BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation v. CHAD CRINGLE and MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
No. DA 10-0161
Supreme Court of Montana
December 30, 2010
Rehearing Denied February 8, 2011
2010 MT 290 | 359 Mont. 20 | 247 P.3d 706
For Appellees: Terry N. Trieweiler, Trieweiler Law Firm, Whitefish (Chad Cringle); Marieke Beck, Department of Labor and Industry, Helena.
JUSTICE MORRIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appeals from the judgment of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissing BNSF‘s petition for judicial review. We reverse and remand.
¶2 We review the following issue on appeal:
¶3 Does the 14-day filing deadline in
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 The Montana Human Rights Bureau determined that BNSF unlawfully had discriminated against Chad Cringle (Cringle) when it denied him employment based solely on a statistical analysis of his height and weight ratio. BNSF appealed the decision to the Human Rights Commission (Commission) several days after the 14-day filing deadline of
¶5 BNSF conditionally had offered Cringle employment as a track laborer. BNSF later denied Cringle employment after reviewing his height and weight. BNSF determined that Cringle presented a risk of
¶6 The Human Rights Bureau found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination had occurred and forwarded the complaint for a contested case proceeding. The Human Rights Bureau‘s hearing officer awarded summary disposition in favor of Cringle in May 2009. The hearing officer entered a final decision awarding damages to Cringle on September 2, 2009. The hearing officer also issued and served notice of the decision on September 2, 2009.
¶7 BNSF filed a notice of appeal and a request for an extension of time with the Commission on September 22, 2009. Cringle objected to BNSF‘s appeal and request for an extension of time. Cringle argued that the expiration of the 14-day filing deadline of
¶8 BNSF filed a petition for judicial review in district court on November 2, 2009. BNSF argued that the Commission had authority to extend the 14-day filing deadline and had authority to hear BNSF‘s reasons why an extension should have been granted. BNSF acknowledged that it had received the hearing officеr‘s final decision on September 3, 2009. BNSF mentioned in its brief that it had missed the appeal deadline due to its staff misfiling the decision or failing to calendar the appeal deadline.
¶9 Cringle moved to dismiss BNSF‘s petition for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to
¶10 Cringle then filed an
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 We review for correctness a district court‘s review of an administrative agency‘s decision. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 2010 MT 111, ¶ 9, 356 Mont. 296, 234 P.3d 51. We review for correctness a district court‘s conclusions of law. Id. We review de novo a district court‘s determination regarding its subject matter jurisdiction. Koeplin v. Crandall, 2010 MT 70, ¶ 7, 355 Mont. 510, 230 P.3d 797.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Does the 14-day filing deadline in
¶13 BNSF argues that
¶14 We have concluded that “categorical time prescriptions” do not “withdraw” or “circumscribe” the district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. Miller, ¶ 45; Davis, ¶ 23. In Davis, we overruled ”Gray, Pena, Wells, and other cases to the extent they have held that the Legislature limited district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction” by
¶15 The
¶16 We have called procedural time bars by several names. We characterized the one-year time bar for post-conviction relief in
¶17 These “periods of limitation” are scattered throughоut the Montana Code Annotated and are “too numerous to mention.” Rohlfs, ¶ 33 n. 2. We have distinguished these “categorical time prescriptions” from “jurisdictional provisions” that “delineat[e] the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) ... falling within a court‘s adjudicatory authority.” Miller, ¶ 43 (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455, 124 S. Ct. at
¶18 Procedural time bars are affirmative defenses that are subject to forfeiture and waiver. Marias Healthcare Serv., Inc. v. Turenne, 2001 MT 127, ¶ 9, 305 Mont. 419, 28 P.3d 491;
¶19 Subsection
¶20 The 14-day filing deadline set out in
¶21 The Dissent aggrandizes today‘s decision with claims that the Court has “breathtakingly [...] legislated a ‘good cause’ exception to every procedural deadline the Legislature has ever enacted.” We agree that this decision resounds with separation of power considerations, but disagree that we havе “violate[d] separation of powers,” struck “down the Legislature‘s fundamental power,” or “violate[d] this Court‘s constitutional duty.” Stripped of its grandiose language, the Dissent contains no response to any of the caselaw on which the decision rests. Where the Dissent has relied on legal authority, the Dissent has relied on clearly distinguishable caselaw.
