IN RE M.W.
No. 2011-0215
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted December 6, 2011-Decided October 3, 2012
133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Rademaker, Matty, Henrikson & Greve, David J. Matty, and Shana A. Samson; and Sergio DiGeronimo, for relator.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Aaron D. Epstein and Damian W. Sikora, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary of State Jon Husted.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.
IN RE M.W.
[Cite as In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538.]
{1} The issue we confront in this appeal is whether a juvenile has a statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before a complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court.
{2}
Facts and Procedural History
{3} On August 22, 2009, Cleveland Police Sergeant Thomas Shoulders stopped a vehicle driven by M.W. (who at that time identified himself as M.J.) and determined he had no valid Ohio driver‘s license. When Shoulders asked why he lied about his name, M.W. stated he “thought [he] could get away with it” and he thought he had been stopped for “something to do with [A.C.]” Shoulders knew that A.C. had been arrested for aggravated robbery the previous day and therefore asked M.W. what he knew about that robbery. M.W. told Shoulders that he heard A.C. robbed “someone at gun point on Thursday night” and then added that he had served as the lookout for A.C.: “I kept anyone from walking up on him or watched for the police.” M.W. further explained that after the robbery, they each ran, intending to split the money the following day, but the police arrested A.C. before they had that opportunity.
{4} Based on those statements, Shoulders arrested M.W., transported him to the Cleveland Second District Police Station, and in the presence of Detective David Borden, advised M.W. of his constitutional rights. M.W. signed a written waiver of his rights and a written statement.1 Detective Borden then filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court alleging M.W. to be delinquent for having committed aggravated robbery, in violation of
{6} Subsequently, a juvenile court magistrate adjudicated M.W. delinquent of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification, and the juvenile court adopted that decision: it placed M.W. in the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum of one year on the aggravated-robbery charge and one year on the three-year firearm specification, to be served consecutively, for a period of commitment not to exceed 21 years of age.
{7} M.W. appealed and raised several claims, urging that the trial court erred in admitting his written statement into evidence because Shoulders had violated
{8} The state disputed the assertion that interrogation constituted a proceeding within the scope of R.C. Chapter 2151 at which the right to counsel pursuant to
{9} The appellate court rejected M.W.‘s claim that giving a written statement to Shoulders constituted a stage of the proceedings, explaining that “a juvenile proceeding does not commence until the filing of a complaint.” 8th Dist. No. 94737, 2010-Ohio-6362, 2010 WL 5486847, ¶ 16. It concluded that because no
{10} M.W. appealed and now presents this proposition of law for our consideration:
A child has the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings against him. Because Ohio‘s General Assembly has designated interrogation as a stage of the proceedings, a child must be represented by his parent, guardian, custodian, or an attorney before the child can waive his right to counsel pursuant to Miranda.
{11} M.W. contends that an interrogation is an R.C. Chapter 2151 proceeding because it is included in
{12} The state contends that an interrogation is not a “proceeding” as that term is used in
{13} Thus, the issue presented by this appeal is whether the statutory right to counsel delineated by the General Assembly in
{14}
{15}
{16} In the case of In re C.S., we construed
{17} This appeal involves a matter of statutory construction. The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. When analyzing a statute, we first examine its plain language and apply the statute as written when the meaning is clear and unambiguous. State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. This analysis also requires that we read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
{18}
{19} Prior decisions from this court also support interpretation of the term “proceedings” to mean court proceedings. In State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St.3d 25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 N.E.2d 466, we construed
{20} In addition, the Juvenile Rules lend support to the view that the term “proceedings” in
{21} Finally, the context in which the term “proceedings” is used in
{22} The fallacy of M.W.‘s argument is highlighted by the fact that he invokes a right to counsel pursuant to
{23} In view of these reasons and the plain language of
{24} This conclusion also conforms with our statement in State v. Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359 (1972): “Taken as a whole, the purpose of
{25} In this case, the complaint filed by Detective Borden commenced the delinquency proceeding against M.W. and invoked the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and afforded M.W. the right to counsel pursuant to
{26} We stress that the only claimed right to counsel in this appeal is a statutory one premised on
Conclusion
{27} The term “proceedings” as used in
Judgment affirmed.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent.
