Ralph W. Thomas and Gateway Chevrolet, Inc. appealed from a district court judgment which granted American Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company’s [American Standard] motion for summary judgment. The judgment ordered that American Standard, the garnishor, recover from Gateway Chevrolet, Inc. [Gateway], the garnishee, $138,443.90, plus interest and costs as the result of an Arizona judgment against defendant Thomas, an employee and major shareholder of Gateway. We affirm.
American Standard obtained a judgment against Thomas on October 2, 1991, in Mar-icopa County, Arizona. The judgment arose from an agreement in which Thomas guaranteed a loan extended by American Standard. The guarantee agreement specified it was to be governed by Arizona law. After the loan was in default, American Standard commenced a proceeding in Arizona to sell the real estate which secured the loan. The real estate was sold but the proceeds did not satisfy the claim, and American Standard successfully sued Thomas for the deficiency. Under Arizona law, the judgment against Thomas for the deficiency was limited to his “sole and separate property.”
An authenticated copy of that judgment was filed in Cass County, North Dakota, on January 14, 1992, pursuant to Chapter 28-20.1, NDCC, North Dakota’s codification of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Since then, several garnishee summons have been served, most notably against Gateway. The bases for the garnishee summons upon Gateway are that it pays Thomas a monthly salary and pays a rental on land which is leased from Thomas and owned in joint tenancy by Thomas and his wife.
After initially denying holding any money that was the “sole and separate property” of Thomas, Gateway made two garnishment disclosures, and the deposition of Bruce A. Nelson, Office Manager of Gateway, was taken. The disclosures and deposition revealed that Thomas’s monthly salary from Gateway was $5,149.00. They also revealed that Gateway entered into a written lease with Thomas, individually, whereby Gateway pays him, individually, $26,-500.00 per month for property in Cass County which is owned in joint tenancy by Thomas and his wife. Although acknowledging service of the Garnishment Summons, Gateway has continued to issue salary and lease checks to Thomas and has neither applied nor set off any monthly salary payments or lease payments to Thomas against the amount claimed in American Standard’s garnishee summons.
Because of Gateway’s failure to apply or set off any money owed to Thomas, American Standard brought a motion for summary judgment for the entire amount claimed in the garnishee summons. See NDCC § 32-09.1-15. The district court granted the motion. The issue before us on appeal is whether North Dakota or Arizona law applies to the wages and lease payments received by Thomas as a result of the Arizona judgment transferred to North Dakota through Chapter 28-20.1, NDCC.
In 1969, North Dakota adopted the 1964 Revised Act of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association. Chapter 28-20.1 provides a summary procedure for actions on foreign judgments by providing the enacting state with a speedy and economical method *602 of doing what it is required to do by the Constitution of the United States, that is, to provide full faith and credit to the judgments of courts of other states. NDCC §§ 28-20.1 et seq.; TJnif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (1964) Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 150 (1986).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution asserts:
“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws proscribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”
U.S. Const,
art. IV, § 1. In applying the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, constitutional full faith and credit is afforded to foreign judgments even though a similar judgment could not be obtained in the forum state as a matter of law,
Matson v. Matson,
When a properly authenticated foreign judgment is filed with the clerk of any district or county court in North Dakota and notice is properly given to all parties,
Beck v. Smith,
Appellants contend that, because American Standard and Thomas agreed that the guarantee be construed according to the laws of Arizona, Arizona law should be applied to the enforcement of the judgment in North Dakota. Matters of procedure and remedial rights are governed by the law of the forum where relief is sought.
Dixon’s Extrs. v. Ramsay’s Extrs.,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 319,
Although we are bound to give full faith and credit to the substance of foreign state judgments, procedure and remedies are different from substance; and what is procedure and what is substance is determined by the forum.
Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
Here, applying Arizona law which the parties agreed controlled the guarantee agreement, the Arizona court held that American Standard recover from Thomas as to his sole and separate property, a fixed sum plus costs and interest. Relying upon North Dakota law for the methods and procedure of enforcement of its judgment, American Standard initiated garnishment proceedings against Thomas and Gateway to execute upon two sources of income— Thomas’s salary and Thomas’s rental income. North Dakota law therefore governs the enforcement of the Arizona order in North Dakota.
