CODY BUTLER v. ST. STANISLAUS KOSTKA CATHOLIC ACADEMY and THE DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN
19-CV-3574(EK)(ST)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
June 27, 2022
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge
Document 81; PageID #: 4333
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
This employment dispute arises from the termination of a teacher by a Catholic school — the St. Stanislaus Kostka Catholic Academy in Queens, which Plaintiff and Defendants’ employees refer to as “St. Stans.” Plaintiff Cody Butler claims that St. Stans fired him on account of his sexual orientation. He brings suit against the school and the Diocese that oversees it pursuant to Title VII and analogous New York State and City laws, and also seeks unpaid wages under the New York Labor Law. Both parties move for summary judgment: Butler with respect to certain of St. Stans’ affirmative defenses, and St. Stans on all of Butler’s claims. For the reasons set out below, I grant St. Stans’ motion for summary judgment and deny Butler’s motion.
I. Background
The following facts are drawn from the parties’ Local
St. Stans’ stated mission is to, among other things, provide a “nurturing environment that emphasizes Catholic values” as well as “the beauty of diversity and love of God, others and life-long learning.” Pl.’s Responses to Defs.’ Local
In August 2015, Butler applied to teach two subjects at St. Stans: English Language Arts and Social Studies. Pl.’s
St. Stans interviewed Butler that month; the school subsequently offered him the position for the 2015-2016 school year. Id. ¶¶ 77–78. Butler signed a Contract of Employment requiring him to, among other things, “exemplify by [his] public conduct Catholic Doctrine and Morality,” serve as “a role model of the Catholic Faith,” and “includ[e] the Church’s teachings within” the subject matter of his lessons. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 15, at 2, ECF No. 57-5. And he received the Academy Teacher Personnel Handbook (the “Handbook“), sent to all new hires, which stated that teachers must “embrac[e] the ministry” and could be terminated if they violated “the tenets of Catholic morality or teaching contrary to Catholic doctrine.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 16, at 10, 62, ECF No. 57-6.1
Deposition testimony also made clear that St. Stans expected its teachers to fulfill several religious obligations. This testimony primarily came from Dr. Thomas Chadzutko, the Superintendent of Catholic School Support Services at the Brooklyn Diocese, and Christina Cieloszczyk, St. Stans’ principal. Among other things, Superintendent Chadzutko
On September 1, Butler attended a “New Teacher Orientation Program” at St. Stans along with the other first-year teachers. Pl.’s
After attending the first day of orientation, I am concerned about my position within the diocese and school. The tones of the speakers were strident at times and I cannot tell if I would be accepted. I am homosexual and plan on marrying my boyfriend eventually, and after being told all day that I have to live church doctrine I feel wounded and unwanted.
I want to teach the kids at St. Stan’s [sic] more than anything, but I put the decision in your hands now rather than at some point down the line. Would I still be a welcome member of the St. Stan’s community?
Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 27, at 44, ECF No. 57-7.
Principal Cieloszczyk forwarded Butler’s email to Dr. Chadzutko and asked for advice. Pl.’s
The next day, Principal Cieloszczyk sent Butler a termination letter (which was returned as undeliverable). Pl.’s
Given that the school year was to start shortly thereafter, St. Stans embarked on a rapid interview process to replace Butler. Id. ¶ 130; Cieloszczyk Dep. Tr. 32:17-19. The school wound up hiring a new teacher, Amanda Puglionisi, who served for only one year. Pl.’s
In April 2016, Butler filed a discrimination claim with the New York City Commission on Human Rights (“NYCCHR“). Verified Complaint to the NYCCHR, ECF No. 60-40. In its position statement before the NYCCHR, St. Stans took the position (as it does here) that the termination was predicated on Butler’s statement of intended conduct, rather than his sexuality itself. The school asserted that Butler’s “choice to marry another man is a clear and obvious violation of Church teachings,” and that “[i]f [Butler] was living a celibate life[,] his sexual orientation would be meaningless absent more actions on his part.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. E ¶¶ 40-41, ECF No. 60-8. Butler commenced this action in June 2019.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a dispute of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). If the movant carries its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). The entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Generally speaking, employment-discrimination claims proceed through the three-step analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). At the first step, the plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to prove a prima facie case of discrimination based on a protected characteristic — here, Butler’s sexual orientation. Id. at 802; see Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.” (emphasis added)). If the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a “legitimate, non-discriminatory” explanation for the challenged employment action, McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802; St. Stans proffers, here, its religious tenets and Butler’s rejection thereof. If the defendant meets its burden at the second step, the burden returns to the plaintiff, who must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the justification put forward by the defendant is pretextual. Id. at 804.
