Benedict Firelands Platt, L.L.C. v. FTFT Supercomputing, Inc.Benedict Firelands Platt, L.L.C. v. FTFT Supercomputing, Inc.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: February 27, 2026
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Linda B. Ebersole and John J. Rutter, for appellee.
Paul V. Wolf, for appellant.
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MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, FTFT Supercomputing, Inc., appeals the July 23, 2025 judgment of the Norwalk Municipal Court, striking its
I. Background
{¶ 2} FTFT Supercomputing entered into a commercial lease agreement with Benedict Firelands Platt. Under that agreement, FTFT leased an industrial building
{¶ 3} On November 18, 2024, Benedict filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer in the Norwalk Municipal Court. Benedict alleged that it terminated the lease agreement effective October 24, 2024, after FTFT defaulted, but despite posting a notice to leave the premises on October 29, 2024, FTFT had not vacated or removed all its personal property from the premises. Benedict alleged that FTFT continued to unlawfully holdover and forcibly detain possession of the premises. It asked the municipal court to issue a writ of restitution and possession in its favor and against FTFT. It made no claim for money damages.
{¶ 4} Service of process was completed on November 27, 2024, and a hearing was set for December 5, 2024. Despite proper service and additional notices, FTFT failed to appear at the court hearing. In a judgment entered on December 6, 2024, the Norwalk Municipal Court granted a writ of restitution of the premises. A notice of eviction was posted on the entry door of the building that same day.
{¶ 5} FTFT did not appeal the ruling of the Norwalk Municipal Court or move for relief from judgment under
{¶ 6} Despite having already entered judgment on Benedict‘s complaint, the municipal court granted FTFT‘s motion to transfer and certified the case to the Huron County Court of Common Pleas on December 24, 2024. Benedict moved the common pleas court to strike and to dismiss FTFT‘s pleadings and motions. It argued that because FTFT filed its counterclaims after the municipal court entered judgment on the sole count of Benedict‘s complaint, there was no cause of action pending in the municipal court. As such, Benedict claimed, FTFT‘s counterclaims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under
{¶ 7} In a judgment journalized on February 28, 2025, the Huron County Court of Common Pleas granted Benedict‘s motion. It found that FTFT‘s answer and counterclaims, first amended answer and counterclaims, motion for temporary restraining order and permanent injunction, and motion to transfer were “untimely having been filed after the conclusion and final judgment on the sole cause of action before the Norwalk Municipal Court.” It ordered them “stricken and denied pursuant to
{¶ 8} FTFT appealed the February 28, 2025 judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas. On June 4, 2025, while that appeal was pending, FTFT filed a
{¶ 9} FTFT filed the current appeal from the Norwalk Municipal Court‘s July 23, 2025 judgment. On October 14, 2025, it voluntarily dismissed its appeal from the February 28, 2025 judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas. In the present appeal, FTFT assigns the following error:
The trial court erred to the prejudice of Defendant-Appellant in holding that it was without jurisdiction to hear and consider Defendant Appellant‘s Motion for Relief from Judgment and, therefore, striking that Motion.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 10} In its sole assignment of error, FTFT argues that the municipal court erred when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider its
{¶ 11} Benedict acknowledges that the December 6, 2024 judgment of the municipal court was a final judgment on the merits, but it maintains that the time to appeal the municipal court‘s transfer order has passed, so “[a]ny arguments on this appeal concerning the transfer to the Huron County Court are therefore time-barred.” It urges that under the invited-error doctrine, FTFT cannot now seek reversal of the order granting its request to transfer. Benedict complains that the appeal of the common-pleas court‘s February 28, 2025 judgment deprived the municipal court of jurisdiction. It claims that FTFT‘s
{¶ 12} FTFT replies that its
{¶ 13} In its July 23, 2025 judgment, the municipal court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address FTFT‘s
{¶ 14} There are two ways we can approach the issue presented in FTFT‘s appeal, both of which lead to the same result: that the municipal court had jurisdiction to consider FTFT‘s
A. The municipal court‘s transfer order had no effect because no case remained pending at the time of the purported transfer.
