Byungmin Chae v. United StatesByungmin Chae v. United States
Byungmin Chae, plaintiff, of Omaha, Nebraska, proceeding pro se.
Marcella Powell, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, N.Y., argued for defendant United States. With her on the brief were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy,
Reif, Judge: Before the court is the motion to dismiss of defendant United States (“defendant“). Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def. Br.“), ECF No. 7.
Plaintiff Byungmin Chae (“plaintiff“) filed his second action with this Court to challenge the denial by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs“) of credit for plaintiff‘s answer to Question No. 27 on the April 2018 Customs Broker License Exam (CBLE). Pl.‘s Complaint (“Compl.“) at 1, ECF No. 2. To obtain a license, section 641(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
Broker license applicants who are dissatisfied with their exam scores may file an appeal first to the Broker Management Branch (“BMB“) of Customs and then to Customs’ Executive Assistant Commissioner (“Commissioner“).
On the April 2018 CBLE, plaintiff received a score of 65 percent and subsequently filed an appeal with the BMB. Chae v. Sec‘y of the Treasury, 45 CIT __, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1383, 1390 (2021);
On March 4, 2020, plaintiff brought his first action to contest the decision of Customs
On June 6, 2022, this Court held that Customs’ denial of credit for four of the five contested questions (Question Nos. 5, 27, 33 and 39) was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1372. The Court determined that Customs’ decision to deny credit for Question No. 57, however, was not. Id. Despite the credit adjustment, plaintiff‘s score was 72.5 percent and still below the passing requirement. Id. at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1370-71. The Court denied plaintiff‘s motion for judgment on the agency record and concluded that Customs’ decision to reject plaintiff‘s application for a customs broker‘s license was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (quoting
On July 13, 2022, plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit“) this Court‘s decision to sustain Customs’ denial of credit for Question Nos. 5, 27 and 33 on the CBLE. Chae v. Yellen, 2023 WL 3072385, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2023). On April 25, 2023, the Federal Circuit affirmed this Court‘s decision as to Question Nos. 27 and 33 but found that Customs’ denial of credit for Question No. 5 was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at *7. As a result, plaintiff‘s score rose to 73.75 percent, but stayed below the minimum 75 percent. Id. The Federal Circuit accordingly upheld this Court‘s judgment that Customs was justified in denying plaintiff a license due to an insufficient score. Id. (citing Kenny, 401 F.3d at 1361).
On June 24, 2023, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking review of the Federal Circuit‘s decision. See Chae v. Yellen, 144 S. Ct. 347 (2023). On October 23, 2023, the Supreme Court denied plaintiff‘s request. Id. On January 22, 2024, the Supreme Court also rejected plaintiff‘s subsequent request for a rehearing. Chae, 46 CIT at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1372, aff‘d, 2023 WL 3072385 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 347 (Oct. 30, 2023), reh‘g denied, 144 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 22, 2024) (“Chae I“).
On May 8, 2024, plaintiff commenced the instant action with this Court. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff contended that Customs’ denial of credit for Question No. 27 was improper given that a vague term in
For the following reasons, the court grants defendant‘s motion to dismiss.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court maintains exclusive jurisdiction to review “any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs broker‘s license under section 641(b)(2) or (3) of the Tariff Act of 1930.”
“A court may properly dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if Plaintiffs’ allegations of fact are not ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.‘” VoestAlpine USA Corp. v. United States, 46 CIT __, 578 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1276 (2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Courts consider allegations within the complaint along with other “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, [and] matters of public record.” A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
“The court may decide to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim if the claim is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.” United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 42 CIT __, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1300 (2018) (citing Bowers Inv. Co. v. United States, 695 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
DISCUSSION
The court considers whether plaintiff‘s claim is barred by claim preclusion. Because plaintiff‘s arguments in the instant action could have been raised in Chae I, the court answers yes. Plaintiff is barred from bringing the instant action.
I. Whether plaintiff‘s claim is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion
A. Legal framework
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Cromwell v. Cnty. of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (“Res judicata prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior
A transaction is characterized as having “the same, or nearly the same factual allegations” or “the same nucleus of operative facts.” Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1993) (first quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 521 (1986); and then quoting Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 744 (8th Cir. 1990)). By contrast, new events or facts arising after the first suit are not part of the same “operative nucleus of facts.”6 Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1052, 1057 (2003) (citing Herrmann, 999 F.2d at 226); see also E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 32 CIT 476, 489, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1331 (2008) (explaining
that claim preclusion did not apply because the first suit concerned “a judicial challenge to a different administrative determination by Customs” than in the second suit).
B. Analysis
The court asks whether the proceedings in Chae I bar plaintiff from making his current claim in this court. Plaintiff insists that he is not barred by claim preclusion on the basis that his current claim as to Question No. 27 differs from his previous claim. Compl. at 2; see Pl. Letter. Specifically, he highlights a perceived ambiguity in
Defendant contends that the three elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. Def. Br. at 8. Specifically, defendant asserts that the parties involved in the present action and in Chae I are identical and that the claim under consideration here matches plaintiff‘s claim in Chae I. Id. (citing Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326 n.5. Defendant notes additionally that this Court issued a final judgment in plaintiff‘s first action. Id.
Plaintiff is foreclosed from bringing the instant action because each element of claim preclusion is satisfied. First, the parties in Chae I and the instant case are identical. Second, this Court issued a final judgment on the merits in plaintiff‘s first action, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that judgment. See Chae I, 46 CIT at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1372. Third, the instant
Plaintiff rebuts that he “was not seeking to relitigate the claim challenging CBP‘s decision on Question No. 27.” Pl. Letter at 1. Plaintiff asserts instead that the definitions of “Customs territory” in
Plaintiff‘s position is unsupported. Plaintiff here simply presents an additional reason that he should have been awarded credit for the same question that was the subject of Chae I. The claim in Chae I and the present claim share the identical objective of obtaining credit for Question No. 27 and achieving a 75 percent score on the CBLE. See Chae I, 46 CIT at __, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1358-61. Plaintiff already received a final judgment from this Court and the Federal Circuit‘s affirmation of that judgment. Id.
Additionally, plaintiff had the opportunity to address his purported confusion regarding “Customs territory” while he challenged the same regulation in Chae I. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 94 (“[A] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” (citation omitted)); see also Federated Dep‘t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). Plaintiff contested the same regulation —
In sum, the instant action is barred due to the doctrine of claim preclusion. Plaintiff has no valid claim to present, and the court in turn grants defendant‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant‘s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Judgment will enter accordingly.
/s/ Timothy M. Reif
Timothy M. Reif, Judge
Dated: November 13, 2024
New York, New York