MICHAEL I. BROWN v. CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Case No. 1:20-cv-3661-JMC-RMM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
March 22, 2022
ROBIN M. MERIWEATHER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Michael I. Brown brought this suit against his former employer, Chemonics International (“Chemonics“), alleging that Chemonics terminated him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Chemonics is an international development corporation. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *4. The company hired Mr. Brown in March 2014, when he was sixty-two years old, to work as a Manager and Home Office Director. See id.; Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8. Mr. Brown was subsequently named the Environment and Natural Resources Practice Director within the company‘s Latin American and Caribbean business unit (the “LAC Unit“). See Mot. for Prot. Order at *4; Compl. ¶ 6. The LAC Unit is one of a dozen regional business units within Chemonics, each of which is headed by a Senior Vice President or “SVP.” See Mot. for Prot. Order at *4. The SVP of the LAC Unit is Anne Spahr. See id.
In February 2020, nearly five years after he was hired, Mr. Brown—now sixty-seven—learned that his position was to be eliminated. See Compl. ¶ 7. Chemonics had faced a significant budget shortfall in 2019. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *4. Mr. Brown says the company‘s Executive Vice President assured employees that “practice staff would not be terminated due to budget constraints,” yet he was out of his job by March. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7. Mr. Brown was “the only home office director of a practice terminated.” Id. ¶ 9. He was also “one of the very oldest home office director[s]” then employed by Chemonics. Id. Mr. Brown reasons that Chemonics “had and has a culture of ageism” that resulted in “a pattern and practice of discriminating against older workers” so that “younger employees” could step into their shoes. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Mr. Brown points out that among the entire staff of Chemonics home office directors—a group of nine to eleven2 employees—all were younger than Mr. Brown, and all survived the 2019-20 Chemonics terminations. See id. ¶ 9. Mr. Brown‘s own job responsibilities were assigned to a “former associate” in the Environment and Natural Resources
Chemonics has offered a different explanation for Mr. Brown‘s termination. Rather than initiate a company-wide reduction-in-force program following the 2019 budget shortfall, the company says it assigned each regional unit its own budget and directed the unit‘s SVP to allocate funds within their respective region. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *4. As SVP of the LAC Unit, Ms. Spahr “saw limited opportunities in Mr. Brown‘s area” and “decided that the LAC region‘s budget could no longer support a Director[-]level position for Environment and Natural Resources.” Id. So Ms. Spahr eliminated Mr. Brown‘s position, and informed Mr. Brown that “his termination would be effective on March 20, 2020, unless [he] successfully obtained another position within the company.” Mot. to Compel at 17. Mr. Brown did not obtain another position at Chemonics and was fired. See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 15. He is now working as a self-employed consultant through his international development firm, Satya International (“Satya“), which Chemonics sees as a potential market competitor. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *7-*8; Pl. Reply at 3.
Mr. Brown initially filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Compl. ¶ 5. The Commission issued a right to sue letter in December 2020. See id. Mr. Brown then filed this civil suit. See generally id.
By mid-summer the parties had reached an impasse. See June 30, 2021 Min. Order. The parties described their discovery dispute as involving four main issues: First, Chemonics had refused to produce some of the documents Mr. Brown requested without a protective order, but the parties had been unable to settle on mutually acceptable language. See Jt. Rep. at 1, 2-3. Second, Chemonics had objected to discovery requests that Mr. Brown characterized as “identical, or essentially identical” to discovery requests the company had sent to Mr. Brown and to which Mr. Brown had already responded. See id. at 1-2. Third, Chemonics believed it could limit the scope of discovery to the LAC Unit, while Mr. Brown insisted on obtaining companywide discovery, because “while housed in one group, [he] did work for other groups throughout the [c]ompany and . . . alleged a pattern and practice of age discrimination” at the
Under the Court‘s General Order and Guidelines, the parties were to participate in a telephonic conference with the Court before docketing any discovery-related motions. See Order pt. 4(b), ECF No. 10. Mr. Brown did not wait for a conference before filing his Motion to Compel. Chemonics timely responded with an omnibus Opposition and Motion for Protective Order. Mr. Brown has since reached out to Chambers on several occasions to inquire about the status of the Court‘s resolution of the discovery disputes. In February 2022, he filed a Motion for Hearing noting that discovery had been “at a stand[-]still.” Hearing Mot. at 3. Chemonics counters that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the parties’ substantive discovery disputes. See Response to Hearing Mot., ECF No. 28.
LEGAL STANDARDS
In a civil suit, discovery is permitted into “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party‘s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”
If the party seeking discovery believes that an answer or document was improperly withheld or is evasive or incomplete, the party “may—after first attempting to resolve the issue by conferring with the other party—file a motion to compel.” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 289 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2012) (Barnes II); see also
The party from whom discovery is sought may also seek a protective order to guard against “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” occasioned by the other party‘s discovery requests.
I. Chemonics‘s Days-Late Responses are Not Prejudicial
Mr. Brown opens his motion to compel by pointing to Chemonics‘s procedurally late responses and objections to his discovery requests. See Mot. to Compel at 4. Under the Federal Rules, the party responding to interrogatories or requests for production must serve its response, including any objections, within thirty days.
No prejudice to Mr. Brown is apparent here, where Mr. Brown received Chemonics‘s responses and objections three and eleven days late, respectively. Nor does Chemonics appear to be engaged in a “pattern of misconduct.” The Court will therefore consider the company‘s objections to Mr. Brown‘s discovery requests on their merits.
II. Good Cause Supports Issuing the Proposed Protective Order
The parties’ first substantive dispute over Mr. Brown‘s discovery requests is whether a
The proposal now before the Court was provided by Chemonics and is based on a template from the District of Maryland. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *8; see also ECF No. 18-3 (the “Proposed Prot. Order“). The proposal permits either party to designate discovery material as “confidential” when the party “in good faith believes [the discovery] contains sensitive
There is good cause to issue the Proposed Protective Order in this case. Chemonics has presented specific evidence that the company could be harmed if Mr. Brown uses commercial information discovered in this matter to compete with Chemonics in the international development market through his competitor company Satya. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *7-*8. Even if Mr. Brown poses no serious threat to Chemonics‘s bottom-line business prospects, as Mr. Brown insists, see Pl. Reply at 3, the Federal Rules specifically contemplate issuing protective orders to shield “commercial information” disclosed in discovery. See
The Court will therefore grant Chemonics‘s Motion for Protective Order,4 and, with a protective order in place, deny as moot the portions of Mr. Brown‘s Motion to Compel premised on Chemonics‘s refusal to produce discovery “without a protective order.” Mot. to Compel at 2; see also id. at 9, 16-27 (reproducing responses to Production Request No. 12 and Interrogatory No. 3).
III. Estoppel Does Not Apply
The next issue raised by Mr. Brown is that Chemonics has refused to respond to discovery requests “identical, or essentially identical” to requests served on Mr. Brown that Mr. Brown has already answered. Mot. to Compel at 2, 8-9, 18-20. Mr. Brown reasons that having sent the same discovery requests to him and having raised no objection to his responses, Chemonics “should be estopped from objecting” to Mr. Brown‘s requests in return. Id. at 8.
IV. Company-Wide Discovery Is Not Warranted
Underlying Mr. Brown‘s estoppel theory is a broader dispute regarding the proper scope of discovery in this matter. Chemonics has objected to several discovery requests on the basis that they are irrelevant, overbroad, or unduly burdensome, as Mr. Brown requests information from the company as a whole rather than from the LAC Unit in which Mr. Brown was organizationally housed. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *6, *13. Mr. Brown insists that he should have access to companywide discovery for two principal reasons. See Pl. Reply at 1-2, 4.
A. Companywide Financial Documents (Request for Production No. 27)
One of Mr. Brown‘s arguments for compelling companywide discovery relates to the scope of his work at Chemonics. See Pl. Reply at 2. Mr. Brown asserts that his responsibilities were not confined to the LAC Unit because “in fact Plaintiff worked primarily for other business units” to create “outside” opportunities and support “the company as a whole.” Id. He was “housed in the [LAC Unit] arbitrarily,” he says, and his work had “companywide implications.” Id. Mr. Brown thus theorizes that “to effectuate his layoff,” Chemonics must have considered companywide budgetary shortfalls, particularly because “the budget shortfall that is being blamed for Plaintiff‘s layoff was companywide.” Id. “[I]f the decision to terminate the Plaintiff
The problem is that Mr. Brown has misstated—or misunderstood—Chemonics‘s theory of the case, and so misjudged the relevance of his companywide financial discovery request. Chemonics has not suggested it eliminated Mr. Brown‘s position “based on his worth to the company” or to shore up the companywide budget shortfall in 2019. Rather, Chemonics insists it eliminated Mr. Brown‘s position after financial strains in 2019 convinced company leadership to assign independent budgets to each regional unit, and the LAC Unit in which Mr. Brown was housed determined it “could no longer support a Director[-]level position for Environment and Natural Resources.” Mot. for Prot. Order at *4. The termination decision was thus LAC Unit-specific, based on the LAC Unit‘s independent regional budget. Mr. Brown will therefore find no “strong evidence of pretext” if the LAC Unit SVP “ignored the benefit of Plaintiff‘s work for other business units,” as he claims. Pl. Reply at 4. For one, the LAC Unit could have been in the red even while the overall Chemonics budget was in the black. Additionally, the information Mr. Brown has already uncovered reveals that Ms. Spahr was quite aware of Mr. Brown‘s benefit to other business units at Chemonics—she attempted to convince other units to “purchase” Mr. Brown‘s time in order to “ease the LAC budget constraints” and more accurately capture his extra-regional benefits to the company. Mot. to Compel at 16. And Chemonics has agreed to produce the 2020 LAC budget information now that a protective order is in place, see Mot. for Prot. Order at *21, so Mr. Brown can test whether the LAC Unit budgetary constraints are a pretext for his termination.
B. Companywide Age-Based Hiring and Firing Decisions (Requests for Production Nos. 21, 24-25, and 31 and Interrogatories 1 and 2)
The other overarching dispute over the scope of proper discovery in this case relates to Mr. Brown‘s allegations of a companywide “pattern and practice of age discrimination.” Pl. Reply at 1; see also Compl. ¶¶ 8-12. Unlike companywide financial documents, discovery related to Chemonics‘s hiring and firing decisions based on age—whether to attract and retain older workers or to push them out—is at least marginally relevant to Mr. Brown‘s ADEA claim.
Mr. Brown‘s requests related to the age of the company‘s workforce and age-based hiring and firing decisions are nevertheless out of proportion to the needs of this case. Six requests fall into this category. In document requests 21, 24, and 25, Mr. Brown seeks “documents and communications that refer to, relate to or memorialize” the company‘s efforts to “hire,” “retain,” or “accomplish . . . the hiring of” employees who are “old,” “older,” “young,” or “younger.” Mot. to Compel at 11-12. In document request 31, Mr. Brown sought “minutes or records of meetings [Chemonics held] from January 1, 2018 through April 30, 2020 [at which] the age of [Chemonics] employees, or [the Chemonics] workforce, or age diversity or age inclusion was discussed.” Id. at 13. And in interrogatories 1 and 2, Mr. Brown sought seven years’ data about every employee at the company, including their title and age, as well as hiring and termination decisions for eight distinct periods in time, each identifying employees by name, title, and age. See id. at 14-15.
Mr. Brown responds only superficially to these objections. He maintains that Chemonics has not provided “declarations or evidence of any burden.” Pl. Reply at 4. If Mr. Brown is insisting here on a formal declaration under penalty of perjury, or evidence in a form that would be admissible under the Rules of Evidence, his argument is misplaced. Burdensomeness objections are routinely judged on party proffers in briefs and at motions hearings, and Chemonics has spelled out several in its opposition papers. See Mot. for Prot. Order at *20, *22.
Mr. Brown also suggests that discovery “is now usually made based on computer searches, [so] it is no more burdensome to do the search of the whole company[] th[a]n for a
Additional factors weigh against the proportionality of Mr. Brown‘s companywide employment data requests, as well. Among them, Chemonics did not simply refuse to respond to Mr. Brown‘s requests. The company produced lists of the individuals employed, hired, and fired within the LAC Unit between January 2019 and April 2020. See Mot. to Compel at 14-15; ECF No. 17 (amended exhibits). And Chemonics offered to narrow the meeting records request to meeting records from its Diversity and Inclusion team, which “would be in charge of . . . meetings regarding ‘age diversity’ or ‘age inclusion.‘” Mot. for Prot. Order at *22. Chemonics conferred with that team and informed Mr. Brown that the company has “no responsive documents” subject to the limitation. Id. Mr. Brown has not explained why these narrowed responses are inadequate or will hamper his preparation for the trial of this case.
V. Chemonics‘s Remaining Objections Are Sustained
The remaining discovery responses Mr. Brown seeks to compel can be addressed in a more summary fashion. Overall, Mr. Brown‘s requests are phrased in exceptionally broad terms, and Chemonics has cautiously raised objections to portions of the requests that appear to seek documents or information outside the scope of discovery under
In other instances, Mr. Brown has made sweeping requests that appear to target relevant discovery, as that concept is broadly construed. But the full scope of the discovery he seeks will be far more burdensome to uncover than it will be useful to litigating or adjudicating this case.
Other of Mr. Brown‘s requests appear to seek documents not under Chemonics‘s control, or which do not exist. Document Requests 6 and 8, for example, seek among other things “communications . . . by or between Plaintiff . . . and Plaintiff‘s . . . friends, family, business associates, or anyone . . . formerly employed by Chemonics,” and “diaries [and] journals . . . describing, relating to, referring to or touching upon Plaintiff‘s employment at Chemonics.” Mot. to Compel at 6-7.
These examples illustrate the sweeping language used in Mr. Brown‘s requests, and exemplify why the Court will not compel Chemonics to respond more thoroughly than it has to date. The Court will not condone or encourage the “inordinate expense involved in overbroad and far-ranging discovery requests.” Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983).
VI. Requests for Which There Is Nothing to Compel
A concluding note is warranted with respect to several discovery requests Mr. Brown included in his Motion to Compel to which Chemonics has already responded to the fullest extent required by the Rules. Mr. Brown wonders “if all [responsive] information was produced, why make the objection?” Pl. Reply at 5. What Mr. Brown or his counsel hopes to convey by this witticism is unclear. Presumably, Chemonics raised objections to preserve them, because as
Mr. Brown also suggests that the “only way to be sure that all information and documents have been and in the future will be produced, is to overrule the objections.” Pl. Reply at 5. He asks, “what is the harm of overruling the objection and compelling discovery, if all information and documents have been produced?” Id. That is not how motions to compel work. The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of proving that the discovery requested is relevant and that the opposing party‘s response is inadequate or incomplete. See Alexander II, 193 F.R.D. at 3. Mr. Brown has generally not met that burden, and where he has, Chemonics has adequately demonstrated that the requests are nonetheless disproportional to the needs of this case.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Chemonics‘s Motion for Protective Order and ADOPTS the order attached to that motion as Exhibit A, ECF No. 18-3. The company is ORDERED to provide discovery it withheld pending entry of a protective order within fourteen days. Mr. Brown‘s Motion to Compel is DENIED. The Motion for Hearing is further DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED this March 22, 2022.
ROBIN M. MERIWEATHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE