Bryant v. Hamilton Civ. Serv. Comm.Bryant v. Hamilton Civ. Serv. Comm.
Timothy G. Werdman, One Renaissance Center, 345 High Street, Suite 710, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendants-appellees
O P I N I O N
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Michael Bryant, appeals from a judgment of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas which affirmed a decision of the city of Hamilton Civil Service Commission terminating his employment. For the reasons outlined below, we reverse and remand.
{¶2} Bryant was employed as a police officer for the city of Hamilton Police
{¶3} In early 2007, Captain Murray received an unsolicited subscription to Cosmopolitan Magazine along with a bill for $54.00. The bill indicated that subscriptions had also been sent to Lieutenant Scrimizzi and Sergeant Waldeck. This prompted an internal affairs investigation. Bryant eventually admitted to forging the subscriptions as a “stupid joke,” but denied doing so in retaliation for his previous suspension.
{¶4} As a result of the investigation, Bryant was discharged from his employment with the HPD for violating several departmental rules of conduct. These included unbecoming conduct, respect required to superiors, relationships with others, and conformance to laws. On appeal, the termination was first upheld by the Hamilton Civil Service Commission (the commission), and then by the common pleas court. Bryant timely appeals, raising two assignments of error.
{¶5} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶6} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHEN IT APPLIED AN IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION.”
{¶7} Bryant argues that reversal is required because the common pleas court improperly reviewed the commission‘s decision for an abuse of discretion rather than conducting a de novo review. We agree that Bryant was entitled to a trial de novo,
{¶8} The suspension, demotion, or removal of civil servants is governed by
{¶9} “The tenure of every officer or employee in the classified service of the state and the counties, civil service townships, cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city school districts of the state, holding a position under this chapter, shall be during good behavior and efficient service. No such officer or employee shall be * * * removed, except * * * for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of this chapter or the rules of the director of administrative services or the commission, any other failure of good behavior, any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, or conviction of a felony.”
{¶10} The statute goes on to specify the termination and appeals processes when a civil servant is found to have violated one or more of the above-quoted prohibitions.
{¶11} Both subsections (B) and (C) require the appointing authority to provide
{¶12} Subsection (B), which applies to most civil service employees, explains the discretionary right of appeal to the common pleas court under that subsection as follows:
{¶13} “In cases of removal * * *, either the appointing authority or the officer or employee may appeal from the decision of the state personnel board of review or the commission to the court of common pleas of the county in which the employee resides in accordance with the procedure provided by section 119.12 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶14}
{¶15} Referring back to
{¶16} “An appeal on questions of law and fact may be had from the decision of
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court held that a police officer‘s appeal on questions of law and fact contemplates a trial de novo. Cupps v. Toledo (1961), 172 Ohio St. 536, paragraph two of the syllabus (construing
{¶18} Turning to the present matter, the commission argues that the review conducted by the common pleas court was sufficient to constitute a de novo review. However, it is evident from the language in the court‘s decision that the court mistakenly employed the wrong standard in reviewing the commission‘s decision. As a member of the police department, Bryant‘s case fell within
{¶19} The scope of review contemplated by a trial de novo is governed by the provisions of
{¶20} We observe that our ruling in the present matter conflicts with a decision rendered by this court just over two decades ago. In Holtzberger v. Civ. Serv. Comm. (Apr. 13, 1987), Butler App. No. CA86-06-094, 1987 WL 9753, we addressed an appeal involving a Hamilton police officer who was suspended for three days as the result of a verbal altercation between him and another officer. The suspension was upheld by the commission and by the common pleas court. On appeal to this court, Holzberger argued that the common pleas court applied the wrong standard of review when it concluded that the commission‘s decision was supported by reliable and probative evidence. We agreed that Holzberger was entitled to a trial de novo, but held that the lower court‘s failure to perform such a review constituted harmless error on three fronts.
{¶21} First, there was no conflicting testimony regarding whether Holzberger violated departmental rules. Holzberger admitted to using foul and threatening language towards the other officer. Because there were no factual disputes, the common pleas court did not have to independently resolve any questions of fact. We concluded that although the common pleas court should have independently stated its findings of fact, this omission amounted to harmless error due to the absence of any factual issues.
{¶22} Second, the common pleas court failed to resolve a legal question regarding whether the officer with whom Holzberger had the argument was his
{¶23} Third, the common pleas court failed to make any independent findings regarding the appropriate sanction for Holzberger‘s infraction. Again, we concluded that this was harmless error in view of the common pleas court‘s conclusion that the commission‘s decision was supported by the evidence.
{¶24} In the present matter, the commission maintains that Bryant‘s case is indistinguishable from Holzberger because there were no factual disputes for the common pleas court to resolve. Particularly, there were no factual disputes regarding the central issue, that is, whether Bryant was responsible for sending in the magazine subscriptions for the three officers. To the extent that the common pleas court failed to express that its conclusions were based upon an independent review of the record, the commission asserts, this amounted to harmless error.
{¶25} We must now determine whether Holzberger should be applied to the present matter as controlling precedent. We begin by noting that the doctrine of stare decisis is a revered means for ensuring continuity and predictability in our justice system. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶43. Even so, a steadfast adherence to this doctrine is not warranted when a reviewing court discovers that one of its prior decisions was erroneous. Id. Only when there is a “special justification” shall a reviewing court depart from the doctrine of stare decisis. Id. at ¶44. The Ohio Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for determining whether to overrule a prior decision, stating:
{¶26} “Thus, in Ohio, a prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled
{¶27} Although the high court set forth this test in the context of determining whether to overrule one of its own decisions, it stands to reason that a state court of appeals may appropriately apply the same factors in deciding whether to overrule one of its prior decisions. Consequently, these factors guide our scrutiny of Holzberger.
{¶28} As stated, the lower court in Holzberger applied the wrong standard in reviewing the commission‘s decision. The plain language of
{¶29} In order to preserve the correct standard of review in cases involving
{¶30} We hold that a trial de novo is mandatory in cases where the administrative appeal is governed by
{¶31} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶32} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT WAS THE PROPER REMEDY FOR BRYANT‘S MISCONDUCT.”
{¶33} Although Bryant concedes that some form of punishment was warranted by his foolish conduct, he maintains that termination was too severe in light of his favorable record of service with the HPD. However, Bryant‘s second assignment of error has been rendered moot by our disposition of his first assignment of error. Consequently, we need not address it. See
{¶34} Due to the common pleas court‘s failure to conduct a trial de novo, the decision of the common pleas court is reversed and this matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶35} Reversed and remanded.
{¶36} POWELL, P.J., and YOUNG, J., concur.