JOAN BUZZARD v. LAURA FASS ET AL.
(AC 46257)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
May 7, 2024
Elgo, Clark and Lavine, Js.
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Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (
Pursuant further to statute (
The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an order of the Probate Court overruling her objection to the approval of a periodic accounting of a testamentary trust, which had provided for distributions to the defendants, F and W, the adopted great grandnieces of the testator, T. In 1946, T executed a will and two codicils. T‘s will established a testamentary trust for the benefit of the descendants of his siblings. T‘s sister and the living issue of T‘s other siblings were designated as the original beneficiaries. T died in 1947, and, in 1949, the Probate Court issued a decree that transferred the “rest, residue and remainder” of T‘s estate to the trustee, so that the trustee could make distributions in accordance with the trust. W was adopted as a child in 1948 by a descendant of one of the original beneficiaries and began receiving distributions under the trust upon the death of her parent in 1997. F was adopted in 2008 as an adult by one of the descendants of the original beneficiaries and began receiving distributions under the trust in 2014 upon the death of her parent. In 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection in the Probate Court to the approval of a periodic accounting of the trust, arguing that the trust did not allow for distributions to F because she had been adopted as an adult. The Probate Court approved the periodic accounting, concluding that the presumption in favor of adopted persons in
- The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the Superior Court erred in rendering summary judgment for the defendants, which was based on her claim that the exception to the presumption in favor of adopted persons set forth in
§ 45a-731 (11) (B) applied: the 1949 decree, which transferred the rest, residue and remainder of the estate to the trustee, did not constitute a “distribution” for purposes of§ 45a-731 (11) (B) so as to require the application of the outmoded “stranger to the adoption” rule, which presumed that an adopted child was not within the intended bounty of a settlor who was not the adopting parent, because the 1949 decree did not finalize the apportionment of the remainder of the estate under the will, as distributions to those who were entitled to share in the estate under the testamentary trust were still to occur into the future, with the beneficiaries under the trust continually changing upon the birth and death of T‘s descendants, and the trust remained under the jurisdiction of the Probate Court; moreover, other than the plaintiff‘s threadbare assertion that the 1949 decree fixed the identity of the distributees under the trust, the plaintiff did not explain how that decree vested any interest in any beneficiary of the trust, rather, the record showed that the 1949 decree simply transferred to the trustee the residue of the estate so that the trustee could, in turn, make distributions to the proper beneficiaries; furthermore, although some distributions under the trust were made prior to October 1, 1991, other distributions were made and approved after that date, and, therefore,§ 45a-731 (11) (B) applies only to trust distributions made or approved to be made pursuant to a court order entered prior to October 1, 1991, and does not apply to those distributions, such as the distribution challenged in this appeal, made after that date. - The plaintiff‘s claim that the exception to the presumption in favor of adopted persons set forth in
§ 45a-731 (11) (A) applied because there was clear and convincing evidence that T did not intend to include adopted persons as beneficiaries under the trust was unavailing: there was no rule of law at the time T‘s will was executed in 1946 excluding adopted persons from the definition of “issue” or “descendants,” rather, under the common law, there existed a mere presumption against including an adopted person within those terms when a testator‘s intent was unclear, and, although the presumption in effect when T executed his will led some courts to interpret terms like the term “issue” to exclude adopted persons, that presumption no longer applies because, in 1991, the legislature altered that presumption, and, as a result, this court presumes that the terms “issue” and “descendants” include legally adopted persons when interpreting instruments that control distributions made in accordance with a will or an estate of a person that died prior to October 1, 1959; moreover, the plaintiff‘s argument that T‘s use of the terms “issue” and “descendants” constituted clear and convincing evidence of an intent to exclude adopted persons because the old common-law presumption excluded them conflated T‘s actual intent with a rule of construction, and, although the terms “issue” and “descendants” may have been presumed to exclude adopted persons at the time the will was executed, the use of these terms in a will or trust, in the absence of evidence that a testator actually considered the contingency of adoption, does not provide the requisite clear and convincing evidence of T‘s intention that adopted persons be treated differently from biological children; furthermore, although T executed a first codicil in which he added the word “the” into the trust document, so that the trust as amended provides that the interest of any of the original beneficiaries shall be held upon the same terms for the benefit of “the other beneficiaries then living and/or their issue or successors,” the addition of that clarifying word did not imply anything with respect to T‘s intent as to adopted persons and did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an intention to exclude them.
Argued January 9-officially released May 7, 2024
Appeal from the decree of the Probate Court for the district of Hartford approving the periodic accounting of a testamentary trust, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Sicilian, J., granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, denied the plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment, and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
John F. Carberry, with whom, on the brief, were Kelley Galica Peck and M. Juliet Bonazzoli, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Steven L. Katz, with whom was Alan J. Rome, for the appellee (named defendant).
Patrick M. Fahey, for the appellee (defendant Pamela Baker Weiss).
Opinion
CLARK, J. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the defendants, Laura Fass and Pamela Baker Weiss, the adopted great grandnieces of Joseph Merrow, the testator, are included within the terms “issue” and “descendants” used in a testamentary trust executed by the testator in 1946. The plaintiff, Joan Buzzard, claims that the only persons permitted to receive distributions under the subject trust are the originally named beneficiaries and their lineal blood descendants, not the adopted defendants. The plaintiff claims that the Superior Court improperly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denied her motion for summary judgment because it erroneously concluded that
follow, we disagree with the plaintiff and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
We begin with the relevant undisputed facts and procedural history of the case. The testator died on or about March 27, 1947. He never had children and he had no living siblings at the time of his death. The testator executed a will on March 19, 1946, and later executed two codicils, one on July 1, 1946 (first codicil), and another on September 6, 1946 (second codicil). The will established three testamentary trusts for the benefit of the descendants of his siblings: the Article Fifth Trust, the Article Sixth Trust, and the Article Eighth Trust. The Article Eighth Trust (trust) is the subject of the present dispute.
The trust provides for a contingent, outright distribution of a portion of the interests in the trust proceeds to the testator‘s nephew, John Merrow Washburn, but it otherwise designated the testator‘s sister, Mary W. Merrow, who had no children, and the living issue of the testator‘s other two siblings, George W. Merrow and Martha Belden Washburn, as original beneficiaries.3 Relevant for present purposes, the testator‘s brother, George W. Merrow, had nine children, four of whom, John Merrow, Oliver Wolcott Merrow, Pauline M. Baker, and Harriet M. Landon, also had children. John Merrow had three biological children, all of whom had biological children, and Oliver Wolcott Merrow had three children, all of whom had biological children. Pauline M. Baker
had three biological children. One of Pauline M. Baker‘s children, William Baker, adopted Weiss, who was born in April, 1946, and was placed for adoption with William Baker and his wife in or around February, 1947. Weiss’ adoption was approved by the Hartford Probate Court on March 19, 1948. Harriet M. Landon had one biological daughter, Elizabeth M. Landon, who had no biological children. Elizabeth M. Landon adopted Fass in 2008, when Elizabeth M. Landon was eighty-five years old and Fass was fifty-three years old.
The trust provides in relevant part: “If any of the original beneficiaries or their successors in interest as herein determined shall die either before or after my death leaving issue, the interest of the one so dying shall thereafter be held upon the
Upon the death of William Baker in 1997, Weiss succeeded to his interest. She began receiving distributions under the trust whenever the trustee made distributions. Specifically, as her father‘s only child, Weiss
received the entirety of what previously had been her father‘s share of each distribution from the trust.4
After the death of Elizabeth M. Landon in 2014, the distributions that were payable to her under the trust were paid to Fass. An accounting listing Fass as a beneficiary of the trust was approved by the Probate Court in 2015. Fass received distributions from the trust from 2014 to 2019.
On or about December 5, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection in the Probate Court to the approval of a periodic accounting of the trust. On January 6, 2020, a hearing was held by the Probate Court on the approval of the periodic accounting and the objection filed by the plaintiff. At the hearing, the plaintiff‘s counsel argued that the trust document did not allow for distributions of the trust proceeds to Fass because she was adopted by Elizabeth M. Landon in 2008, when Fass was an adult. Notwithstanding
On June 9, 2020, the Probate Court rejected the plaintiff‘s argument that the narrow exceptions to
(4) that are set forth in
On July 9, 2020, pursuant to
On February 28 and March 18, 2022, Fass and Weiss, respectively, filed motions for summary judgment. They claimed that
On April 6, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. She argued that subdivisions (1) through (9) of
(11), applied. In particular, she claimed that the exception set forth in
On January 24, 2023, the court, Sicilian, J., issued a memorandum of decision granting the motions for summary judgment filed by Fass and Weiss, and denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff. The court concluded that the exceptions set forth in
and, as evidenced by the decree challenged in this probate appeal, the Probate Court has been presented with periodic accountings seeking approval of distributions to be made.”
