Chеster Loyde BIRD, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. WYOMING BOARD OF PAROLE, Daniel M. Fetsco, Executive Director, and Wyoming Department of Corrections, Robert O. Lampert, Director, Appellees (Defendants).
S-16-0105
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
October 18, 2016
2016 WY 100
Representing Appellees: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; James M. Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Assistant Attorney General.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
FOX, Justice.
[¶1] Chester L. Bird is serving a sentence of life according to law for crimes he committed in the 1990s. Mr. Bird filed a pro se complaint pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging various constitutional violations. The district court dismissed Mr. Bird‘s claims, and he appealed. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Mr. Bird presents a number of issues for our review. Although the issues presented are not discretely listed, Mr. Bird
- Does
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-16-205(a)(i) violate Mr. Bird‘s equal protection rights by treating similarly situated prisoners differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest? - Does the Wyoming Department of Corrections’ good time policy violate Mr. Bird‘s equal protection rights by treating similarly situated prisoners differently?
- Did the enactment of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-16-205(a)(i) impliedly repealWyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) ? - Did the Wyoming Board of Parole violate the doсtrine of separation of powers by enacting policies governing the commutation application procedure?
- Did the Wyoming Board of Parole violate Mr. Bird‘s due process rights by amending the commutation application procedure?
- Did the Wyoming Board of Parole‘s amendment to the commutation application procedure violate Mr. Bird‘s constitutional protection against ex post facto laws?
FACTS
[¶3] In the mid-90s, Mr. Bird was sentenced to two life sentences according to law, to run concurrently. Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Wyo. 1995). On September 1, 2015, Mr. Bird filed a complаint against the Wyoming Board of Parole (WBOP) and the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. Mr. Bird made a number of allegations, as set forth in the Issues section above. In response to Mr. Bird‘s complaint, the defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Bird failed to state a claim for relief. The district court granted the motion, and Mr. Bird timely filed his notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶4] We sustain the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) “only if it shows on its face that the plaintiff [is] not entitled to relief under any set of facts.” Hochalter v. City of Gillette, 2005 WY 125, ¶ 19, 120 P.3d 674, 677 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575 (Wyo. 1996)). The facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted and the allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to the complaining party. Id. “Dismissal is a drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Does Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-16-205(a)(i) violate Mr. Bird‘s equal protection rights by treating similarly situated prisoners differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest?
[¶5] In 2010, the Wyoming legislature amended
Unless the prisoner is serving a sentencе of death or life without the possibility of parole or is subject to mandatory savings under
W.S. 25-13-107(b)(i) , ten percent (10%) shall be credited to the prisoner‘s personal savings account within the correctional facility‘s trust and agency account, until the prisoner‘s account has a balance of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). Once the prisoner‘s personal savings account balance reaches one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), the income otherwise distributed to the prisoner‘s savings account under this paragraph shall be distributed to the prisonеr as provided by paragraphs (ii) through (vi) of this subsection. Funds in the prisoner‘s personal savings account shall be paid to the prisoner upon parole or final discharge[.]
[¶6] The United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
[¶7] In an equal protection analysis, we begin by examining whether the classified groups alleged to be treated differently as a result of a governmental action are, in fact, similarly situated. Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 26, 36 P.3d 586, 594 (Wyo. 2001). If not, there is no equal protection violation, and the claim must be dismissed. Id. However, if we find that two groups treated differently are similarly situated, then we must determine whether the challenged government action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.1 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. If so, we uphold the governmental action; however, if not, the governmental action must be invalidated as violating equal protection.
[¶8] The district court upheld the statute, finding that it “does not provide dissimilar treatment to similarly situated inmates.” Equal protection “does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Reiter, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 26, 36 P.3d at 594 (quoting Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)). However, in the context of a motion to dismiss, there was an insufficient basis to conclude that prisoners sentenced to life without parole and prisoners sentenced to life according to law are not similarly situated.
