Belcastro v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y.Belcastro v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the defendant Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York appeals, and the defendants St. Margaret‘s Roman Catholic Church and St. Margaret Catholic Academy separately appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (George J. Silver, J.), dated August 23, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the motion of the defendant Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York and the separate motion of the defendants St. Margaret‘s Roman Catholic Church and St. Margaret Catholic Academy which were pursuant to
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondent payable by the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Child Victims Act (see
The Diocese moved, and the Church and the School separately moved, inter alia, pursuant to
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to
An employer can be held liable under theories of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision where it is shown that “the employer knew or should have known of the employee‘s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury” (Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 AD2d 159, 160; see Boyle v North Salem Cent. Sch. Dist., 208 AD3d 744). Causes of action alleging negligence based upon negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are not statutorily required to be pleaded with specificity (see Boyle v North Salem Cent. Sch. Dist., 208 AD3d at 745; Doe v Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Middletown, 195 AD3d at 596).
A school “has a duty to exercise the same degree of care toward its students as would a reasonably prudent parent, and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Destiny S. v John Quincy Adams Elementary Sch., 98 AD3d 1102; Nancy Ann O. v Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 95 AD3d 972, 973). “[A] school, in assuming physical custody and control over its students, effectively takes the place of parents and guardians” (Visiko v Fleming, 199 AD3d 1431, 1432 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see BL Doe 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 199 AD3d 1419, 1422-23).
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff was a student of the School, which was operated by the Diocese, the School, and the Church. The complaint also alleged that Collins and the John Does were employees of those defendants, the defendants had knowledge that Collins and the John Does were abusing the plaintiff or had the propensity to abuse, and the sexual abuse of the plaintiff occurred in the School during times at which the plaintiff was under the defendants’ supervision and care, custody, and control. The complaint thus sufficiently alleged causes of action to recover damages for negligence, including the negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of Collins and the John Does (see Doe v Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Middletown, 195 AD3d at 595), and also inadequate supervision of the plaintiff (see Destiny S. v John Quincy Adams Elementary Sch., 98 AD3d at 1102; Nancy Ann O. v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 95 AD3d at 973).
The complaint‘s allegations that the Diocese, the School, and the Church knew of the sexual abuse and condoned it, covered it up, and intentionally failed to prevent it were sufficient to allege a cause of action to recover damages for gross negligence, which exists where a defendant‘s conduct “smack[ed] of intentional wrongdoing or evince[d] a reckless indifference to the rights of others” or the defendants “fail[ed] to exercise even slight care or slight diligence” (Dolphin Holdings, Ltd. v Gander & White Shipping, Inc., 122 AD3d 901, 901 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 161 AD3d 926, 926).
DUFFY, J.P., MALTESE, DOWLING and WARHIT, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Maria T. Fasulo
Clerk of the Court