Charles YANG, Petitioner-Appellant v. Tom ROY, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee
No. 13-1190
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Submitted: Nov. 20, 2013. Filed: Feb. 25, 2014.
We do not doubt that Scheffler‘s experience with Molin was quite unpleasant, particularly given Molin‘s position of trust as a city official; nor do we condone Molin‘s treatment of him. However, the actions ascribed to the city administrator in Naucke—which did not inflict constitutional injury—were far more severe and persistent than the single instance of misconduct involved here. Unlike the plaintiff in Garcia, who did prevail on her claim, Scheffler did not experience “concrete consequences.” Moreover, the mayor in Garcia successfully used his power to mobilize city resources against the plaintiff in response to her First Amendment activity. When Sergeant Holm arrived at the building inspection office, he did not take Molin‘s side or arrest Scheffler; instead, after investigating the situation, he offered Scheffler information to help him further exercise his rights. Molin‘s instruction to call the police could be deemed a threat of retaliation, which may be an adverse action sufficient to chill a person of ordinary firmness. See Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 992-93 (8th Cir.2013). But if anything, Molin‘s statement was a threat that the police would come; what the police would do after that was in their discretion, not Molin‘s. In this case, the potential chilling effect of Molin‘s instruction was mitigated by the fact that the other city employees present did not echo Molin‘s attitude—instead, they also believed Molin was acting inappropriately and later vouched for Scheffler to the police. Finally, to the extent that we can rely on Scheffler‘s actual conduct in our objective inquiry, Scheffler did, in fact, successfully exercise his First Amendment right to file a complaint against Molin. While Molin‘s conduct was certainly disrespectful, it did not violate Scheffler‘s First Amendment rights.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Molin and the City of Crystal.
Robert D. Goodell, argued, Anoka, MN, for Appellee.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
A Minnesota jury found Charles Yang guilty of twelve counts of murder. After appealing the verdict to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Charles Yang filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to
I. Background
On February 3, 2005, a pool hall fight between the largely Hmong gang “Menace of Destruction” (“MOD“) and a group of Tibetan men resulted in two men killed and four wounded. The sequence of events is set out in greater detail in the district court opinion, but the following describes the facts as relevant here. Earlier that day, MOD members made hostile comments to some of the Tibetans in the parking lot of a pool hall in Columbia Heights, Minnesota. That night, at least one of the Tibetans confronted one of the MOD members in the pool hall. A fight began inside the hall, but both groups soon ran out the back door and into the alley nearby. The district court found that at least twelve and possibly twenty gun shots were fired. Once the gunfire started, police officers came quickly to the pool hall, and some stopped a car that was leaving the area. MOD member Sai Vang was driving the car, with petitioner Yang in the passenger seat and Yang‘s brother Grogan Yang (also an MOD member) in the back seat. Police found two guns under the driver‘s seat and a .357 Magnum Smith and Wesson under Yang‘s seat, with six empty bullet shells. Yang acknowledged that he, too, was a member of the MOD gang and had been at the pool hall that night. A subsequent search of Yang‘s home uncovered .357 ammunition in his bedroom.
Yang was charged with aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder (two counts); aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder for the benefit of a gang (two counts); aiding and abetting attempted first-degree murder (four counts); and aiding and abetting attempted first-degree murder for the benefit of a gang (four counts). At trial, three witnesses testified against Yang based on conversations with him while in the Anoka County Jail. Other prosecution witnesses included Vang (the driver of Yang‘s car) and Xee Lor, both of whom were also MOD members and were also charged with twelve felony counts. Vang‘s and Lor‘s plea agreements allowed them to plead guilty to lesser offenses, and they accordingly expected shorter sentences than if they had gone to trial. The plea agreements also required them to testify at Yang‘s trial.
The Minnesota trial judge prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining codefendants Vang and Lor about the number of months by which their sentences would be reduced based on their plea agreements; he permitted cross-examination into the percentage of reduction, if the parties could agree on percentages to use. No such agreement was reached. Although the district court denied Yang‘s federal habeas petition, the court granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Yang‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by the limit on his counsel‘s ability to cross-examine Vang and Lor regarding the extent to which their sentences might be reduced in exchange for their testimony against Yang.
II. Discussion
In reviewing a habeas petition, we first evaluate whether the state court ruling at issue was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law as reflected by the holdings, not the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions at the time of the relevant state court decision.
If Yang‘s Sixth Amendment rights were violated as a result of the Minnesota court‘s decision, he must also demonstrate that the error was prejudicial, meaning that it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quotation omitted). “A ‘substantial and injurious effect’ occurs when the court finds itself in ‘grave doubt’ about the effect of the error on the jury‘s verdict.” Toua Hong Chang v. Minnesota, 521 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting O‘Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995)). “‘Grave doubt’ exists where the issue of harmlessness is ‘so evenly balanced that [the court] feels [itself] in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.‘” Id.
