DAVID BLUBAUGH, Appellant v. FRED MARTIN MOTORS INC., et al., Appellees
C.A. No. 23793
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County
February 27, 2008
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
{¶ 1} Appellant, David Blubaugh, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, which granted appellees Fred Martin Motors Inc., Steven Kapelka and Brett Smith‘s motion to dismiss and/or enforce an arbitration agreement. This Court reverses and remands.
I.
{¶ 2} Mr. Blubaugh worked for Fred Martin Motors Inc. (“Fred Martin“) as a finance and insurance manager from November 2, 2004 to October 6, 2006. On December 18, 2006, Mr. Blubaugh filed a complaint in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, in which he alleged seven claims sounding in wrongful
{¶ 3} On May 1, 2007, appellees filed a motion to dismiss and/or enforce an arbitration agreement. Appellees invoked the provisions of
{¶ 4} Mr. Blubaugh timely appeals, raising two assignments of error, which this Court consolidates for purposes of review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING APPELLEES’ MOTION TO STAY AND A MOTION TO REFER THE CASE TO ARBITRATION BECAUSE THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION CONCERNING ARBITRATION IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE FIRM EDICTS OF THE LAW.”
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR MOTION TO REFER TO ARBITRATION BECAUSE THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION DOES NOT CONTAIN LANGUAGE THAT COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONTRACTUAL LAW.”
{¶ 5} Mr. Blubaugh argues that the trial court erred by granting appellees’ motion to enforce the arbitration agreement. Blubaugh asserts that the trial court has a legal obligation to review such types of agreements to determine whether they are enforceable or whether they are unconscionable. He asserts that the trial court failed to do so. This Court agrees.
{¶ 6}
“The court shall hear the parties, and, upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the agreement.”
{¶ 7} The Ohio Supreme Court distinguished between the procedural requirements of
{¶ 8} In reliance on Maestle, this Court reasoned:
“It follows, that, pursuant to the plain language of
{¶ 9} Here, appellees expressly requested an order to enforce the arbitration agreement, not merely a stay so that arbitration might proceed. In addition, Blubaugh challenged the scope and viability of the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to hold a hearing before ruling on the motion.
{¶ 10} A review of the record gives no indication that the trial court held any sort of hearing on the motion to enforce the arbitration agreement. “To the extent that the court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration, the court was first required to hold a hearing on the motion.” Rehor at ¶ 17, citing Maestle at ¶ 19.
{¶ 11} Accordingly, this Court sustains Mr. Blubaugh‘s assignments of error solely on this basis, and remands the case to the trial court so that it may hold a hearing on the issues of the conscionability and viability of the arbitration agreement, i.e., the arbitrability of Blubaugh‘s claims, and to modify its judgment accordingly. Therefore, this Court declines to address the merits of Mr. Blubaugh‘s arguments at this time. See Rehor at ¶ 18.
III.
{¶ 12} Mr. Blubaugh‘s two assignments of error are sustained insofar as the trial court failed to hold a hearing on the motion to enforce the arbitration agreement. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed, and caused remanded.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of
Costs taxed to appellees.
MOORE, J. DICKINSON, J. CONCUR.