Beatty v. LamontBeatty v. Lamont
Connecticut is one of many States that have what is known as a prisoner “pay to stay” law. The law creates a claim that the State may enforce against a prisoner for some or all of the costs of imprisonment. See
Pay-to-stay laws have proved controversial. On the one hand, proponents argue that they appropriately shift the costs of imprisonment to criminals who have chosen to violate the law and who have chosen to make their costly incarceration necessary.2 On the other hand, critics argue that such laws unfairly burden prisoners with crushing debt that disproportionately falls on minorities and that makes it even harder for prisoners to rejoin the community without committing a crime again.3
But this case is not about whether pay-to-stay laws are good policy. It is about whether Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law is unconstitutional because it violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the plaintiffs in this case.
And—most significantly for present purposes—there are threshold issues of standing. The three named plaintiffs have filed this lawsuit against the Attorney General of Connecticut. But do the plaintiffs allege enough facts to plausibly show that the Attorney General has sought to enforce the pay-to-stay law against them or that there is a meaningful threat he will do so?
The answer is no. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no standing to sue the Attorney General. So I will dismiss the complaint without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
I start by reviewing the particulars of Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law and then reviewing how each of the three plaintiffs allege that this law has been unconstitutionally applied to them.
Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law
Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law endows the State with “a claim” against current and former state prisoners for the costs of their incarceration.
First, the law provides that the Attorney General “may” file a court action “to enforce such claim” for the costs of incarceration. See
According to the plaintiffs, the Attorney General filed just 65 court actions over the course of more than five years from January 2015 to August 2020.6 This is only about a dozen lawsuits per year that have been filed by the Attorney General to enforce a claim under Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law. But the plaintiffs also allege that “since 2017, about 25,000 people have cycled out of Connecticut‘s prisons.”7 Thus, according to the plaintiffs’ own numbers, the probability that the Attorney General will file a court action against any particular prisoner is near vanishingly small.8
Apart from the general two-year limitation on the Attorney General‘s filing of a court action, the law describes two more circumstances when the State has up to 20 years after a prisoner‘s release to enforce its claim for the costs of imprisonment.9 Most significantly for present purposes, neither of the law‘s provisions governing these two circumstances assigns a role for the Attorney General to enforce any such claim.
The first circumstance is if the prisoner has filed a civil lawsuit and stands to gain a settlement or award of damages. See
Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law authorizes the Commissioner of Correction to issue implementing regulations. See
The Department of Administrative Services (“DAS“) is an executive branch agency of the State of Connecticut that carries out multiple and miscellaneous functions with respect to the general administration of state government.13 Among these many functions, Connecticut law
The record also includes a copy of the above-referenced memorandum of understanding between the Department of Correction (“DOC“) and the DAS.14 It provides for the DAS “to provide a range of collection services” to the DOC including “[f]iling claims against proceeds of ‘private’ causes of action[s] brought by DOC current and former inmates (plaintiffs) through a match of DOC inmate data with Judicial Information Systems data” and “[f]iling claims against interests in estates of DOC current and former inmates.”15 The DOC in turn must furnish to the DAS prisoner identification information as well as statements of the balances owed by current and former prisoners.16 The memorandum of understanding does not refer to the Attorney General or assign any collection responsibilities to the Attorney General.
