Cheng v. NeumannCheng v. Neumann
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Barron, Lynch, Gelpí
I.
We draw the facts from the plaintiffs’ complaint, “documents attached to or fairly incorporated into the complaint,” “facts susceptible to judicial notice,” and “concessions in plaintiff[s‘] response to the motion to dismiss.” Lemelson v. Bloomberg L.P., 903 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2012)).
Maine People‘s Alliance, a Maine non-profit corporation, publishes an online media outlet named Beacon. On June 16, 2021, Beacon published an article written by Dan Neumann titled “Maine GOP hosts speaker present at Jan. 6 Capitol assault” (the “Article“). The Article stated, in relevant part:
The Maine Republican Party co-sponsored a community forum in Windham on Monday evening that included as a panelist a far-right media personality and conspiracy theorist who has said she was among the supporters of former President Donald Trump who were present at the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.
. . .
Dana Cheng, vice-president of the right-wing multi-language newspaper and media company Epoch Times, was invited by the Gray Republicans to brief their members about the threats posed to Americans by the Chinese government.
. . .
The day after the insurrection that left five people dead, Cheng said on a Denver radio program that she was present at the Capitol when it was breached, but was not at the front of the crowd and did not enter the building.
Cheng alleged during the radio interview that the violence that day was perpetrated by anti-fascist infiltrators -- a false refrain echoed throughout conservative media in the days after the insurrection.
“We have got photos from our readers that there were some antifa people,” she said. “They have seen a few people try to push into the building, some got into the building. They were the same people that were in the antifa movement.”
Since Trump‘s loss to President Joe Biden, Cheng‘s Epoch Times has consistently questioned the election results. The news outlet is partially funded by far-right media financier Robert Mercer and has promoted anti-vaccine misinformation and an array of pro-Trump conspiracy theories such as QAnon, leading the New York Times to call the outlet a “global-scale misinformation machine.”
The Article included a link to a recording of Cheng‘s appearance on The Kim Monson Show, a Denver radio show and podcast. That link provided access to the statements actually made during that show. The Article also referred to statements made by the chair of the Maine Republican Party regarding the Capitol assault. The Article and a transcript of Cheng‘s radio appearance are attached in their entirety as Exhibits A and B hereto.
On January 7, 2021, the day after the attack on the U.S. Capitol, Cheng had appeared on The Kim Monson Show as a repeat guest. When asked about the events of January 6, Cheng stated:
Yesterday I was at a rally in the morning. I went to a -- a lot of people, people, people were very peaceful relatively and then people were excited and when Trump was speaking. So later on at the Capitol, I was there but I was not on the right front, so I did not see with my own eyes what happened when some people broke into the building. I was -- most people there, to my eyes, had been very peaceful. So those on the front, I -- we have got photos
from our readers that there‘s a -- there were some antifa people infiltrating in, and they have seen a few people trying to push, push into the building and some got into the building and some photos that they could see they are the same people that were in the antifa movement. We got some photos sent by readers. So no matter who was involved, to us, we‘re very fully aware with the communism strategy -- and it happened in China, it happened in Hong Kong. The easiest way to ruin a movement or a protest is to lead a few people to go extreme. That‘s the fastest way to ruin a protest or movement. So I don‘t think if it‘s random and it‘s like, it‘s not planned. I think some people planned it. Who was involved and who tried to plot this, it‘s not clear yet.
Pressed by Monson on whether she could say “for sure” that anti-fascist (“antifa“) infiltrators were involved in breaching the Capitol, Cheng replied: “We are in the process of confirming those. And that is a familiar strategy from communists.” Cheng also stated that “it [was her] opinion that China has been deeply involved in this election fraud.”
Cheng and Epoch Group (publisher of The Epoch Times) sued Neumann and Maine People‘s Alliance in federal court in Maine under diversity jurisdiction, alleging defamation based on the statements in the Article. Cheng also asserted the other claims previously described.
As relief, the plaintiffs sought a retraction of the Article in its entirety, an injunction enjoining the defendants
The defendants moved to dismiss under
II.
We review a district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss a defamation suit de novo. McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (stating general principle that, in First Amendment cases, appellate courts have “an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression‘” (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964))). We “accept as true the complaint‘s well-pleaded factual allegations” and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” McKee, 874 F.3d at 59. We do not credit legal labels or conclusory statements, but rather focus on the complaint‘s non-conclusory, non-speculative factual allegations and ask whether they plausibly narrate a claim for relief. Lemelson, 903 F.3d at 23.
A.
We first consider the plaintiffs’ defamation claims. “Modern defamation law is a complex mixture of common-law rules and constitutional doctrines.” McKee, 874 F.3d at 60 (quoting Pan Am Sys., Inc. v. Atl. Ne. Rails & Ports, Inc., 804 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2015)). Here, we bypass the parties’ choice-of-law disputes as to whether Maine or New York law (including either state‘s anti-SLAPP statute) applies. Rather, we look to dispositive First Amendment principles. See Lemelson, 903 F.3d at 23 (taking a similar approach); Schatz, 669 F.3d at 56 (same).
We focus on two such principles. We have no need to reach further First Amendment principles concerning public figures and the pleading requirements for actual malice.
