CAIRO v. BELLOWSCAIRO v. BELLOWS
Plaintiffs Cairo—a resident of Texas and professional “circulator” of ballot initiative petitions—and three Maine voters (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) petition this Court for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant Shenna Bellows, in her official capacity as Secretary of State, from enforcing Maine’s statutory and constitutional voter registration and residency requirements against out-of-state circulators. For the reasons that follow, the court DENIES the Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
This matter comes before the Court following a lengthy procedural history—winding through prior federal litigation, state administrative decisions, and now finally a ruling from Maine’s highest court.
I. We the People PAC v. Bellows
On December 31, 2020, We the People PAC and several other plaintiffs filed a federal civil action against Secretary of State Bellows, challenging residency and voter
II. “Protect Girls’ Sports in Maine” Ballot Initiative
Fast forward to 2025, where Protect Girls’ Sports in Maine (“PGS”), a registered Ballot Question Committee, and Plaintiffs in this case sought to place a ballot initiative entitled “An Act to Designate School Sports Participation and Facilities by Sex” (“the Ballot Initiative”) on the November 3, 2026, general election ballot. See ECF No. 29 ¶ 11. To qualify for placement on the ballot, the Ballot Initiative needed to secure valid signatures from Maine electors equal to at least 10% of the total vote cast in the gubernatorial election preceding the filing of its petition. See
III. State Court Litigation6
On March 27, 2026, individuals Jane Gilbert, Mark Sayre, and Kaitlin Webber (“the Intervenors”) appealed the Secretary’s Determination to the Maine Superior Court, contesting petitions submitted by Cairo and three other out-of-state circulators on the basis that they had failed to check the Jurisdiction Box on their affidavits. ECF No. 29 ¶¶
On May 6, 2026, Cairo submitted a revised affidavit in which she checked the Jurisdiction Box. Id. ¶ 66; see ECF No. 14 (Cairo Circulator’s Affidavit, May 6, 2026). On May 12, Cairo appeared at the evidentiary hearing via Zoom and confirmed under oath her agreement to submit to the jurisdiction of Maine, authenticated her signature on the Affidavit, and testified that she herself had checked the Jurisdiction Box. ECF No. 29 ¶ 67. Plaintiffs note that during the hearing, counsel for the Intervenors and the Secretary confined their examination of Cairo to her failure to check the Jurisdiction Box on her initial petition and declined to question her further regarding her conduct as a circulator or the validity of the elector signatures she gathered. Id. ¶ 68. During the hearing, PGS petitioned the Secretary to reconsider her position that the contested signatures were not valid, in part arguing that Cairo’s belated May 6, 2026, affidavit in which she checked the
On May 23, 2026, the Hearing Officer issued a Decision recommending the Secretary invalidate all signatures on petitions circulated by out-of-state circulators—including Plaintiff Cairo—who had failed to check the Jurisdiction Box at the time of submission. ECF No. 29 ¶ 70. Although the Consent Order imposed no specific time limit for checking the Jurisdiction Box, the Hearing Officer reasoned that
PGS subsequently appealed the Secretary’s May 26, 2026, Final Decision invalidating the 1,520 elector signatures. ECF No. 36-15 at 21–43. On June 11, 2026, the Maine Superior Court upheld the Secretary’s Final Decision. ECF No. 29 ¶ 73; see ECF
On appeal, the Maine Law Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. Gilbert v. Sec’y of State, 2026 ME 59, 2026 WL 1993411 (Me. July 10, 2026). In upholding the Secretary’s decision to invalidate the signatures based on the circulators’ failure to check the Jurisdiction Box, the Law Court held the Secretary “was not only authorized but was constitutionally bound to impose and enforce the [jurisdiction] oath requirement.” Id. ¶ 12. The Court further concluded the requirement that circulators affirmatively consent to the jurisdiction of Maine, the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement, was “not . . . a novel rule created by the Secretary without enabling authority,” but rather represented the Secretary “complying with the Maine Constitution and Maine statutes to the extent not precluded by federal restrictions.” Id. ¶ 26. Finally, the Court determined the requirement that the Jurisdiction Box on the Affidavit be checked at the time of submission complied with
IV. Instant Federal Action
Separate from the Gilbert state court litigation, Plaintiffs filed the instant action on June 30, 2026, seeking primarily declaratory relief and requesting retroactive
Plaintiffs subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to bar the Secretary “from enforcing the Consent Order against Plaintiff Cairo and to direct the Secretary to reverse any and all decisions adverse to” the Plaintiffs’ interests. ECF No. 30 at 1. On July 30, 2026, both the Secretary and the Intervenors filed responses opposing the Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF Nos. 35 & 36. The Secretary argues Plaintiffs lack both Article III standing to pursue their claims and any legal basis to seek enforcement of the Consent Order. See ECF No. 36 at 6–12. She further argues Plaintiffs have no likelihood of success on the merits of any of their constitutional claims. Id. at 6. Intervenors raise similar arguments but additionally contend the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and collateral estoppel
DISCUSSION
To grant a preliminary injunction, the Court must find four elements satisfied: (1) the movant is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent interim relief, (3) the balance of equities favors the movant, and (4) granting relief would serve the public interest. See Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 2015). Courts award such injunctive relief only as an “extraordinary and drastic remedy”—never as of right. Carey v. Town of Rumford, 25-cv-00356, 2025 WL 2978795, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 22, 2025) (quoting Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp. 3d 273, 282 (D. Me. 2020)). District courts accordingly retain wide discretion in judging whether such injunctive relief is appropriate. Francisco Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2009).
The likelihood of success on the merits is the “sine qua non” of this inquiry: a plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits ordinarily disposes of the motion. See New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). On this issue the district court need only estimate the likelihood of success; it “need not predict the eventual outcome on the merits with absolute assurance.” Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Harnett, 731 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996)).
The Court now proceeds in three parts. It first takes up the threshold issues raised by the Secretary and the Intervenors, then turns to the substantive merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims—both bearing on Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits—and then finally
I. Threshold and Jurisdictional Barriers to Relief
The Secretary and Intervenors argue that several threshold and jurisdictional defects in the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint—Article III standing, this Court’s jurisdiction over the Consent Order, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and collateral estoppel—independently defeat any likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court now considers each in turn and concludes that these defects foreclose Plaintiffs’ entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief.
A. Standing
The Secretary first challenges Plaintiffs’ Article III standing to bring this action, arguing a favorable decision by this Court would not cure or redress the Plaintiffs’ purported injury. Justiciability principles require an actual case or controversy before a litigant may pursue a claim in a federal court. See Ramírez v. Sánchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing
The Secretary relies primarily on the First Circuit’s recent decision in Taker v. Blanche, where the plaintiff brought a Second Amendment challenge to federal and state statutes barring him from possessing a firearm. 179 F.4th 96, 98 (1st Cir. 2026). At the
Plaintiffs’ claims each rest either on the constitutionality of the Secretary’s interpretation of the Consent Order, or her actions taken in purported reliance on it. Those actions include the Secretary’s creation of the Jurisdiction Box and, based on Cairo’s failure to check the Box, the Secretary’s resulting invalidation of the signatures. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ claims or their prayer for relief, see ECF No. 29 at 32–37, purports to challenge the constitutionality of
B. Jurisdiction over the Consent Order
As part of their request for declaratory and injunctive relief, Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, a declaration that the Consent Order does not apply to them as non-parties to the We the People litigation, coupled with an injunction against its enforcement. ECF No. 29 at 32–34. In the same breath, Plaintiffs ask this Court to retroactively modify that same Consent Order—striking the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement and ordering instead “that Defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing
First, Plaintiffs, as non-parties to the We the People action, lack standing to enforce or modify its Consent Order. A consent order or decree10 “is not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those who are not parties to it, even though they were intended to be benefited by it.” Blake v. Pro. Coin Grading Serv., 898 F. Supp. 2d 365, 383 n.12 (D. Mass. 2012) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975)); see, e.g., Antonelli v. New Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming that non-parties to prior litigation lack standing to enforce consent decrees). Plaintiffs offer no persuasive justification as to why this Court should grant relief allowing amendment or revision of a final judgment issued in a separate federal case.11
Second, Plaintiffs cannot point to an independent cause of action that would allow them to enforce the Consent Order entered in We the People I. The ordinary vehicle for enforcing a consent order’s terms is civil contempt, which supplies no independent cause
Third, sovereign immunity independently bars Plaintiffs’ request. Even assuming this Court had the authority to amend the Consent Order—which it does not—the Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the Eleventh Amendment forecloses relief to the extent Plaintiffs’ claims trace back to the Consent Order rather than to any independent violation of federal law. ECF No. 36 at 20–22. The Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment permits federal courts to “grant prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law, in part because a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State.” Doe v. Shibinette, 16 F.4th 894, 903 (1st Cir. 2021) (quotation modified). That exception does not, however, extend to instructing “state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). The enforcement of the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement rests on state law alone, specifically
C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Intervenors raise another threshold challenge to Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success: that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Plaintiffs from relitigating matters finally decided by the Maine state courts in Gilbert. ECF No. 35 at 12–13. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had . . . .”
