HECTOR L. CASABLANCA v. ANOLAN CASABLANCA
(AC 40332)
Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.
June 18, 2019
Alvord, J.
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Syllabus
The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court resolving certain postjudgment motions. The trial court had incorporated into the dissolution judgment the terms of an agreement between the parties, which included a retirement asset provision that required the plaintiff to transfer to the defendant via a qualified domestic relations order, 50 percent of the value of the marital portion of his benefit in a certain retirement fund, minus the amount of the defendant‘s social security benefit. After the plaintiff submitted a proposed qualified domestic relations order to the defendant, the defendant refused to sign it, and the plaintiff filed a motion to compel, which sought a court order requiring the defendant to execute the proposed qualified domestic relations order. Thereafter, thе defendant filed a motion to open the dissolution judgment on the grounds of mutual mistake and unilateral mistake, and on the basis of equitable principles. She claimed that the relevant part of the retirement asset provision that required the amount of her anticipated future social security benefit to be subtracted from the amount of her share of the plaintiff‘s pension benefit was entered upon mutual mistake, and provided an inequitable and unconscionable windfall to the plaintiff. At a hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial court granted a motion in limine filed by the plaintiff, which sought to preclude the defendant from presenting parol evidence in support of her motion to open the judgment. The court subsequently denied the dеfendant‘s motion to open, granted the plaintiff‘s motion to compel and ordered the defendant to sign the qualified domestic relations order. On the defendant‘s appeal to this court, held that the trial court erroneously determined that the retirement asset provision of the parties’ agreement was unambiguous, as the language of the provision was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation: in light of the language in the provision, there was more than one possible approach to calculating the amount of the defendant‘s social security benefit and, therefore, the provision was ambiguous, and because the court‘s underlying determination that the provision was unambiguous was erroneоus, its subsequent conclusion that the evidence regarding the intent of the parties was irrelevant necessarily also was erroneous; accordingly, a remand to the trial court was necessary for the court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions and to determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the entering of the agreement.
Argued March 19—officially released June 18, 2019
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Suarez, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief; thereafter, the court, Nastri, J., granted the plaintiff‘s motion in limine, denied the defendant‘s motion to open the judgment, аnd granted the plaintiff‘s motion to compel; subsequently, the court, Nastri, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to reargue, and the defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Nastri, J., granted in part the defendant‘s motion for articulation; subsequently, this court granted the defendant‘s motion for review but denied the relief requested therein. Reversed; further proceedings.
Brandon B. Fontaine, with whom, on the brief, was C. Michael Budlong, for the appellant (defendant).
Steven R. Dembo, with whom were Caitlin E. Kozloski and, on the brief, P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The parties were married on July 23, 2005. The parties’ marriage was dissolved on January 21, 2016. On that date, the parties entered into a separation agreement (agreement). Article 11 of the agreement (retirement asset provision), titled “Retirement/Stock Accounts,” provided: “The husband shall transfer to the wife, via QDRO, fifty (50%) percent of the value of the marital portion of his benefit under the City of Hartford Municipal Retirement fund, valued as of date of dissolution, minus the amount of the wife‘s Social Security Benefit. The assigned benefit shall be paid as a separate interest payment over the life of the wife. The husband shall retain his Mass Mutual 457 Plan and wife shall make no claim to same. Attorney Jeffrey Winniсk shall prepare said QDRO(s) and the parties shall be equally responsible for the cost of same.” The court, Suarez, J., found the agreement fair and equitable and incorporated its terms into the dissolution judgment. Attorney Winnick subsequently prepared a proposed QDRO and transmitted it to the parties. The defendant refused to sign it.
On May 23, 2016, the defendant filed the first of a series of motions to open the dissolution judgment.2 On October 25, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion captioned “motion to compel,” which sought a court order requiring the defendant to execute the proposed QDRO.3 On February 14, 2017, the defendant filed the operative motion to open the dissolution judgment on grounds of mutual mistake and unilateral mistake, and on the basis of equitable principles. Spеcifically, she contended that the relevant part of the retirement asset provision, the phrase ” ‘minus the amount of the wife‘s Social Security Benefit,’ was entered upon mutual mistake of the parties.” In her memorandum of law in support of the motion, the defendant maintained that the intent of the parties was to equalize the plaintiff‘s retirement pension benefits and the defendant‘s social security benefits. According to the defendant, she was
Under the proposed QDRO, however, the defendant‘s share of the pension benefit was reduced by immediately subtracting her anticipated future social security benefit amount of $1479 a month at her full retirement age (sixty-seven years old), which resulted in a current monthly retirement asset payment to the defendant of $242.75. She argued that because she was not entitled to receive her social security benefit until age sixty-five, approximately thirty years in the future, the proposed QDRO provided the plaintiff with “an inequitable and unconscionable windfall of $1479 per month . . . .”
