was materially false when made or that because of changed circumstances, it is no longer true.”
In his amended petition, Appellant joined Warren as a defendant to the underlying suit. Although he was not formally served, Warren made an appearance in this case when he filed his motion, and he acknowledged and conceded at the hearing that doing so subjected him to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because he is a party to Appellant’s suit, Warren would therefore have standing to contest Appellant’s Statement, provided he filed a motion that substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 145(e)(1). Warren’s motion does just that.
B. Warren’s Motion and Exhibits
After the trial court denied the district clerk’s challenge to Appellant’s Statement for failure to comply with Rule 145(e), Warren filed a separate contest. In his motion, Warren, a licensed attorney who is presumably well familiar with the consequences of perjury and the filing of frivolous pleadings and motions, provided
Pursuant to Rule 145(e)(1), a “motion to require the declarant to pay costs must . . . contain sworn evidence—not merely allegations—either that the Statement was materially false when made or that because of changed circumstances, it is no longer true.”
We conclude that Warren’s contest was not a “frivolous challenge” to Appellant’s Statement that the amendments to Rule 145 were designed to prevent. After the district clerk’s challenge was filed, Appellant amended his petition to name fifty-one defendants, including Warren. Warren later filed his motion after Appellant joined him as a defendant in the underlying suit and following the trial court’s denial of the district clerk’s challenge to Appellant’s Statement, informing the trial court that Appellant’s Statement included numerous material misstatements and omissions. Warren’s motion and the attached exhibits—submitted by an officer of the court—were sufficient to notify the trial court that an evidentiary hearing was warranted to determine (1) the alleged falsity of Appellant’s Statement and (2) his
Unlike the appellees’ motion in Strickland, which “contain[ed] no evidence whatsoever” and “attachments [in a supplement that] were not verified or otherwise sworn to,” Warren’s motion in this case provided specific, relevant evidence to alert the trial court that Appellant’s Statement may be false. Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 38. Moreover, given the trial court’s previous denial of the clerk’s challenge based on the noncompliance with Rule 145(e)(1), the trial court clearly understood that mere allegations alone will not suffice to challenge a litigant’s Statement. In this instance, we conclude that the trial court had appropriate evidence before it to proceed and ultimately grant Warren’s motion, as discussed below.
Nevertheless, we do not make this decision lightly. We endeavor to construe a litigant’s Statement in favor of the litigant, as we do in every appeal where a Statement is filed. See
C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
The standards that we employ for legal and factual sufficiency arguments depend on whether the party challenging the adverse finding bears the burden of proof on the contested issue. Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017); Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241–42 (Tex. 2001). In this case, Appellant bore the burden to prove that he was unable to afford the payment of the clerk’s record, the reporter’s record, and other costs related to the prosecution of his suit. See
The record shows, and the trial court found, numerous factual inconsistencies in Appellant’s Statement and his testimony at the hearing. For example, in his Statement, Appellant claimed that he was unemployed, did not own any property or other assets, and was receiving financial assistance from others to meet his monthly expenses and other obligations. He also stated, and he testified at the hearing, that he earned $650 each month as a self-employed contractor. However, Appellant testified at the hearing, and the trial court found based on his testimony, that his
Further, although Appellant’s Statement indicated that his monthly expenses were $6,620 per month, the testimony presented at the hearing established that his monthly expenses were inflated and substantially less. For instance, he listed in his Statement an expense of $1,550 per month in child support; however, as the trial court found, he was not paying it, and Warren averred in his motion that Appellant had not made a child support payment since September 2021. Appellant also failed to list certain assets in his Statement—a car and other properties—but acknowledged and conceded at the hearing that he owned or had previously owned them.
The trial court, having observed Appellant during the hearing, noted that Appellant was physically fit, healthy, intelligent, educated, and therefore presumably capable of securing gainful employment in addition to his self-employment projects. See Rodgers v. Mitchell, 83 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (noting that voluntary unemployment may be considered by the trial court in its indigency determination); Wallgren v. Martin, 700 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, orig. proceeding) (“A litigant who voluntarily remains unemployed and lives by the generosity of relatives is not entitled to require the officers of the court to render services free [of charge] while other citizens are required to pay for similar services.”); In re J.P.N., No. 04-17-00633-CV, 2018 WL 626526, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A trial court does not abuse its discretion in sustaining a contest to an affidavit of inability to pay when the record shows a party has the ability to earn money through future employment.”); cf. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. 2011) (if an obligor is intentionally underemployed, a trial court may set child support based on the obligor’s earning potential). Given the time that Appellant—as a pro se litigant—
As the factfinder, the trial court assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented and was within its discretion to resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence, and we defer to its credibility determinations. Strickland, 668 S.W.3d at 37; Turner, 265 S.W.3d at 714–15. Based on the record before us, the trial court could have reasonably determined, and it indeed found, that representations in Appellant’s Statement concerning his available income, monthly expenses, employment opportunities, and ability to afford the payment of costs were false, inaccurate, misleading, and lacking in credibility.
We have reviewed the evidence under the applicable standards and conclude, as the trial court did, that (1) Appellant failed to conclusively establish that he was unable to afford to pay for the required court costs, see Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 480, and (2) the trial court’s finding on that point is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, see Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 242. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sustained Warren’s contest.
D. Constitutional Arguments
Appellant also asserts a variety of constitutional challenges. However, Appellant did not preserve any of his constitutional complaints for our review.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was first presented to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that “stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint,” and that the trial court either ruled on or refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion. See
In this context, we note that even constitutional challenges are waived if not first presented to and addressed by the trial court. In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003). Thus, because Appellant failed to (1) address these complaints to the trial court, and (2) secure a ruling on them, he presents nothing for our review.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We overrule Appellant’s issues on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
June 4, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.