The plaintiffs
The three plaintiffs in this action have all previously served state prison sentences in Connecticut. They all allege that they are, or are about to be, subject to Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law and that the law as applied to them violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Teresa Beatty
The first named plaintiff is Teresa Beatty.18 Her challenge implicates the part of the pay-to-stay law that involves collecting from a prisoner‘s inheritance (i.e.,
Beatty was imprisoned on drug charges from 2000 to 2002.19 Long after Beatty was released from imprisonment, her mother passed away in 2020, and the estate is currently in probate proceedings.20 The principal asset of the mother‘s estate is the family home in Stamford where Beatty now lives and that is worth about $590,000.21 But because Beatty is only one of four sibling beneficiaries to her mother‘s will, she alleges that the probate court will almost certainly order that the house be sold and that the proceeds be distributed to Beatty and her siblings.22 As a 40% beneficiary of the will, Beatty expects to inherit about $230,000 before probate administrative expenses.23
Beatty alleges that the DAS filed a notice in November 2020 with the administrator of the mother‘s estate alleging that Beatty owes $83,762.26 for her time in custody.24 The DAS notice requests that when distribution from settlement of the estate is made payment of the amount due should be mailed to the DAS.25
The second named plaintiff is Karl Weissinger.26 His challenge implicates the part of the law involving collection of the costs of incarceration from lawsuit proceeds (i.e.,
Weissinger served almost two years in a Connecticut state prison from 2014 to 2016 for larceny.27 After he finished serving his sentence, Weissinger was involved in a car accident, and he filed a personal injury lawsuit against the other driver.28
In February 2022, the DAS sent a notice to Weissinger‘s attorney advising that “the State has a claim and lien for repayment” for $115,585 for the costs of Weissinger‘s incarceration.29 The letter further advised that “[w]hen the settlement is effected, please send us your itemized settlement sheet with all proposed disbursements, so that a final notice of the State‘s lien amount may be calculated and provided to you.”30 In addition, the letter advised that Weissinger could contact the DAS with questions and that within 60 days he could also “request an administrative hearing to challenge the validity of the lien filed by the Department of Administrative Services.”31 The complaint alleges that, in late February 2022, Weissinger and the driver reached a settlement but that Weissinger “must now pay half of that settlement amount to the State of Connecticut.”32
The third named plaintiff is Michael Llorens.33 Like Weissinger, his challenge implicates the part of the pay-to-stay law involving collection of the costs of incarceration from lawsuit proceeds (i.e.,
Llorens was released from prison in September 2022 after serving a three-year sentence for burglary.34 In August 2021, he filed a still-pending federal civil rights action seeking $7 million in damages against local police officers who allegedly subjected him to a false arrest and used excessive force against him.35
According to Llorens, each day of his three-year imprisonment exposed him to a debt of $249 to the State of Connecticut, and he estimates that the State now has a claim against him for $272,655.36 Although the complaint does not allege facts to suggest that there has been any effort to date to enforce a claim or collect from him, Llorens alleges that all or part of the amount he owes could be subject to recoupment by the State of Connecticut if he wins his lawsuit or gains a monetary settlement.37
The motion to dismiss
The plaintiffs filed this complaint against both Governor Ned Lamont and Attorney General William Tong.38 Both the Governor and the Attorney General moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds including that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that their claims were not ripe, that their claims were moot, that their claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that on the merits the complaint failed to allege plausible grounds for relief
Accordingly, the only remaining defendant is the Attorney General. The plaintiffs have not named as defendants either the Commissioner of Correction or the DAS Commissioner. Those officials’ departments, as described above, are integrally involved with the administration of Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law.
DISCUSSION
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.”
As the Supreme Court has recently observed, “[f]ederal courts do not possess a roving commission to publicly opine on every legal question,” and therefore they “do not adjudicate hypothetical or abstract disputes.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021). “Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury caused by the defendant and redressable by the court ensures that federal courts decide only the rights of
At the motion to dismiss stage, the complaint must allege enough facts to make it plausible to conclude that the plaintiff has standing. See Maddox v. Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2021). “[A]lthough the plausibility requirement is most commonly applied in the context of evaluating whether a complaint substantively states a claim for relief, there is little reason to suppose that it should not equally govern the evaluation of factual allegations that support federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 3d 153, 155 (D. Conn. 2016).
Moreover, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). By the same token, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that someone caused the plaintiff an injury; instead, a plaintiff must show that the injury is fairly traceable to the named defendant. In other words, “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The fact that the named plaintiffs have framed this action as a class action does not relieve them from carrying their burden to plausibly allege that they themselves have standing. See McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC, 995 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 2021).
I will start with the first plaintiff—Teresa Beatty. As noted above, the DAS has actively taken steps to enforce the State‘s claim by filing a lien notice against her for the costs of imprisonment. The statutory language makes clear that this notice imposes no less than a mandatory duty on the probate court: “[t]he Court of Probate shall accept any such lien notice
The Attorney General argues that the probate court proceedings are still pending and that “it is speculative that the Probate Court will order the house to be sold.”42 But the complaint alleges enough facts to make it plausible to conclude that the house will be sold because the house is the principal asset of the estate and because Beatty‘s right to 40% of the estate cannot be satisfied absent a sale of the house. Although it appears that the probate proceedings have been delayed, the Attorney General does not set forth convincing reasons to believe that the house will not eventually be sold.