{¶ 15} An answer and counterclaim may not be filed after the trial court has entered judgment on the sole cause of action before it. See Phillips v. Thompson, 2021-Ohio-4500, ¶ 14-16 (9th Dist.) (“Ms. Hiner and Ms. Thompson have cited to no authority
{¶ 16} “It is well settled that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case after issuing the final judgment that resolves all claims before it.” In re Criminal Charges Against Groves, 2018-Ohio-1406, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing Palmer v. Bowers, 2017-Ohio-355, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). “Thus, after a case has ended, a trial court may not continue to act, absent specific authority as prescribed by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Witta, 2011-Ohio-6068, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). “If a trial court does act outside of the specific post-judgment motions set forth in the civil rules, its ruling will be considered void.” Id., citing Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 380 (1981) and Kitson v. Gordon Food Serv., 2016-Ohio-7079, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).
{¶ 17} The Ninth District considered a similar issue in Servpro, 2010-Ohio-3494, at ¶ 1. In Servpro, the plaintiff gave notice of satisfaction and dismissed its claim against the defendants. The next day, the defendants filed an answer, counterclaim, and cross-claim. They also filed a motion for attorneys fees, alleging that plaintiff engaged in frivolous conduct. They prayed for damages in excess of the jurisdictional
{¶ 18} The file was returned to municipal court and the defendants requested a hearing on their motion for attorneys fees. The municipal court heard argument, then issued a judgment finding that because the common-pleas court had dismissed as moot the defendants’ counterclaims, cross-claims, and motion for attorney fees, the municipal court lacked authority to overturn the common-pleas-court decision dismissing the motion. The defendants appealed the municipal court‘s judgment, arguing that it erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on their motion for attorneys fees.
{¶ 19} The Ninth District concluded that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the matter after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its complaint. It explained that there was no case pending when the defendants purported to file their counterclaims and cross-claims, therefore, there was no case in existence to transfer to the common-pleas court. As such, the court concluded, the common-pleas court‘s judgment finding the defendants’ motion for attorney fees moot had no effect because there was no case pending before it. Id. at ¶ 16. The appellate court explained that the motion for attorneys
{¶ 20} Here, as in Servpro, there was no case pending at the time of the transfer. As such, the transfer order and the common-pleas court judgment had no effect because the December 6, 2024 judgment was final.1
{¶ 21}
- Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
- Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(B) ; - Fraud . . ., misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
- The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
- Any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
A motion filed under
{¶ 22} Here, FTFT‘s motion was filed on June 4, 2025—less than six months after the municipal court‘s December 6, 2024 judgment. It was timely under
{¶ 23} Benedict maintains that because the time to appeal the municipal court‘s transfer order has passed, “[a]ny arguments on this appeal concerning the transfer to the Huron County Court are therefore time-barred.” However, “a void judgment can be challenged at any time.” Lingo v. State, 2014-Ohio-1052, ¶ 25. In any event, even if the transfer order and the common-pleas court judgment were not void and could not now be challenged, we would reach the same conclusion based on the common-pleas court‘s disposition of the action in its February 28, 2025 judgment.
B. The common-pleas court dismissed the case because a final judgment was entered before FTFT filed its pleadings.
{¶ 24} Upon transfer of the action to the common-pleas court, Benedict promptly moved to strike and dismiss FTFT‘s answer, counterclaim, and motions because no claims remained pending in the municipal court once it entered the December 6, 2024 judgment. The common-pleas court granted Benedict‘s motion because FTFT‘s filings were all filed “after the conclusion and final judgment on the sole cause before the Norwalk Municipal Court.” In other words, the common-pleas court ruled that the
{¶ 25} As stated above, “[a] motion to vacate a judgment must be filed in the court which rendered the judgment.” Harroff, 1976 WL 191092, at *2, citing Perdrix Machinery Sales, 116 Ohio App. at 294. Indeed, “[a] court of common pleas has no power to vacate an order rendered by a municipal court.” Lingo at paragraph four of the syllabus. Thus, only the municipal court had authority to consider a motion to vacate its December 6, 2024 judgment, and the municipal court erred when it concluded otherwise.
{¶ 26} In sum, whether the transfer order and the common-pleas court judgment were nullities because the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to transfer this case, or whether the common-pleas court‘s February 28, 2025 judgment was effective, the end result is that the municipal court‘s December 6, 2024 judgment was a final judgment. The municipal court—and only the municipal court—had jurisdiction to consider FTFT‘s timely motion for relief from that judgment.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we find FTFT‘s assignment of error well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 28} The municipal court‘s decision to transfer FTFT‘s answer, counterclaims, and motion to the common-pleas court and the common-pleas court‘s judgment were
{¶ 29} We reverse the July 23, 2025 judgment of the Norwalk Municipal Court and remand for the municipal court to consider FTFT‘s
Judgment reversed and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Christine E. Mayle, J.