III. Analysis
Title VII prohibits covered employers from firing employees where their sex or sexual orientation is a “motivating factor.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015); see
the Religion Clauses protect the right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters of faith and doctrine without government intrusion. State interference in that sphere would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any attempt by government to dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment of religion. The First Amendment outlaws such intrusion.
St. Stans claims it is exempt from Title VII liability in this case based on these First Amendment principles and also the statutory exemptions in Title VII itself, which permit religious “educational institution[s]” to “employ employees of a particular religion.”
St. Stans’ First Amendment defense implicates, first, the so-called “ministerial exception” recognized and discussed by the Supreme Court in two relatively recent cases. This exemption shields religious employers from liability for employment decisions regarding employees who qualify as “ministers,” regardless of whether they are terminated for a religious reason, a secular reason or, indeed, with no reason given at all. In Section III.A, I conclude that Butler was hired into a “ministerial” capacity at St. Stans, and that summary judgment is required on that basis.
The ministerial exception is not, however, the only mechanism limiting secular courts’ intrusion into the employment decisions of religious institutions. The ministerial exception derives from, and is but one manifestation of, a broader (and
A. The Ministerial Exception Requires Dismissal
Broadly speaking, the ministerial exception “precludes application of [Title VII] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). Every circuit had adopted a version of the ministerial exception before the Supreme Court recognized it
The Supreme Court analyzed the ministerial exception twice in the last decade: first in Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171, and eight years later in Our Lady of Guadalupe (“OLG“), 140 S. Ct. 2049. Neither case sets out a definitive rule for when a religious employee qualifies as a “minister,” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190; indeed, the cases counsel against any formulaic test or “checklist” approach. See id. (counseling against the adoption of a “rigid formula“); Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (criticizing the Court of Appeals for treating the factors identified as relevant in Hosanna-Tabor as “checklist items“). The Court did, however, identify a series of relevant factors, and the application of those factors compels the conclusion that the ministerial exception applies here.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court considered whether a fourth-grade teacher at a Lutheran school qualified as a
Eight years later, the Supreme Court revisited the ministerial exception in Our Lady of Guadalupe. Unlike the
The religious education and formation of students is the very reason for the existence of most private religious schools, and therefore the selection and supervision of the teachers upon whom the schools rely to do this work lie at the core of their mission. Judicial review of the way in which religious schools discharge those responsibilities would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate.
In analyzing the applicability of the ministerial exception, the Court observed that formal titles are not
- The schools’ stated missions. “Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught . . . .” Id. at 2066.
- The teachers’ employment agreements, which were “in pertinent part nearly identical.” Id. at 2058. One plaintiff’s agreement informed her, for example, that the school’s mission was “to develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community,” that “all her duties and responsibilities as a Teacher were to be performed within this overriding commitment,” and that she was expected to
“model and promote Catholic faith and morals.” Id. at 2056; see also id. at 2066 (the teachers “were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith“). - Faculty handbooks. “The St. James handbook define[d] ‘religious development’ as the school’s first goal and provide[d] that teachers must ‘model the faith life,’ ‘exemplify the teachings of Jesus Christ,’ ‘integrate Catholic thought and principles into secular subjects,” and “prepare students to receive the sacraments.” Id. at 2058-59.
- Religious teaching. Both elementary school teachers provided religious instruction, in addition to teaching all other subjects. “Morrissey-Berru provided religious instruction every day using a textbook designed for use in teaching religion to young Catholic students.” Id. at 2057. “Under the prescribed curriculum, she was expected to teach students, among other things, to learn and express belief that Jesus is the son of God and the Word made flesh; to identify the ways the church carries on the mission of Jesus“; and to “locate, read and understand stories from the Bible.” Id. The other teacher, Ms. Biel, “was required to teach religion for 200 minutes each week
and administered a test on religion every week.” Id. at 2059. - “Catechist” status. “Like all teachers in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Morrissey-Berru was considered a catechist, i.e., a teacher of religion.” Id. at 2057. Catechists are “responsible for the faith formation of the students in their charge each day.” Id. The Supreme Court repeatedly invoked this notion — that all teachers were expected to model religious values for students at all times.
- Participation in prayer. One teacher, Morrissey-Berru, was “expected to attend faculty prayer services,” id. at 2056, and was required to participate in “school liturgical activities, as requested.” Id. She “occasionally selected and prepared students to read at Mass,” id. at 2057, and she “was expected to take her students to Mass once a week and on certain feast days.” Id. “Biel taught her students about Catholic practices like the Eucharist and confession. At monthly Masses, she prayed with her students.” Id. at 2059.
Consideration of these factors leads to the same conclusion here. In its public job listing, St. Stans said that it was looking only for “a practicing Roman Catholic committed to the mission of Catholic education” — not secular education — to fill the position. Pl.’s
After receiving the job offer, Butler signed a written Contract of Employment dated August 28, 2015. See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 15 (countersigned by St. Stans’ Principal Cieloszczyk). In that contract Butler agreed, among other things, that:
The TEACHER and the Academy [are] involved in the ministry of teaching and conveying the Roman Catholic Faith. The TEACHER is essential to the ministry of conveying the Faith. The TEACHER is to teach and convey the Roman Catholic Faith by being a role model of the Catholic Faith to [his] students. The TEACHER is to support and exemplify by his/her public conduct Catholic Doctrine and Morality. The TEACHER is to include the Church’s teachings within the content/subject matter of all subjects. The TEACHER is to incorporate objects of Catholic Faith into the learning environment and she/he will have religious articles displayed in the classroom at all times. The TEACHER shall not teach, advocate, encourage, or
counsel beliefs or practices contrary to the Catholic Faith.
Pl.’s
Butler’s contract also incorporated St. Stans’ Personnel Handbook by reference: he agreed to “fulfill the requirements for Professional Development and Living and Leading by Faith set forth in the Academy Teacher Personnel Handbook.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 15. The Handbook, in turn, “called” on Butler to “embrac[e] the ministry of the Roman Catholic school,” “demonstrate an acceptance of Gospel values and the Roman
would share “the awesome responsibility of bringing the Gospel message to the students.” Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Responses ¶ 92.10
Because he was hired in late summer, Butler missed the first day of orientation on August 26, 2015; but he was in attendance on Day 2. Id. ¶¶ 257-259. The New Teacher Orientation consisted of fifteen separate presentations or sets of remarks, nine of which explicitly involved prayer or discussed St. Stans’ teachers’ obligations to impart the Catholic faith to students. See Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 26, at 40-42, ECF No. 57-7 (schedule of programming listing “Opening Prayer, Welcome and Introductions”; “Mass – Immaculate Conception Chapel”; “Presentation: Mission and Ministry of Catholic Education”; “Teacher as Catechist~ Living and Leading by Faith”; “Living and Leading by Faith: Methodology”; “Closing Remarks & Prayer”; “Opening Prayer, Welcome”; “How Do We Bring Religion Into Everything We Teach?”; and “Closing Remarks & Prayer”).
At the orientation, presenters repeated these sentiments, instructing teachers to “live by” the “word.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 20, at 126. During a presentation entitled “Teaching our Catholic Faith for New Teachers”, the school emphasized that “every teacher is a Religion teacher” at St.
Principal Cieloszczyk testified that “religion is expected to be incorporated into whatever subject the teachers teach, including prayer with the students in the classroom,” Cieloszczyk Dep. Tr. 26:13-16, and that this was true “in English language arts especially.” Id. 26:16-17. And Butler effectively concedes that part of his job at St. Stans would have been the obligation to model the faith for his students. Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Responses ¶ 25 (replying “Undisputed” to Defendants’ assertion that “[t]he academy views its teachers to be ministers of the Faith”); id. ¶ 26 (again “Undisputed” that St. Stans “considers its teachers essential to the ministry of conveying the Faith”).
The key assessment of “what an employee does” is made at least somewhat more difficult in this case by the timing of Butler’s email and his ensuing termination, which occurred
There are several problems with this argument. First, it accords no weight to the specific ministerial duties that it is undisputed Butler would have performed. The parties agree, among other things, that Ms. Puglionisi accompanied her students
Second, and more importantly, Butler’s argument about religious teaching would require the Court to disregard St. Stans’ evidence — discussed above at length — that Butler was obligated to live as a catechist and teach the gospel every day by word and deed.11 This evidence, when considered holistically,
Third, it would violate the Supreme Court’s directives in Hosanna-Tabor and OLG for me to regard specified religious curricular duties as a prerequisite for the ministerial exception’s application. Hosanna-Tabor explicitly declined to adopt a “rigid formula,” 565 U.S. at 190, and OLG disparaged the “checklist” approach applied by the Court of Appeals below. 140 S. Ct. at 2066-67. Indeed, OLG made clear that no single prerequisite controls by holding that the ministerial exception may apply even to employees who are not practicing members of the institution’s faith. Id. at 2069.
In the end, OLG commands that courts afford meaningful deference to religious school administrators and clergy when they attest that a particular employee had ministerial duties. In holding that both OLG plaintiffs were ministers despite lacking the title, the Court noted that both teachers’ “schools saw them as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church, and the schools’ definition and explanation of their roles is important.” Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added). The Court offered a reason for this deference: “In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition.” Id. This is a point the Court has made on many previous occasions: that secular courts are ill-equipped to wade into any controversy of religious doctrine. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (observing “the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry”); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969) (civil courts should not resolve questions that would require them “to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine”); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (holding that “[f]reedom to select the clergy” has “constitutional protection”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871) (civil court should defer to religious authorities on “questions of [church] discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”).
Beyond any deference to St. Stans, however, we can also look to Butler’s own statements — made during his brief employment — for evidence of his ministerial role. While Butler contends now that his job was not ministerial in nature, he acknowledged otherwise in his reaction to the orientation, in a precise and explicit way. Indeed, this case arises directly out of Butler’s reaction to the ministerial training in his orientation. As noted above, Butler described himself as feeling “wounded” and “unwanted” after that training — in his words, at “being told all day that I have to live church doctrine.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 27, at 44.
In this regard, the religious interests at stake in this case go beyond the First Amendment interests in Hosanna and OLG. Butler was not only terminated from a ministerial position at St. Stans — he was terminated from that position after expressing discomfort with the ministerial aspects of the position. He did so by articulating the view that the requirement to “live church doctrine” was discomfiting to him,
When Butler took issue with the admonishment to live church doctrine, he was objecting to his own job description — what he was being told that he had to do to perform the job successfully. His legal position is, for this reason, obviously internally contradictory: it defies logic to acknowledge that a teacher in his position is “told all day that [he has] to live church doctrine,” on the one hand, and still contend that the job has no religious component, on the other.
For these reasons, St. Stans’ motion for summary judgment must be granted.
