Kyle Cameron v. University of Toledo, et al.
Court of Appeals No. L-13-1284
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: December 19, 2014
2014-Ohio-5587
Trial Court No. CI0201303385
Mike DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Jeffrey S. Greenley, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
YARBROUGH, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kyle Cameron, appeals from the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his complaint alleging violation of Ohio‘s anti-hazing statute,
{¶ 2} Appellant was recruited as a scholarship football player to the University of Toledo. However, during the summer before his freshman year, appellant was injured in an alleged hazing incident involving some of the team‘s older players. As a result of his injury, appellant‘s athletic career ended.
{¶ 3} On June 21, 2013, appellant filed a complaint in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas against appellees, the University of Toledo, Tim Beckman, and several other university employees. The complaint presented one count of a violation of
{¶ 4} Appellant has timely appealed the November 19, 2013 judgment, asserting one assignment of error for our review:
- THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 12(B)(1).
II. Analysis
{¶ 5} We review trial court judgments regarding Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Dargart v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 171 Ohio App.3d 439, 2006-Ohio-6179, 871 N.E.2d 608, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.). The standard
{¶ 6} At issue in this appeal is the interplay between
{¶ 7} Under the Court of Claims Act, the state waived its immunity from liability, and subjected itself to being sued in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties.
{¶ 8} Initially, we note that the parties do not contest that this is a civil action for money damages, that the action against the university is an action against the state, or that the individuals who are defendants are officers or employees of the state. In attempting to bring this action for hazing against appellees in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, appellant argues that the court of claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over monetary actions against the state does not apply because
{¶ 9} In its entirety,
Any person who is subjected to hazing, as defined in division (A) of section 2903.31 of the Revised Code, may commence a civil action for injury or damages, including mental and physical pain and suffering, that
result from the hazing. The action may be brought against any participants in the hazing, any organization whose local or national directors, trustees, or officers authorized, requested, commanded, or tolerated the hazing, and any local or national director, trustee, or officer of the organization who authorized, requested, commanded, or tolerated the hazing. If the hazing involves students in a primary, secondary, or post-secondary school, university, college, or any other educational institution, an action may also be brought against any administrator, employee, or faculty member of the school, university, college, or other educational institution who knew or reasonably should have known of the hazing and who did not make reasonable attempts to prevent it and against the school, university, college, or other educational institution. If an administrator, employee, or faculty member is found liable in a civil action for hazing, then notwithstanding Chapter 2743. of the Revised Code , the school, university, college, or other educational institution that employed the administrator, employee, or faculty member may also be held liable.The negligence or consent of the plaintiff or any assumption of the risk by the plaintiff is not a defense to an action brought pursuant to this section. In an action against a school, university, college, or other
educational institution, it is an affirmative defense that the school, university, college, or other institution was actively enforcing a policy against hazing at the time the cause of action arose. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 10} Appellant argues that the language of the statute demonstrates the legislature‘s clear intent to treat all perpetrators of hazing the same, and that the inclusion of the phrase “notwithstanding
{¶ 11} Appellees, on the other hand, argue first that the phrase referencing
{¶ 12} Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the language of
{¶ 13} A straightforward reading of
A civil action against an officer or employee, * * * that alleges that the officer‘s or employee‘s conduct was manifestly outside the scope of the officer‘s or employee‘s employment or official responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court of claims that has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially,
whether the officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action.
Notably, the anti-hazing statute is silent on the issue of immunity and
{¶ 14} Alternatively, a claimant could allege that the administrator, employee, or faculty member was acting within the scope of his or her employment responsibilities while engaged in activity that would incur liability under the anti-hazing statute. In this scenario, however, the “notwithstanding” language again would not be triggered because the employee would not be found liable. First, the employee would be entitled to personal immunity under
{¶ 15} Here, the complaint alleges both that the individual defendants were acting within the course and scope of their employment, and that their conduct was “intentional, negligent, willful, wanton and reckless.” In either event, as described above, the initial determination of whether the individual defendants are entitled to personal immunity must be made in the court of claims. However, appellant did not file in the court of claims, and, consequently, the court of claims did not make a determination regarding whether the individual defendants are entitled to personal immunity. Moreover, there has been no determination that any of the individual defendants are liable. Therefore, the “notwithstanding” language in
{¶ 16} Accordingly, appellant‘s assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J.
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Stephen A. Yarbrough, P.J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.