JUDGE
Charles E. Sulek, J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J. DISSENTS AND WRITES SEPARATELY.
{¶ 30} I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Norwalk Municipal Court because the municipal court correctly determined that once it exercised its jurisdiction and ordered the transfer of the case to the common pleas court on December 24, 2024, it lacked jurisdiction to rule upon FTFT‘s June 4, 2025
{¶ 31} The majority opinion concludes in this case that the municipal court‘s transfer order had no effect because “no case remained pending at the time of the purported transfer,” or, alternatively, because the common pleas court‘s February 28, 2025 judgment “did nothing to disturb” the municipal court‘s December 6, 2024 judgment from which FTFT seeks relief. I believe that both of these conclusions are faulty because they ignore the fact that the municipal court‘s transfer, even if made in error, vested jurisdiction over the case in the common pleas court, leaving the municipal court without authority to rule on FTFT‘s subsequently filed
{¶ 32} “Jurisdiction” includes both “jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person.” Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, [and] it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time.” Id. “A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the parties involved in a particular case.” State ex rel. Schwarzmer v. Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-1246, ¶ 13, citing Ank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19. If a court acts without subject-matter jurisdiction, its orders are void. Id.
{¶ 33} But “jurisdiction” has also been used to refer “to a court‘s exercise of its jurisdiction over a particular case.” Pratts at ¶ 12. This type of jurisdiction “encompasses the trial court‘s authority to determine a specific case within that class of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation and citation omitted.) Id.
{¶ 34} Thus, the Schwarzmer court has recognized “‘a distinction between a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.‘” Schwarzmer at ¶ 13, quoting Pratts, at ¶ 10. “[L]ack of jurisdiction over [a] particular case merely renders [a] judgment voidable.” Id.
{¶ 35} Regarding challenges to an order transferring a case, the Schwartzmer court made clear that “[a] motion to transfer is not a final order subject to immediate appeal, but the propriety of a court‘s retaining a case after transfer may be challenged for an abuse of discretion on appeal after a final judgment.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 21, citing
{¶ 36} Applying the foregoing authority to the facts of this case, my analysis would begin with the question of whether the Huron Court of Common Pleas possessed
{¶ 37} Common pleas courts are courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction with power over “‘all matters at law and in equity that are not denied to [them].‘” Schwarzmer at ¶ 14, quoting Saxton v. Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 554, 558-559 (1891). “In civil cases, the common pleas courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over all cases involving a value that exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the county courts.” Id., citing
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} In Schwartzmer, the Supreme Court characterized the transfer of the appellant‘s case from the municipal court to the common pleas court as “putatively proper” because the monetary value of the damages alleged in the counterclaim exceeded $15,000. Id. at ¶ 14. In this case, as well, there is no question that the transfer to the court of common pleas court based on the monetary value of the damages alleged in the
{¶ 40} Having established that the common pleas court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction in this case, I believe the next question should be whether the common pleas court -- having received the case after the municipal court issued a final judgment on the merits of Landlord‘s complaint for forcible entry and detainer -- improperly exercised its subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.
{¶ 41} The Schwarzmer court explained that “If a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the invocation or exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case…must wait to be challenged until appeal of the final judgment.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing Schlegel v. Sweeney, 2022-Ohio-3841, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel Huntington Natl. Bank v. Kontos, 2015-Ohio-5190, ¶ 17 (“The availability of an ‘appeal is considered an adequate remedy that will preclude a writ of prohibition.‘“); see also In re J.J., 2006-Ohio-5484, at paragraph one of the syllabus (the Ohio Supreme court clarified that in a court that possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, procedural irregularities in the transfer of a case -- such as the transfer of a case to a visiting judge -- affect the court‘s jurisdiction over the particular case and render the judgment voidable, not void).
{¶ 42} Given the procedure prescribed in Schwarzmer for challenging the exercise of jurisdiction over a case, I would find that any error in the common pleas court‘s exercise of that jurisdiction should have been raised on appeal of the common pleas court‘s judgment. See Id. at ¶ 13, 21 (stating that if the appellant‘s action failed in the
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.