LANZINGER, J., concurring.
{28} I concur in judgment because the statute, the juvenile rules, and the cases cited in the majority opinion support the conclusion that the term “proceedings” in
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.
{29} Because I believe that the majority‘s holding offends the United States Supreme Court‘s constitutional commands on a juvenile‘s due process and Fifth Amendment rights, our own precedent, and the intent of the General Assembly in enacting
THE CONFESSION
{30} In 2009, M.W., a 15-year-old boy, acted as a lookout while his friend, another juvenile male, robbed a victim at gunpoint. We believe this to be true because soon thereafter, M.W. admitted those facts to Cleveland Police.
{32} There is no doubt that M.W.‘s actions were dangerous and that he is in need of intervention. But there is doubt whether his confession, which was used against him in the subsequent delinquency proceedings, was constitutionally obtained.
{33} The majority opinion divorces the relevant analyses from the question before us, asserting that there is no need to discuss a juvenile‘s constitutional protections because M.W. waived any constitutional right against self-incrimination. Evidently, the majority ignores that the proposition we accepted for review in this appeal clearly refers to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).3
{34} The majority then asserts that the statute at issue,
{35} The majority is mistaken on both counts.
CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
The Statutory Term “Proceedings” Is Not Clear and Unambiguous
{36} The term “proceedings” does not have one plain and ordinary meaning.
{37} The term can certainly refer to an event in civil litigation or criminal prosecution that occurs after the filing of a complaint or an indictment with the court. But that understanding of the word is not the exclusive one, nor is it dispositive here. After all, the majority concedes that the word “proceedings” also refers to “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action.” Majority opinion at ¶ 18, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th Ed.2009). And certainly an interrogation of a juvenile is an act or step that is part of a larger action, i.e., the process of adjudicating the juvenile as a delinquent.
{38} Perhaps more compelling, however, is that Black‘s recognizes that the term “proceedings” includes “all ancillary or provisional steps, such as arrest.” (Emphasis added.) Black‘s at 1324, quoting Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of3
{39} Thus, the varied definitions of “proceedings” contradict the majority‘s insistence that there is only one plain and ordinary meaning of the word and its conclusion that the only meaning of “proceedings” is a court event that takes place after the filing of a complaint or indictment. Thus, to understand what the General Assembly intended, we must look beyond the statute‘s words.
{40} The majority implicitly agrees that we must look beyond the words of the statute because its analysis does not end with a discussion of the plain and ordinary meaning of “proceeding.” Instead, it attempts to buttress its conclusion with context from our case law. I agree that context controls the analysis here, but I strongly disagree with the context upon which the majority relies.
THE IMPROPER CONTEXT USED BY THE MAJORITY
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Inapplicable in Juvenile Cases
{41} The majority holds, “‘Proceedings’ evokes a court of law, not the investigatory action taken by police prior to the filing of the complaint or a juvenile‘s appearance before a tribunal.” Majority opinion at ¶ 18. The majority would be correct if it were addressing an adult criminal defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a proceeding, which does not attach until a prosecution commences. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). More specifically, in the adult criminal context, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant‘s right to counsel in a proceeding does not commence until the government initiates “‘adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.‘” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (plurality opinion).
{42} But the Sixth Amendment is not applicable here.
{43} As we explained in In re C.S., the juvenile‘s right to counsel is not governed by the Sixth Amendment, but rather by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 79, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Because it is founded in due process, the juvenile‘s right to counsel in proceedings is a malleable right rather than a rigid one; it is driven by concerns for fundamental fairness. Id. at ¶ 80. It was that sense of fundamental fairness that drove the analysis in In re C.S., a critical point that was evidently lost on the majority.
The Majority‘s Reliance on Inapposite Precedent
{44} The majority also relies on Ohio case law decided long after the General Assembly enacted
{45} For example, the majority‘s reliance on cases like State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St.3d 25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 N.E.2d 466, is entirely misplaced.