[¶9] The United States Supreme Court has never precisely defined the meaning of the term “similarly situated,” Selsor v. Workman, 644 F.3d 984, 1016 (10th Cir. 2011), and the circuit courts of appeal that have grappled with this question have not presented a uniformly applicable test to resolve this thorny issue.2 The Seventh Circuit
[¶10] In Nicodemus, we recognized that the purpose of
assure that an inmate who has been paroled or finally discharged from his sentence has funds to pay expenses until he can find employment or another source of legitimate revenue so that he is not temptеd or forced to steal or commit other crimes to keep body and soul together.
Id., 2014 WY 135, ¶ 4, 336 P.3d at 673. Mr. Bird argues that there is no real difference between prisoners serving life without parole and prisoners serving life according to law, and that
[¶11] However, looking to the legislative purpose behind distinguishing between sentences of life without parole and life according to law, we find there is a rational basis for their different treatment. Life without parole sentences are reserved for the most egregious crimes. See
In 1994, the Wyoming Constitution was amended to add
Art. 3, § 53 , which empowered the legislature to create a penalty of “life imprisonment without parole” that would not be subject to commutation. Two years later, the legislature enacted a statute which permitted a sentence of “life imprisonment without parole” for specific crimes to be designated by statute. 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 73, § 1;Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(a) (Michie 1997).Section Two of the law amended
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) to provide that the parole board could grant parole on any sentence except “a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a life sentence.” Section Two of the 1996 act also added the new form of life sentence to the penalties available underWyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 for offenders repeatedly convicted of sexual assault. 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 73, § 2. Five years after passage of the 1996 act, the legislature amended the first-degree murder statute,Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 , to add life without parole to the existing sentencing options of death and life according to law. 2001 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 96, § 2.
Id., 2014 WY 135, ¶¶ 15-16, 336 P.3d at 675.
[¶12] We conclude that the legislature intended that these two classes of prisoners be treated differently — those sentenced to life according to law with better prospects for eventual release than those sentenced to life without parole. There is a legitimate state interest in providing incentive to prisoners for good behavior that would enhance the possibility of leaving the prison system before the end of their lives. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 470 n.3, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2467 n.3, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]ehavior in prison often is molded by [a prisoner‘s] hope and expectation of securing parole at the earliest time permitted by law.“). That hope is furthered by the requirement to comply with the mandatory savings account requirement. We find that there is a rational basis for treating the two categories of life-sentenced prisoners differently with respect to the prisoner savings requirement. We therefore affirm the dismissal of this claim.
II. Does the Wyoming Department of Corrections’ good time policy violate Mr. Bird‘s equal protection rights by treating similarly situated prisoners differently?
[¶13] Mr. Bird argues that his right to equal protection under the law hаs also
[¶14] Again, we must first determine whether life according to law prisoners are similarly situated to those serving a term of years sentence. In accordance with our analysis above, we look first to the purpose of the policy. The WDOC Policy and Procedure # 1.500 (effective July 30, 2015) states:
It is the policy of the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) to utilize a process of awarding, removing, and withholding of good time allowances, which serves as an incentive for inmates to abide by the rules of the facility, participate in recommended programs and activities, and pursue other activities and behaviors which improve the likelihood of positive institutional adjustment and successful re-entry to the community. The awarding of good time serves as an incentive and is part of the comрensation for program compliance.
The policy is an attempt by the WDOC to ensure that inmates behave well while in prison and participate in activities to ensure that they will do well when they are released. A prisoner who has been sentenced to a term of years will be released from prison upon attaining his maximum term (at the latest) unless he misbehaves or commits further crimes while incarcerated. This is a vested, constitutional right that cannot be denied without due process of law. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2646, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (“[T]he interest in being free from physical detention by one‘s own government” “is the most elemental of liberty interests[.]“); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (“A State, pursuant to its police power, may of course imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution. But there are constitutional limitations[.]“). Conversely, the only avenue for release of a prisoner sentenced to life according to law is through clemency — either a commutation of his sentence or a pardon — at the discretion of the governor.
III. Did the enactment of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-16-205(a)(i) impliedly repeal Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-402(a) ?