A. Contrary to or Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Law
A defendant has the right under the Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause to elicit enough facts about a witness’ “possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives” to let the jury assess witness credibility. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). “[T]he exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important feature of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id. at 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105. “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited in engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.‘” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105). Even so, this right is not unlimited: a defendant is guaranteed “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). The trial judge “retain[s] wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. We take these considerations into account when assessing Yang‘s claim that the state court violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
In affirming Yang‘s verdict, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on two Minnesota decisions regarding two codefendants that applied this line of cases. In State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488 (Minn.1999)
Based on Greenleaf and DeVerney, the trial judge ruled that Yang could not ask Vang and Lor about the specific number of months by which their sentences might be reduced. Although Yang was permitted to ask them about the percentage reduction, there was no such percentage explicitly included in their plea agreements, nor could defense and prosecution counsel agree on one. Tr. 795-804, No. 11-177, ECF No. 5 Ex. 4. Yang was thus unable to elicit information that would quantify Vang‘s and Lor‘s anticipated sentence reductions. He was, however, allowed to ask Vang about the charges that had been brought against him; those to which he ultimately pled guilty; and whether he was satisfied with the plea agreement. Id. at 1777-79. On direct exam, Lor testified, unprompted, that he had taken a “32 years plea agreement” with the state; when asked whether he agreed “to plead guilty to a lower count of murder ... to take advantage of less time in jail” and whether he “believed [the plea agreement] was a good deal” for him, he answered in the affirmative. Id. at 1843. On cross-examination, Yang asked Lor whether, as part of his plea agreement, Lor would be able to serve his sentence for the charges arising from the pool hall incident concurrently with a sentence for unrelated charges; Lor again said yes. Id. at 1888. Lor was also cross-examined as to the charges he originally faced and those to which he pled guilty in the plea agreement. Id. at 1893. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination: “the jury had sufficient information about [Yang‘s] codefendants’ plea agreements to assess their credibility,” since “[t]he jury knew that the codefendants received considerably less jail time in exchange for their testimony.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 553 (Minn. 2009).
In evaluating the Confrontation Clause implications, we are concerned that “the accused should [be] able to contrast the original punishment faced by the witness with the more lenient punishment contemplated by the plea agreement.” United States v. Walley, 567 F.3d 354, 360 (8th Cir.2009). This contrast, however,
In this case, the jury knew that Vang and Lor pled guilty to lesser charges and that both hoped for a lower sentence as a result. See Walley, 567 F.3d at 360. Yang argues, however, that the trial judge erred in forestalling specific inquiry into the percentage by which Vang‘s and Lor‘s sentences were reduced by virtue of their plea agreements. This, Yang asserts, violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Although the agreements did not include percentages, Yang contends that the trial judge could have estimated a percentage based on the sentences they potentially faced from the original charges. We find that this was not a realistic possibility. Under Minnesota law, a premeditated first-degree murder conviction meant a mandatory life sentence, which is inherently not a fixed number of months.
B. Prejudice
Even if the jury were left without enough facts to gauge Vang‘s and Lor‘s credibility such that Yang‘s Sixth Amendment rights were violated, Yang must show that the state court‘s error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury‘s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court in Van Arsdall listed several factors for reviewing courts to use in assessing preju-
Although their testimony was damaging to Yang, Vang and Lor did not provide enough material information to have a “substantial and injurious effect” on the jury‘s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. Vang testified that he only knew Yang had a gun that night when Yang joined him in the car after leaving the pool hall. He did not testify in detail regarding where Yang was during the altercation. Vang‘s most harmful statement was Yang‘s admission to him that Yang had fired several shots but did not know if any of them had hit someone. Lor‘s contribution was less substantive than Vang‘s. He testified that Yang was in the pool hall when the fight started and in Vang‘s car when it was stopped by the police. In addition, the credibility of both Vang and Lor was already suspect: Yang was able to show that some aspects of their testimony did not match the accounts they initially gave the police. Likely because of these credibility problems, the prosecution did not rely on either codefendant‘s testimony significantly during closing argument.
Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied in part on the trial court‘s jury instruction that it could not find Yang guilty “based on Vang‘s accomplice testimony unless it was corroborated by someone other than an accomplice.” Yang, 774 N.W.2d at 554. The Court found that Vang‘s testimony—“[s]pecifically, the events inside the pool hall, and Yang‘s admission when he entered the car after the shootings” that he had fired a gun several times—was, in fact, corroborated by “numerous witnesses,” including three jailhouse informants who had allegedly spoken with Yang while incarcerated with him at the Anoka County Jail. Id. While the informants may have had something to gain from testifying, how much their testimony should be discounted is a credibility determination left to the jury. Vang‘s statement that Yang had a gun at the pool hall was also corroborated by physical evidence: when the police searched Vang‘s car, there was a gun under Yang‘s seat, and police later found bullets of the appropriate size for that gun in Yang‘s bedroom.
Finally, as the district court acknowledged, Yang was charged with aiding and abetting two murders and four attempted murders. A conviction on these charges did not require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Yang actually used the gun found under his car seat. “Active participation in an offense is not required“; rather, there must be “some knowing role in the commission of the crime by a defendant who
III. Conclusion
We affirm the district court‘s denial of Yang‘s habeas petition on the merits.
No. 13-1421.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Jan. 15, 2014.
Filed: Feb. 25, 2014.