Chapter 32-09.1, NDCC, provides a method by which a judgment creditor may proceed by garnishing property, real or personal, belonging to the creditor’s debtor which would satisfy the judgment creditor’s claim. NDCC § 32-09.1-02. A garnishment action is the exclusive procedure which may be used to execute on earnings of a debtor while those earnings are held by a third party employer. Id. We have long held that fundamental in any garnishment procedure, only the actual interest of the defendant can be reached by garnishment proceedings, and the creditor cannot obtain any more than actually belongs to the debtor:
“The rights of the debtor are the source of the creditor’s rights. The stream cannot rise higher than its source_ Under no circumstances can the plaintiff be placed in a more favorable, or the garnishee in a worse, position than if the defendant was himself enforcing his claim. For the plaintiff cannot, by garnishment, place himself in a superior position, as regards a recovery, than is occupied by the principal defendant.”
Hatcher v. Plumley,
Thomas’s Wage Income from Gateway
Arizona is a community property state. 2 The wages Thomas receives from Gateway are personal property acquired during the marriage and are community property and therefore not his “sole and separate property” under Arizona law. A.R.S. § 25-211. Applying Arizona law, the wages would not be subject to the present garnishment actions.
North Dakota is not a community property state.
Rozan v. Rozan,
*604 Arguably, North Dakota law allows foreign laws to reach a party’s personal property located within North Dakota by stating that “[i]f there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” 5 NDCC § 47-07-01. The source note of section 47-07-01, NDCC, incorrectly states it was derived from section 946 of the California Civil Code, 6 which in turn was derived from the Field Code. 7 This section of the Field Code was enacted by the Dakota Territory Legislature in 1865 (Civ.C.1865, § 364). It was subsequently adopted by the North Dakota Legislature where it has undergone only minor changes. 8
For the purposes of historical reference and to aid in interpretation, the provisions of the modern Century Code are to be considered as continuations of previously existing sections if the two are substantially similar. NDCC § 1-02-25. Section 47-07-01 is substantially similar to section 364 of the 1865 Dakota Civil Code, which in turn is substantially similar to California’s adaptation of the Field Code. In construing statutes, we may look to its legislative history and former statutory provision, including laws upon the same or similar subjects. NDCC § 1-02-39;
Furlong Ent. v. Sun Exploration & Prod.,
Foreign case law interpreting statutes is most persuasive if the cases were decided prior to our own adoption of the statute. Although we fmd no relevant case law interpreting the Field Code provision, prior to North Dakota’s adoption of it, we find relevant interpretations after our enactment; and although not mandatory, California’s interpretation of it is somewhat persuasive.
E.g., Estate of Zins by Kelsch v. Zins,
In
In re Latkrop
's
Estate,
The “exception to the rule” was expounded upon in
In re Nolan’s Estate,
In
Waite v. Waite,
In American Standard’s case, the purpose of assigning a situs to the wages is to establish the jurisdiction in which to garnish them. Within this context, jurisdiction should be determined “in light of the totality of contacts with the state involved” and the “bearing that local contacts have to the question of over-all fair play and substantial justice.”
Atkinson, supra,
As unpaid wages are intangibles and the action taken with reference to them shows closer connections to North Dakota than any other state, the wages are classified according to North Dakota law. Because North Dakota is not a community property state, the wages are Thomas’s sole and separate property. We accordingly hold that Thomas’s wages are subject to the garnishment proceeding. Because there is no dispute as to fact, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of American Standard in this regard. Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P.;
Capsco Prods., Inc. v. Savageau,
Thomas’s Rental Income from Gateway
When a foreign court attempts to affect title to real property located in North Dakota, we have said that:
“It is settled in this State that a court decree or court judgment of another state in its determination of property rights may not directly affect or transfer title to real property situate in North Dakota.... A decree or judgment of a court of another jurisdiction having such a purported consequence will not be ac *606 corded full faith and credit under Article IV, Section I, of the Constitution of the United States.”
Rozan, supra, at 700. In this case, however, the valid Arizona judgment did not directly convey or encumber North Dakota real estate. Although the Arizona judgment did not affect real property, the garnishment action which executes the Arizona judgment does affect real property by essentially encumbering the property by taking the rentals. In addition we believe the right to receive land lease payments would be classified as intangible personal property. See f.n. 9. We therefore apply North Dakota law to the garnishment of the lease income.