As to the first principle, where challenged statements are published by a media defendant and involve matters of public concern, there can be no liability unless the statements are false. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986); see also, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (reiterating this principle); Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990) (same); Veilleux v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 108 (1st Cir. 2000) (same). The district court correctly held that the Article was published by media defendants and concerned matters of public concern. See Cheng, 2022 WL 326785, at *4, *6.1 Such a falsity must be material, not merely a minor inaccuracy. See Pan Am, 804 F.3d at 66; Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 108; see also Air Wisc. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237, 247 (2014) (“A ‘statement is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.‘” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517)).
As to the other First Amendment principle, “a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation . . . receive[s] full constitutional protection,” as does “imaginative expression” and “rhetorical hyperbole.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (first citing Hepps, 475 U.S. 767; and then citing Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53-55 (1988)); see also Pan Am, 804 F.3d at 65; Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 108. “[I]f it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.” Gray v. St. Martin‘s Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.)). “The vaguer a
We conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege defamation both as to the Article as a whole and as to each of the individual challenged statements.
The plaintiffs have, on appeal, largely focused on the statements in combination to support an allegedly defamatory inference.2 The plaintiffs argue that all of the challenged statements, taken together, combine to convey a defamatory inference as to the nature of Cheng‘s conduct. Such an inference, once defined, is treated like a claim for direct defamation and is subject to the same constitutional guardrails. See White v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1990). We conclude that the argued inference is not plausible.
The plaintiffs do not argue that the defamatory inference purportedly at issue is that Cheng was present at the Capitol as a protestor rather than as a journalist. Nor do they argue that the inference reasonably drawn by readers is that Cheng shared similar views as the protestors and that inference is
We reject the argument. The Article states that Cheng was “present at [the] Jan. 6 Capitol assault” and “present at the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.” As discussed infra, these statements are substantially true on their face because they accurately place Cheng at the Capitol during the events of January 6. The passive language of these statements suggests mere “presen[ce]” rather than active participation. Indeed, the Article contains the explicit statement that Cheng “was not at the front of the crowd and did not enter the [Capitol] building.”
If considered individually, the challenged statements are not actionable. Three of the challenged statements are not actionable because they are substantially true. These are the Article‘s headline and the statements that Cheng was “among the supporters of former President Donald Trump who were present at the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6” and that she “alleged during [her appearance on The Kim Monson Show] that the violence that day was perpetrated by anti-fascist infiltrators.”
A complaint cannot plausibly allege falsity where, as here, materials incorporated into the complaint refute that very assertion. “It is a well-settled rule that when a written instrument contradicts allegations in the complaint to which it is attached, the exhibit trumps the allegations.” Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Com. Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 n.3 (similar).
The Article‘s headline states: “Maine GOP hosts speaker present at Jan. 6 Capitol assault.” That statement is factually
The second statement -- that Cheng was “among the supporters of former President Donald Trump who were present at the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6” -- is non-actionable for the same reasons: Cheng stated as much during the interview.5
The third statement -- that Cheng “alleged during [her appearance on The Kim Monson Show] that the violence [on January 6] was perpetrated by anti-fascist infiltrators” -- is also substantially true. The plaintiffs argue that Cheng did not allege antifa involvement in the Capitol assault but rather “merely stated that certain people that submitted information to The Epoch Times made such claims and that the information had not been verified.”
[T]hose on the front, I -- we have got photos from our readers that there‘s a -- there were some antifa people infiltrating in, and they have seen a few people trying to push, push into the building and some got into the building and some photos that they could see they are the same people that were in the antifa movement.
Cheng also stated that this was a “communism strategy” intended to “ruin a movement . . . [by] lead[ing] a few people to go extreme” and later expressed her belief in “election fraud.” Pressed on whether she could say definitively that antifa was involved, Cheng responded that The Epoch Times was confirming the photographs and reiterated that this was a “familiar strategy from communists.” The challenged statement does not permit an inference of falsity because “it ‘would [not] have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth [or here, the truth as evident from the source material] would have produced.‘” Air Wisc. Airlines Corp., 571 U.S. at 247 (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517). The statement is substantially true.
The remaining statements are not actionable because they are expressions of opinion and are unprovable as false. “Right-wing,” “far-right,” and “conspiracy theorist” are vague, judgement-based terms that “admit[] of numerous interpretations”
The plaintiffs argue that the statements that The Epoch Times “has promoted anti-vaccine misinformation and . . . QAnon” are defamatory. The Epoch Times has in fact published articles that include discussions of theories which in the opinions of others could be called “anti-vaccine” and/or favorable to QAnon.8 The allegedly defamatory statements are opinions which reflect subjective judgments about the nature of The Epoch Times’ coverage. See Pan Am, 804 F.3d at 65; Gray, 221 F.3d at 248. Indeed, the subjective nature of these judgments is evident from the face of the complaint. The complaint does not dispute that The Epoch Times covers these two topics. The complaint instead attempts to build a defamation claim on the argument that The Epoch Times “has never promoted anti-vaccine misinformation” and has “reported on QAnon but [has] never promoted the organization or its theories.” (Emphasis in original.) The challenged statements are non-actionable opinions.
On appeal, Cheng references in passing her claims for false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress but does not develop any argument as to these claims. Accordingly, any challenge has been waived. See United States v. Valdez, 975 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2020). The latter two claims also fail for the independent reason that “a failed defamation claim cannot be recycled as a tort claim for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 83 (1st Cir. 2012).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint.