Rоdney Brossart, Susan Brossart and Thomas Brossart, Plaintiffs and Appellants v. Kelly Janke, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff for Nelson County, Eric Braathen, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff for Nelson County, and Nelson County, North Dakota, Defendants and Appellees
No. 20190236
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Filed 5/7/20
2020 ND 98
VandeWalle, Justice.
Appeal from the District Court of Nelson County, Northeast Central Judicial District, the Honorable Lolita G. Hartl Romanick, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.
Timothy C. Lamb, Grand Forks, ND, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Howard D. Swanson, Grand Forks, ND, fоr defendants and appellees.
Brossart v. Janke
No. 20190236
[¶1] Plaintiffs appealed from a district court order denying their motion for relief from judgment and granting defendants’ motion to compel answers to interrogatories in aid of execution of judgment and awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm.
I
[¶2] In June 2014, Rodney, Thomas, and Susan Brossart, as plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit in North Dakota federal district court against Nelson County, North Dakota, and the sheriff and a deputy sheriff of Nelson County, as defendants. The Brossarts alleged claims under
[¶3] On September 12, 2017, the defendants filed the federal judgment awarding costs in the clerk’s office in Nelson County district court under
[¶4] On February 1, 2019, the defendants’ attornеy served three sets of interrogatories in aid of execution of judgment, one for each of the three named plaintiffs, on the Brossarts’ attorney. Each set of interrogatories contained 73 identical questions. Subparts to the main questions contained in the interrogatories were separately numbered. The Brossarts’ were not personally served the interrogatories. However, on appeal the Brossarts acknowledge they were informed of the filing of the federal judgment on or about February 1, 2019.
[¶5] On February 19, 2019, the Brossarts’ attorney sent a letter to the defendants’ attorney informing him the Brossarts “[had] no intention of completing the form Interrogatories” because the Brossarts believed the federal judgment was procedurally and substantively defective. Nothing in the record indicates there had been communication between the parties’ attorneys concerning enforcement of the fеderal judgment prior to the February 19 letter sent by the Brossarts’ attorney. Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating the Brossarts’ attorney represented them in the state court action prior to February 19. After the Brossarts’ attorney sent the February 19 letter, the parties’ attorneys continued to communicate regarding the interrogatories.
[¶6] The defendants filed a motion to compel answers to the interrogatories on May 6, 2019. On May 7, the Brossarts filed a motiоn for relief from judgment under
[¶7] A hearing was held on the parties’ motions on July 8, 2019. On July 29, the district court issued an order granting the defendants’ motion to compel and denying the Brossarts’ motion for relief from judgment. The court also awarded defendants $2,340.00 in attorney’s fees after determining the Brossarts’ justification for refusing to answer the interrogatories and their motion for relief from judgment were frivolous. The court determined the Brossarts were served notice on October 5, 2017, when the attorney representing them in the federal lawsuit was served notice of the filing of the federal judgment. The court alsо determined the Brossarts’ motion for relief from judgment was a collateral attack on the merits of the federal judgment, which was entitled to full faith and credit. Additionally, the court found the number of interrogatories served on the Brossarts did not exceed the number permitted under
II
[¶8] The Brossarts argue the district court abused its discretion in granting
A
[¶9] The Brossarts argue they were under no obligation to answer the interrogatories because they were not served notice of the filing of the federal judgment. North Dakota has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) (codified at
this state.”
Promptly upon the filing of a foreign judgment and the affidavit, the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice must include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor’s lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to thе judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed.
[¶10] The main purpose of the provisions in
[¶11] Section 28-20.1-03(3) states execution or other enforcement processes may commence ten days after the date the judgment is filed, not ten days after
notice is mailed or served. A plain reading of
[¶12] We interpret and construe statutes to avoid absurd, ludicrous, or illogical results. Wilkens v. Westby, 2019 ND 186, ¶ 6, 931 N.W.2d 229; Mertz v. City of Elgin, 2011 ND 148, ¶ 7, 800 N.W.2d 710. “We presume the legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and we construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted.” Wilkens, at ¶ 6 (quoting Riemers v. Jaeger, 2018 ND 192, ¶ 11, 916 N.W.2d 113). Interpreting
[¶13] We previously decided a case involving improper notice under
[¶14] In the proceedings before the district court, the Brossarts argued lack of proper notice rendered the federal judgment invalid and unenforceable. On appeal, the Brossarts concede lack of proper notice does not invalidate the fedеral judgment and instead argue that, under Beck, lack of proper notice stays enforcement proceedings until notice is provided pursuant to
[¶15] We agree with the Brossarts to the extent they argue they were not served notice in compliance with
[¶16] The defendants argue
[¶17] Adhering to our decision in Beck, we also agree with the Brossarts’ contention that enforcement proceedings are stayed until the notice procedures provided in
enforcement prоceedings are stayed from the time the judgment debtor acquires knowledge of the filing of a foreign judgment without having been mailed notice is immaterial here because, under the facts of this case, the result is the same. See Dakota Heritage Bank v. Iaccone, 2014 ND 150, ¶ 21, 849 N.W.2d 219 (stating that under
[¶18] The Brossarts contend they learned of the filing of the federal judgment on or about February 1, 2019, when their attorney was served with the interrogatories in aid of execution. The first affirmative act demonstrating the Brossarts had actual knowledge of the filing of the federal judgment was their attorney’s February 19, 2019, letter acknowledging the filing of the federal judgment and stating the Brossarts would not be answering the interrogatories because they believed the federal judgment was invalid on its merits. Notice pursuant to
[¶19] The purpose of the notice provisions in the UEFJA is to inform the debtor of the proceedings against him or her and allow the debtor an opportunity to respond. The Brossarts were informed of the filing of the foreign judgment prior to the court issuing its order. The Brossarts were also afforded an opportunity to respond and raise defenses to the enforcement of the federal judgment, which they did in their motion for relief from judgment. The same remedies were available to the Brossarts at all times during the proceedings as would have beеn had they been mailed notice pursuant to
[¶20] The district court erred, as a matter of law, in its conclusion that the Brossarts were provided notice under
B
[¶21] The Brossarts argue the number of interrogatories served on them exceeds the limit allowed under
[¶22] “Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 50 written interrogatories.”
Each party is allowed to serve 50 interrogatories on any other party . . . . Parties cannot evade this limitation by joining as “subparts” questions that seek information about discrete separate subjects. However, a question asking about communications of a particular
type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests that the time, place, persons present, and сontents be stated separately for each such communication.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶23] Rule 33 allows each party to serve 50 interrogatories “on any other party.” The Rule does not set a combined limit of 50 interrogatories that may be served on all the plaintiffs or defendants to a lawsuit. Rather, a plain reading of the Rule allows up to 50 interrogatories to be served on any party to an action. See Bradfield v. Donahue, No. 13-1310-JDT-egb, 2016 WL 5661855, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2016); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 06-2376-KHV-DJW, 2008 WL 1924945, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2008). Rodney, Thomas, and Susan Brossart were all named as plaintiffs. The three Brossarts were each separate parties to the action. Serving post-judgment interrogatories in aid of execution on each of the Brossarts concerning their joint and separate property was not unreasonable because each of the Brossarts was jointly and severally liable for the judgment. See Heller v. Prod. Credit Ass’n of Minot, 462 N.W.2d 125, 127-28 (N.D. 1990). Under Rule 33, the defendants were permitted to serve separate interrogatories on eaсh of the three named plaintiffs.
[¶24] Defendants served the same set of interrogatories on Rodney, Thomas, and Susan Brossart. Each set of interrogatories contained 73 questions. The district court determined a total of 42 interrogatories had been served on the Brossarts when subparts were included in the primary question. After a thorough and complete review of the interrogatories served
III
[¶25] Plaintiffs argue the district court erred by awarding attorney’s fees under
[¶26] The district court found plaintiffs’ justification for refusing to answer the interrogatories and their collateral attack on the federal judgment through their motion for relief from judgment under
[¶27] The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
[¶28] In applying the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, we have stated, “constitutional full faith and credit is afforded to foreign judgments even though a similar judgment could not be obtained in the forum state as a matter of law, or though the judgment could not be obtained in the forum state as a matter of strong public policy.” Am. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Speros, 494 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D. 1993) (internal citations omitted); 1st Summit Bank v. Samuelson, 1998 ND 113, ¶ 13, 580 N.W.2d 132. However, we have recognized foreign judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit under certain circumstances such as when they are rendered in violаtion of due process in the rendering state, see Gray v. N.D. Game & Fish Dep’t, 2005 ND 204, ¶ 18, 706 N.W.2d 614, when the rendering court lacks jurisdiction, see Darling & Co. v. Burchard, 69 N.D. 212, 284 N.W. 856, 859 (1939), or when the judgment is procured through fraud in the rendering state, see Shary v. Eszlinger, 45 N.D. 133, 176 N.W. 938, 942-43 (1920).
[¶29] The Brossarts’ entire basis for refusing to answer the defendants’ interrogatories
[¶30] In their motion for relief from judgment, the Brossarts argued the federal judgment was invalid because the federal district court did not consider state law, the amount of the federal judgment was unreasonable, and the federal court was not justified in awarding the defendants certain costs of the federal litigation. The Brossarts did not argue the federal court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, they were nоt afforded adequate due process in federal court, or that the federal judgment was fraudulently procured. The Brossarts did not appeal the federal judgment in federal court. The Brossarts’ motion for
relief from judgment was a collateral attack on the merits of the unappealed federal judgment.
[¶31] Under basic principles of law, the federal judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and the Brossarts did not raise any viable defense as to why thе federal judgment was invalid or unenforceable. The Brossarts correctly assert they were not initially provided notice of the filing of the foreign judgment pursuant to
IV
[¶32] The parties’ remaining arguments are either without merit or unnecessary to our decision, and we decline to address them.
V
[¶33] The district court’s order is affirmed.
[¶34] Gerald W. VandeWalle
Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Jerod E. Tufte
Lisa Fair McEvers