Plaintiffs respond that Rooker-Feldman does not preclude consideration of their claims for two reasons: no named Plaintiff here was a party to the Gilbert proceedings,
Privity “is an elusive concept,” but parties may be found to stand in privity where their relationship “is sufficiently close so as to bind them both to an initial determination, at which only one of them was present.” N.L.R.B. v. Donna-Lee Sportswear Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 31, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1987) (quotation modified); see United States v. Wolas, 520 F. Supp. 3d 114, 137 n.31 (D. Mass. 2021) (“Parties are in privity with one another when the party’s legal interests in the state court proceeding were congruent with the privy’s legal interests.” (quotation modified)).13 While not ultimately ruling on the issue, the Supreme Court has suggested “there may be circumstances in which Rooker-Feldman applies against a party that was not precisely named in the state court proceeding.” Decoulos v. Town of Aquinnah, No. 17-cv-11532, 2018 WL 3553351, at *9 (D. Mass. July 24, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-1820, 2019 WL 11234357 (1st Cir. Dec. 10, 2019) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 n.2 (2006)). In election law disputes specifically, courts have found candidates and their voters may be in privity for Rooker-Feldman purposes because “plaintiff voters are in reality the candidates’ pawns” when the voters’ federal suit, in
As in Hoblock, the record here suggests Cairo and the Plaintiff voters may be advancing this federal suit merely as PGS’s “puppets” or “pawns” following its defeat in state court. The same counsel who represented PGS in state court represents the Plaintiffs here, raising many of the same arguments regarding the legality and application of the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement. Cairo was retained specifically as a “professional petition circulator[]” for PGS’s Ballot Initiative effort, ECF No. 29 ¶ 44, and even appeared at the Secretary of State’s evidentiary hearing as a witness at PGS’s own request, id. ¶¶ 67. The three named Plaintiff voters each signed a petition to place the Ballot Initiative on the November general election ballot. Id. ¶¶ 46–47, 49. On the record currently before it, the Court finds that Plaintiffs bear a sufficiently close relationship and share “congruent” legal interests to stand in privity with PGS for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, though recognizes that further factual development may bear on the ultimate conclusion.
Plaintiffs’ second argument—that their instant suit challenges only the Secretary’s interpretation and application of the Consent Order, not the constitutional issues decided in Gilbert—fares no better. Although Plaintiffs frame their claims as challenges to the Secretary’s reliance on the Consent Order to invalidate the signatures, they explicitly seek an injunction against enforcement of, or the outright dissolution of, the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement as applied to out-of-state circulators. See ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 34–36, 131 (requesting modification of Consent Order to remove any reference to the consent-to-
Additionally, Rooker-Feldman independently forecloses jurisdiction over claims “inextricably intertwined” with claims already adjudicated in a state court. Hill v. Town of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court claims if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2000) (quotation modified). The doctrine applies “where, regardless of how the claim is phrased, ‘the only real injury to [the plaintiff] is ultimately still caused by a state-court judgment.’” Silva v. Massachusetts, 351 F. App’x 450, 455 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Davison, 471 F.3d at 223). Plaintiffs’ claims here meet that standard: their actual injury—the invalidation of signatures gathered by Cairo and other out-of-state circulators—was caused by the Law Court’s judgment in Gilbert. For these reasons, the Court finds Rooker-Feldman likely deprives it of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims—a jurisdictional defect that, standing alone, forecloses any likelihood that Plaintiffs will succeed on those claims.
