Chavis v. State, 235 A.3d 696

In June 2018 Dakai Chavis was accused of entering a hotel room at the Baymont Inn; the occupant saw a man at the foot of the bed who said he was in the wrong room and left; ~$50 was later found missing.
Hotel surveillance placed a man matching the description near the Engs’ room at the relevant time; Chavis’ GPS monitor also placed him at the hotel then.
Detective Anderson recalled two prior, related 2014 incidents at a Days Inn in Newark: (1) Chavis pled guilty to trespass after allegedly opening an occupied room door and claiming to be a maintenance worker; (2) Chavis pled guilty to theft involving a stolen credit card. The State moved to admit those convictions under D.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of modus operandi, intent, and absence of mistake.
The Superior Court admitted testimony about the prior incidents; the detective testified to narrative facts from police reports though he had no personal involvement in those 2014 investigations.
The jury convicted Chavis of Criminal Trespass in the First Degree (lesser-included of burglary) and acquitted him of misdemeanor theft.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the admission of the detailed prior-offense narrative was improper because the testimony lacked the required "plain, clear and conclusive" foundation under Getz and the officer lacked personal knowledge; the error was not harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether guilty pleas alone satisfy Getz’s “plain, clear and conclusive” requirement for admitting other-crimes evidence	Chavis’ guilty pleas are "plain, clear and conclusive" proof of participation and thus permit admission of the convictions	Pleas do not establish the detailed underlying narrative facts the State sought to prove (e.g., posing as maintenance)	Pleas are plain, clear and conclusive as to participation/conviction, but do not automatically prove additional narrative facts beyond the convictions
Whether testimony by a detective recounting facts from police reports (without personal knowledge) satisfies Getz and D.R.E. 602	The officer’s testimony about prior incidents was admissible to show identity/plan; jury was instructed to use it only for limited purposes	Officer lacked personal knowledge; repeating report narrative is improper and fails the Getz "plain, clear and conclusive" requirement	Officer lacked personal knowledge of the contested narrative facts; secondhand testimony failed Getz/D.R.E. 602; admission was erroneous and not harmless

Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988) (establishing guidelines for admissibility of other-crimes evidence under Rule 404(b))
Morse v. State, 120 A.3d 1 (Del. 2015) (standard of review for admission of 404(b) evidence)
Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904 (Del. 2009) (en banc) (eyewitness testimony typically satisfies the "plain, clear and conclusive" standard)
Renzi v. State, 320 A.2d 711 (Del. 1974) (holding secondhand officer testimony insufficient where witness lacked firsthand knowledge)
Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1 (Del. 2018) (en banc) (harmless error standard requires fair assurance the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error)