[¶15] Mr. Bird argues that by enacting
[¶16] First, Mr. Bird argues that there would be no reason to require prisoners serving life according to law to save their earnings in the event that they are released if the legislature did not intend for those prisoners to be parole eligible and subject to release at some future date. As we recognized in Nicodemus, while there is little hope that prisoners sentenced to life according to law will ever be parole eligible (through commutation), the plain language of
[¶17] Mr. Bird next argues that because life according to law prisoners are treated as similarly situated to prisoners serving a term of years for purposes of
[¶18] The language of
IV. Did the Wyoming Board of Parole violate the doctrine of separation of powers by enacting policies governing the commutation application procedure?
[¶19] Mr. Bird argues that the WBOP enаcted policies governing commutation applications in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. He asserts that the Wyoming Constitution gives the legislature the exclusive power to govern the procedure required for commutations, and the WBOP usurped this power.
[¶20] The constitutional provision which Mr. Bird cites states:
The governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of imрeachment; but the legislature may by law regulate the manner in which the remission of fines, pardons, commutations and reprieves may be applied for.
The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of sepаration of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government. . . . [W]e long have insisted that “the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution” mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692, 12 S.Ct. 495, 504, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892). We also have recognized, however, that the separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches. . . .
[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. “The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function.” Accordingly, this Court has deemed it “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”
Id., 488 U.S. at 371-73, 109 S.Ct. at 654-55 (citations omitted). We apply this analysis to our state constitution and the state legislature.
[¶21] In this case, the legislature clearly delineated the general policy, the public agency, and the boundaries of the delegated authority by permitting the WBOP to “make recommendations to the governor to grant commutations of sentences and review inmate matters,”
V. Did the Wyoming Board of Parole violate Mr. Bird‘s due process rights by amending the commutation application procedure?
[¶22] Mr. Bird argues that he was deprived of due process when the WBOP amended the procedure governing the application process for commutations. However, under no set of facts can Mr. Bird demоnstrate that he has been deprived of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest, which is a threshold requirement for a due process claim. Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, ¶ 27, 367 P.3d 619, 626 (Wyo. 2016) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)). “[A]n inmate has no constitutional or inherent right to commutation of his sentence.” Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 2464 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bird, 371 Fed.Appx. at 940 (“[C]ommutation is a matter of grace and not a right[.]“). Thus, the district court appropriately dismissed Mr. Bird‘s due process claim.
VI. Did the Wyoming Board of Parole‘s amendment to the commutation application procedure violate Mr. Bird‘s constitutional protection against ex post facto laws?
[¶23] Both the Wyoming Constitution аnd the United States Constitution prohibit the passage of ex post facto laws.
[¶24] In determining whether a law makes a punishment more burdensome, “we must determine whether [the law] produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishmеnt attached to the covered crimes.” California Dep‘t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1603, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). If a law “creates only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes, [then] such conjectural effects are insufficient” to implicate ex post facto concerns. Id. Because commutations are wholly discretionary and unpredictable, it is nearly impossible to demonstrate a “significant risk” that Mr. Bird would be denied a commutation that he might otherwise have received if the policy had not been amended. Snodgrass v. Robinson, 512 F.3d 999, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Lewis-El v. Sampson, 649 F.3d 423, 426-27 (6th Cir. 2011) (It would be nearly impossible to demonstrate that a change in commutation procedure would present a significant risk of lengthening the amount of time served “considering that the decision to commute a prisoner‘s sentence is so tied to the personal predilections of the person occupying the governor‘s office.“). The district court therefore did not err when
CONCLUSION
[¶25] There is a legitimate state interest in treating prisoners differently with respect to
Notes
The central issue here is what degree of similarity is required for two entities to be considered “similarly situated.” Too broad a definition of “similarly situated” could subject nearly all state regulatory decisions to constitutional review in federal court and deny state regulators the critical discretion they need to effectively perform their duties. Conversely, too narrow a definition of “similarly situated” could exclude from the zone of equal protection those who are plainly treated disparately and without a rational basis.