In 1988, the property which forms the basis of Gateway’s lease was quit-claimed to Thomas and his wife “as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common.” As joint tenants, both Thomas and his wife hold a joint interest in the property. A joint interest is one owned by several persons in equal shares by a title created by a single transfer. NDCC § 47-02-06. Contrary to Thomas’s assertions, the land is not, nor ever can be, community property by the mere fact that the marital couple resided in a community property state. 10 North Dakota is not a community property state and we do not apply community property principles to land within our borders. 11
We have held that each joint tenant has the right of enjoyment to the extent of his or her interest.
In re Estate of Paulson,
In 1988, Thomas leased the entire property to Gateway. The lease was not signed by the other joint tenant, Thomas’s wife. We have held that a joint tenant may not encumber another joint tenant’s interest in the property without the authorization or consent of the cotenant.
Olson, supra.
Though a lease of joint property must be made by the act of all cotenants, if such a lease is made without the cotenant’s consent or authority, the lease will in most instances be deemed valid and deemed for the benefit of both joint tenants.
Shelby v. Shelby,
This right to accounting, however, is a personal one. In the past, we have held that tenants in common are entitled to an accounting against their cotenants.
Stevahn v. Meidinger,
Thomas’s wife made no appearance to defend her interest. She is entitled to a personal charge against Thomas for her share of the rental income, but it is not our province to apportion the income in order to limit American Standard’s access to only Thomas’s one-half interest in the income. We accordingly hold that all the rental income received by Thomas is subject to the garnishment proceeding. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of American Standard in this regard. Rule 56 N.D.R.Civ.P.; Cap-sco, supra.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. Pursuant to section 1-02-13, NDCC, we freely cite to other jurisdictions which have adopted, and whose courts are applying, the 1964 revision of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. This section states: "Any provision in this code which is a part of a uniform statute must be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.” NDCC § 1-02-13. Conversely, appellant's arguments stemming from the heavy reliance upon California cases will be given minimal weight as that jurisdiction has not adopted the Act.
. Section 25-211, A.R.S., states: “All property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage, except that which is acquired by gift, devise or descent, is the community property of the husband and wife."
. Section 14-07-04, NDCC, negates community property principles in domestic relations by stating, “Separate property — Rights and privileges. Except as otherwise provided by section 14-07-03, neither the husband nor the wife has any interest in the property of the other, but neither can be excluded from the other’s dwelling.”
.Section 1-01-49(4), NDCC, states, " 'Personal property’ includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt,” and section 47-01-07, NDCC, states, " ‘Personal prop *604 erty’ shall mean and include every kind of property that is not real.”
. Apparently the domicile of Thomas may have been Texas, but Texas, like Arizona, is a community property state. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 5.01(b) [“Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage."].
. The source note of section 47-07-01, NDCC, cites as its derivation section 946 of the California Civil Code, which reads:
"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.”
. The source notes of the North Dakota Century Code incorrectly cite to the Territorial Civil Code of 1877 as the earliest source of Dakota Territory’s Field Code. However, Dakota Territory enacted the Field Code in December of 1865. Laws of Dakota Territory, §§ 1-2034.
See Furlong Ent. v. Sun Exploration & Prod.,
. R.C. 1895, § 3465; R.C. 1899, § 3465; R.C. 1905, § 4901; C.L. 1913, § 5444; R.C. § 47-0701.
. Wages which have been paid and received in the form of money are tangible assets. However, a garnishment action involves the execution “on earnings of a debtor while those earnings are held by a third party employer.” NDCC § 32-09.1-02. Not yet having received the wages, the wage-earner only has a "right” to the wages. "Intangible property” is generally defined as “claims, interest and rights,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1217 (6th ed. 1990), and "property [that] has no intrinsic and marketable value, but is merely the representative or evidence of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds, promissory notes_” Id. at 809. As a right, claim, or interest against the employer, wages yet to be received are intangible property.
. Even if we were to apply Arizona or Texas community property law, the result would probably be the same. A common principle of community property law is that a husband and wife can hold property in derogation of their community property status if it clearly appears that the spouses agreed that the property should be taken in that manner.
McClennen v. McClennen,
. In
Rozan v. Rozan,