S16A0514. MOSLEY v. THE STATE.
S16A0514
Supreme Court of Georgia
APRIL 4, 2016
(785 SE2d 297)
Gary Mosley was tried by a Fulton County jury and convicted of murder and other crimes, all in connection with the killing of Justin Evans. Mosley appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence on four occasions at trial. We find no reversible error, however, and we affirm.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Evans had arranged to buy marijuana from Mosley and Taurean Thorpe on June 21, 2010. When Mosley and Thorpe met Evans, however, he robbed them instead. Mosley decided that “[h]e had to get back at [Evans].” Later that day, Mosley and Darelle Phillips observed Evans enter an apartment complex in Union City, and Mosley called Thorpe for assistance. Thorpe arrived soon thereafter with Santino Butler and Paul Hill. Mosley and Thorpe both were armed, and they eventually cornered Evans inside the apartment complex and shot him. The gunshot wound was fatal. Mosley and his accomplices fled the scene, with Mosley driving
Almost immediately, law enforcement officers were advised to be on the lookout for the Impala. Within a matter of minutes, a police officer observed the Impala about three miles from the apartment complex and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. A high-speed chase ensued, and eventually, Mosley and the other men in the Impala abandoned the car and escaped on foot into a wooded area. Investigators found Mosley’s name and address, however, on an invoice for an oil change inside the Impala, and they located Mosley — who had scratch marks on his body consistent with having run through the woods — at that address about 40 minutes later.
Mosley’s account evolved as he spoke with investigators. At first, he admitted that he had been with Phillips near Evans’s apartment complex earlier that day, but he said that his Impala was stolen while he and Phillips were dining in a restaurant. When investigators informed Mosley that the police car involved in the high-speed chase was equipped with a video camera that recorded the men jumping out of the Impala and running into the woods, Mosley claimed that — although his car, in fact, had been stolen — he ultimately found it. Immediately after he found it, Mosley claimed, he was involved in the high-speed chase that was recorded by the video camera. Finally, Mosley admitted that he was at the scene of the crimes, but he claimed that it was Thorpe who shot Evans.
Mosley does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Nevertheless, we have independently reviewed the record with an eye toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mosley was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted, either directly or as a party to the crime. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744 (1) (733 SE2d 294) (2012) (“[a] person who does not directly commit a crime may be convicted upon proof that a crime was committed and that person was a party to it”) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also
2. Mosley claims that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony on four occasions at trial. We see, however, no reversible error.
(a) First, Mosley says that a witness (“C. N.”) was erroneously permitted to testify that Phillips — on the day after Evans was killed — had confessed to a friend that he and Mosley had gone to the apartment complex on the previous day and that Mosley shot Evans. The friend worked with C. N., and he subsequently told her what Phillips had said. Mosley argues that this double hearsay was inadmissible. Mosley, however, failed to object to this testimony at trial, and so, we review the admission of the testimony only for plain error.2 See
In the first place, it is not clear that the admission of that testimony was error at all. See
Second, Phillips’s friend also testified at Mosley’s trial, although he denied that he ever had a conversation with C. N. about Phillips’s confession. Moreover, the friend minimized the scope of what Phillips had told him, claiming he could not remember much about it and that Phillips did “not necessarily” say anything at all about Mosley. The friend was provided with an opportunity to explain his prior inconsistent statement to C. N., and Mosley had the opportunity to cross-examine him about it. See
(b) Mosley also complains about testimony from a police investigator that described statements he received from three different witnesses. First, Mosley points to testimony about a statement given by Mosley’s brother, which implicated Mosley in the murder. But again, Mosley did not object to this testimony at trial, and we review it only for plain error. Even if we assume that the investigator’s testimony was admitted in error, Mosley has not shown that it “probably did affect the outcome below.” Gates, 298 Ga. at 328 (3) (citation omitted). The oral statement made by Mosley’s brother (as described at trial by the police investigator) was the same as the brother’s contemporaneous written statement, and the written statement was properly admitted into evidence without objection. As a result, the investigator’s testimony about the brother’s oral statement was merely cumulative, and its admission was not plain error. See Fraser v. State, 329 Ga. App. 1, 2 (763 SE2d 359) (2014).
(c) The police investigator also testified about a statement provided to him by Butler, who was one of the men who fled the scene in Mosley’s Impala. Mosley objected to the investigator’s testimony on the grounds of improper bolstering, but he did not renew his objection after the State laid a foundation for admitting the testimony.3 In any event, the investigator’s testimony would have been admissible as a prior consistent statement made by Butler. At trial, Butler testified on behalf of the State, and Mosley attacked his credibility by suggesting that he had fabricated his testimony after the State
(d) Finally, the police investigator testified about a tip that he received from C. N., and Mosley objected on the basis that the investigator’s testimony about what C. N. told him was hearsay. The State argued that the testimony was admissible as a prior consistent statement because Mosley attacked C. N.’s credibility when he suggested that Phillips’s friend did not trust her enough to have confided in her about a murder involving Phillips. Given that C. N.’s credibility could have been attacked on the same grounds at the time she provided a tip to the police, the tip is not a prior consistent statement under
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED APRIL 4, 2016.
Arora & Lascala, Manubir S. Arora; Stephen R. Scarborough, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, David K. Getachew-Smith, Assistant District Attorneys; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Catherine Greaber, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.