On February 22, 2017, the parties appeared for a hearing on the defendant‘s motion to open the judgment and the plaintiff‘s motion tо compel. On the day of the hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the defendant from presenting parol evidence, including testimony of the defendant herself, in support of her motion to open the judgment.4 According to the plaintiff, the agreement was fully integrated and therefore no evidence could be introduced to vary or contradict its terms. The plaintiff also argued that even if the defendant was permitted to testify that she was mistaken as to the language of the retirement asset provision, her claim of mutual mistake would necessarily fail on the basis that the plaintiff would testify in opposition that the provision accurately reflected the parties’ intent. After hearing oral argument on the motion in limine, the court, Nastri, J., granted the motion in part, stating: “The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary [or] to contradict the terms . . . of a fully integrated written contract. The parties’ separation agreement is a fully integrated written contract, therefore the motion in limine is granted, the court will not hear parol evidence.” As to the second ground challenging the merits of the defendant‘s mutual mistake claim, the court stated: “I‘m not going to grant the motion in limine on that basis.” The court then asked whether the defendant‘s counsel was prepared to proceed, to which counsel replied: “I‘m not quite sure then, the court will not accept testimony from my client?” The court responded: “Well the court will not accept testimony that is contrary to the written contract. I don‘t know what your client is prepared to testify to or what the substantive evidence is, but the court will not hear parol evidence.”
The court then held an evidentiary hearing, during which the defendant presented the testimony of the defendant, Attorney Winnick, Attorney Kim Duell (who represented the plaintiff during the dissolution proceedings), and the plaintiff. The attorney who represented the defendant during the dissolution proceedings did not testify. See footnote 4 of this opinion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an oral ruling denying the motion to open. It stated: “The court finds that there was no
On March 14, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to reargue the court‘s February 22, 2017 rulings. In her motion, she argued that the court‘s granting of the motion in limine improperly precluded her frоm eliciting testimony as to the intent of the parties, which would have been offered in support of her claims of mutual and unilateral mistake.5 She further argued that the testimony she sought to introduce in support of her motion to open did not constitute parol evidence because, as evidence of the parties’ intent, it was not introduced to vary or contradict the terms of the agreement. The plaintiff filed an objection on March 21, 2017. The court denied the motion to reargue on the papers without comment, and this appeal followed.
The defendant sought articulation of the court‘s decision denying the motion to reargue and its February 22, 2017 orders. The defendant‘s fifth request asked the court to articulate “whether, when granting the plaintiff‘s motion in limine . . . to exclude parol evidence and when enforcing that ruling during the February 22, 2017 hearing, the court: (a) considered whether article 11 of the parties’ separation agreement contained any relevant ambiguities, particularly regarding its proper application, and (b) determined that article 11 of the separation agreement is clear and unambiguous.” The plaintiff objected on the basis that the defendant had not raised the issue of ambiguity during the hearing. Over the plaintiff‘s objection, the court granted the request for articulation in part. Answering question five in the affirmative, the court stated: “After carefully con-sidering the arguments advanced in the defendant‘s motion to open, the testimony of the witnesses,6 the well-articulated arguments of counsel and applicable case law, the court found no ambiguities in Article 11. In the absence of any ambiguity or uncertainty, the evidence the defendant [sought] to introduce regarding the intent of the parties or their object was irrelevant.”7
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred by granting both the plaintiff‘s motion to compel the defendant to execute the proposed QDRO and the plaintiff‘s motion in limine to preclude parol evidence. We begin by addressing the defendant‘s claim of error as to the court‘s ruling on thе motion to compel because our resolution of whether the court properly found the retirement asset provision unambiguous will inform our consideration of the defendant‘s claim that the trial court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence in support of her motion to open the judgment.
In his motion to compel, the plaintiff requested an order requiring the defendant to execute the QDRO. As support, the plaintiff cited to the retirement asset provision and a separate provision of the agreement requiring the parties to “execute such additional documents as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Captioned “motion to compel,” the mоtion in substance sought enforcement of the agreement‘s retirement asset provision, which had been incorporated into the dissolution judgment. In order to grant the motion and order compliance with the judgment in the manner requested by the plaintiff, however, the court necessarily had to determine that the judgment was clear. See Rozbicki v. Gisselbrecht, 152 Conn. App. 840, 847, 100 A.3d 909 (2014) (“[t]he trial court‘s continuing jurisdiction to effectuate its prior judgments, either by summarily ordering compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted, is grounded in its inherent powers, and is not limited to cases wherein the noncompliant party is in contempt, family cases, cases involving injunctions, or cases wherein the parties have agreed to continuing jurisdiction” [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 922, 108 A.3d 1123 (2015).8 Likewise, “[a] trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.” Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993); see also Matos v. Ortiz, 166 Conn. App. 775, 777, 144 A.3d 425 (2016) (“[i]t is well established that a court may summarily enforce—within the framework of existing litigation—a clear and unambiguous settlement agreement
reached during that litigation“).
It is evident from the trial court‘s articulation that it did consider whether the retirement asset provision was ambiguous and expressly concluded that it was unambiguous. The court articulated as follows: “After carefully considering the arguments
At the outset, we address the plaintiff‘s argument that this court should decline to review the defendant‘s claim of error as to the granting of the motion to compel. He argues that the defendant, in failing to file a written objection or to raise objection at the hearing, induced or invited the granting of the motion to compel. We first note that the plaintiff does not direct this court‘s attention to any authority requiring that the defendant file a written objection to his motion. Furthermore, the defendant‘s counsel opposed the motion through his attempt to elicit the defendant‘s testimony as to why she did not sign the QDRO when it was presented to her. However, counsel was unable to pursue this line of questioning, as the plaintiff‘s counsel objected to the questioning of the defendant regarding her defense to the motion. The plaintiff‘s counsel stated, “I‘m going to object in so far as it seeks to vary, contradict, and it would be law of the case in terms of your ruling,” and the court sustained the objection.9 Moreover, the record reflects that the court viewed the motion to compel as contested. In responding to a question from the plaintiff‘s counsel regarding whether the parties would need to return, the court stated: “[W]ell it depends on what they take an appeal from, they may also appeal . . . from the order granting the motion to compel.” We conclude that the defendant‘s claim of error as to the granting of the motion to compel is reviewable.10
“A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definitе and precise intent. . . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . . Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous. . . .
“In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself. . . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties. . . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and every provision must be given effect if it is possible to do so. . . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than оne reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gabriel v. Gabriel, 324 Conn. 324, 341-42, 152 A.3d 1230 (2016). “[T]he construction of a written contract is a question of law for the court. . . . The scope of review in such cases is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sachs v. Sachs, 60 Conn. App. 337, 342, 759 A.2d 510 (2000).11
There are at least three possible interpretations of the retirement asset provision. First, that provision could be interpreted as captured in the proposed QDRO, i.e., the defendant‘s estimated full retirement (age sixty-seven) payment of “about . . . $1479 a month” must be subtracted, as though it were commencing immediately, from the defendant‘s 50 percent assigned monthly benefit. Second, the provision could be read to require that the defendant receives her 50 percent assigned benefit until such time as she elects to receive her social security benefit,12 at which future time her 50 percent assigned benefit wоuld be reduced by the monthly social security benefit she actually elects to receive. A third interpretation of the provision would require calculating the present lump sum equivalent of the defendant‘s future estimated full retirement (age sixty-seven) payment of “about . . . $1479 a month,” which lump sum would then be converted to an immediate stream of payments, each of which would be subtracted from the 50 percent monthly assigned benefit.13
Because the language of the provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court erroneously determined that the provision is unambiguous. See Thomasi v. Thomasi, 181 Conn. App. 822, 831, 188 A.3d 743 (2018) (“A
On the basis of our conclusion that the court erroneously determined that the provision was unambiguous, we conclude that a remand to the trial court is necessary for the court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions14 and to determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the entering of the agreement. See Hirschfeld v. Machinist, 181 Conn. App. 309, 328, 186 A.3d 771 (2018) (court was required to resolve ambiguity by considering extrinsic evidence and making factual findings as to parties’ intent), cert. denied, 329 Conn. 913, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018); see also Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370, 386, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (remanding case to trial court to resolve ambiguity in
parties’ separation agreement “through a determination of their intent after consideration of all available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the entering of the agreement“); Fazio v. Fazio, 162 Conn. App. 236, 251, 131 A.3d 1162 (2016) (same), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 922, 132 A.3d 1095 (2016).
After stating in its articulation that it found no ambiguities in the retirement asset provision, the court continued: “In the absence of any ambiguity or uncertainty, the evidence the defendant [sought] to introduce regarding the intent of the parties or their object was irrelevant.” Because the court‘s underlying determination that the provision was unambiguous was erroneous, its subsequent conclusion that the evidence regarding the intent of the parties was irrelevant necessarily also is erroneous. Because the issue may arise on remand, we note the general legal principles concerning the parol evidence rule and its exceptions.15
“Parol evidence offered solely to vary or contradict the written terms of an integrated contract is . . . legally irrelevant. When offered for that purpose, it is inadmissible not because it is parol evidence, but because it is irrelevant. By implication, such evidence may still be admissible if relevant (1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of the writing; (3)
This court cannot find facts in the first instance. See Fazio v. Fazio, supra, 162 Conn. App. 251. Thus, a remand is necessary for the trial court to hold a new hearing on the parties’ motions16 and to “determine the intent of the parties after consideration of all the available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the entering of the agreement.” Id.; see also Parisi v. Parisi, supra, 315 Conn. 386.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
It is the plaintiff‘s position that the defendant‘s argument that the retirement asset provision is ambiguous should not be reviewed because it was not raised until her motion for articulation. We note that the trial court, in its articulation, answered that it had considered whether the provision was ambiguous, and, therefore, the circumstances do not amount to a trial by ambuscade of the trial judge. Cf. Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn. App. 469, 477, 997 A.2d 599 (2010). Moreover, as discussed further infra, the issue of whether the provision was ambiguous was necessarily subsumed within the plaintiff‘s motion to compel.