MICHELLE BROSE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. TRAVIS COPELAND, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
CASE NO. 13-13-08
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY
August 5, 2013
[Cite as Brose v. Copeland, 2013-Ohio-3399.]
Aрpeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division Trial Court No. 21170250 Judgment Affirmed
John C. Filkins for Appellant
Kent D. Nord for Appellee
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Michelle Brose, appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Seneca County, Juvenile Division, denying her request for a modified child supрort order. On appeal, Brose argues that the trial court should have modified the child support order because there was allegedly a change in circumstances due to an increase in the income of Defendant-Appellеe, Travis Copeland. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
{¶2} Brose and Copeland were never married. They have a child, G.B., who was born in April 2011. In July 2011, the Seneca County Child Support Enforcement Agency issued an administrative order for сhild support. The order included an administrative calculation worksheet that showed Brose with an adjusted gross income of $41,649.02 and Copeland with an adjusted gross income of $19,285.68 for 2011. The worksheet did not include any documents, such as pay stubs, to indicate how the CSEA calculated the parties’ incomes. The order obligated Copeland to pay approximately $345.00 per month in child support and approximately $80.00 per month for cash medical support.
{¶3} In early August 2011, Copeland, a resеrvist in the National Guard, informed Brose that he was being deployed to Afghanistan. Brose responded by filing a motion for modification of the child support order on August 25, 2011. Subsequently, Copeland filed motions regarding parental rights, Brose‘s purported violatiоn of his parenting time, and the possibility of a name change for G.B.
{¶4} On December 29, 2011, a magistrate conducted a hearing on temporary orders regarding Copeland‘s parenting time. The parties did not offer evidence regarding Brose‘s motion for a child support modification at that time. Rather, to accommodate Copeland‘s overseas deployment, the magistrate continued the hearing to October 1, 2012. At the hearing, the following relevant evidence was adduced.
{¶5} Copeland testified at length regarding his compensation. For most of 2011, he received a weekly unemployment benefit of $387.00. However, after assuming active duty in September 2011, Copeland‘s compensation increased dramatically. He also received additional compensation for serving in a hostile region. During his service overseas, Copeland‘s compensation peaked at approximately $2,550.00 for every two weeks. He testified that his active deployment ended in August 2012 аnd that he did not expect to be called again for active duty in the future. After returning from active duty, Copeland was unemployed and received a weekly unemployment benefit of $485.00.
{¶6} Brose testified that she worked 36 hours a week as a nurse and thаt she was paid approximately $24.00 per hour. Brose also indicated that she pays $183.00 per pay period to obtain health insurance for her, G.B., and her other child and that she pays approximately $120.00 per week to her mother and а babysitter for child care. Brose did not offer any documentary evidence, such as pay stubs or
{¶7} On October 5, 2012, the magistrate issued a decision denying Brose‘s motion for a modified child support order. The magistrate found that Brose failed to properly verify her testimony regarding her day care expenses, insurance costs, and income, which precluded thе magistrate from properly calculating a revised support amount. The magistrate also found that Copeland‘s increased income for his active duty service was nonrecurring income and thus excluded from his gross income. Accordingly, the mаgistrate concluded that there was no change in circumstances justifying a modified support order.
{¶8} On October 18, 2012, Brose filed her objections to the magistrate‘s decision. She filed supplemental objections on January 23, 2013. On March 4, 2013, the trial court оverruled Brose‘s objections. It similarly found that there was no basis for a modified order since Brose failed both to provide documentation of her income and expenses and to prove that there was a change in circumstances.1
{¶9} Brоse filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A RESULT OF ITS FAILURE TO ORDER A MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE TIME PERIOD IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS IN THE ACTIVE MILITARY AS WELL AS THE TIME PERIOD FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE THEREFROM.
{¶10} In her sole assignment of error, Brose argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that there was a substantial change in circumstances supporting the modification of Copeland‘s child support obligation. Specifically, Brose argues that the trial court improperly found that she failed to provide the necessary documentation regarding her income and that Copeland‘s pay for his activе duty military service was nonrecurring income. Brose also asserts that the trial court should have considered the change in Copeland‘s unemployment compensation when determining whether a change in circumstances existed to suppоrt the modification of the child support order. We disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶11} Since trial courts are vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to modify a child support order, Woloch v. Foster, 98 Ohio App.3d 806, 810 (2d Dist. 1994), we review a trial court‘s ruling on a child support modification request for an abuse of discretion, Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the evidence, or grossly unsound. State v. Boles, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23037, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 17-18. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
R.C. 3119.79
{¶12}
(A) If an obligor or obligee under a child support order requests that the court modify the amount of support required to be paid pursuаnt to the child support order, the court shall recalculate the amount of support that would be required to be paid under the child support order in accordance with the schedule and the applicable worksheet through the line establishing the actual annual obligation. If that amount as recalculated is more than ten per cent greater than or more than ten per cent less than the amount of child support required to be paid pursuant to the existing child suppоrt order, the deviation from the recalculated amount that would be required to be paid under the schedule and the applicable worksheet shall be considered by the court as a change of circumstance substantial enough to rеquire a modification of the child support amount.
R.C. 3119.05(A)
{¶13} When considering whether a change in circumstances exists so as to mеrit a modified child support order, a trial court must determine each parent‘s income. Drummer v. Drummer, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-11-10, 2012-Ohio-3064, ¶ 24. This determination necessarily implicates
{¶14} Further, the failure to comply with
see, e.g., id. at ¶ 8 (reversing trial court‘s modification of child support order where the trial court did not verify financial information as required by statute); Aiello, supra (same).
{¶15} Here, Brose offered no documentation of hеr income in support of her request for a child support modification. This is plainly contrary to the dictates of
{¶16} Brose invites us to merely consider her testimony as to her income and rely on this testimony, by itself, to find that she provided sufficient documentation of her income. However, we decline this invitation because of the mandatory nature of
{¶17} In sum, Brose did not offer the necessary documentation under
{¶18} Accordingly, we overrule Brose‘s sole assignment of error.
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to Brose in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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