Byungmin Chae v. United StatesByungmin Chae v. United States
[Granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in challenge to customs broker’s license denial.]
Dated: July 8, 2026
Byungmin Chae, plaintiff, of Omaha, Nebraska, proceeding pro se.
Marcella Powell, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, N.Y., for defendants. With her on the brief were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Justin R. Miller, Attorney-in-Charge, International Trade Field Office. Of counsel on the brief was Paula S. Smith, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
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Reif, Judge: Before the court is defendant United States’ (“defendant”) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Plaintiff Byungmin Chae (“plaintiff”) commenced this third action challenging the denial by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) of credit for plaintiff’s answer
For the reasons discussed below, the court grants defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
To obtain a customs broker license, an applicant must demonstrate knowledge of U.S. customs laws and regulations by passing the CBLE.
An applicant dissatisfied with a CBLE score may appeal first to Customs’ Broker Management Branch (“BMB”) and then to Customs’ Executive Assistant Commissioner (“Commissioner”).
Plaintiff received a score of 65 percent on the April 2018 CBLE and appealed to the BMB. Chae v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 45 CIT __, __, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1383, 1390 (2021). The BMB awarded plaintiff credit for two of the 13 challenged questions, increasing plaintiff’s score to 67.5 percent. Id. Plaintiff then sought review by the Commissioner with respect to the remaining eleven questions. Id. The Commissioner awarded credit for three additional questions, increasing plaintiff’s score to 71.25
On March 4, 2020, plaintiff brought his first action before this Court challenging Customs’ denial of his license application. Id. at __, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 1391. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that plaintiff failed to commence the action within the applicable statute of limitations.2 Id. at __, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 1388-89. The Court denied defendant’s motion, concluded that equitable tolling applied and granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint and summons.3 Id. at __, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 1389-92. Plaintiff’s amended complaint challenged Customs’ denial of credit for Question Nos. 5, 27, 33, 39 and 57. Chae v. Yellen, 46 CIT __, __, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1353 (2022) (“Chae I”).
On June 6, 2022, the Court held that Customs’ denial of credit for Question Nos. 5, 27, 33 and 39 was supported by substantial evidence, but concluded that Customs improperly denied credit for Question No. 57. Id. at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1372. Plaintiff’s score consequently increased to 72.5 percent, which remained below the passing score. Id. at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1370-71. Accordingly, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record and held that Customs’ denial of plaintiff’s license application was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
Plaintiff appealed. On April 25, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) affirmed the Court’s decision as to Question Nos. 27 and 33 but held that Customs improperly denied credit for Question No. 5. Chae v. Yellen, 2023 WL 3072385, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2023). Although plaintiff’s score increased to 73.75 percent, it remained below the required passing score. Id. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment sustaining Customs’ denial of plaintiff’s license application. Id.
On June 24, 2023, plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Chae v. Yellen, 144 S. Ct. 347 (2023). The Supreme Court denied the petition and later denied plaintiff’s petition for rehearing. Chae, 46 CIT at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1372, aff’d, 2023 WL 3072385 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 347 (2023), reh’g denied, 144 S. Ct. 714 (2024).
On May 8, 2024, plaintiff brought a second action before this Court challenging Customs’ denial of credit for Question No. 27. Chae v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (2024) (“Chae II”). Plaintiff argued that Question No. 27 was defective because an allegedly vague term in
The Federal Circuit held that the Court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s action on claim-preclusion grounds and further held that plaintiff waived his Baxter-based argument by raising it for the first time on appeal. Id. at *3. The Federal Circuit also considered plaintiff’s remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. Id.
On May 8, 2026, plaintiff commenced the present action. Once again, plaintiff challenges Customs’ denial of credit for Question No. 27 on the April 2018 CBLE. Accordingly, this action represents plaintiff’s third challenge arising from Customs’ denial of his 2018 customs broker license application and his second action directed specifically to Question No. 27. See Compl.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court maintains exclusive jurisdiction to review “any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs broker’s license under section 641(b)(2) or (3) of the Tariff Act of 1930.”
“A court may properly dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if Plaintiffs’ allegations of fact are not ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” VoestAlpine USA Corp. v. United States, 46 CIT __, __, 578 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1276 (2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Courts consider allegations within the complaint along with other “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, [and] matters of public record.” A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
“The court may decide to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim if the claim is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.” United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 42 CIT __, __, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1300 (2018) (citing Bowers Inv. Co. v. United States, 695 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether plaintiff’s claim is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion
A. Legal framework
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Cromwell v. Cnty. of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)); see also Golden Pac. Bancorp. v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The party asserting claim preclusion is required to establish that: (1) the parties in both actions are identical or in
Claims arise from the same transaction when they share the same nucleus of operative facts. Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (Fed. Cir. 2003). By contrast, claim preclusion does not apply when the later action arises from new operative facts occurring after the first action. Id.; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 32 CIT 476, 489, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1331 (2008).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that plaintiff’s present action is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is based on two grounds. First, defendant argues that plaintiff’s action is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Def. Br. at 6. Second, defendant argues that plaintiff’s action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id.
In response, plaintiff raises what appear to be three main arguments. Resp. of Pl. Byungmin Chae to Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 1-2 (“Pl. Resp. Br.”), ECF No. 9.
First, plaintiff argues that “the issue currently before the Court is not identical to the one previously adjudicated” because plaintiff now advances a new basis for challenging Customs’ denial of credit for Question No. 27. Pl. Resp. Br. at 1. Specifically, plaintiff argues that he relied on Baxter I when he took the CBLE because
In reply, defendant argues that “[t]he chronology of the prior proceedings refutes plaintiff’s argument.” Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 5 (“Def. Reply Br.”), ECF No. 18. Defendant argues that, even if Baxter II would have affected the correct answer to Question No. 27,4 plaintiff could have, but failed to, raise that argument during Chae I and therefore is barred from raising it in this action. Id.
The court agrees with defendant. Both Baxter I and Baxter II predated the final judgment in Chae I. Baxter II was issued in February 2020 while plaintiff commenced Chae I a month later, filed an amended complaint on July 6, 2021, and the Court entered final judgment on June 6, 2022. Plaintiff therefore had ample opportunity to present the Baxter-based argument in Chae I.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit held expressly that plaintiff waived the Baxter-based argument by raising it for the first time on appeal. Chae, 2025 WL 3228192, at *3 (“The problem with this argument is that it has been waived because Mr. Chae raises it for the
Plaintiff’s second argument is that his new challenge to Question No. 27 is not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because the Third Circuit decision in Baxter II constituted “new evidence” that was “not reasonably available at the time of the prior proceeding” and therefore “falls within a recognized exception” to res judicata, namely the “newly discovered evidence” exception. Pl. Resp. Br. at 1.
In reply, defendant argues that the “‘newly discovered evidence’ exception to res judicata or claim preclusion is extremely narrow.” Def. Reply Br. at 4. Defendant explains that the exception applies only when the evidence was “either fraudulently concealed or it could not have been discovered with due diligence.” Id. (quoting Bosley v. The Chubb Inst., 516 F. Supp. 2d 479, 484-85 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Defendant argues that plaintiff “has neither pointed to facts that were fraudulently concealed nor facts that could not have been discovered with due diligence.” Id.
The court agrees with defendant. Plaintiff cannot invoke the newly discovered evidence exception to claim preclusion because Baxter II does not constitute newly discovered evidence within the meaning of that exception. Instead, Baxter II is an intervening judicial decision. See Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 394 (1981) (“The res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal
Plaintiff‘s third argument is that “ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) under the
In reply, defendant argues that “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not provide a basis for avoiding the application of res judicata or claim preclusion in a civil action . . . . The
The court again agrees with defendant. The Federal Circuit explained that “[i]t is well established that, as a general matter, the constitutional right to counsel—and thus the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel—does not attach in civil cases that do not involve the potential deprivation of a liberty interest.” Pitts, 700 F.3d at 1283. The Federal Circuit has recognized only limited exceptions to that general rule, such as when an indigent litigant may lose his or her personal freedom if the action is
Accordingly, the court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss because plaintiff’s claims are barred by claim preclusion. Baxter II does not constitute newly discovered evidence, and this case does not implicate the ineffective assistance of counsel concerns that may warrant an exception to claim preclusion. Because the court grants defendant’s motion on claim preclusion grounds, the court need not address defendant’s alternative statute of limitations argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss. Judgment will enter accordingly.
/s/ Timothy M. Reif
Timothy M. Reif, Judge
Dated: July 8, 2026
New York, New York