The court further explained that, contrary to the plaintiff‘s contention,
With respect to the exception set forth in
as reflected in
The court went on to reject each of the plaintiff‘s additional arguments. Specifically, the court was not persuaded by the plaintiff‘s argument that the addition of the word “the” in the first codicil implied anything about adopted persons. Nor was it persuaded by the plaintiff‘s contention that the provision of the will excluding spouses of the descendants of the testator‘s siblings shed any light on the testator‘s intention regarding adopted persons. Accordingly, the court concluded that the “[the plaintiff] fail[ed] to provide clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended to exclude adopted persons as beneficiaries of the trust at issue.” This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the appropriate framework for appellate review of a summary judgment determination. Practice Book § 17-49 provides: “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. New Haven, 214 Conn. App. 553, 563 (2022). “[T]he moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle [her]
Before we turn to the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims, we begin with a brief history and overview of the law governing the inheritance rights of adopted persons in Connecticut. Prior to 1959, “[w]here the grantor or testator [was] the adopting parent, it [was] reasonable to presume that the adopted child was within the intended bounty of such grantor or testator.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, 96 Conn. 61, 71 (1921). That presumption, however, did not apply to a grantor or testator who was not the adopting parent. See Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 9 (1930). Connecticut courts “presumed that an adopted child [was] not within the intended bounty of a settlor who, as a nonadopting parent, [was] a stranger to the adoption.” Schapira v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 450, 455 (1987). “[T]he common law favor[ed] ancestral blood and [would] presume that the settlor did not intend that a stranger to his blood take.” Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, 162 Conn. 201, 207 (1972). This has become known as the “stranger to the adoption” doctrine. Mooney v. Tolles, supra, 9.
In 1959, the legislature enacted No. 106 of the 1959 Public Acts (P.A. 106),6 a predecessor of
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, supra, 162 Conn. 209 (“we once again must refuse to hold . . . [
For more than thirty years, the statutory presumption in favor of adopted persons continued to apply only to wills and trust instruments executed after October 1, 1959. In 1991, however, the legislature transferred the provisions of
As previously explained in this opinion, P.A. 91-83 transferred the statutory provisions governing the rights of adopted persons to
whether issued by a court of this state or a court of any other jurisdiction, shall have the following effect in this state . . . (4) The adopted person shall, except as hereinafter provided, be treated as if such adopted person were the biological child of the adoptive parent for purposes of the applicability of all documents and instruments, whether executed before or after the adoption decree is issued, which do not expressly exclude an adopted person in their operation or effect. The words ‘child‘, ‘children‘, ‘issue‘, ‘descendant‘, ‘descendants‘, ‘heir‘, ‘heirs‘, ‘lawful heirs‘, ‘grandchild’ and ‘grandchildren‘, when used in any will or trust instrument shall include legally adopted persons unless such document clearly indicates a contrary intention. . . .”
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court erred in rendering summary judgment for the defendants because it improperly concluded that
The defendants disagree. Weiss takes issue with the plaintiff‘s contention that all the interests in the trust were “vested” by operation of the 1949 decree. Weiss points out that the 1949 decree did not vest any interest in the plaintiff or in any of the original beneficiaries of the trust, rather, that the distribution in the 1949 decree was only a distribution to the trustee of the trust. Weiss notes that the trust remains subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court and the beneficiaries of the trust continue to receive distributions. She argues that the
trial court properly construed the exception in
Fass similarly argues that it is clear that the trust was not distributed for purposes of the exception set forth in
“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied
itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.
Contemporary to the 1991 amendment of
among those who are legally entitled to share in the same.” (Emphasis added.) Black‘s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 475. More generally, the term “distribution” meant “the act or process of distributing” or “something distributed. . . .” Webster‘s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1990) p. 368.
