Bobo v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.Bobo v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
Victor Bobo, pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stephanie D. Pestello-Sharf and Amy S. Brown, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio.
BRYANT, P.J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Victor Bobo, appeals from a judgment of the
[Bureau of Sentence Computation] are liable due to failure to comply with court‘s journal entry to run sentence Concurrently despite Mr. Bobo‘s repeative complaints.
(Sic passim.)
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On June 24, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging DRC falsely imprisoned plaintiff. According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff, at the time he was incarcerated at the Marion Correctional Institution on a separate conviction, was charged with and found guilty of possession of drugs. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas imposed a sentence of six months to be served concurrently with the crime for which plaintiff was then incarcerated. The complaint asserts that, in response to his question, the sentencing court advised plaintiff his new sentence would not alter the May 24, 2010 release date for plaintiff‘s earlier conviction.
{¶3} Plaintiff‘s complaint alleged that, contrary to those representations, the second conviction caused plaintiff‘s release date to be changed to July 21, 2010; according to the allegations of the complaint, the warden informed plaintiff “the court made a mistake.” (Complaint, 2.) Plaintiff asserted that, as a result of DRC‘s holding him beyond May 24, 2010, he suffered psychological pain and mental anguish for which he was entitled to $500 for each of the 58 days he was held beyond May 24, 2010.
{¶4} Although DRC initially responded on July 19, 2010 with a motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion. DRC subsequently filed an answer on September 16, 2010 and followed it with a motion for summary judgment filed on September 27, 2010.
{¶5} Attached to the summary judgment motion was the affidavit of Melissa Adams, DRC‘s Chief of the Bureau of Sentence Computation. Averring she had personal
{¶6} The affidavit further states that on April 1, 2010, plaintiff was taken to court for case No. CR09532714 in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, where he received a sentence of six months for possession of drugs. The entry granted plaintiff 71 days of jail-time credit, and he received an additional 12 days conveyance time for a total of 83 days of credit. Beginning computation of his sentence on his return date from court, April 4, 2010, and applying the six-month sentence reduced by 83 days of credit, the bureau computed the stated term to expire on July 21, 2010. DRC held plaintiff for that specified period of time and released him.
{¶7} Plaintiff did not respond to the summary judgment motion. On January 14, 2011, the trial court filed an entry granting DRC‘s motion for summary judgment. Noting plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, the court concluded the undisputed affidavit testimony revealed “defendant properly computed plaintiff‘s release date” and was “privileged to confine him at all relevant times.” (Entry, 3.) Plaintiff timely appealed.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶8} Plaintiff‘s single assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in granting DRC‘s summary judgment motion. Noting that concurrent sentences are to be served simultaneously, his argument intimates that both sentences also must end simultaneously and, in this case, on May 24, 2010.
{¶9} An appellate court‘s review of summary judgment is conducted under a de novo standard. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41; Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588. Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor.
{¶10} Pursuant to
{¶11} The state may be held liable for false imprisonment of its prisoners. Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 107, paragraph two of the syllabus. “False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally ‘without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.’ ” Id. at 109, quoting Feliciano v. Kreiger (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71, quoting 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) 226, Section 3.7. The elements for wrongful imprisonment of an inmate beyond a lawful term of incarceration are: “(1) expiration of the lawful term of confinement, (2) intentional confinement after the expiration, and (3) knowledge that the privilege initially justifying the confinement no longer exists.” Corder v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 315, 318.
{¶12} Here, although DRC submitted
{¶14} Plaintiff‘s argument thus lacks merit. Although his sentences were to be served concurrently and the second was shorter in duration than the first, the discharge date for the second offense was after that of the first. DRC properly held plaintiff until he served the full six months on the sentence imposed on his second conviction. Because he was released on completing that sentence, he was not falsely imprisoned.
{¶15} Plaintiff‘s single assignment of error is overruled.
III. Disposition
{¶16} The trial court properly granted summary judgment to DRC where the undisputed evidence, submitted through DRC‘s affidavit supporting its summary judgment motion, demonstrated DRC applied the jail-time credit specified in the trial court‘s order,
Judgment affirmed.
FRENCH and TYACK, JJ., concur.
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