D. Collateral Estoppel
The Intervenors next raise a related yet distinct argument: even if Rooker-Feldman does not deprive the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction, collateral estoppel bars
Plaintiffs assert, largely echoing their Rooker-Feldman arguments, that collateral estoppel does not apply because they were not parties to the Gilbert litigation and because Maine’s state courts “did not, and could not, definitively interpret the meaning of a federal court’s consent order.” ECF No. 37 at 8–9. Plaintiffs’ argument, however, cannot be reconciled with what they actually seek to litigate. The issue Gilbert decided—whether the Secretary properly invalidated the signatures gathered by Cairo and other out-of-state circulators—is the same issue Plaintiffs raise here, merely relabeled as a challenge to the “Secretary’s rejection, in reliance on . . . [the] Consent Order, of Ballot Initiative petitions circulated by Plaintiff Cairo and three other circulators.” ECF No. 31
The second requirement—whether Plaintiffs “had a fair opportunity and incentive” to litigate the issues in Gilbert—is likewise satisfied. “A party has a fair opportunity to litigate an issue if that party either controls the litigation, substantially participates in that litigation, or could have participated in the litigation had they chosen to do so.” State v. Williams, 2020 ME 17, ¶ 16, 225 A.3d 751 (quotation modified). Beyond her privity with PGS, Plaintiff Cairo played a direct role in the Gilbert litigation: she submitted a sworn affidavit to the Superior Court regarding her belated consent to Maine‘s jurisdiction, ECF No. 29 ¶ 61, and, following remand to the Secretary, testified under oath regarding her decision not to check the Jurisdiction Box, id. ¶¶ 67–68. While the three Plaintiff voters did not directly participate in Gilbert, the Court notes that Maine state law explicitly provided them with the opportunity to do so. See
The Court does not purport, on the present record, to conclusively resolve every factual issue bearing on the application of Rooker-Feldman or collateral estoppel. At this preliminary stage, however, Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish a likelihood of success before obtaining the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” of injunctive relief. Kennedy v. Bellows, 721 F. Supp. 3d 98, 109 (D. Me. 2024) (quotation modified). The substantial questions concerning whether Rooker-Feldman deprives the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and whether collateral estoppel independently precludes relitigation of issues resolved in Gilbert foreclose Plaintiffs from making that necessary showing. See Berlitz Schs. of Languages of Am., Inc. v. Everest House, 619 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of injunctive relief where case raised a “serious question as to whether the doctrine[] of collateral estoppel . . . would bar the instant action“). Aside from these issues, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits is foreclosed by the issues of standing and jurisdiction over the Consent Order as already discussed.
E. Summary of Threshold & Jurisdictional Challenges
Standing alone, each of these threshold and jurisdictional defects would likely bar Plaintiffs’ claims and thus preclude a finding of their likelihood of success on the merits; taken together, they reinforce the conclusion that Plaintiffs cannot make their necessary extraordinary showing. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the Court next addresses the substantive merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and finds they cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits there either.
II. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To the extent any of Plaintiffs’ claims may survive the threshold challenges already addressed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims based on the substance of their arguments—principally because doing so would require disregarding First Circuit precedent in We the People II—a path foreclosed to this Court.
The underlying dispute in We the People challenged the Maine Constitution‘s and
Plaintiffs additionally argue the Secretary‘s decision to invalidate signatures obtained by Plaintiff Cairo and other out-of-state circulators who did not check the Jurisdiction Box violates the First Amendment, along with an assortment of other constitutional provisions. See ECF No. 29 at 24–32 (raising Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clause challenges, along with First Amendment and unconstitutional-conditions claims). Each of these claims rest on the premise that the Secretary misapplied the Consent Order to invalidate the signatures submitted with Cairo‘s petitions and that the Consent Order, as Plaintiffs assert the Secretary interpreted it, violates federal constitutional law. This argument runs headlong into the First Circuit‘s decision in We the People II, which upheld the very consent-to-
Even setting that controlling precedent aside, the Court independently analyzes each of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims under the Anderson/Burdick framework, which governs constitutional challenges implicating the electoral process and core political speech, such as the circulating and signing of ballot initiative petitions. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992); see also We the People I, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 39–40 (applying Anderson/Burdick to plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to Maine‘s voter registration and residency requirements). Under Anderson/Burdick, the Court must assess “the burdens, if any, placed on a plaintiff‘s constitutionally protected rights, followed by an evaluation of the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the burdens.” Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Gardner, 638 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). Courts apply strict scrutiny and require that the challenged restriction be narrowly tailored to the State‘s interest only when the restriction imposes “severe burdens” on “core political speech and associational rights.” Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found. Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 206–07 (1999). By comparison, where a challenged restriction on the electoral process “imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the . . . rights of voters, the State‘s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.” Gardner, 638 F.3d at 14 (quotation modified); Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (noting that “lesser burdens trigger less exacting review“).
Before turning to the remaining factors in the preliminary injunction inquiry, the Court briefly addresses Plaintiffs’ Due Process argument and claim. Because Plaintiffs
The Court accordingly finds minimal likelihood of success on the merits—in large part based on the First Circuit‘s ruling in We the People II regarding the constitutionality of Maine‘s residency and voter-registration requirements as applied to out-of-state circulators who satisfy the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement. Under Buckley and other federal case law pertaining to the constitutionality of election regulations, the application of the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement to out-of-state circulators does not impose a severe burden on Plaintiffs’ core political speech, is both reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and furthers the State‘s important interest in the enforcement and
III. The Remaining Factors Do Not Favor Injunctive Relief
A. Irreparable Harm
Plaintiffs’ argument regarding irreparable harm rests entirely on a presumption they have not earned. They contend that because “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,” irreparable harm must be presumed once a court determines Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their First Amendment claims. ECF No. 31 at 5 (quoting Sindicato Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno, 699 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2012) (quotation modified). That presumption never triggers here because the Court has already found Plaintiffs unlikely to prevail on those claims and Plaintiffs develop no separate argument for irreparable harm independent of the merits presumption they invoke. The Secretary and Intervenors press the converse of that same logic—because Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of success, they cannot show a likelihood of irreparable harm either—and the Court agrees. ECF No. 35 at 24; ECF No. 36 at 23–24; see also Baber v. Dunlap, 349 F. Supp. 3d 68, 79–80 (D. Me. 2018) (finding no potential for irreparable harm where plaintiff had not established constitutional violation with respect to state law election regulation).
That said, the Court is cognizant that, absent an injunction barring the Secretary‘s enforcement of the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement, the Ballot Initiative will not appear on the November general election ballot. The Court recognizes the reality of that consequence, but finds it is not enough, standing alone and without further support, to
B. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
Because the State, through the Defendant Secretary of State, is the opposing party, the balance of equities and public interest factors merge for the Court‘s consideration. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). The Court finds both factors weigh heavily against granting Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief, in large part because Plaintiffs waited until the eleventh-hour to seek it.
The consent-to-jurisdiction requirement Plaintiffs now challenge was no late-breaking development: the Secretary first stated it in instructions issued to circulators in November 2025. ECF No. 36-2 ¶ 8. On April 17, 2026, the Secretary submitted her brief to the Maine Superior Court, taking the position that the 1,520 elector signatures on the four petitions circulated by out-of-state circulators, including Plaintiff Cairo, who had not checked the Jurisdiction Box should be invalidated. ECF No. 29 ¶ 57. Despite that early notice, Plaintiffs waited until June 30, 2026, to seek relief in this Court, and did not move for emergency injunctive relief until July 20, 2026—mere weeks before the applicable ballot distribution and printing deadlines. See ECF No. 36-2 ¶¶ 23–26 (ballots must be finalized by August 25, 2026, to allow ample time for printing and distribution, and noting that any further delay “could jeopardize the [Secretary]‘s ability to meet the ballot
The Secretary and Intervenors also point to
On the other side of the scale, Plaintiffs will suffer harm from the Ballot Initiative‘s absence from the November 2026 general election ballot. This harm, however, is largely self-inflicted. The First Circuit affirmed the legality of the consent-to-jurisdiction requirement well before Plaintiffs’ political activity began. See We the People II, 40 F.4th at 20. More recently, in Gilbert, the Maine Superior Court found that Cairo‘s decision not to check the Jurisdiction Box was no inadvertent error, but rather an affirmative choice made “due to unresolved questions about the implications of such consent.” ECF No. 15 at 8. Moreover, any harm to Plaintiffs is temporary rather than permanent; they remain free to gather signatures to place the Ballot Initiative on the 2027 general election ballot by following the already established election procedures. The public interest strongly favors the consistency and regularity of state elections achieved through enforcement of election regulations such as the one at issue here. Accordingly, both the balance of equities and the public interest weigh against granting injunctive relief here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons already discussed, Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their claims, and the remaining preliminary injunction factors likewise do not favor relief. Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 30, is DENIED as to all Plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 20th day of August, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
Defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing