MAESTLE ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. BEST BUY COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES.
No. 2002-1674
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 24, 2003
100 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-6465
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
Submitted September 16, 2003
Gerald L. Heaton, Logan County Prosecuting Attorney; Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Fred J. Livingstone and Timothy J. Duff, for appellant Logan County Auditor.
Alison Boggs, Union County Prosecuting Attorney; Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Fred J. Livingstone and Timothy J. Duff, for appellant Union County Auditor.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and James C. Sauer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Tax Commissioner of Ohio.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Kevin M. Czerwonka, for appellee Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
I
{¶1} Plaintiffs Shawn W. Maestle and Bonnie Simons are the prospective class representatives in a lawsuit filed against defendants Best Buy Company, Inc., Best Buy Stores, L.P., and Bank One, N.A. Through a complaint and two amended complaints, plaintiffs alleged that they were improperly assessed certain finance and interest charges on Best Buy credit cards issued by Bank One. Plaintiffs requested certification of a class on their claims.
{¶2} Defendants contend that plaintiffs are required to arbitrate the dispute under a change-in-terms provision regarding the credit cards, and defendants therefore moved for a stay of proceedings. This motion was based on both
{¶3} On appeal,1 defendants and plaintiffs argued the merits of the trial court‘s decision to deny the stay. Rather than ruling on the merits, the court of appeals determined that the trial court‘s order was procedurally flawed because the trial court had neglected to hold an
{¶4} This case comes to us by way of a certified conflict on the following issue, as stated by the court of appeals: “Should
II
{¶5} This appeal raises a single narrow issue: Must a trial court considering whether to grant a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration filed under
{¶6}
{¶7} “If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement, provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.”
{¶8}
{¶9} “(A) The party aggrieved by the alleged failure of another to perform under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any court of common pleas having jurisdiction of the party so failing to perform for an order directing that the arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in the written agreement. * * * The court shall hear the parties, and, upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the agreement.
{¶10} “(B) If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure to perform it is in issue in a petition filed under division (A) of this section, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial of that issue.”
{¶11} Although defendants have been designated as “appellants/cross-appellees” and plaintiffs have been designated as “appellees/cross-appellants,” and the parties strongly disagree on whether the trial court should have denied the
{¶12} Defendants’ motion was premised on
{¶13} In Brumm, 78 Ohio App.3d 96, 603 N.E.2d 1141, the trial court granted a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration pursuant to
{¶14} The court of appeals in Brumm held that the procedural requirements of
{¶15} “By its terms,
{¶16} Similarly, in Wishnosky v. Star-Lite Bldg. & Dev. Co. (Sept. 7, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 77245, 2000 WL 1281830, decided by a different panel of judges of the Eighth District than the panel that decided the case sub judice, the court found that
{¶17} We agree with the reasoning adopted in Brumm and Wishnosky. Even though
{¶18} A party seeking to enforce an arbitration provision may choose to move for a stay under
{¶19} We hold that a trial court considering whether to grant a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration filed under
{¶20} The law is the same under the federal statute. Federal courts have found that the procedural requirements of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (a statute very similar to
{¶21} For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by not holding a hearing pursuant to
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘CONNOR and WHITMORE, JJ., concur.
BETH WHITMORE, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for O‘DONNELL, J.
Dworken & Bernstein and Patrick J. Perotti; and Brian Ruschel, for appellees and cross-appellants.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Anthony J. O‘Malley and Bruce P. Batista; and Andrew I. Sutter, for appellants and cross-appellees.
