Chan v. Montoya
150 N.M. 44
| N.M. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Two consolidated cases involve property tax refund claims for 2007 in Albuquerque, NM.
- First installment due date on November 10, 2007; delinquency date set as December 10, 2007.
- Taxpayers paid installments and filed refunds in February 2008, within 60 days after due date per statute.
- Assessor moved to dismiss as untimely; district court denied; stipulated judgments allowed appeal.
- Issue: whether the 60-day filing window begins on the due date or the delinquency date.
- Court held the window begins on the due date, reversing the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the 60-day deadline begin? | Taxpayers: begins on delinquency date; favors public convenience | Assessor: begins on due date as written in statute | Deadline begins on the due date; untimely otherwise |
| Does common usage of 'due' alter its meaning in the statute? | Taxpayers: 'due' means when payment is expected, not the delinquency date | Assessor: statutory language controls; 'due' and 'delinquent' are distinct | Plain reading controls; ordinary usage does not alter the statute |
| Do practical consequences render the statute unconstitutional? | Taxpayers: time frame too short and unconstitutional as a due process issue | Assessor: time frame reasonable given notice and options to challenge valuation | Sixty-day period is constitutional as a statute of repose |
Key Cases Cited
- Sonic Indus. v. State, 140 N.M. 212, 141 P.3d 1266 (2006) (statutory interpretation governed by plain language and intent)
- Terry v. N.M. State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982) (due process depends on reasonableness of the time limit)
- Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428 (1995) (statutes of repose begin before accrual of the cause of action)
- Tafoya v. N.M. State Police Bd., 81 N.M. 710, 472 P.2d 973 (1970) (ordinary meaning rule for ambiguous terms; contextual limits)
- Muse v. Muse, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 (2009) (counsel arguments alone are not evidence)
- Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 128 N.M. 309, 992 P.2d 860 (1999) (statutory interpretation guided by legislative intent)