¶22 The Dissent‘s concern regarding the separation of powers further appears misplaced alongside the Dissent‘s concession that the District Court incorrectly used “jurisdictional language” and erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain BNSF‘s appeal. Dissent, ¶¶ 36, 42. The Dissent falls into the linguistic trap identified by this Court‘s recent opinions, see Opinion, ¶ 13, when it attempts to distinguish “this jurisdiction” with the court‘s authority. Compare Dissent, ¶ 32 with ¶ 34.
¶23 The Dissent relies on a reference guide‘s interpretation of Nye v. Department of Livestock for the proposition that “only the legislature may validly provide for judicial review of agency decisions.” Nye v. Dept. of Livestock, 196 Mont. 222, 226, 639 P.2d 498, 500 (1982). Nye involved a terminated employee‘s filing of a petition for judicial reviеw in district court. Id. at 223, 639 P.2d at 499. The employee argued that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the claim for wrongful termination based on broad language in an employment policy manual. Id. at 225, 639 P.2d at 500. The Court in Nye concluded that the policy manual constituted an administrative regulation that could not confer a right to appeal in district court. Id. at 226, 639 P.2d at 500. Read in context, the assertion that “only the legislature may validly provide for judicial review of agency decisions” clearly responds to the employee‘s argument that the policy manuаl permitted her to sue directly in district court. Id., 639 P.2d at 500. The Dissent ignores this critical distinction.
¶24 The Dissent also relies on Molnar and In re McGurran, 1999 MT 192, 295 Mont. 357, 983 P.2d 968. Though disguised as a separation of powers concern, the Dissent advocates for the return to a distinction between “jurisdiction” and “authority jurisdictional in nature” that the
¶25 We finally address the Dissent‘s unfounded implication that our decision restricts a district court‘s authority to enforce procedural statutes sua sponte. Dissent, ¶ 41. As we emphasized in Davis, ¶ 24, and recently confirmed in Spencer v. Beck, 2010 MT 256, ¶ 16, 358 Mont. 295, 245 P.3d 21, a court can raise a procedural time bar sua sponte so long as the court takes due process precautions, including fair notice and providing an opportunity for the parties to present their positions.
¶26 The Dissent also presents a laundry list of statutory “good cause” exceptions to statutory deadlines. Dissent, ¶ 38. The Dissent apparently believes that the existencе of these statutory exceptions somehow supports its conclusion that courts cannot hear and determine whether a litigant has good cause to justify the missing of a procedural bar. Under the Dissent‘s approach, a court would be required to deny BNSF‘s petition for judicial relief even if BNSF had missed the deadline because a tornado that struck its counsel‘s office had destroyed the entire case file. Under the Dissent‘s approach, the district court would “properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction” simply by tallying the days that have passed and issuing a denial of judicial review without a hearing, regardless of whether good cause existed. Dissent, ¶¶ 32, 36.
¶27 BNSF requests that this Court remand to the Commission to hear its motion for an extension of the 14-day filing deadline in the first instance. BNSF cites to
¶29 Reversed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES LEAPHART and NELSON concur.
JUSTICE RICE, dissenting.
¶30 In my view, the Court has misapplied jurisdictional prinсiples, misinterpreted the Constitution, and failed to follow our holdings. Worse, the Court has acted beyond its own constitutional powers by legislating a “good cause” exception to virtually every procedural bar passed by the Legislature. In its zeal to diminish the effect of procedural bars, the Court has gone too far. I strongly dissent.
¶31 The Court states repeatedly that legislatively enacted filing deadlines do not deprive the courts of subject matter jurisdiction. See Opinion, ¶¶ 13, 14, 17, 20. In fact, virtually the entire analysis of the Opiniоn is dedicated to this proposition. See Opinion, ¶¶ 13-20. While I generally agree with this proposition—that legislative acts may improperly impinge the jurisdiction of the courts—that did not happen here. The Court‘s jurisdictional analysis is insufficiently nuanced and misses the real issue in this case—the express constitutional authority given to the Legislature.
¶32 The District Court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain BNSF‘s appeal from the agency decision and to address the issues raised therein. We have previously explained this concept. Molnar v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 2008 MT 49, ¶ 9, 341 Mont. 420, 177 P.3d 1048 (“the District Court possessed general subject matter jurisdiction to review the agency decision ....“); see also In re McGurran, 1999 MT 192, 295 Mont. 357, 983 P.2d 968. The District Court had jurisdiction to determine whether BNSF‘s appeal was validly filed, whether the cross-petitions seeking enforcement of the agency decision were valid, and whether an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in this discrimination proceeding was appropriate pursuant to
¶33 However, the Court reverses on the ground that the Legislature‘s enactment of a filing deadline and a limitation upon appeals made directly from a hearing officer to the courts impermissibly conflicts with a district court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, I believe there is no such conflict in this cаse.
¶34 First, the Constitution has granted the Legislature express authority over appeals to the district courts from agency determinations. Right within
This section establishes the basic trial and appellate jurisdiction for district courts ....
.....
As to appellate jurisdiction, the principal litigation concern has been review of administrative action. The Montana Supreme Court has emphasized the legislative role in providing for administrative review. Only the legislature may provide for judicial review of administrative actions (Nye v. Department of Livestock, 1982), and the legislature may deny or restrict the right of review from administrative decisions to a particular court.
Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 144-45 (Greenwood Press 2001) (emphasis added). The comment correctly cites our decision in Nye v. Department of Livestock, 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982), where we held: “In Montana, only the legislature may validly provide for judicial review of agency decisions. ‘The legislature may provide for direct review by the district court of decisions of administrative agencies.’
¶35 Pursuant to its constitutional authority, the Legislature enacted the appeal provisions at issue in this case, particularly,
If the decision is not appealed to the commission within 14 days as provided in subsection (4), the decision becomes final and is not appealable to district court.
¶36 Within this statute, the Legislature utilized the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court by authorizing appeals to the district court after the Commission has rendered a decision.
¶37 However, the Court, which apparently sees only the potential for inequity in the enforcement of procedural deadlines, has not only ignored the Constitution, but has overreacted: it has effectively
¶38 It is only the Legislature who is constitutionally empowered to enact “good cause” exceptions to statutory deadlines, and it uses that authority often. See e.g.
¶39 It is true, as the Court notes, that statutory time bars are subject to constitutional challenge and review. Opinion, ¶ 18. Application оf a procedural bar may be found to violate a litigant‘s due process rights. See Pickens v. Shelton-Thompson, 2000 MT 131, ¶ 21, 300 Mont. 16, 3 P.3d 603. We have delineated the standards by which we will determine whether due process is satisfied.1 However, BNSF has not mounted a constitutional challenge to the 14-day statutory time bar enforced in this case, electing instead to rely on jurisdictional arguments, which I would reject.
¶40 Of course, it is cumbersome for courts to entertain constitutional challenges to statutory procedural bars on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the Court avoids suсh cumber and inconvenience by judicially legislating a good cause exception to every statutory time deadline. I will admit this is a much more convenient approach. However, what is convenient is not always constitutional, and here it is not.
¶41 Then, further narrowing our existing precedent, the Court declares that procedural bars are merely “affirmative defenses that are subject to forfeiture and waiver.” Opinion, ¶ 18. Yet, in Davis, a case on which the Court relies, the Court held that “nothing in our ruling precludes a court frоm raising, sua sponte, the timeliness of the petition” and enforcing the statutory time bar. Davis v. State, 2008 MT 226, ¶ 24, 344 Mont. 300, 187 P.3d 654. Today, the Court steps away from that holding, essentially implying that a district court can no longer enforce procedural statutes by its own action.
¶42 The Legislature was within its express constitutional authority to enact the statutes at issue here. The Court has erred in its jurisdictional analysis but, worse, has acted beyond its constitutional authority and duty by legislating good cause exceptions to statutory
¶43 In response, the Court asserts that this dissent has relied upon “clearly distinguishable caselaw.” Opinion, ¶ 21. However, this criticism merely seeks to distract from the reality that this dissent relies at root upon
¶44 I dissent.