Burton v. HarrisBurton v. Harris
Rendered on March 21, 2013
Mark L. Rhea and Lauren E. Flynn, for appellant Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
KLATT, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“FCCSEA“), appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, that refused to allow FCCSEA to intervene in the proceedings. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Paula G. Harris (“Harris“) is the mother of Teryn Burton, who was born on May 24, 1995. FCCSEA determined that Terence D. Burton (“Burton“) is the father of Teryn Burton. In an administrative order issued March 14, 1997, FCCSEA required
{¶ 3} On November 2, 2004, FCCSEA exercised its statutory authority under
{¶ 4} Harris requested a court hearing on the revised amount of child support. When Harris did not appear at the hearing, the magistrate recommended that the trial court adopt and approve the administrative modification of child support. In a January 31, 2006 judgment, the trial court followed the magistrate‘s recommendation.
{¶ 5} On June 8, 2011, FCCSEA reviewed the trial court‘s January 31, 2006 child support order. FCCSEA recommended that the trial court adopt an order requiring: (1) Harris to provide private health insurance coverage for Teryn Burton; (2) Burton to pay child support of $435.52 per month, plus a processing charge, or, if Teryn Burton‘s private health insurance lapsed, child support of $268.23 per month and cash medical support of $82.00 per month, plus a processing charge; and (3) each party to pay 50 percent of Teryn Burton‘s health care costs not covered by insurance.
{¶ 6} Burton requested a court hearing to seek a deviation from the child support amount set in the June 8, 2011 administrative adjustment recommendation. FCCSEA moved to be joined as a party to the proceedings. The trial court granted FCCSEA‘s motion.
{¶ 7} At the September 7, 2011 hearing, the magistrаte revisited FCCSEA‘s motion. In answer to the magistrate‘s questioning, FCCSEA‘s attorney represented that neither Harris nor Teryn Burton were receiving public assistance benefits. Although
{¶ 8} The magistrate issued two decisions. In the first, the magistrate recommended a downward deviation from the amount of child support that FCCSEA recommended. The trial court issued a judgment approving and adopting that decision, and neither party has appealed from that judgment.
{¶ 9} In the magistrate‘s second decision, she addressed her denial of FCCSEA‘s motion to intervene. FCCSEA objected to the magistrate‘s second decision. In a May 17, 2012 decision and judgment, the trial court overruled FCCSEA‘s objection and affirmed the magistrate‘s decision. The trial court held that no statute provided FCCSEA with a right to be a party to the court hearing. The trial court stated that FCCSEA could move to intervene under
{¶ 10} FCCSEA now appeals the May 17, 2012 judgment and assigns the following errors:
- THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED THE FCCSEA FROM A HEARING WHEN THE FCCSEA WAS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT ITS STATUTORY DUTIES PURSUANT TO R.C. 3125.01, ET SEQ. AND IN REQUIRING THE FCCSEA TO BE FORMALLY JOINED AS A PARTY.
- THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING R.C. 119.12 AS IT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT OBJECTION HEARINGS HELD PUSURANT TO R.C. 3119.60, ET SEQ.
- THE COURT ERRED AS THE JUDGE‘S RULING EXCLUDING THE FCCSEA FROM OBJECTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.
{¶ 11} By its first assignment of error, FCCSEA argues that it has a statutory right to participate as a party in the court proceedings that follow an objection to an administrative decision adjusting a court-issued child support order. We disagree.
{¶ 12} The General Assembly has adopted a scheme, supplemented by administrative rule, that governs when and how a child support enforcement agency may review and adjust a court-issued child support order.1 That scheme also sets forth the procedure by which a court may review the revised amount of child support calculated by a child support enforcement agency. According to that scheme, a child support enforcement agency, an obligor, or an obligee may initiate an administrative review of a child support order.
{¶ 13} On the designated date, the child support enforcement agency must calculate a revised amount of child support in accordance with
{¶ 14} Either party may object to the revised amount of child support by filing a request for an administrative hearing.
{¶ 15} In two instances, a party may circumvent the administrative hearing and request a court hearing directly from the child support enforcement agency‘s initial calculation of a revised amount of child support. An administrative hearing is unnecessary if the court order being reviewed contains a deviation granted under
{¶ 16} Upon receiving a hearing request, the trial court must “schedule and conduct a hearing to determine whether the revised amount of child support is the appropriate amount and whether the amount of child support being paid under the court child support order should be revised.”
{¶ 17} At the hearing, if the trial court determines that the revised child support amount calculated by the child support enforcement agency is the appropriate amount, it will issue an order requiring the obligor to pay the revised amount.
{¶ 18} Of the applicable statutes and rules,
The [child support enforcement agency‘s] legal representative shall primarily serve an administrative function rather than that of a legal advocate. When a legal challenge occurs at the court level аnd the [child support enforcement agency] is requested to appear, the [child support enforcement agency] shall present to the court the facts from the administrative adjustment review and hearing to assure that the guidelines were correctly applied and to explain the [“Administrative Adjustment Recommendation“].
{¶ 19} “An administrative agency has no authority beyond the authority conferred by statute and it may exercise only those powers that are expressly granted by the General Assembly.” State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 88 Ohio St.3d 166, 171 (2000); accord Burger Brewing Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ohio St.2d 377, 379 (1975); Ohio Cent. Tel. Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm., 166 Ohio St. 180, 182 (1957). Thus, an administrative agency‘s acts may not exceed the parameters of the authority legislatively granted to the agency. Shell v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd., 105 Ohio St.3d 420, 2005-Ohio-2423, ¶ 32; Johnson‘s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health, 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 36 (1991). Administrative rules are designed to accomplish the ends sought by the legislation enacted by the General Assembly. Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Rev., 130 Ohio St.3d 316, 2011-Ohio-5448, ¶ 21. Administrative rules issued pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law; consequently, administrative agenciеs are bound by those rules until those rules are duly changed. Lyden Co. v. Tracy, 76 Ohio St.3d 66, 69 (1996).
{¶ 20} Here, the director of Job and Family Services promulgated
{¶ 21} A court interprets an administrative rule in the same manner it would interpret a statute. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgt. of Am., Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 183, 2010-Ohio-2744, ¶ 27. We first look to the plain language of the administrative rule.
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} In its brief, FCCSEA largely ignores
The office of child support shall establish and аdminister a program of child support enforcement that meets the requirements of Title IV-D of the “Social Security Act,” 88 Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 651, as amended, and any rules adopted under Title IV-D. The program of child support enforcement shall include the location of absent parents, establishment of parentage, establishment and modification of child support orders and medical support orders, enforcement of support orders, collection of support obligations, and any other actions appropriate to child support enforcement.
{¶ 24} To address FCCSEA‘s argument, we must place
{¶ 25} Ohio participates in the TANF program. Thus, the General Assembly has enacted legislation to create a child support enforcement program that complies with Title IV-D. In
{¶ 26} By listing the necessary components of Ohio‘s child support enforcement program,
{¶ 27} Next, FCCSEA argues that it should be a party to court hearings so it can supply the court with information that the court may not have. Like the foregoing
{¶ 28} Finally, FCCSEA argues that the case of Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d 442 (8th Dist.1995), entitles it to be a party in the court hearing. Decided almost 18 years аgo, Lozada held that:
From a thorough reading of R.C. Chapters 3111 and 3113, together with the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, we find that the General Assembly intended that the child support enforcement agencies be parties to all actions for the collection of child support; any other result would hinder the legitimate state interest spelled out by the General Assembly for the enforcement of child support orders as well as the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D.
{¶ 29} In Lozada, the appellate court consolidated five actions in which the juvenile court had not allowed the child support enforcement agency to act as a party. Each of the actions at issue was an
{¶ 30} The Lozada decision compared the
{¶ 31} Essentially, the Lozada court reasoned that since statutes allowed the child support enforcement agency to be a party in two types of child support actions, the child support enforcement agency must also be a party to all actions deciding child support. According to the Lozada court, the child support enforcement agency‘s interest in child support cases was identical whether or not the applicable statute named the agency as a party. Therefore, the court inferred, the General Assembly intended the child support enforсement agency to be a party in all child support actions.3
{¶ 32} Despite Lozada‘s sweeping holding, it does not apply to this case. Unlike Lozada, where no statute or rule addressed the child support enforcement agency‘s role in the court proceedings at issue, we have an administrative rule to rely upon. Ohio
{¶ 33} Moreover, the holding in Lozada only applies to ”actions for the collection of child support.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, at bеst, Lozada permits child support enforcement agencies to be parties to
{¶ 34} In conclusion, we find that FCCSEA does not have a statutory right to bе a party to court hearings on objections from revised amounts of child support calculated by FCCSEA. Accordingly, we overrule FCCSEA‘s first assignment of error.
{¶ 35} By FCCSEA‘s second assignment of error, FCCSEA argues that the trial court erred in applying
{¶ 36} By FCCSEA‘s third assignment of error, it argues that the trial court violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and Ohio Constitutions. We disagree.
{¶ 37} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Ohio‘s Equal Protection Clause states, “All politiсal power is inherent to the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit * * *.” Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 2. The federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses are functionally equivalent. Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, ¶ 17. Both provisions require that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like circumstances. Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-2751, ¶ 30.
{¶ 38} Here, the trial court held that FCCSEA did not claim a substantial enough interest to justify its intervention in the court hearing. The trial court noted, however, that in future cases FCCSEA may hаve a right to intervene if the obligee received or receives public assistance. Such a right arises because participation in public assistance “constitutes an assignment to the [D]epartment of [J]ob and [F]amily [S]ervices of any rights * * * to support from any other person.”
{¶ 39} FCCSEA argues that the trial court‘s ruling will result in сourts treating obligees who receive public assistance differently from obligees who do not receive public assistance. FCCSEA contends that the latter group will be entitled to FCCSEA‘s legal assistance, while the former group will not. We disagree for two reasons. First, FCCSEA creates an illusory classification. In accordance with the trial court‘s ruling, courts may treat FCCSEA differently depending on whether or not it has an assigned right to the child support payments of the obligor. In sоme cases, the court may allow FCCSEA to intervene, in others perhaps not. Second, FCCSEA mistakes its role in court hearings, if allowed to intervene. FCCSEA must represent the state, not provide legal assistance to the obligee.
{¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule FCCSEA‘s three assignmеnts of error, and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
Judgment affirmed.
CONNOR and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.