Aрpellant Douglas Wayne Brown was charged with driving under the influence and other crimes after he was stopped and later arrested at a traffic safety checkpoint, or roadblock, in Cobb County.
As explained below, we reject Appellant’s initial argument that the checkpoint at which he was stopped was unconstitutional because the police sergeant who authorized it was not a “programmatic-level executive.” Appellant draws this argument from Court of Appeals cases that have improperly conflated the “supervisory personnel” requirement for implementing a specific checkpoint, see LaFontaine v. State,
However, Appellant’s fallback argument — that LaFontaine’s “supervisory personnel” requirement was not satisfied in this case, rendering the checkpoint at which he was stopped unconstitutional — has merit. As the dissent below correctly recognized, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the police sergеant decided to
1. (a) In July 2008, the Cobb County Police Department adopted Policy 5.19 on Traffic Safety Checkpoints. The policy’s stated purpose is
to protect the citizens of Cobb County and to monitor and check driver’s licenses, driver condition, vehicle registrations, vehicle equipment, and various other requirements of the Georgia State Motor Vehicle and Traffic Code.
The policy directs that “traffic safety checkpoints will be conducted in compliance with applicable state and federal law... in a manner that will be of minimal inconveniencе to the affected motorists,” before reciting and elaborating on the five elements that this Court said in LaFontaine are required for a particular checkpoint to be deemed constitutional.
Regarding LaFontaine’s “supervisory personnel” requirement, see
According to the trial court, Sergeant Marchetta decided on April 9 to set up a traffic safety checkpoint on Groover Road.
Sergeant Marchetta directed Officer David Smith to assist him with the checkpoint. The checkpoint began on April 9 at approximately 6:45 p.m., while it was still daylight. The checkpoint was marked by two traffic cones, by Sergeant Marchetta’s and Officer Smith’s patrol cars, which were parked with their blue lights on, and by the officers themselves, who were wearing bright yellow vests. The two officers both acted as screeners. Traffic was light, and in the first 20 minutes, only seven vehicles were stopped, resulting in one citation for an invalid tag.
At about 7:05 p.m., Appellant approached the checkpoint in a Nissan Maxima with a pizza delivery sign on it. He initially attempted to drive around the checkpoint, but when Officer Smith yelled at him
As Sergeant Marchetta approached Appellant’s parked car, he saw Appellant make a furtive movemеnt with his hands toward the center of the car and ordered Officer Smith to remove Appellant from the car. As Officer Smith did so, Sergeant Marchetta saw a black object in Appellant’s right hand and a large folding knife clipped to his shorts. As Appellant emerged from the car, he reached toward his waist, dropped the object in his hand (which turned out to be a marijuana pipe), and stomped on it. As Officer Smith tried to control him, Appellant began to fight. He continued to struggle even after being handcuffed, at one point reaching for Officer Smith’s service pistol. Officer Smith broke away from Appellant, and Sergeant Marchetta radioed for backup. After considerable effort by both officers, they were able to subdue and arrest Appellant.
(c) In August 2010, Appellant was indicted for driving under the influence of drugs, violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, two counts of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and attempted removal of a weapon from a peace officer. Appellant filed a motion to suppress on the ground that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The trial court acknowledged that as a supervisor, Sergeant Marchetta had the general authority to implement traffic safety checkpoints pursuant to Policy 5.19. However, the court found, “from the evidence presented,” that Sergeant Marchetta decided to implement the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped “while acting as an officer in the field and that no evidence was presented that it was planned in advance to occur at a specific time.” The court also found that the checkpoint was not adequately staffed as required by law “to safely and efficiently conduct the checkpoint.”
Pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), the State appealed the suppression order to the Court of Appeals, which reversed in a 4-3 decision. See Brown,
Citing Miller v. State,
We granted Appellant’s petition for certiorari.
2. (a) “The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
The U. S. Supreme Court has recognized, however, a narrow exception to the individualized suspicion requirement for vehicle
Applying this balancing test, the Supreme Court approved checkpoint programs designed to intercept illegal immigrants near the border, see Martinez-Fuerte,
First, the Court focused on the risk of arbitrary stops of citizens аs they travel, noting the “grave danger that such unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in the field.” Martinez-Fuerte,
Second, the Court recognized the risk of oppressive interference with the rights of law-abiding citizens, examining both the objective intrusion on their privacy and right to free passage and the subjective intrusion on motorists’ sense of personal security. See Martinez-Fuerte,
“Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”
Martinez-Fuerte,
(b) Attuned to the concerns highlighted in Martinez-Fuerte, Prouse, and Sitz, in 1998 this Court identified five minimum requirements that a particular checkpoint must satisfy to be upheld as constitutional:
A roadblock is satisfactory where [1] the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field; [2] all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle stops; [3] the delay to motorists is minimal; [4] the roadblock operation is well identified as a police checkpoint; and [5] the “screening” officer’s training and experiencе is sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication.
LaFontaine,
Addressing the danger that “unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in the field,” Martinez-Fuerte,
(c) Two years after we decided LaFontaine, the U. S. Supreme Court added another layer to the constitutional analysis of vehicle checkpoints. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
The Court described Martinez-Fuerte, Prouse, and Sitz as approving “only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion” and noted that “each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.” Id. at 41. See also id. at 43 (distinguishing the narcotics-interdiction purpоse of the Indianapolis checkpoints from “the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was designed to eliminate”). The Court acknowledged the magnitude of the social harms created by illegal narcotics trafficking but said:
We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.
Id. at 44.
The Court recognized the problems inherent in determining a checkpoint program’s “primary purpose” but concluded that this limitation was critical, because “[w]ithout drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.” Edmond at
“For this reason,” the Court said, “we examine the available evidence to determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program.” Edmond at 46. The Court reiterated, however, that “ ‘[subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,’ ” id. at 45 (citation omitted), and cautioned that “the purpose inquiry in this context is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene,” id. at 48. Examining the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program at this “рrogrammatic level,” the Court found that its “primary purpose ... is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control” and therefore held that “the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
The first LaFontaine requirement ensures that a police checkpoint cannot be set up at the “standardless and unconstrained discretion ... of the official in the field,” Prouse,
Put another way, the focus of the Edmond requirement is not on when, where, how, and by whom the specific checkpoint was implemented and operated — the focus of the LaFontaine requirements — but rather on why the agency uses checkpoints. Thus, if the primary purpose of the checkpoint program is crime-fighting in general, then the checkpoints implemented under that program are unconstitutional, even if the decision to implement them was made well in advance by the official with the most policymaking authority in the agency — as was true of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program at issue in Edmond. See
In sum, the five LaFontaine requirements and Edmond’s appropriate primary purpose requirement address different issues in the Fourth Amendment analysis and should be addressed separately by courts reviewing disputed checkpoint stops — as this Court has done after Edmond. See Hardin v. State,
It should also be noted that compliance with the Edmond and LaFontaine requirements does not necessarily end the Fourth Amendment analysis of a checkpoint case. The ultimate question remains whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged stop was reasonable. See Baker,
(e) About a year after Edmond was decided, our Court of Appeals considered, in a whole-court case, how the U. S. Supreme Court’s new police checkpoint decision affected the test this Court had established in LaFontaine. See Baker,
Baker’s merger of the Edmond requirement into the first LaFontaine requirement has created confusion in some cases, because the official who decided to implement the specific checkpoint at issue — the focus of the LaFontaine inquiry — may not be, and need not be, the official or officials whose primary purpose for establishing the agency’s checkpoint program must be determined under Edmond. As discussed previously, in accord with the U. S. Supreme Court’s pre-Edmond checkpoint cases, LaFontaine’s first requirement works to control the potential for arbitrary stops that would exist if every officer in the field could implement a checkpoint by moving the implementation decision up and away from the field to a supervisor. If that supervisor is low-ranking, he may have the authority to implement a particular vehicle checkpoint under LaFontaine and his agency’s checkpoint program, and the primary purpose of that particular checkpoint may be appropriate.
When not conflated, the first LaFontaine requirement and Edmond’s appropriate primary purpose requirement can be more easily understood and applied. Two distinct questions are presented:
(1) Was the police checkpoint at issue implemented pursuant to a checkpoint program that had, when viewed at that programmatic level, an appropriate primary purpose other than general crime control?
(2) If so, was the decision to implement that specific checkpoint made by a supervisor in advance rather than by an officer in the field?
To the extent that Baker and subsequent Court of Appeals’ cases conflate these issues, those cases are disapproved.
(f) To.summarize, where a defendant challenges his initial stop at a police checkpoint by way of a motion to suppress, the State bears the bur den of proving that the seizure was constitutional. SeeOCGA § 17-5-30 (b); Baker,
3. We now apply these legal principles to the facts of Appellant’s case.
(a) This case involves no Edmond issue. Appellant does not dispute that the Cobb County Police Department’s checkpoint policy, viewed at the programmatic level, has a primary purpose other than the general interest in crime control, namely, “to monitor and check driver’s licenses, driver condition, vehicle registrations, vehicle equipment, and various other requirements of the Georgia State Motor Vehicle and Traffic Code.” See Prouse,
(b) Thus, if Appellant is to prevail, he must do so based on his contention that the State failed to prove that the first LaFontaine requirement was satisfied — that “the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field.” Id. Appellant advances two arguments on this point. First, he maintains that Sergeant Marchetta did not qualify as “supervisory personnel” under LaFontaine because the State failed to prove that the sergeant was a “programmatic-level executive.” Second, Appellant claims that the State failed to prove that Sergeant Marchetta made the decision to implement the checkpoint in advance while acting in a supervisory role, instead of while acting as an officer in the field. The first argument is meritless, but the second is correct.
(1) Appеllant does not deny that Sergeant Marchetta was a shift supervisor in the Cobb County Police Department and that Policy 5.19 gave him the authority to implement a traffic safety checkpoint. Instead, Appellant asserts that to satisfy LaFontaine’s requirement that the decision to implement a checkpoint be made by “supervisory
Moreover, as explained above in Division 2 (d), the term “programmatic level” relates to the Edmond requirement that a checkpoint program have a primary purpose other than ordinary crime control, a requirement distinct from the LaFontaine requirements. Appellant has cited no decision from the U. S. Supreme Court or this Court that holds that an “executive” or “programmatic-level” law enforcement official must make the decision to implement a particular checkpoint in order for that checkpoint to be constitutional, as opposed simply to a supervisory official who has the authority to implement checkpoints and does so in his capacity as a supervisor rather than as an officer out in the field. Edmond did not use the term “executive” or “programmatic level” in this context. The only reference to “ ‘executive-level officers’ ” in LaFontaine was in the partial dissent, see
Indeed, it is unclear how courts would apply such a requirement. If “executive” or “programmatic-level” means something other than “supervisor” or “non-field officer,” Appellant does not explain how to accurately identify such officials, suggesting only that it would require a complicated, multi-factor analysis of the official’s rank, duties, management responsibilities, and decision-making authority in terms of hiring, firing, pаy rates, and work scheduling. Nor does he explain how such a requirement would be applied consistently to the multitude of law enforcement agencies throughout Georgia. Who qualifies as an “executive”-level official in a large metropolitan police department with hundreds of sworn officers and multiple layers of management might be quite different from who qualifies as an “executive”-level official in a small municipal agency with only a handful of officers, and even agencies of the same size may be organized in many different ways. Courts are not in the business of micromanaging how law enforcement agencies should organize themselves and delegate authority.
To be sure, thorough oversight of the implementation of specific checkpoints by higher-level officials in law enforcement agencies is a commendable practice and one that may well identify and deter problems in checkpoint programs — including, potentially, implementation issues that could lead a court reviewing the checkpoint program to question whether it really has an apprоpriate primary purpose. But we see no basis to depart from precedent and impose such an ill-defined requirement as a purported constitutional obligation. Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s argument that an officer cannot be classified as “supervisory personnel” under the first LaFontaine requirement unless he exercises “programmatic-level” authority within his agency or is identified as an “executive.”
(2) After asking us to revise the first LaFontaine requirement, Appellant asks us simply to enforce it, arguing that the State failed to prove that Sergeant Marchetta made the decision to implement the checkpoint on Groover Road as a supervisor in advance rather than as an officer in the field. Supported by the dissent below, Appellant contends that the trial court’s factual finding that Sergeant Marchetta decided to implement the checkpoint “while acting as an officer in the field” was supported by some evidence at the suppression hearing and therefore should have been affirmed. We agree.
In Miller v. State,
First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support [them]. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment.
Id. (citation omitted). These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant. See id. at 286-287. The majority opinion below deviated from these principles in reversing the trial court’s suppression order.
The Court of Appeals majority asserted that de novo review of the trial court’s order was appropriate because “[t]he record reveals without dispute that Marchetta decided to implement the roadblock two days before” it occurred. Brown,
But when the decision was made to actually implement a roadblock on Groover Road at 6:45p.m. on April 9 was not undisputed. At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Marchetta testified that he informed Captain Cox on either April 8 or 9 about his plan to set up a checkpoint on Groover Road, although he did not claim to have specified when the checkpoint would be set up, and when Captain Cox testified, he squarely denied that he had any advance notice from Sergeant Marchetta of the checkpoint at which Appellant was stopped. In addition, the other officer who participated in the checkpoint, Officer Smith, testified at the hearing, and one reasonable interprеtation of his testimony is that Sergeant Marchetta did not inform him of the planned checkpoint until Officer Smith arrived at the scene. Furthermore, Sergeant Marchetta testified that he did not order the checkpoint in writing, and the State presented no documents at the hearing showing that Sergeant Marchetta (or any other supervisor) decided on the time that the checkpoint would be established prior to
Thus, the relevant evidence was not undisputed, and the principles set forth in Miller apply. Under those principles, the record supports the trial court’s express factual findings that Sergeant Marchetta made the decision to implement the checkpoint while acting as an officer in the field and that the State failed to prоve that the checkpoint was planned in advance to occur at a specific time. Indeed, even putting aside the testimony that conflicted with Sergeant Marchetta’s account, the trial court had the opportunity to observe his testimony firsthand and was entitled to disbelieve his claim that he decided to implement the checkpoint in advance. As we explained in the context of a motion to suppress in Tate v. State,
[t]he trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony. . . . [Thus,] a rational trier of fact can choose to reject even “undisputed” testimony .... Factors such as demeanor, contradictory or inconsistent statements and evidence that an officer had “ulterior motives” can all lead a finder of fact to disregard testimony by an officer....
Id. at 56 & n. 5.
Based on its adequately supported finding that the State had not proved compliance with the first LaFontaine requirement, the trial court correctly concluded that the checkpoint at which Appellant was stoppеd violated the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s suppression ruling.
(c) The trial court cited as an additional ground for its suppression ruling the fact that the Groover Road checkpoint was not sufficiently staffed “to safely and efficiently conduct the checkpoint,” noting Sergeant Marchetta’s testimony that he simultaneously acted as the checkpoint supervisor, an initial screener, a follow-up investigator of drivers whom the screeners developed reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain, and the back-up officer to chase motorists who refused to stop at the checkpoint. The trial court indicated that
The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected this alternative ground for suppression, see Brown,
Contrary to the Court of Appeals dissent’s view, however, insufficient staffing of a checkpoint is not “irrelevant” to the constitutional analysis, Brown,
Thus, the two-officer staffing of the checkpoint in this case was not in itself a constitutional violation, but it certainly did not enhance the State’s ability to show that the checkpoint was implemented and operated lawfully. In addition, the questionable application or violation of the staffing requirements set out in the police department’s checkpoint policy could be considered by the trial court in evaluating the credibility of Sergeant Marchetta’s testimony that he decided to implement the checkpoint two days in advance.
4. Traffic safety checkpoints can be a valid and important means of law enforcement. However, police checkpoint programs must have an appropriate primary purpose other than general crime control, and each checkpoint must also be implemented and operated so as to control the risks of unconstrained discretion that “would be abused by some officers in the field,” Martinez-Fuerte,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
The terms “checkpoint” and “roadblock” are generally used interchangeably to refer to situations where law enforcement officers require vehicles passing on a road to stop at a designated point to allow brief checks of the vehicles and their occupants. This opinion will do the same.
We have considered the legal issues in this case alongside those in another police checkpoint case, which we also decide today, in which we focus further on the Edmond requirement. See Williams v. State,
The LaFontaine requirements are listed and discussed in Division 2 (b) below.
Policy 5.19 addresses staffing as follows:
A. Supervisor Approval
. . . [T]he approving supervisor should ensure:
1. There is adequate manpower to safely and efficiently conduct the checkpoint. Normally, the checkpoint supervisor should not act as a screening officer....
*789 B. Personnel
The traffic volume will in most cases determine the number of personnel needed for the traffic safety checkpoint. At a minimum:
1. Officers will be needed to screen motorists in the roadway. Only officers with the appropriate training and experience should be deployed as screeners.
2. Officers will be needed to conduct follow-up investigations of motorists whom the screeners have developed articulable suspicion or probable cause to detain.
3. At least one additional officer will be needed to initiate traffic stops of motorists who violate state law in the vicinity of the traffic safety checkpoint and/or refuse to stop at the checkpoint.
As discussed further in Division 3 (b) (2) below, the trial court found that Sergeant Marchetta made the decision to implement the checkpoint on the day it was set up (April 9), while the Court of Appeals majority said that the decision was made two days in advance (on April 7).
The Georgia Constitution’s Bill of Rights contains the same language. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII. Appellant raises no separate claim under the Georgia Constitution, but in any event we have held that Paragraph XIII is applied in accord with the Fourth Amendment in this context. See Brent v. State,
The quantum of individualized suspicion required depends on the context. Typically the standard is probable cause to believe that the individual seized has committed a crime, but more limited seizures may be based on a lesser showing of articulable suspicion, based on specific, objective facts, that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See Bailey v. United States, 568 U. S._,_(
The Court distinguished situations where “the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control,” such as “an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.” Edmond at 44. The Court also reserved for another day “whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics,” and “whether police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.” Id. at 47 n. 2. See also Lidster,
Edmond’s requirement that a checkpoint program have a primary purpose beyond detecting “evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” or advаncing “the general interest in crime control,”
In LaFontaine, this Court examined the primary purpose of the individual checkpoint at issue, finding that it was implemented for the proper purpose of “routine traffic checks.”
In LaFontaine, this Court upheld the constitutionality of a roadblock on Old Atlanta Road in Forsyth County where “[t]he decision to implement the roadblock was made by a State Patrol supervisor” but “the determination as to the location of the roadblock was made by the field officers.”
Beyond this passage’s analytical defect, it also appears to be the place where Georgia courts began summarizing Edmond as requiring a police checkpoint to have simply a “legitimate primary purpose.” As discussed in footnote 9 above, that phrasing is misleading.
Of course, if the primary purpose of the checkpoint at issue were inconsistent with the agency’s checkpoint program, the chеckpoint could not be justified by the program and would be invalid (assuming it was not justified by an emergency situation, see footnote 8 above).
Judge Eldridge’s dissent in Baker recognized this distinction between LaFontaine and Edmond-.
In fact, Edmond does not “modify” LaFontaine, as the majority asserts. The two cases have little to do with each other, except that both deal with roadblocks. Nonarbitrary interference á la the LaFontaine procedural criteria may be shown, yet a permissible purpose for a roadblock still goes unproved. Likewise, a constitutionally permissible purpose for a roadblock maybe shown, while a nonarbitrary roadblock procedure goes unproved. Edmond and LaFontaine involve different constitutional burdens, and compliance with such burdens is proved by different evidence. Neither Edmond nor LaFontaine, nor both read together, creates a new evidentiary “constitutional prerequisite” that a supervisor’s purpose for a roadblock program must be proved in order to prove the purpose of a roadblock.
Baker,
We are not suggesting that it is improper for supervisory personnel to he present at a police checkpoint. To the contrary, having an experienced supervisor present may help ensurе that proper procedures (including constitutional requirements) are followed by the officers conducting the roadblock. Nor is a checkpoint rendered unconstitutional solely because the supervisor who authorized the checkpoint later participates to some extent in the checkpoint’s operation. See, e.g., Johnson v. State,
We also note in this respect that the majority below was wrong in saying that “officers are not precluded as a matter of law from acting simultaneously as a supervisor and a field officer,” to the extent that the majority was speaking to the decision to implement a checkpoint. Brown,