Cecilia CIGARRILHA et al. v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE.
No. 2012-9-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
May 15, 2013.
64 A.3d 1208
So it is here. Although the report accompanying the MRI results revealed that the mass could be a product of rheumatoid arthritis or infection, it also indicated that the mass could be “chordoma, [or] other primary or metastatic bone tumor.” Jose had been еxamined by several doctors over a span of more than a year and a half for his persistent neck pain; and, dissatisfied with the diagnoses he had received to that point, he sought yet another opinion on the source of his neck pain. When the subsequent MRI examination revealed a mass in his neck, which Dr. Castano diagnosed аs a cervical tumor, and the diagnosis and MRI examination results were shared with plaintiffs on June 2, 2005, “a reasonable person in similar circumstances [would] have discovered that the wrongful conduct of * * * defendant[s] caused [Jose‘s] injuries * * *” Hanson, 898 A.2d at 1249 (quoting Martin, 784 A.2d at 300). The three-year statute of limitations therefore began to run on that date.
In reaching this conclusion, wе are mindful that the plaintiffs will not have their day in court. Nevertheless, although the strength of a plaintiff‘s interest in seeking recompense for injuries caused by the wrongs of others cannot be gainsaid, a defendant in a malpractice case has a countervailing interest in repose. See Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providenсe, 941 A.2d 174, 180 (R.I.2008) (“Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.” quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879)). Statutes of limitation “are the product of a balancing of the individual person‘s right to seek redress for past grievances against the need of society and the judicial system for finality—for a closing of the books.” Id. at 181. The General Assembly legislatively has struck this balance in
Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, wе affirm the judgment below. The papers may be remanded to the Superior Court.
Daniel R. Sumner, Esq., Warwick, for Plaintiffs.
Michael A. Calise, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.
OPINION
Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.
I
Facts and Travel
It is undisputed that plaintiffs own real estate located at 24-26 Farragut Avenue in
In 2008, plaintiffs sought permits from the city so that they might restore electrical meters at the Farragut Avenue property. Before issuing the requested permits, the city conducted an inspection of the property, during which plaintiffs were found to be in violation of several provisions of the city‘s housing code and Rhode Island‘s building code. Most pertinently, the inspection revealed that the property was being used as a three-family dwelling and that, therefore, it was not in compliance with the above-quotеd provision of the zoning ordinance. The city maintains that the area in which the property is located is zoned for single- and two-family residences, and it contests plaintiffs’ contention that they should benefit from the grandfathering provision.
On May 1, 2008, plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior Court for Providence County by filing a verified comрlaint as well as a motion for a temporary restraining order. In that motion, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the city from enforcing the city‘s codes based upon the above-referenced violations; in addition, they sought to compel the city‘s building official to issue all permits necessary with respect to restoring the electrical metеrs. After a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order, a motion justice of the Superior Court ordered that the city issue building permits that would allow plaintiffs to restore electricity to the property (with a proviso that the basement of the property was not to be used “for habitable occupancy“). The motion justice also made it clear that her order was temporary and that its purpose was “to restore the property to the status quo” until an administrative hearing could be held before the city‘s zoning board on the issue of what plaintiffs contended was the legal nonconforming use of the property.
Following the May 1, 2008 hearing in the Supеrior Court, plaintiffs filed with the city‘s zoning board an appeal of the city official‘s determination that their property was an illegal three-family dwelling. After a hearing on July 22, the zoning board affirmed the city official‘s determination that using the property as a three-family dwelling was illegal.
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an amended verified complaint in their pending Superior Court action, in which they appealed the zoning board‘s decision and sought a declaration that their use of the property as a three-family dwelling was a legal nonconforming use. In due course, a nonjury trial took place, during which the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts and a number оf exhibits. The exhibits
Thereafter, the trial justice issued a written decision, in which he found that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving that the property was used as a three-family dwelling prior to the enactment of the city‘s first zoning ordinance in 1923. He therefore declined to declare that the property constituted a legal nonconforming use. The trial justice also ruled that plaintiffs had failed to establish that either equitable estoppel or the equitable doctrine of laches precluded the city from enforcing its zoning ordinance.
The plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. They assert three arguments on apрeal: (1) that the trial justice erred in concluding that the property was not a nonconforming use; (2) that the trial justice erred in concluding that tax assessments had no bearing on the issue of nonconforming use and did not provide a basis for holding the city to be equitably estopped; and (3) that the trial justice erred in declining to allow plaintiffs to rely upon the doctrine of laches as a basis for ruling that the city should not be permitted to enforce the provision of the zoning ordinance that prohibits using the property in a three-family manner.
II
Standard of Review
In an action for declaratory relief, a justice of the Superior Court has “discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ***” Town of Barrington v. Williams, 972 A.2d 603, 608 (R.I. 2009); see also
III
Analysis
A
The Merits of the Nonconforming Use Contention
We have рreviously noted that a “nonconforming use is a particular use of property that does not conform to the zoning restrictions applicable to that property but which use is protected because it existed lawfully before the effective date of the enactment of the zoning restrictions and has continued unabated since then.” RICO Corp. v. Town of Exeter, 787 A.2d 1136, 1144 (R.I.2001). It is axiomatic that
The plaintiffs contend that the trial justiсe erred when he declined to sufficiently consider the tax assessment records because of his view that they constituted inadmissible hearsay. In order to succeed in having their property declared a legal nonconforming use, plaintiffs were required to prove that the Farragut Avenue property was used as a three-family dwеlling at the time of the enactment of the zoning ordinance in 1923. See RICO Corp., 787 A.2d at 1144. We note that all evidence in the record, including the tax assessment records, postdate 1923. Bearing in mind the previously described burden of proof that the law imposes upon plaintiffs, it is our view that we need not address plaintiffs’ above-referenced contention because the evidence of any use of the property after 1923 is irrelevant to the determination of legal nonconforming use. As the trial justice correctly noted, the record is silent as to the use of the property in 1923; accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial justice‘s conclusion that plaintiffs failed to sustain thеir burden of proof. Therefore, in our view, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in declining to declare that plaintiffs’ property was a legal nonconforming use, nor did he misinterpret the applicable law, overlook facts, or otherwise exceed his authority. See Town of Richmond, 941 A.2d at 155.
B
The Equitable Estoppel Contention
In an effort to win judicial approval of the use of their property as a three-family home, plaintiffs contend that the trial justice, by not properly considering certain tax assessment records concerning the property, erred in not allowing the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude the city from enforcing its codes. The plaintiffs argue that the city has benefited from taxing the property as a three-family dwelling “for an excess of seven decades.” The city, in response, points out that plaintiffs have benefited from the rental income on what it refers to as the “illegal third unit.”
This Court has clearly indicated what must be present for equitable estoppel to be potentially appliсable:
“The indispensable elements of an estoppel are, first, an affirmative representation or equivalent conduct on the part of the person against whom the estoppel is claimed which is directed to another for the purpose of inducing the other to act or fail to act in reliance thereоn; and secondly, that such representation or conduct in fact did induce the other to act or fail to act to his injury.” Lichtenstein v. Parness, 81 R.I. 135, 138, 99 A.2d 3, 5 (1953); see also Providence Teachers Union v. Providence School Board, 689 A.2d 388, 391-92 (R.I.1997) (citing Lichtenstein, 81 R.I. at 138, 99 A.2d at 5).
We agree with the trial justice that there is no evidence in the record that the city acted or made any representatiоn which
C
The Laches Contention
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the equitable doctrine of laches should be applied so as to shield them from the city‘s efforts at enforcement of its ordinances.3 We have noted that “[l]aches is an equitable defense that precludes a lawsuit by a plaintiff who has negligently sat on his or her rights to the detriment of a defendant.” O‘Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 702 (R.I.1993). In order to pass upon the applicability (vel non) of the doctrine of laches in a particular case, the court looks to two considerations: (1) whether there has been negligence that has led to “a delay in the prosecution of the case“; and (2) whether that delay has prejudiced the adverse party. See School Committee оf Cranston v. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d 629, 644 (R.I.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is also well established that “the applicability of the defense of laches in a given case generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice.” Hazard v. East Hills, Inc., 45 A.3d 1262, 1270 (R.I.2012). For that reason, we “will not reverse the trial justice‘s decision on what constitutes laches on appeal unless it is clearly wrong.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The trial justice in the instant case specifically found that the city had not “acted negligently” due to the fact that the city took the appropriate steps against the property in taxing its actual use and in promptly enforcing its codes once it learned of the violations. He further stated that, even if he believed that the city had acted negligently, he would “not use laches to sanction an illegally established nonconforming use in contravention of the Zoning Ordinance.” In our view, the trial justice was not “clearly wrong,” see id., especially given our clear adherence to the principle that nonconforming uses “should not be perpetuated any longer than necessary” and that they should be “abolish[ed] *** as speedily as justice will permit.” See RICO Corp., 787 A.2d at 1145.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the Superior Court is
Notes
“In this particular instance the City sat on its rights, if it had any, for over 70 years. To hold [plaintiffs] responsible to try to prove something that occurred more than 70 years ago while the City refused to enforce its own rights, whatever they might be, demands the use of the concept of laches.”