B. Summary Judgment Would be Warranted Even if the Ministerial Exception Did Not Apply
Given that the ministerial exception applies, Butler’s claims must be dismissed: employees “properly characterized as ‘ministers’ are flatly barred from bringing employment-discrimination claims against the religious groups” for whom
1. Church-Autonomy Principle
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses assure a right to church autonomy. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2061; see also, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing cases). This doctrine includes “a religious institution’s right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance,” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006), and guarantees religious organizations “independence from secular control or manipulation.” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
The church-autonomy principle arises not only from the recognition that secular courts have limited business managing religious institutions, but also that courts have limited
The ministerial exception is but one manifestation of the church-autonomy principle. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (religious institutions’ freedom to make hiring decisions is “a component” of their autonomy). More broadly, the Supreme Court held long ago that courts were to avoid interfering in “matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine,” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, including those involving “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 733. Thus the First Amendment protects more generally against “wide-ranging intrusion[s] into sensitive religious matters.” Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 207; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (instructing that “courts should refrain from trolling through a person’s or
These admonitions make clear that the church-autonomy principle has procedural, as well as substantive, components. It prevents courts from subjecting religious institutions to “protracted legal process pitting church and state as adversaries,” Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 1999), and offers some protection from “the expense and indignity of the civil legal process.” Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (recognizing that “the very process of inquiry” can implicate the First Amendment). Indeed, in EEOC v. Catholic University, the D.C. Circuit held that “the EEOC’s two-year investigation of [the plaintiff’s] claim, together with the extensive pre-trial inquiries and the trial itself, constituted an impermissible entanglement with judgments that fell within the exclusive province of” the religious institution. 83 F.3d at 467.
With the church-autonomy principle in mind, I proceed to examine the McDonnell Douglas framework as Butler seeks to apply it to this case.
2. Interplay with McDonnell Douglas Factors Here
The plaintiff’s burden at step one of the McDonnell Douglas framework — to establish a prima facie case — is “not onerous,” Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981), and I assume here that Butler has satisfied it.15 At step two of the framework, it falls to the defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the termination at
In cases against religious employers, these inquiries are constrained, to some degree, by the First Amendment. Among other things, the principle of church autonomy precludes a jury — and at the summary-judgment stage, the Court — from treating as broadly up-for-debate the Church’s assessment that Butler’s email violated an important religious tenet. The Second Circuit said so explicitly in Rweyemamu, even before Hosanna-Tabor or OLG was decided, summarizing the state of its jurisprudence as follows: “we will permit lay employees . . . to bring discrimination suits against their religious employers,”
In sum, Butler cannot carry his burden at step three by instigating a debate over whether the Church really believes
Butler has produced virtually no meaningful evidence of those kinds. His pretext argument is predicated largely on three pieces of evidence:
The “coded message” at orientation. Butler asserts that one speaker at his orientation warned against leading a “double life,” and that Butler “understood to be a disparaging reference to homosexuals.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp. Br.”) 2–3, ECF No. 58; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Responses ¶¶ 104-05, 260-61.
But nothing in the orientation materials mentions homosexuality, and Butler concedes that the speaker — a Diocese representative — did not mention it by name. The term “double life” is regularly deployed in other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 917 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2019) (having
Principal Cieloszczyk’s email. Butler points to an email Principal Cieloszczyk sent Dr. Chadzutko two months after he was terminated. Principal Cieloszczyk had just received an email attaching a letter from Butler’s counsel. She forwarded the email and attached letter to the superintendent, noting that they were in regard to the “young man that I had hired in August before I knew he was gay.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 29, ECF No. 57-7.
Policy violation. Butler advances only one argument that implicates DeMarco’s neutral principles — he claims that St. Stans violated its own policies in firing him. Butler’s argument goes as follows: St. Stans’ stated policy is to permit homosexuals into the ministry, as long as they do not engage in conduct proscribed by the Vatican. Pl.’s Opp. Br. Ex. J (“Chadzutko Dep. Tr.”) 272:14-19 (testifying that a “gay teacher who was celibate” would be “eligible for employment in the Brooklyn diocese,” but that the decision to “marry another man . . . is a clear and obvious violation of Church teachings”). Notwithstanding this policy, Butler’s argument goes, St. Stans fired Butler because of the statement in his email about his sexual orientation. This policy violation, according to Butler, constitutes “strong evidence of pretext.” Pl.’s Opp. Br. 5; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 50:22–52:14, ECF No. 67.
