Caleshu v. Caleshu
No. 19AP-742
In the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth Appellate District
August 11, 2020
2020-Ohio-4075
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Shannon K. Caleshu, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 19AP-742
(C.P.C. No. 17DR-2788)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Elias J. Caleshu, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on August 11, 2020
On brief: Weis Law Group LLC, and David R. Plumb, for appellee. Argued: David R. Plumb.
On brief: Babbitt & Dahlberg LLC, and C. Gustav Dahlberg, for appellant. Argued: C. Gustav Dahlberg.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Elias J. Caleshu (“Lee“), appeals from a decision and judgment entry/decree of divorce of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch, dividing the marital рroperty and debts of Lee and plaintiff-appellee, Shannon K. Caleshu (“Shannon“), and awarding Shannon spousal support and child support. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Shannon and Lee were married on August 9, 2008, and they have three minor children. The parties separated in 2017, and on July 26, 2017, Shannon filed a complaint for divorce. Pursuant to
{¶ 3} On September 11, 2018, the parties agreed to a Shared Parenting Plan that revised the parties’ parenting schedule as to their specific days with the children but did not alter the equal division of time between the parties’ households. The parties agreed to a second Shared Parenting Plan on May 7, 2019, again retaining the equal division of time between the parties’ households.
{¶ 4} Prior to trial, the parties filed a stipulated balance sheet and agreed-upon distribution of marital property and debts. The parties left some items for the trial court‘s discretion. The trial court conducted a full evidentiary hearing on May 8, 9, and 20, 2019. At the close of evidence, Shannon‘s trial counsel withdrew, and the parties submitted an Agreed Entry regarding additional marital property and an agreed Shared Parenting Decree.
{¶ 5} In a September 30, 2019 decision and judgment entry/decree of divorce, the trial court determined that the parties’ respective credit card balances were not subject to equal allocation. Accordingly, the trial court ordered Lee to pay Shannon the sum of $30,074.50 in order to equitably divide the marital assets. Further, the trial court ordered Lee to pаy Shannon spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month effective September 30, 2019 and terminating December 31, 2020. The trial court also ordered Lee to pay child support in the amount of $2,300 per month, effective September 30, 2019, specifically finding the child support order to be an upward deviation from guideline child support. The trial court specifically noted the parties’ income disparity in making the upward dеviation, noting Lee‘s annual salary is $200,000 while Shannon‘s annual salary is stipulated at minimum wage. Lee timely appeals.
{¶ 6} Lee assigns the following errors for our review:
1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to equitably divide responsibility for the parties’ marital debts, pursuant to the provisions of
2. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in its award of spousal support to Appellee pursuant to the provisions of
3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in deviating from the guideline amount of child support pursuant to the provisions of
III. First Assignment of Error – Distribution of Marital Debts
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Lee argues the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the parties’ debts. In particular, Lee asserts the trial court abused its discretion in determining the parties’ debts should not be equalized, resulting in what Lee deems an inequitable division of property and debts.
{¶ 8} In a divorce proceeding, the domestic court has broad discretion to make divisions of property. Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397, 401 (1998), citing Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318 (1982). “In any divorce action, the starting point for a trial court‘s analysis is an equal division of marital assets.” Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St.3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, ¶ 5, citing
{¶ 9} “An appellate cоurt‘s job is not to reweigh the evidence but to determine whether competent, credible evidence in the record supports the trial court‘s findings.” Hood v. Hood, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-999, 2011-Ohio-3704, ¶ 14, citing Dunham v. Dunham, 171 Ohio App.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-1167, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.), and Taub v. Taub, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-750, 2009-Ohio-2762, ¶ 15. We review a trial court‘s division of property for an abuse of discretion. Neville at ¶ 5; Hood at ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion connotes a decision that
{¶ 10} Lee argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to be individually responsible for the credit cards in his name and failing to otherwise equalize the marital debt, rendering the distribution of marital property unequal. As this court has noted, “the duty to equitably divide the marital property necessarily obligates the trial court to divide the marital debt.” Wood v. Wood, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-513, 2011-Ohio-679, ¶ 15, citing Byers v. Byers, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3124, 2010-Ohio-4424, ¶ 18.
{¶ 11} Despite acknowledging that the trial court has broad discretion in determining the equitable division of marital property and marital debt, Lee nonetheless argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the credit card debts on the parties’ three credit cards to be allocated to the parties as their own separate liabilities. Specifically, Lee asserts that Shannon‘s proposal at the trial court regarding the equalization of marital debt called for a total payment of $13,441 from Lee to Shannon, but the trial court went beyond that amount and instead ordered Lee to pay $30,074.50.1 However, Lee concedes the parties did not have an agreement or stipulation on the total amount owed by Lee to Shannon in order to equalize marital debt and, ultimately, equitably divide the marital property.
{¶ 12} Lee does not allege the trial court did not consider appropriate statutory factors in reaching its decision on the equitable division of property and debt. Instead, Lee disagrees with the conclusions the trial court reached after considering those factors. Having reviewed the reсord, we find the trial court appropriately considered all of the factors in
{¶ 13} Further, to the extent Lee argues the trial court should have considered the parties’ incomes after support payments in determining the equitable division of martial property and martial debt, we note that such an argument is contrary to the statutory requirements. Specifically,
IV. Second Assignment of Error – Spousal Support
{¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, Lee argues the trial court abused its discretion in making its award of spоusal support to Shannon pursuant to
{¶ 15} ” ‘[S]pousal support’ means any payment or payments to be made to a spouse or former spouse * * * that is both for sustenance and for support.”
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Leе disagrees with the trial court‘s characterization of the length of the parties’ marriage. While the trial court finds the parties were married almost 11 years, Lee notes they separated after being married for less than 9 years. However, the trial court specifically considered the timing of the parties’ separation. Additionally, Lee argues the trial court failed to adequately consider the length of time he paid temporary spousal support during the pendency of the litigation. Again, however, the trial court specifically considered that Lee financially supported Shannon throughout the separation and litigation. Finally, Lee asserts Shannon‘s failure to seek any income during the parties’ separation should have limited the duration of the trial court‘s spousal support order. However, Lee does not exрlain how the trial court abused its discretion in determining the duration of the spousal support order other than to express his disagreement with the trial court‘s ultimate conclusion. He does not account for the trial court‘s detailed recitation and weighing of the other factors listed in
{¶ 18} Having reviewed the record, we find the trial court considered and weighed each of the required factors under
{¶ 19} In his third and final assignment of error, Lee argues the trial court abused its discretion in making its child support award. More specifically, Lee asserts the trial court abused its discretion in deviating upward frоm the guideline child support amount.
{¶ 20} Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court‘s determination regarding child support obligations will not be disturbed on appeal. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997). The trial court does not abuse its discretion making a child support order where some competent, credible evidence supports the trial court‘s decision. Weaver v. Weaver, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-743, 2017-Ohio-4087, ¶ 9, citing Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 208 (1980).
{¶ 21} On March 28, 2019, several months before the trial court issued its final judgment in this case, updated versions of Ohio‘s child support statutes went into effect. Pursuant to the updated statutes, when issuing an order of child support, the trial court must calculate the amount of support “in accordance with the basic child support schedule, the applicable worksheet, and the other provisions of Chapter 3119.”
{¶ 22} For the purpose of
(B) Other court-ordered payments;
(C) Extended parenting time or extrаordinary costs associated with parenting time, including extraordinary travel expenses when exchanging the child or children for parenting time;
(D) The financial resources and the earning ability of the child or children;
(E) The relative financial resources, including the disparity in income between parties or households, other assets, and the needs of each parent;
(F) The obligee‘s income, if the obligee‘s annual income is equal to or less than one hundred per cent of the federal poverty level;
(G) Benefits that either parent receives from remarriage or sharing living expenses with another person;
(H) The amount of federal, state, and local taxes actually paid or estimated to be paid by a parent or both of the parents;
(I) Significant in-kind contributions from a parent, including, but not limited to, direct payment for lessons, sрorts equipment, schooling, or clothing;
(J) Extraordinary work-related expenses incurred by either parent;
(K) The standard of living and circumstances of each parent and the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage continued or had the parents been married;
(L) The educational opportunities that would have been available to the child had the circumstances requiring a child support ordеr not arisen;
(M) The responsibility of each parent for the support of others, including support of a child or children with disabilities who are not subject to the support order;
(O) Costs incurred or reasonably anticipated to be incurred by thе parents in compliance with court-ordered reunification efforts in child abuse, neglect, or dependency cases;
(P) Extraordinary child care costs required for the child or children that exceed the maximum state-wide average cost estimate as described in division (P)(1)(d) of section 3119.05 of the Revised Code, including extraordinary costs associated with caring for a child or children with specialized physical, рsychological, or educational needs;
(Q) Any other relevant factor.
If the court grants a deviation based on division (Q) of this section, it shall specifically state in the order the facts that are the basis for the deviation.
In view of these provisions, it is clear that ” ‘there is no bright-line test to determine when a deviation is warranted.’ ” (Internal quotation omitted.) Habtemariam v. Worku, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-47, 2020-Ohio-3044, ¶ 36, quoting Weaver at ¶ 11.
{¶ 23} Here, after considering the factors outlined above from
{¶ 24}
(A) If court-ordered parenting time exceeds ninety overnights per year, the court shall consider whether to grant a deviation pursuant to section 3119.22 of the Revised Code for the reason set forth in division (C) of section 3119.23 of the Revised Code.
(B) If court-оrdered parenting time is equal to or exceeds one hundred forty-seven overnights per year, and the court does not grant a deviation under division (A) of this section, it shall specify in the order the facts that are the basis for the court‘s decision.
{¶ 25} Thus, pursuant to
{¶ 26} Here, it is undisputed that Lee‘s parenting time exceeds 147 overnights per year. Although Lee requested a downward deviation, the trial court considered his request in detail and, pursuant to
{¶ 27} Lee asserts that Shannon‘s position in the trial court was that Lee should pay the guideline child support amount, and he thus argues the triаl court abused its discretion in granting an upward deviation when Shannon did not request it. However, we note that Shannon calculated the guideline amount to be $3,101.36 per month, significantly more than the trial court‘s calculated guideline amount. The ultimate amount awarded, though an upward deviation from the guideline amount, is still less than the amount Shannon requested.
{¶ 29} For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Lee to pay Shannon $2,300 per month in child support. We overrule his third and final assignment of error.
VI. Disposition
{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the equitable division of marital property and debts, in determining the duration of the spousal support order, or in determining the amount of the child support order. Having overruled Lee‘s three assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch.
Judgment affirmed.
BRUNNER and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.