ROBERT CALDWELL, ET AL. v. LUCIC ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.
No. 97303
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
March 15, 2012
[Cite as Caldwell v. Lucic Ents., Inc., 2012-Ohio-1059.]
BEFORE: Keough, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-734799
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
James M. Johnson
110 Hoyt Block Building
700 W. St. Clair Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44113-1287
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Samuel J. Mamich
P.O. Box 46316
Bedford, OH 44146
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Robert and Stephanie Caldwell (“appellants“), appeal the trial court‘s judgment granting the motion in limine filed by defendants-appellees, Lucic Enterprises, Inc. d.b.a. Scripts Nite Club, and Scripts Nite Club (collectively “appellees“). Appellants also appeal the trial court‘s decision dismissing the complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
{¶2} In 2009, appellants filed an action against appellees alleging that Robert suffered injury and damages as a result of a fall that occurred at Scripts Nite Club, a bar owned and operated by Lucic Enterprises, Inc. Specifically, appellants alleged that one of appellees’ employees pushed Robert to the floor, causing him injury, including a fractured ankle. Appellants asserted causes of action for negligence, intentional misconduct, and loss of services.
{¶3} Appellees subsequently filed a motion in limine contending that appellants failed to comply with
{¶5} Prior to trial, appellees moved to dismiss the case, asserting that because the motion in limine was granted, appellants were precluded from presenting any evidence on proximate cause and therefore they would not be able to withstand their burden of proving an essential element of their negligence case. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.1
{¶6} Appellants appeal, raising two assignments of error.
{¶7} In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellees’ motion in limine.
{¶8} A motion in limine is essentially a request to limit or exclude evidence or testimony at trial. State v. Winston, 71 Ohio App.3d 154, 158, 593 N.E.2d 308 (8th Dist.1991). Therefore, the standard of review on appeal of the grant of a motion in limine is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See State v. Graham, 58 Ohio St.2d 350, 390 N.E.2d 805 (1979). “Abuse of discretion” means more than an error of law or of judgment and implies that the court‘s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶10} Proximate cause is defined as “an event that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces that event and without which the event would not have occurred.” Aiken v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St. 113, 117, 53 N.E.2d 1018 (1944). “This definition encompasses a sense of ‘but for’ in that an original wrongful, or negligent act in a natural and continuous sequence produces a result that would not have taken place without the act.” Sabolik v. HGG Chestnut Lake Ltd. Partnership, 180 Ohio App.3d 576, 2009-Ohio-130, 906 N.E.2d 488, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Strother. Accordingly, proximate cause is “that without which the accident would not have happened, and from which the injury or a like injury might have been anticipated.” Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 143, 539 N.E.2d 614 (1989), quoting Corrigan v. E.W. Bohren Transport Co., 408 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir.1968).
{¶11} In this case, appellees moved to prohibit or limit appellants from using or introducing any expert testimony, medical or non-medical, and from using or introducing into evidence any and all medical records and documents at trial because appellants failed to comply with
{¶12}
{¶13} On appeal, appellants contend that they were not required to provide medical expert testimony regarding Robert‘s broken ankle because it is common knowledge that if a person falls, a fractured ankle could occur.
{¶14} Whether the plaintiff is required to provide medical expert testimony regarding an injury depends on the causal connection between the injury and disability. In Darnell v. Eastman, 23 Ohio St.2d 12, 261 N.E.2d 114 (1970), the Ohio Supreme Court held:
Except as to questions of cause and effect which are so apparent as to be matters of common knowledge, the issue of causal connection between an injury and a specific subsequent physical disability involves a scientific inquiry and must be established by the opinion of medical witnesses competent to express such opinion. In the absence of such medical opinion, it is error to refuse to withdraw that issue from the consideration for the jury. Id. at syllabus.
{¶15} The question presented to this court is whether the cause and effect of the injury was so apparent as to be a matter of common knowledge. “It is not always necessary to produce medical testimony to establish proximate cause between the injury and the harm claimed. In certain cases, the testimony of lay witnesses can be sufficient
{¶16} In White Motor Corp. v. Moore, 48 Ohio St.2d 156, 357 N.E.2d 1069 (1976), at paragraph two of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court established the counterpoint to Darnell: “Where the issue of causal connection between an injury and the specific subsequent physical disability involves questions which are matters of common knowledge, medical testimony is not necessary in order to submit the case to the jury.”
{¶17} In White Motor, the injury complained of was a bruised knee. The court concluded that the injury was allegedly caused when a truck frame fell from a dolly and landed on the employee, and it involved “little if any medical complexity,” and therefore, did not require medical expert testimony to establish causation. Id. at 159-160. “Further, to argue that there is a dispute as to the occurrence of the injury itself is a matter of credibility of witnesses, not scientific certainty.” Id. at 160.
{¶18} The Eleventh District, in interpreting Darnell and White Motor and considering the exact injury now before this court, held that a “broken ankle was a sufficiently understandable, observable, and comprehensible injury within the scope of common knowledge, and that an expert witness was not required.” Canterbury v. Skulina, 11th Dist. No. 2000-P-0060, 2001 WL 1561479, *5 (Dec. 7, 2001).
{¶19} In this case, it is difficult to determine how an expert witness could be utilized to establish that the defendant‘s employee proximately caused the plaintiff‘s
{¶20} We find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellees’ motion in limine. Although the motion was limited to precluding medical expert testimony and records, the trial court expanded appellees’ request by prohibiting appellants from submitting any and all evidence or testimony concerning proximate cause. The use of medical expert testimony was not necessarily required to prove proximate cause in this case. Therefore, the sanction the trial court imposed against appellants for failing to comply with
{¶21} Accordingly, appellants’ first assignment of error is sustained. Because the basis for dismissing appellants’ case was due to the ruling on the motion in limine, we summarily sustain appellants’ second assignment of error challenging the trial court‘s dismissal of the case.
{¶22} Judgment reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellees costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR