Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787

Background

Douglas Wayne Brown was stopped and arrested at a Cobb County traffic checkpoint; he moved to suppress evidence, arguing the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment.
Cobb County Policy 5.19 authorized supervisors to implement checkpoints and required that checkpoints serve a non-crime-control primary purpose and follow LaFontaine safeguards.
Sergeant Andrew Marchetta (a shift supervisor) implemented and participated in a two-officer checkpoint on Groover Road; Brown was detained after officers smelled marijuana and observed furtive movements.
The trial court granted suppression, finding Marchetta decided to implement the checkpoint while acting as a field officer (not in advance as a supervisor) and that the checkpoint was inadequately staffed.
The Court of Appeals reversed (4–3), applying de novo review and concluding the decision was made in advance; the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the trial court’s factual finding that Marchetta acted as a field officer when deciding to implement the checkpoint was supported by evidence and not clearly erroneous.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Brown)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the LaFontaine “supervisory personnel” requirement requires a programmatic‑level executive to authorize a checkpoint	LaFontaine requires a programmatic‑level or executive supervisor to authorize checkpoints	“Supervisory personnel” simply means a supervisor with authority under agency policy; programmatic‑level status not required	Rejected Brown’s proposed elevated‑level requirement; supervisory personnel means a supervisor, not necessarily an agency executive
Whether the decision to implement the specific checkpoint was made by a supervisor in advance or by an officer in the field	Marchetta decided in the field the day of the checkpoint, so LaFontaine’s supervisory‑decision requirement not satisfied	State argued Marchetta decided in advance (two days earlier) and had authority under policy	Court held trial court’s finding that Marchetta acted as a field officer when deciding was supported by evidence and must be upheld; suppression proper
Whether Edmond’s “primary purpose” inquiry applies to this case and requires proof at programmatic level	Brown suggested supervisory/programmatic proof required to satisfy LaFontaine	State showed Cobb County’s checkpoint program (Policy 5.19) had a primary purpose other than general crime control; Edmond not in dispute here	Edmond applies at the programmatic level and was satisfied; no Edmond issue in this case
Whether understaffing alone renders a checkpoint unconstitutional	Brown contended inadequate staffing violated Policy 5.19 and LaFontaine	State argued understaffing alone does not automatically violate the Fourth Amendment	Understaffing alone is not per se unconstitutional, but it is relevant to credibility and to whether LaFontaine safeguards (including supervisory decision and effective operation) were met

Key Cases Cited

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (requires checkpoint programs to have a primary purpose other than general crime control; inquiry at the programmatic level)
United States v. Martinez‑Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (approved limited checkpoints where neutral plans reduce arbitrary field discretion)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stressed constraints on officer discretion for vehicle stops; approved license/registration‑focused stops)
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upheld sobriety checkpoints balancing public safety and intrusion)
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (checkpoint exception requires explicit, neutral limitations on officer conduct)
LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251 (1998) (established five requirements for constitutional roadblocks, including supervisory decision in advance)
Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 (2010) (appellate review principles for suppression rulings: trial court fact‑finder entitled to deference)