Chan v. MontoyaChan v. Montoya
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- Before:
- Vigil
{1} The question presented in these cases is whether the statutory time limit for filing a property tax refund complaint, under
I. BACKGROUND
{2} In the first case, Taxpayers, as trustees for property located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, were mailed a property tax bill for the 2007 tax year. In the second ease, Taxpayer also received its 2007 property tax bill for property it owns in Albuquerque, New Mexico. (Hereinafter, “Taxpayers” refers to both sets of Taxpayers.) Each of the tax bills stated that the first of two installments of the annual tax payment was due on November 10, 2007, and that the first installment payment would become delinquent on December 10, 2007.
{3} After making the installment payments, Taxpayers each filed a complaint for property tax refund in February 2008, approximately ninety days after the November 10 due date. Pursuant to
{4} Asserting that the complaints were untimely, the Bernalillo County Assessor (Assessor) moved to dismiss. In response, Taxpayers argued that the common understanding among taxpayers and tax authorities is that the first installment payment is
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{5} We review the district court interpretation of the Property Tax Code de novo. See Sonic Indus, v. State, 2006-NMSC-038, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 212, 141 P.3d 1266 (stating that questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo). Taxpayers also raise questions concerning the constitutionality of
B. The Language of the Property Tax Code Requires a Tax Refund Complaint to be Filed Within Sixty Days of the Statutory Due Date
{6} When interpreting statutes, our guiding principle is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 1999— NMSC-040, ¶ 18, 128 N.M. 309, 992 P.2d 860. In ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, we are assisted by classic canons of statutory construction. Id. The first of these is that a court is required to give effect to the statute’s language and refrain from further interpretation when the language is clear and unambiguous. Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 17,122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153; Bd. of Comm’rs of Doña Ana Cnty. v. Las Cruces Sum-News, 2003-NMCA-102, ¶ 19, 134 N.M. 283, 76 P.3d 36 (noting that where language is clear, appellate courts “give the statute its plain and ordinary meaning and refrain from further interpretation”).
{7}
C.The Common Usage of the Word “Due” Does Not Alter the Plain Meaning of the Statute
{8} Although Section 7-38^40 provides that the first installment of a tax payment is due on November 10,
{9} First, Taxpayers have provided no facts or evidence to support this argument. “It is not our practice to rely on assertions of counsel unaccompanied by support in the record. The mere assertions and arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶51, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104. In addition, this common usage argument does not alter the plain language of the Property Tax Code itself. Reading “delinquent” as synonymous with “due” does not comport with the Legislature’s use of two, distinct statutory definitions of the two words. The “due” date is a statutorily fixed date of November 10, and the “delinquency” date is a separate date, thirty days later. See
{10} Our conclusion is further supported by the way the Legislature requires tax bills to be worded.
D. The Practical Implications of the Property Tax Code Do Not Alter the Plain Meaning of the Statute
{11}
{12}
E. Taxpayers Must Make Payment of Property Taxes Due on the First Installment Due Date
{13} In the alternative, Taxpayers argue that their complaints were timely because a taxpayer may file a complaint any time before any delinquency date shown on the tax bill. Since their tax bills stated that the second installment of the annual tax payment was not delinquent until April 10, they assert that their complaints were timely filed because the complaints were filed prior to April 10. They base their argument on language of
F. The Sixty-Day Period for Bringing Suit Does Not Violate Due Process
{14} Taxpayers argue that our interpretation of Section 70-38410 creates a time limit for filing suit that is too short for purposes of due process under the federal and state constitutions. Taxpayers’ main contention is that if the sixty-day time limit begins to run on the due date of November 10, then the statute begins to run even before the cause of action accrues because payment, which creates the right of action, does not become delinquent until December 10. Therefore, taxpayers will have only between thirty and sixty days to file tax refund claims, depending on when they make their payments.
{15} We agree with Taxpayers that for a statute of repose to be constitutional, the time frame to pursue a remedy cannot be unreasonably short. See Terry v. N.M. State Highway Comm’n, 98 N.M. 119, 122, 645 P.2d 1375, 1379 (1982) (holding that the constitutionality of statutory time limits has “hinged on the reasonableness of the time provided to pursue a remedy”). However, we do not agree that the time frame provided in these cases is unnecessarily short.
{16} Taxpayers rely on Terry and Garcia to support their argument that the sixty-day statute of repose provided in
{17} The tax situation in this case is dissimilar. In both Terry and Garcia, application of the statutes was unconstitutional because the cause of action had arisen, or an injury had been discovered, near the expiration of the statutory time limit. We have no such facts in this case. Moreover, unlike situations involving accidents or illness, which are unpredictable and generally cannot be anticipated, taxpayers are aware that they will be required to pay taxes every year on particular dates. Furthermore, taxpayers have notice each year as of April 1 of the actual property valuations on which their claims for refund will necessarily be based. See
III. CONCLUSION
{18} We hold that the Legislature meant for
{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER and MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judges.