We conclude that the plain language of
In applying
later make distributions in accordance with the testamentary trust), constitutes a distribution for purposes of
Furthermore, the plaintiff‘s contention that the 1949 decree “affirm[ed] the identity of the distributees . . . and distribution was made pursuant to that [decree] [and] that the rights of the biological descendants were fixed and vested” at that time must also be rejected. Other than these threadbare assertions, the plaintiff has not sufficiently explained or demonstrated how the decree vested any interest in any beneficiary of the trust, let alone named or otherwise vested any interest in her. Rather, the record shows that the 1949 decree simply transferred to the trustee the rest, residue and remainder of the estate so that the trustee, in turn, could make distributions from the estate to the proper beneficiaries. Although the plaintiff attempts to support her arguments by pointing to a few cases; see, e.g., Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey, supra, 96 Conn. 61; those authorities are inapposite to the facts of the present case and the question presented in this appeal.
The trust at issue, like many testamentary trusts, provides that distributions are to be made on a periodic basis into the future, with the beneficiaries under the trust continually changing upon the birth and/or death of the testator‘s descendants. Although various distributions “of the estate or under the will” were made prior to October 1, 1991;
Although the plaintiff would have us interpret the statute to mean that subdivisions (1) through (9) of
until at least October 1, 1991-a period of not less than thirty-two years after such person‘s death. It is axiomatic, however, that the legislature does “not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results“; (internal quotation marks omitted) Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 361 (2009); and “that reviewing courts should not construe statutes in disregard of their context and in frustration of the obvious legislative intent or in a manner that is hostile to an evident legislative purpose . . . or in a way that is contrary to common sense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Banks, 321 Conn. 821, 842 (2016). Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court properly determined that the exception set forth in
II
The plaintiff next claims that, even if the exception in
and convincing evidence that he intended to exclude such persons as beneficiaries. She also argues that the testator‘s addition of the word “the” in the first codicil to the trust demonstrates a clear intent by the testator to exclude adopted persons as beneficiaries under the trust. We are not persuaded.
Here, the parties dispute the retroactive application of the definitions set forth in
In order for the exception set forth in
belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 226 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 (2006).
The plaintiff argues that the testator‘s use of the words “issue” and “descendants,” alone, is clear and convincing evidence that the testator did not intend for adopted persons to be included as beneficiaries under the trust because an adopted person was not among the class of persons constituting “issue” or “descendants” when the testator executed his will in 1946. The plaintiff contends that “the testator was a knowledgeable businessman, with a keen and sophisticated understanding of the law, and a savvy and careful reviewer of legal documents,” and that “the testator‘s intent to include only lineal blood descendants is clear beyond peradventure.” (Emphasis omitted.)
Contrary to the plaintiff‘s contention, there was no rule of law at the time the will was executed in 1946 excluding adopted persons from the definitions of “issue” or “descendants.” Under the common law, there existed merely a presumption against including an adopted person within the definitions of “issue” or “descendants” when a testator‘s intent with respect to that question was unclear. See, e.g., Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 469, 473-74 (1941); Ansonia National Bank v. Kunkel, 105 Conn. 744, 751 (1927). Indeed, “[w]here no intent to include the adopted child [could] be ascertained, the common law favor[ed] ancestral blood and [would] presume that the settlor did not intend that a stranger to his blood take.” (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, supra, 162 Conn. 207. Our Supreme Court made clear, though, that this presumption was “merely
an aid to construction“; id.; “which cannot prevail over an intent fairly deducible from the terms of the will read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, supra, 474.
Although the presumption in effect around the time the testator executed his will led to some courts interpreting terms, like the term “issue,” to exclude adopted persons; see, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 356 (1953); that presumption is no longer the lens through which we review the testamentary language. The statutory amendment that the legislature adopted in 1991 altered that presumption. See P.A. 91-83. As a result of that amendment, we now presume that the terms “issue” and “descendants” include legally adopted persons when we are interpreting instruments that control distributions made in accordance with a will or an estate of a person that died prior to October 1, 1959. In light of that statutory change and the legislature‘s clear intent to reverse and replace the old presumption that treated adopted and biological children differently, we are not persuaded that the legislature intended for its
Moreover, the plaintiff‘s argument that the testator‘s use of the terms “issue” and “descendants” in the trust constitutes clear and convincing evidence of an intent to exclude adopted persons because the old common-law presumption excluded them conflates the actual intent of a testator with a rule of construction. The decision in Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 398 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (D. Md. 1974), aff‘d, 567 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1977), speaks directly to this point. In Purifoy, the court addressed a nearly identical issue, namely, whether the term “descendants,” as well as the
terms “child” and “children,” included an adopted child in various testamentary instruments that were at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1077. The defendants, like the plaintiff in this case, argued that the testator clearly intended to exclude an adopted child from the terms “child” or “children” because the law in place when the testator executed the testamentary instruments excluded such persons and the testator was presumed to know the law when he executed the will at that time. Id., 1079.
The court rejected that claim, noting that the defendants’ argument “fail[ed] to properly distinguish between the actual intent of the testator in employing the words in question and the meaning that a rule of construction assigns to them. . . . [F]or these words to reflect a clear actual intention, this [c]ourt would have to make the unwarranted assumption that the testator actually considered the contingency of adoption in choosing the words. The defendants, though, find actual intention in a combination of the terms ‘child,’ ‘children,’ etc. and the rule of construction prior to 1947, which excluded adopted children of one other than the testator. In other words, the defendants would have an earlier rule of construction, without anything else, become part of the testator‘s actual intent so as to defeat the retroactive application of a subsequent and conflicting rule of construction. By definition, a rule of construction is not synonymous with or a part of the actual intent of the testator. Its function is to assign a meaning to the words when the testator‘s actual intention cannot be determined, and only after the failure to find an intention can a rule of construction be considered. . . . Therefore, since the testators used only the words ‘child,’ ‘children,’ and ‘descendants’ and since the will and surrounding circumstances fail to reveal that the contingency of adoption was ever considered, no actual intention of the testator concerning adopted
children is present. The meaning to be ascribed to the words in question is to be found in one of the two applicable rules of construction.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id.
The court in Purifoy was addressing competing rules of construction created by statute-the defendants in that case advocated for the earlier rule of construction, whereas the plaintiff argued that the later rule of construction must be applied. Id. Here, by contrast, the plaintiff pits a prior common-law presumption against a more recent, statutory presumption. The rationale of Purifoy, however, applies equally. The plaintiff attempts to equate the common-law presumption about the meaning of the terms “issue” and “descendants” with the actual intention of the testator. In the words of the Purifoy court, this “[she] clearly cannot do.” Id., 1079 n.3.
In a final effort to show by clear and convincing evidence that the testator in this case intended to
exclude adopted persons from receiving distributions pursuant to the trust, the plaintiff points to the testator‘s first codicil, in which the testator added the word “the” into the trust document. The language so amended provides in relevant part: “If any of the original beneficiaries or their successors in interest as herein determined shall die either before or after my death leaving no issue, the interest of the one so dying shall thereafter be held upon the same terms for the benefit of the other beneficiaries then living and/or their issue or successors . . . in the same proportions in which they would inherit from the one so dying without issue if he or she were unmarried, under the laws covering the distribution of intestate estates then in force in the State of Connecticut . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff argues that the addition of the word “the,” which did not appear in the original will but was considered of such importance by the testator that it was added in the first codicil, “clearly define[s] the connecting words ‘other beneficiaries then living and/or their issue or successors,’ ” evincing an intent by the testator to limit the class of distributees under the will to the originally named ten individuals that he named and their lineal blood descendants. We are not persuaded. As the trial court correctly noted, the addition in the first codicil of the clarifying word “the” implies nothing about adopted persons and certainly does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an intention to exclude them. Although the plaintiff attempts to show the testator‘s intent to exclude adopted persons by pointing to other areas of the will, those attempts fall short for the same reasons. Nothing to which the plaintiff points us speaks to the testator‘s intention regarding adopted persons.8
Notes
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that neither of the exceptions in
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
deem her claim, to the extent she is making one to that effect, abandoned. We further note that, to the extent the plaintiff‘s arguments can be read as calling into question the validity of adult adoptions in general, Connecticut law expressly permits them. See