Given the paucity of neutral, “factual” evidence, the only way for the jury to find pretext would be to question the Church’s explanation of religious doctrine, or to question how much that particular religious doctrine really mattered to the Church.24 To do so, however, would violate the church-autonomy principle.
This predicament has been dispositive before, even outside the context of the ministerial exception. In Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., for example, the court dismissed a sex-discrimination claim brought by a Catholic school teacher without invoking the ministerial exception. 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006). Ms. Curay-Cramer, who admittedly violated Church doctrine, claimed the school fired her based on her sex (not religion) because male teachers who also violated Church doctrine kept their jobs. Id. at 137–40. The Third Circuit dismissed Curay-Cramer’s claim because “measur[ing] the degree of severity of various violations of Church doctrine” would have required an impermissible “inquiry into a religious employer’s religious mission or the plausibility of its religious justification.” Id. at 142. The Third Circuit’s reasoning had nothing to do with Curay-Cramer’s substantive job duties. The problem was procedural: the finder of fact would need to inquire into whether, and how much, the employer truly believed in its asserted doctrine.
A decision from another judge in this district is equally compelling. In Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 03-CV-6187 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008), the district judge initially denied a motion for summary judgment on a Title VII sex-discrimination claim, saying that “a jury remains the proper instrument for determining whether it was pregnancy or fornication that caused the Defendant to dismiss the Plaintiff.” Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 566
This is not to say that religious employers may always escape the McDonnell-Douglas pretext inquiry simply by asserting a religious justification for terminating a non-ministerial employee. See Askew v. Trs. of the Gen. Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2012) (“When a church dispute turns on a question devoid of doctrinal implications, civil courts may employ neutral principles of law to adjudicate the controversy.” (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–03 (1979) (states may resolve church property disputes, provided they do so based on “neutral principles of law”))); Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985) (First Amendment does not prevent “Title VII scrutiny, where the [employment] decision does not involve the church’s spiritual functions.”). As DeMarco explained, the pretext inquiry remains, in the usual case, amenable to neutral review on the basis of “factual” questions. See 4 F.3d at 171.
But this is not the “usual” case DeMarco envisioned. Butler affirmatively — and undisputedly — registered his discomfort with Church doctrine; he told St. Stans that “having to live Church doctrine all day” made him feel “wounded” and “unwanted.” And Butler said he had a current intention to marry his boyfriend — a seeming rejection of the Church’s current position on same-sex marriage, regardless of whether he planned to wait until the Church changed its stance.
* * * * *
The bottom line is that courts have long recognized the church-autonomy doctrine, and no binding authority has ever
C. State-Law Claims
In addition to his Title VII claims, Butler brings claims under the New York State Human Rights Law, New York City Human Rights Law, and New York Labor Law. Because I dismiss Butler’s Title VII claim — the sole basis for federal jurisdiction in this case — I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-law claims. See
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, St. Stans’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and Butler’s motion for partial
SO ORDERED.
_ /s/ Eric Komitee__________
ERIC KOMITEE
United States District Judge
Dated: June 27, 2022
Brooklyn, New York
Notes
863 F.3d at 193 n.2 (emphasis added). Fratello’s precondition for significance, however, is present here too: the record is replete with testimony from the school superintendent, principal, and others that St. Stans’ personnel regarded the Personnel Handbook’s pronouncements as authoritative and generally sought to conform to them. As set out below, Butler cannot overcome this testimony solely via Ms. Puglionisi’s testimony. Perhaps more importantly, the argument for which Butler invokes this footnote is diametrically at odds with two aspects of OLG — both (a) the Court’s guidance about taking the religious school’s “definition and explanation” of teachers’ roles seriously, and (b) the Court’s reliance on the schools’ handbooks in its analysis. See OLG, 140 S. Ct. at 2066.Because we give significant weight to the provisions of the Manual, we first caution that its contents establish very little by themselves. What is significant is that the Manual undisputedly governed the operation of the School, and that those who operated the School regarded the Manual as authoritative and generally sought to conform to the practices and standards that it espoused.