Bonnie HARBUCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter B. TEETS, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 05-10594
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Oct. 12, 2005.
Non-Argument Calendar. D.C. Docket No. 02-00406-CV-CAR-5.
C. Mt. Healthy
The district court alternatively held even assuming there was some evidence Raby acted with a retaliatory motive, Boldin‘s claim would nevertheless fail under Mt. Healthy. In cases where a plaintiff has shown a public employer acted under both lawful and unlawful motives, the public employer cannot be liable if the evidence shows the public employer would have arrived at the same employment decision even in the absence of the allegedly protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 97 S.Ct. at 576. We agree with the district court that there is undisputed evidence an impartial public employer would have discharged Boldin without regard to his acts of political expression. Boldin conceded the Limestone County Commission was impartial, and the Commission affirmed Raby‘s dismissal of Boldin based on the evidence his abusive driving damaged truck 112. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (11th Cir.2001) (relying on the decision of an impartial ultimate decisionmaker to conclude the same decision would have been made regardless of the actual decisionmaker‘s possible mixed motive). There is ample evidence Boldin‘s abusive driving caused the damage to Truck 112‘s transmission. There is no genuine issue of material fact that the public employer would have arrived at the same employment decision even in the absence of the allegedly protected conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
We find no merit to Boldin‘s claim the district court applied collateral estoppel in his case. Additionally, the district court did not err in holding Boldin failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact regarding whether his speech was a substantial motivating factor in the termination of his employment, or in holding Boldin failed to raise a material issue of disputed fact regarding Raby‘s Mt. Healthy defense.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM.
Bonnie Harbuck appeals the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Peter B. Teets, acting Secretary of the Air Force, in her Title VII action. Harbuck asserts the district court erred by: (1) allowing the district court‘s own computer personnel to evaluate electronic data, (2) finding the Air Force had fully produced electronic discovery, and (3) failing to impose an adverse inference against the Air Force for not producing all discoverable data. We affirm the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Harbuck is employed by the Department of the Air Force at Warner Robins Air Force Base Logistics Center as a computer assistant and has been employed there since 1979. She filed a civil lawsuit based on an EEOC complaint on February 27, 2001, arising from other employment complaints. She filed the instant action on November 5, 2002, asserting the Air Force violated Title VII by its alleged retaliation against her for her past EEOC activities and subjecting her to a hostile work environment.1
In her complaint, Harbuck alleged the following: (1) the room where she works is too cold for comfort; (2) she and one other employee are certified to work on safe inventory, but the Air Force assigned an uncertified person to work with Harbuck on the safe inventory, which violated security procedures; (3) another employee is allowed to use flex time, while Harbuck is
Regarding discovery, Harbuck filed a motion to compel claiming the Air Force was deliberately deleting e-mails and destroying documents in an attempt to frustrate her discovery. The district court had two telephone conferences and two discovery hearings on Harbuck‘s discovery dispute. The district court ordered both parties to submit their copies of data to the district court‘s Information Technology personnel to see if the material could be retrieved. The court‘s personnel had no problems retrieving the information from the data. Accordingly, the district court closed discovery and did not require the Air Force to do anything more regarding discovery. In granting the summary judgment motion, the district court stated it had dealt with this discovery dispute numerous times, and the district court found no reason to believe the Air Force was hiding any information or otherwise attempting to harass Harbuck in the discovery process.
II. DISCUSSION
“[W]e will not overturn discovery rulings ‘unless it is shown that the District Court‘s ruling resulted in substantial harm to the appellant‘s case.‘” Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether Harbuck could establish a prima facie case of retaliation or hostile work environment even if her discovery allegations are true.
One of the requirements for a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII‘s retaliation clause is that the plaintiff must be subjected to an adverse employment action. Davis v. City of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir.2001). A requirement for establishing a hostile work environment claim under Title VII is “that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment.” Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir.2003).
Harbuck cannot put forth a prima facie case of discrimination. The actions about which Harbuck complains do not constitute an adverse employment action or a hostile working environment. See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1238 (stating basic principle that “Title VII is neither a general civility code nor a statute making actionable the ordinary tribulations of the workplace“); Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir.1998) (observing not every unkind act rises to the level of adverse employment action). Thus, the district court‘s discovery rulings could not have resulted in substantial harm to her case. See Iraola, 325 F.3d at 1286.
In addition, Harbuck‘s discovery allegations on their own are without merit. “We review the district court‘s rulings on discovery issues for an abuse of discretion.” Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir.2003). “District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon discovery motions, and appellate
First, Harbuck asserts “[w]hen the [district court] allowed its own personnel to evaluate the computer data without the presence of either counsel and without the benefit of examination of the witnesses, the [district court] prejudiced the entire case. The [district court] could have appointed a neutral person to evaluate the data, and subjected that neutral person to cross examination as to the person‘s methodology and retrieval methods.” Harbuck has failed to cite any authority to support the assertion the district court could not review the data. The district court is a neutral party in the case. Harbuck does not claim the district court had any improper agenda in having its personnel evaluate the data. We conclude this contention is without merit, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in having its personnel evaluate the data.
Next, Harbuck asserts the Air Force‘s electronic discovery was not fully produced. We agree with the district court that there is no reason to believe the Air Force was hiding any information or otherwise attempting to harass Harbuck in the discovery process. In turn, Harbuck‘s argument regarding an adverse inference also fails.
III. CONCLUSION
Even if Harbuck‘s discovery allegations were true, she could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation or hostile work environment. In addition, we conclude her discovery allegations are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
Bonnie Michelle Smith, Warner Robins, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Dean S. Daskal, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Columbus, GA, William David Gifford, Macon, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.