CATHERINE MILOT v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
No. 329728
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
December 8, 2016
FOR PUBLICATION; 9:05 a.m.; Court of Claims; LC No. 12-000051-MD
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’CONNELL and BECKERING, JJ.
Defendant, Department of Transportation (the Department), appeals as of right the trial court’s decision denying its motion for summary disposition under
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2011, Milot was driving to work when her car struck an open or dislodged manhole cover, causing her vehicle to roll over. Milot required physical therapy and eventual surgery for related neck injuries. Milot also alleged that she subsequently suffered memory loss and forgot normal things she should remember, like her son’s birthday and the way to get to work.
When Milot sent the Department her notice of intent to sue in May 2011, she included the names of witnesses at the scene of the accident, but she did not include the names of her friend Gail Gay or her daughter Ashley Anger. Milot testified at deposition that Gay saw Milot’s overturned truck on her way to work but did not witness the accident. Gay assisted Milot by driving her home from the hospital and allowing Milot to follow her to work when Milot could not remember how to get there. Anger assisted Milot in a variety of ways, including eventually allowing Milot to live with her. Milot indicated in a later witness list and at her deposition that Gay and Anger could testify about the extent of her pain, suffering, and memory loss.
In June 2015, the Department moved for summary disposition under
The trial court agreed with Milot, ruling that
The Department now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under
We review de novo the applicability of governmental immunity and the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity. Moraccini v City of Sterling Hts, 296 Mich App 387, 391; 822 NW2d 799 (2012).
When construing a statute, this Court’s primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. We begin by construing the language of the statute itself. When the language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain meaning and apply the statute as written. [Rowland, 477 Mich at 202.]
III. ANALYSIS
The crux of the Department’s argument is that the highway exception to governmental immunity requires a plaintiff to list in her notice of intent all witnesses to her injuries, regardless of whether those witnesses were present for or observed the actual incident. We disagree.
The governmental immunity act provides “broad immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function . . . .”
One of these exceptions is that a governmental agency with jurisdiction over a highway must maintain the traveled portion of the highway in reasonable repair.
(1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in [
MCL 691.1404(3) ] shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.(2) . . . If required by the legislative body or chief administrative officer of the responsible governmental agency, the claimant shall appear to testify, if he is physically able to do so, and shall produce his witnesses before the legislative body, a committee thereof, or the chief administrative officer, or his deputy, or a legal officer of the governmental agency as directed by the legislative body or chief administrative officer of the responsible governmental agency, for examination under oath as to the claim, the amount thereof, and the extent of the injury. [
MCL 691.1404(1) and(2) .]
The main purpose of this notice is “to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidentiary trail is still fresh and, additionally,
We conclude that, when read in context, these provisions indicate that the relevant witnesses under
We must read the statute as a whole, and “statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation[.]” Robinson v City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 15; 782 NW2d 171 (2010). This Court reads the provisions of statutes “reasonably and in context” and reads subsections of cohesive statutory provisions together. Id. at 15. When words are grouped in a list, this Court gives the words related meanings. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90, 114; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).
Contrary to the Department’s assertion, interpreting
We find additional support in this Court’s recent decision in Streng v Bd of Mackinac Co Rd Comm’rs, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016). This Court has recently held that we must construe
Accordingly, we conclude that “the names of the witnesses” are the names of those persons who witnessed the occurrence. In this case, because neither Anger nor Gay witnessed the accident,
Finally, we reject the Department’s contention that the trial court inappropriately relied on Rule v Bay City, 12 Mich App 503; 163 NW2d 254 (1968), because that case was wrongly decided. In Rule, this Court held that “[t]he mere presence of a person at the scene of an accident does not make that person a witness.” Id. at 506-507. In that case, the plaintiff’s daughter was in a nearby car when the plaintiff tripped and saw the plaintiff fall, but the daughter did not see what caused the accident. Id. at 506. We need not decide whether Rule was correctly decided, and we decline to do so in this case. The statutory language of
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering