Chavis v. StateChavis v. State
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Bernard J. O‘Donnell, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant, Dakai Chavis.
Kathryn J. Garrison, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware for Appellee, State of Delaware.
The Appellant, Dakai Chavis, appeals from his conviction in Superior Court of Criminal Trespass in the First Degree. He raises one issue. He contends that the Superior Court erred during his jury trial by admitting evidence of two prior convictions under
I. FACTS
After attending the first day of Firefly Festival during the June 15, 2018 weekend, Karen Eng and her brother, Brian Eng, checked into the Baymont Inn in Newark, Delaware. In the early hours of the morning, while the Engs were asleep, someone entered their room. Ms. Eng awoke, heard rustling in the room, sat up in bed, and saw a man crawling at the foot of the bed near the door to the room. She asked, “what are you doing?”1 The man replied that he was in the wrong room and left. After the Engs checked personal property they had placed on a desk, Mr. Eng found that roughly $50 was missing from his wallet.
Before they hаd a chance to report the incident to the front desk, the Engs received a call on the hotel room phone. The caller identified himself as the hotel manager and explained that a maintenance worker was just in their room. The caller agreed to meet with the maintenance worker and Ms. Eng at the front desk. She went down to the front desk, on her way finding the cash from her brother‘s wallet on the hallway floor outside their room. When she reached the front desk, she described the situation to a female clerk on duty, who was surprised to hear what Ms. Eng was telling her. The clerk cаlled the maintenance worker on duty to the front desk, and he stated that he was not the man who entered the Engs’ room. Ms. Eng agreed that he was not the intruder. The Newark police were contacted, and Detective William Anderson began an investigation.
Ms. Eng described the intruder as an African-Ameriсan man, between 5‘5” and 5‘7” tall, not heavy, and dressed in dark clothing. She informed Detective Anderson, however, that she would not be
During his investigation, Detective Anderson also discovered that Chavis was wearing a GPS monitor at the time of the incident in the Engs’ motel room. GPS records placed Chavis at the hotel near the Engs’ room at the time Ms. Eng saw her intruder.
As a result of his investigation, Detective Anderson arrested Chavis for Burglary in the Second Degree and Misdemeanor Theft. Chavis was subsequently indicted on those charges.
Prior to Chavis’ trial, the State filed a Motion in limine asking the court to admit into evidence the convictions for the 2014 incidents at the Days Inn under
In this case, the evidence is material in that it goes to the defendant‘s motive, plan, intent, or absence of mistake in coming onto the property of the Baymont Inn. Spеcifically, the prior cases become relevant to show a specific modus operandi the defendant utilizes when he burglarizes hotel rooms in the early morning hours. He gains entry to the rooms and when confronted makes up a story proclaiming to be a maintenance man and flees the scene.3
In addressing the “plain, clear and conclusive” factor of Getz v. State, the motion stated that:
As to the third Getz factor, the evidence will be admitted by the testimony from the investigating officer. The police reports from both incidents, complaints 06-14-092532, and 06-14-095044, have been provided to defense as attachments to the instant motion. The defendant‘s convictions for these offenses are plain, clеar, and conclusive due to his guilty pleas. To the extent there is a witness to further that narrative, witness testimony is sufficient to support a finding of plain, clear, and conclusive evidence.4
The defense filed a written response. Among the arguments set forth in the response was an argument that the Stаte‘s evidence did not satisfy Getz‘s requirement that proof of other crimes be by evidence which is “plain, clear and conclusive.” Specifically, with regard to this factor, the defense argued that Chavis’ pleas of guilty, in and of themselves, were not plain, clear and conclusive proоf of all of the underlying, narrative facts of those offenses.
[I]t‘s pretty clear to me in my mind what happened and that it specifically took place at the hotel, and so I think that both of these overcome the Getz factor. I think you can use this as part of a plan and I think this is relevant, I don‘t think there‘s undue prejudice here. So I‘m going to allow that testimony.5
During the course of his direct examination at trial, Detective Anderson discussed Chavis’ prior convictions. Testifying from the police reports of those incidents, he informed the jury that in the first incident Chavis pled guilty to “trespassing after opening a door to an occupied hotel room and telling the occupant that he was a maintenance employee.”6 With regard to the second incident, Deteсtive Anderson testified that “[t]he defendant pled guilty to taking a credit card out of an occupied hotel room.”7 On cross-examination, Detective Anderson added that both incidents occurred at the same Days Inn in Newark, nine days apart; that he had no involvement in either of the prior incidents; and that his only knowledge of those incidents came from reading the police reports.
The jury found Chavis guilty of Criminal Trespass in the First Degree, as a lesser-included offense to Burglary Second Degree, and acquitted him of Misdemeanor Theft.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the Superior Court‘s decision to admit evidence under
III. DISCUSSION
In Getz v. State,10 this Court discussed Rule 404(b) at length. Among the criteria we noted for admission оf other crimes or bad act evidence is that such evidence must have “independent logical relevance,” meaning that it must have probative relevance which is independent of its relevance as character evidence, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.11 In addition, we established five guidelines to govern the admissibility of such evidence.12
Chavis contends that the evidence of his two prior convictions did not have independent relevance to the charged offenses. If the evidence was independеntly relevant, he argues, the prejudicial effect of its admission substantially outweighed its relevance. Finally, he contends, the evidence did not satisfy Getz‘s third guideline, which is that the proof of the prior crimes must be “plain, clear and conclusive.”
In response, the State argues that the evidence of Chavis’ prior crimes was (1) relevant to prove his identity, intent, motive
We believe the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the evidence of the prior crimes was sufficiently “plain, clear and conclusive.” The State argues that Chavis’ pleas of guilty satisfy the requirement that the evidence be “plain, clear and conclusive.” We agree that a plea of guilty is “plain, clear and conclusive” evidence of a defendаnt‘s participation in that crime.13 With regard to the trespass case, the record indicates that Chavis pled guilty to remaining unlawfully in a building, specifically, Room 221 at the Days Inn Motel. With regard to the theft case, the record appears to indicate that he pled guilty to unlawfully using a stolen crеdit card. Chavis’ pleas of guilty establish those facts by “plain, clear and conclusive” evidence.
The other crimes evidence, however, goes beyond the facts encompassed in the guilty pleas and includes significant underlying facts, specifically that Chavis posed as a maintenance man in the trespassing case and that he entered the motel room at Days Inn to steal the credit card. Such underlying narrative facts must also satisfy Getz‘s requirement that other crimes evidence be “plain, clear and conclusive.”
We have previously recognized that the testimony оf an eyewitness or other witness with personal knowledge typically satisfies the “plain, clear and conclusive” requirement.14 Detective Anderson, however, had no personal knowledge that Chavis had pretended to be a maintenance worker in the trespassing case or had entered a motel room in the theft case. His knowledge of those facts came from police reports he did not prepare and involved investigations in which he did not participate. Such secondhand knowledge does not satisfy Getz‘s requirement that proof of other crimes be by еvidence which is “plain, clear and conclusive.”15 The trial judge erred by permitting
Stripped of the above-discussed underlying facts, the other crimes have no independent logical relevance. Without such facts, they simply become evidence of other crimes of the same or similar character as the charged offenses without evidentiary value apart from their relevance as character evidence, which makes them inadmissible under
Finally, we do not believe that the decision to admit this evidence can be said to be harmless.16 The evidence of the two prior convictions, and in particular the singularity of the maintenance worker ruse, could well have been significant to the jury. We cannot conclude with fair assurancе that the jury was not substantially swayed by the admission of the two prior convictions.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.