BRYAN A. SKORIC, Park County and Prosecuting Attorney, and STATE OF WYOMING, by and through Bryan A. Skoric, Park County and Prosecuting Attorney, Relator v. PARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Honorable S. Joseph Darrah presiding
S-22-0231
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
July 14, 2023
2023 WY 59A
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023
Representing Appellant: Bryan A. Skoric, Park County Prosecuting Attorney; Jack R. Hatfield II, Deputy Park County Attorney, Cody, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Hatfield.
Representing Appellee: Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Brandi Lee Monger, Deputy Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Monger.
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.1
[¶1] We agreed to answer a certified question about circuit court jurisdiction to address the competency of criminal defendants in felony cases pursuant to
CERTIFIED QUESTION
[¶2] The certified question we are answering is:
Does the circuit court have jurisdiction to address the competency of a person charged with a felony pursuant to
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 before they are bound over to the district court?
FACTS
[¶3] Our answer to the certified question is not dependent on factfinding. Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. v. Infrassure, Ltd., 2021 WY 65, ¶ 10, 486 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2021) (citations omitted). The facts of this case are uncontested. A defendant, Mr. Underwood, was charged in Park County with two felonies and two misdemeanors. The circuit court set the matter for a preliminary hearing. Before
[¶4] After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court granted defendant’s motion for a competency evaluation. The circuit court also suspended proceedings until the return of the competency evaluation. After receiving the evaluation submitted by the Wyoming State Hospital, Defendant moved for a second evaluation and that motion was granted.
[¶5] While the first competency evaluation was pending, the prosecutor filed a separate action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to hold a preliminary hearing. The district court did not address the writ and instead issued an order certifying this matter to us pursuant to
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶6] Certified questions are governed by Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 11.01 allows us to answer pure questions of law where there is no controlling precedent. Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co., ¶ 10, 486 P.3d at 994 (citations omitted). The question of law presented here requires us to interpret
DISCUSSION
[¶7] Circuit courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Circuit Court of Eighth Jud. Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, ¶ 35, 332 P.3d 523, 533 (Wyo. 2014). Their jurisdiction is solely that conferred by the legislature. Id. Circuit courts have original jurisdiction over misdemeanors.
[¶8] We have reviewed felony cases where a circuit court ordered a competency evaluation prior to a preliminary hearing. E.g., Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶¶ 4–6, 132 P.3d 1155, 1157–58 (Wyo. 2006) (evaluating whether a district court must sua sponte order another competency evaluation after a case is bound over where the defendant does not request a second evaluation). We have not, however, been asked to address whether circuit courts have jurisdiction to order a competency evaluation in a felony case.
(a) If it appears at any stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court’s own motion, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be suspended.
[¶9] Our primary consideration in construing statutes is to determine the intent of the legislature. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2004 WY 89, ¶ 34, 94 P.3d 430, 444 (Wyo. 2004). “We first look at the plain language used by the legislature. If the statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, the Court simply applies the words according to their ordinary and obvious meaning.” In re BG, 2023 WY 40, ¶ 10, 528 P.3d 402, 407 (Wyo. 2023). A statute is clear and unambiguous if “its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.” Id. (quoting Spence v. Sloan, 2022 WY 96, ¶¶ 34–35, 515 P.3d 572, 581–82 (Wyo. 2022)). Dictionary definitions may be used to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 542 (Wyo. 1988). We must also consider statutory language in pari materia, which means “we construe statutes as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statutes on the same subject.” E.g., BG, ¶ 10, 528 P.3d at 407 (quoting Spence, ¶¶ 34–35, 515 P.3d at 581–82); Hill v. Value Recovery Grp., L.P., 964 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Wyo. 1998); see also Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042–43 (Wyo. 1993) (identifying the obligation to find the plain and obvious meanings of words and also to construe those same words in pari materia).
[¶10] The operative language in
[¶11] The legislature’s use of the term “any” is significant. “Any” means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Any, Merriam-Webster (2023 ed). “Any” is also defined as “one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity.” Id. Thus, the plain and ordinary meaning of “any stage” is one, some, or all of the several stages of a criminal proceeding. The preliminary hearing and the period preceding it fall clearly within the plain and ordinary meaning of that phrase. No technical definition is needed or appropriate. Under the express language of
[¶12] The legislature’s reference to “the court” when describing which court may order a competency evaluation further confirms our determination that the authority to order a competency evaluation is not limited to district courts. The legislature specified neither the circuit court nor the district court. It referred simply to “the court.” In conducting an
pari materia review, e.g., BG, ¶10, 528 P.3d at 407 (citation omitted), we note “court” is not a defined term.
[¶13] To the contrary, pertinent legislative history shows that prior to 1985 the final sentence of this statute read:
If the question is raised in a court other than the district court, the proceeding shall be suspended and the matter transferred to the district court.
[¶14] Finally, we presume that when the legislature enacted
[¶15] For example, defendants have a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing, e.g., Coleman, ¶ 8, 115 P.3d at 413; Wilson, 655 P.2d at 1250, and a right to be present at that hearing.
Competence to consult with and assist counsel is axiomatic and accompanies the right to have counsel. E.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993) (“Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.”); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 103 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (“[T]he ‘test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding[.]’”).
[¶16] The right to be competent does not derive from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but is an attendant right arising from due process. Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 65–66, 133 S. Ct. 696, 184 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2013) (citations omitted). Competence is thus a threshold issue, the resolution of which is necessary to prevent a due process violation. Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 563 (Wyo. 1979) (citations omitted); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1992) (discussing the common law history of competence in criminal proceedings). The legislature’s prescription of “any stage of a criminal proceeding” in
CONCLUSION
[¶17] The plain language of