{46} In Davis, we rendered a narrow holding interpreting
{47} Davis was decided more than 40 years after the General Assembly enacted
{49} Further, our holding in Davis was driven in part by the rule that we must construe ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant and against the state. That rule does not support the majority‘s holding in construing
{50} The majority opinion also relies on State v. Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359 (1972), for the proposition that we interpreted an earlier version of
{51} The full context of the quote used by the majority establishes that in Ostrowski, we were concerned with the sequestration of witnesses, including a juvenile‘s parents, and not the right to have those parents, or counsel, present during the proceedings:
Taken as a whole, the purpose of
R.C. 2151.352 is to insure to the juvenile his right to counsel and/or his right to have his parents present at any hearing. In our opinion, such a provision is not intended to and does not take away from a trial court its basic right to order a separation of witnesses until such time as such witnesses have testified. During such time the exclusion is not of parents, as such, but instead is the exclusion of witnesses.Moreover, during such time as the parents were so excluded, the juvenile was fully and adequately represented by two attorneys. Under these circumstances, no possible prejudice to the juvenile could result from such exclusion.
{52} Even if Ostrowski had not been focused on the issue of sequestration, let us be clear that Ostrowski addressed proceedings in court-not custodial interrogations-in which the juvenile at issue had the benefit of two attorneys. Thus, in this case, in which a juvenile had no counsel during a custodial interrogation, Ostrowski is of no value.
{53} It is a difficult task to attempt to define “proceedings” by looking to cases that analyzed the term in the era in which
{54} In a host of cases, the federal courts interpreted “proceedings” to reach investigations conducted by administrative agencies long before any formal complaint or indictment was filed in court. For example, in 1964, the District of Columbia District Court considered a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation to be a “proceeding.” United States v. Batten, 226 F.Supp. 492, 494 (D.D.C.1964). And soon thereafter, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for giving false invoices to an investigator in a Federal Trade Commission case, holding that the term “proceeding” has a broad scope, “encompassing both the investigative and adjudicative functions of a department or agency.” United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir.1970).
{55} Admittedly, the statutory schemes at issue in Batten and Fruchtman are not any more akin to
In sum, the term “proceeding” is not, as one might believe, limited to something in the nature of a trial. The growth and expansion of agency activities have resulted in a meaning being given to “proceeding” which is more inclusive and which no longer limits itself to formal activities in a court of law. Rather, the investigation or search for the true facts such as that which is described in the indictment here is not to be ruled a non-proceeding simply because it is preliminary to indictment and trial.
{56} Having illustrated the reasons why the majority‘s contextualization is improper, I turn to one that accurately illuminates the statute.
THE PROPER CONTEXT
R.C. 2151.352 Codifies and Expands a Juvenile‘s Constitutional Rights
{57} This court recognizes that
{58} We must look to the constitutional requirements that the statute embodies. And after doing so, we must be true to them and to the statutory right that exceeds those requirements.
Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
{59} The General Assembly enacted our juvenile-delinquency statutes in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s decisions in watershed cases like Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), and Gault. See In re C.S. Those decisions, and their rationales, control here. So, too, do the court‘s contemporaneous pronouncements on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in Miranda, which was announced shortly before Ohio‘s enactment of
{60} The Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being compelled to be a witness against himself, whether in a custodial interrogation or in court after formal charges have been brought. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). In Miranda, the Supreme Court explained those rights, holding that a police officer, before questioning a suspect in custody, must warn the suspect of the right to remain silent and that anything said during interrogation could be used against the suspect in court, that the suspect has a right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney but desires one, the court will appoint one prior to any questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-479.
{61} The Miranda warning is more than fodder for television and movie depictions of police work. Its purpose is “to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” Id. at 458. Indeed, the warning concerning a suspect‘s
{62} As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, by their very nature, custodial police interrogations entail inherently compelling pressures. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 268-270, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), citing Miranda at 467. Those pressures are heightened for juveniles:
Even for an adult, the physical and psychological isolation of custodial interrogation can “undermine the individual‘s will to resist and * * * compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” [Miranda at 467.] Indeed, the pressure of custodial interrogation is so immense that it “can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 [321], 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citing Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L.Rev. 891, 906-907 (2004)); see also Miranda, 384 U.S., at 455, n. 23. That risk is all the more troubling-and recent studies suggest, all the more acute-when the subject of custodial interrogation is a juvenile.
Id., 131 S.Ct. at 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310.
{63} Given the importance of the Fifth Amendment‘s protections against self-incrimination, it is not surprising that the year after the Supreme Court issued Miranda, the court announced its decision in Gault, which held that the concept of Fifth Amendment rights set forth in Miranda applied to juveniles. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55. In doing so, the court made clear that the juvenile‘s right to counsel extended to the juvenile‘s interactions with police as well as in any courtroom hearings that might follow the interaction with police:
The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
{64} The rationale for the Supreme Court‘s holdings was not shrouded in mystery. Rather, the court had previously discussed the need for a juvenile to have parents or counsel present during interrogations. “[A juvenile] cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). A juvenile in police custody is often in need of “more mature judgment” from an adult relative or counsel, who can give the juvenile “the protection which his own immaturity could not.” Id.
{65} That understanding of the limitations on a juvenile‘s cognitive abilities and legal capacity was not new to the court or created by it. Indeed, as recognized by Blackstone, the common law is replete with examples of how juveniles are treated differently in the law. J.D.B., 131 S.Ct. at 2403-2404, 180 L.Ed.2d 310, citing 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, *464-465.
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and protected status in our legal system. There are legally and socially recognized differences between the presumed responsibility of adults and minors. Indeed the juvenile justice system, which deals with most offenses committed by those under eighteen, is substantially different in philosophy and procedure from the adult system. This State, like all the others, has recognized the fact that juveniles many times lack the capacity and responsibility to realize the full consequences of their actions. As a result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of their own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.
(Citations omitted.) Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 437, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
{66} In light of the long-held understanding of the unique place juveniles occupy in the law and the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Gault and Miranda, state high courts, in the era in which
{67} By 1973, the Indiana high court would simply and succinctly announce, “[I]t is clear under the United States Supreme Court rule that a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent is entitled to the assistance of counsel at any interrogation that may take place, and at the hearing before the juvenile judge at which disposition of this status is made.” Bridges v. State, 260 Ind. 651, 653, 299 N.E.2d 616 (1973). Since then, it properly recognized that juveniles should be afforded safeguards that are in addition to those required by Miranda when subjected to custodial interrogation; those holdings were often codified into state statutes. See, e.g., D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ind.2011).
{68} The Indiana approach is consistent with our decision in In re C.S., in which we more clearly enunciated our protective philosophy of juvenile justice that recognizes the realities of modern delinquency proceedings. That philosophy is not reserved only for our courtrooms. Rather, it permeates custodial interrogation as well, consistent with the Supreme Court‘s teachings in Miranda, Gault, and J.D.B., and the fundamental fairness that due process rights are intended to protect.
{69} The majority opinion defies law, logic, and common sense in suggesting that a statute that goes beyond constitutional requirements must be considered without any consideration of constitutional requirements.6 Thus, the majority casts aside those constitutional commands, as well as our precedent, and reframes the issue before us as simply one of statutory language. In doing so, the majority approach impermissibly fails to consider the protections set forth in Miranda simply because M.W. purportedly waived those rights under the statute.
{70} The General Assembly enacted
{71} The majority‘s holding implicitly endorses a system in which the rights our federal and state constitutions were designed to protect, as expressed in Miranda, Gault, and C.S., are offended. I cannot countenance such a holding, and thus I strongly dissent.
PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van and Richard Hanrahan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee, state of Ohio.
Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant, M.W.
Marsha L. Levick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center.
Kim Brooks Tandy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Children‘s Law Center.
Nadia Seeratan, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Juvenile Defender Center.
Joshua Tepfer, urging reversal for amicus curiae Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth.
James L. Hardiman, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio.