Burzynski v. CohenBurzynski v. Cohen
I. BACKGROUND
Halevan is a former employee of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (“DFAS“), a federal agency within the Department of Defense. On March 29, 1994, Halevan applied for the position of supervisory accountant, grade level GS-510-13, Job Opportunity Announcement (“JOA“) 94-088-LK. That position was awarded to Barbara Innskeеp, who was twenty-nine years old at the time and twenty-seven years younger than Halevan.
On April 1, 1996, Halevan filed a second administrative complaint with DFAS contesting his non-selection for the position of staff accountant, GS-510-13, JOA 96-046-EB, on the basis of age and sex discrimination. In support of his age discrimination claim, Halevan alleged that the person selected was not qualified for thе position. He further alleged that thirteen of the last fifteen persons selected for GS-510-13 positions were female. Halevan failed to appear at an EEOC hearing scheduled on March 5, 1997, and his case was remanded to DFAS for further administrative processing. On April 16, 1997, DFAS issued a final decision denying Halevan‘s age and sex discrimination complaint.
Halevan retired from DFAS on October 16, 1996. On February 19, 1997, Halevan filed a third administrative complaint with DFAS alleging that his retirement amounted to a constructive discharge caused by harassment, disparate treatment, and reprisal. In September of 1997, DFAS issued a final agency decision finding no discrimination. Halevan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB“) on October 29, 1997. On November 25, 1997, the MSPB dismissed the petition on the basis that the plaintiff failed to advance a non-frivolous allegation that his retirement was involuntary or that a reasonable person in his situation would have felt cоmpelled to resign, and that therefore the MSPB lacked jurisdiction. The opinion notified the plaintiff that the decision would become final on December 30, 1997, and his time limit for appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
Halevan filed a complaint with the district court on March 30, 1998. In Count I of the complaint, Halevan alleged that during the course of his employment with DFAS, he applied for over forty GS-510-13 positions for which he was qualified, and that persons who were substantially younger than him were selected for those positions. In Count II, plaintiff alleged that the defendant had maintained a pattern of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. In Count III, plaintiff alleged that the defendant discriminated against him because of his sex in violation of Title VII. The defendant brought a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to
After a bench trial on the sole claim to survive summary judgment (plaintiff‘s non-selection for JOA 94-088-LK), the district court found that Halevan had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA and that defendant had offered a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting the plaintiff. However, the distriсt court concluded that Halevan had failed to prove that defendant‘s non-discriminatory rationale for the non-promotion was a pretext
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Halevan appeals both the district court‘s bench trial decision and its ordеr of summary judgment. In considering a district court‘s decision following a bench trial, this court reviews findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See
B. First Administrative Complaint
The ADEA is expressly applicable to federal governmental employees, who are treated separately from private employees under the statute. See
two alternative routes for pursuing a claim of age discrimination. An individual may invoke the EEOC‘s administrative process and then file a civil action in federal district court if he is not satisfied with his administrative remedies. See
29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) and(c) . A federal employee complaining of age discrimination, however, does not have to seek relief from his employing agеncy or the EEOC at all. He candecide to present the merits of the claim to a federal court in the first instance. See § 633a(d) .
Stevens v. Dep‘t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 5-6, 111 S.Ct. 1562, 1566, 114 L.Ed. 2d. 1 (1991). If the employee elects to pursue his administrative remedies, he “must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the effective date of the action.”
As noted above, a federal employee also has the option of bypassing the administrative process and filing an ADEA claim directly with the district court. See
When the individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimination with the Commission, no civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the individual has given the Commission not less than thirty days’ notice of an intent to file such action.
Such notice shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.
The record is clear that the instant suit was filed at least four years after these other non-selections occurred, which is well outside of the 180-day window provided for by statute. Thus, the district court properly found that the only claim that was properly before the court was Halevan‘s non-selection for JOA 94-088-LK.
Halevan contends that the other non-selections are, nonetheless, properly before the court on the basis of their relationship to the one timely claim (his non-selection for JOA 94-088-LK). Specifically, Halevan cites the continuing violation theory which is an equitable exception to the time limits for filing an administrative complaint. The Sixth Circuit articulated the continuing violation theory in Haithcock v. Frank, stating that “discriminatory incidents which occur beyond the limitations period are actionable where a plaintiff . . . challenges not just one incident . . . but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitation period . . .” 958 F.2d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). The court delineated two categories of continuing violations. The first category arises where there is some evidence of present discriminatory activity giving rise to a claim of continuing violation such as where an employer continues to presently imposes disparate work assignments or gives unequal pay for equal work. Id. The second category of continuing violation arises where there has occurred a long-standing and demonstrable policy of discrimination. This requires a showing by a preponderance of the evidence “that some form of intentional discrimination against the class of which plaintiff was a member was the company‘s ‘standing operating procedure.‘” EEOC v. Penton Indus. Publ‘g Co., 851 F.2d 835, 838 (6th Cir. 1988).
In the case at bar, Halevan has failed to show either present discriminatory activity giving rise to a claim of continuing violation or a longstanding and demonstrable policy of discrimination. Halevan‘s complaint dоes not allege
C. Second Administrative Complaint
On April 1, 1996, Halevan filed an EEO complaint with DFAS contesting his non-selection for the position of staff accountant, GS 510-13, JOA 96-046-EB, on the basis of age and sex discrimination. Halevan failed to appear at an EEOC hearing scheduled on March 5, 1997, and his case was remanded to DFAS for further administrative processing. On April 16, 1997, DFAS issued a final decision denying Halevan‘s complaint. This dеcision was delivered to Halevan on April 17, 1997. The district court found that Halevan failed to bring a timely civil action raising his ADEA and Title VII claims.
Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a
complaint of discrimination based on raсe, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint . . . may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate shall be the defendant.
As for Halevan‘s age discrimination claim, the ADEA contains no statute of limitations provision for a federal employee who pursues administrative remedies before going to court. Therefore, an appropriate limitations period must be adopted from an analogous fеderal or state provision. See Stevens, 500 U.S. at 7-8, 111 S.Ct. 1562, 1567, 114 L.Ed. 2d 1. There is a split among the circuits in determining which federal statute is “analogous” to the ADEA. The Ninth Circuit has found that the general six-year statute of limitations under
Title VII is a natural source of borrowing a statute of limitations for age discrimination because “the ADEA and Titlе VII share a common purpose, the elimination of
Halevan argues that the statute of limitations for the ADEA claim should be equitably tоlled because he relied on two letters from EEO officers at DFAS that stated he may have six years within which to file an age discrimination suit, when in fact, he only had 90 days. The final notice of decision by DFAS on April 16, 1997 indicated that Halevan had 90 days in which to file a civil action. The Second Circuit addressed this precise issue in Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1994). In that case, the EEOC‘s final decision dismissing plaintiff‘s ADEA claim stated that: “If any of your claims were based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 . . . AS TO THOSE CLAIMS ONLY, you MAY have up to six yеars after the right of action first accrued in which to file a civil action.” Id. The Second Circuit held that equitable tolling was not warranted because the “uncertainty reflected in the notice stems from the inconsistency in the case law between the circuits.” Id.; see also Lavery, 918 F.2d at 1028 (“[t]he arguably contradictory language-- that claimant must
Halevan furthеr contends that his Title VII and ADEA claims should be equitably tolled on account of his attorney‘s withdrawal from the case. This claim is without merit. As noted above, Halevan received DFAS‘s final notice of decision dismissing his age and sex discrimination claims on April 17, 1997, which meant that he had until July 17, 1997 to file a civil action. Halevan‘s attorney did not withdraw from the case until December 18, 1997, several months after the filing deadline passed. Thus, the attorney‘s withdrawal provides no basis for the applicatiоn of the equitable tolling doctrine to the age and sex discrimination claims contained in Halevan‘s second EEO charge.
D. Third Administrative Complaint
On November 27, 1997, the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or the “Board“) dismissed Halevan‘s third EEO complaint which alleged constructive discharge caused by harassment, disparate treatment, and reprisal. Importantly, the Board concluded that plaintiff had failed to advance a non-frivolous argument that his retirement was involuntary or
E. Pre-Trial Rulings by the District Court
Halevan appeals thе district court‘s denial of his motion to compel production of the personnel files of persons who were selected for positions for which he applied. The district court found that the personnel information for the individual selected for JOA 94-088-LK had been provided to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the district court determined that
Halevan also appeals the district court‘s exclusion of evidence of a “pattern or practice discrimination” by the defendant. This court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999). Halevan sought to introduce evidence of numerous оther failures by the defendant to promote him to positions for which he applied. The district court held that it had already determined that any claims related to other instances of failure to promote are time-barred. The court observed that it did not seem fair to allow plaintiff the benefit of whatever evidentiary value these other forty incidents may have, while expecting the defendant to defend against forty time-barred claims, particularly when the relevance of this evidence to the single discrete failure to promote at issue in this case is slim. Accordingly, the district court ruled that the evidence of pattern or practice discrimination was inadmissible. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.
Finally, Halevan argues that the trial court erred in denying his demand for a jury trial. This argument is without merit. The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs suing the Federal Government under the ADEA do not have a right to a jury trial. See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 168-69, 101 S.Ct. at 2705-06. Thus, the district court properly denied Halevan‘s demand for a jury trial.
F. Trial Court‘s Finding of No Liability under ADEA
The sole claim that survived summary judgment was Halevan‘s non-selection for JOA 94-088-LK, which he alleged was the product of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. The district court applied the burden-shifting evidentiary framework originally articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and later refined in Texas Dep‘t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-59, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095-97, 67 L.Ed. 2d 207 (1981) in analyzing plaintiff‘s claim of age discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was at least 40 years old at the time оf the alleged discrimination; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) he was otherwise qualified for the position; and (4) after he was rejected, a substantially younger applicant was selected. See Barnett v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its action. See id. If the defendant comes up with such a reason, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant‘s proffered reason was a pretext for age discrimination. See id.
The district court found that plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination. The district court further found that defendant articulated a non-discriminatory rationale for plaintiff‘s non-selection--the person who was selected for the position (Barbara Innskeep) was simply the better candidate. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove that defendant‘s proffered reason for its deсision was a pretext for discrimination. The court noted that both the plaintiff and Ms. Innskeep have bachelor degrees of science in business with a major in accounting. However, Ms. Innskeep‘s grades in her course work are superior to plaintiff‘s. Although Halevan had far more overall work experience in the accounting field, the district court observed that Ms. Innskeep had prior
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s order of summary judgment and the court‘s finding, after a trial, that defendant is not liable for age discrimination under the ADEA.