The Attorney General cites a probate court filing to suggest that Beatty is “considering ‘buying out [her] siblings.‘”43 But the Attorney General does not explain why the State‘s lien would be unenforceable against Beatty even if the house is not sold. “Upon death of the owner of real property, legal title to real property immediately passes to the decedent‘s heirs, subject to the right of the executor to administer the estate.” LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 251 (2002). Therefore, Beatty—as a 40% heir of her mother‘s estate—is already a co-owner of the house by means of inheritance and against which a lien may be filed. Section 18-85b(b) establishes “a lien against such inheritance,” not a lien only against the eventual liquidation of assets received by means of an inheritance.
“An allegation of future injury may suffice” to establish Article III standing “if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158. Beatty has alleged enough to plausibly show that she is
Yet despite the fact that Beatty has adequately alleged an injury-in-fact, she nonetheless lacks standing because she has not alleged that her injury is fairly traceable to the Attorney General. She does not allege any facts to suggest that the Attorney General has taken or is threatening to take action to enforce a claim for prison costs against her. As noted above, the pay-to-stay law allows the Attorney General to file a court action only while a person is still a prisoner or within two years of release from imprisonment. But it has been twenty years since Beatty finished serving her sentence.44
To be sure, Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law allows the filing of a lien against an inheritance that a former prisoner receives for up to 20 years after the prisoner‘s release from imprisonment. See
It is no answer to say that the Attorney General has been sued not only in his individual capacity but also in his official capacity, which functions as a claim writ large against the State. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (describing how official-capacity lawsuits are “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer in an
Nor—apart from lack of standing—has Beatty shown that the Eleventh Amendment would not independently bar her particular claim against the Attorney General. Of course, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court lawsuit against a State, its agencies, and its state officers in their official capacity, subject to a long-established exception—as recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)—for lawsuits against a state officer that seek prospective injunctive relief against the officer who is engaged in a continuing violation of the plaintiff‘s federal constitutional rights. See Campbell v. City of Waterbury, 585 F. Supp. 3d 194, 201–03 (D. Conn. 2022).
But for purposes of a claim that is allowed under Ex parte Young, “the state officer against whom a suit is brought ‘must have some connection with the enforcement of the act’ that is in continued violation of federal law.” In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 411 F.3d 367, 372–73 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 154). And so “the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to claims against state officials who lack authority to implement the requested prospective injunctive relief.” Campbell, 585 F. Supp. 3d at 203 (citing cases); see
In a further effort to show that the Attorney General has the required enforcement authority, the plaintiffs argue that “[i]n the course of defending individual state employees who have been indemnified, [Attorney General] Tong‘s office routinely collects money from lawsuit proceeds for carceral debt.”45 But that is not this case. None of the three named plaintiffs has filed a lawsuit for money damages against a state employee who is represented by the Attorney General‘s office. So none of the plaintiffs can claim that they have been injured by reason of the Attorney General‘s invocation of the pay-to-stay law to offset money damage awards from lawsuits against state employees.
Moreover, it is well settled for purposes of a claim under Ex parte Young that “[a]n attorney general cannot be sued simply because of his duty to support the constitutionality of a challenged state statute.” Doe v. Holcomb, 883 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1976)). Nor can the Attorney General be sued because of his authority “to defend actions in which the state is interested,” because “the Attorney General does
Turning to the second plaintiff Karl Weissinger, the same reasons foreclose his claim against the Attorney General. It has been seven years since Weissinger was released from imprisonment in 2016.46 The two-year period for the Attorney General to file a court action against Weissinger has long since elapsed. Although the DAS has taken steps to enforce a claim against the proceeds from Weissinger‘s car accident lawsuit, Weissinger does not allege any actions by the Attorney General or responsibilities assigned to the Attorney General to assist the DAS‘s collection efforts. In short, Weissinger has no standing for his claim against the Attorney General, and his claim against the Attorney General is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
As to the third plaintiff Michael Llorens, he also lacks standing to sue the Attorney General but for different reasons. He was released from prison in 2022—still within the two-year window under
Llorens argues, however, that he does not have to wait to see if the Attorney General will seek to enforce a claim against him.48 He chiefly relies on the Second Circuit‘s decision in Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2019). The question in that case was whether an airport had standing to challenge a state statute that limited the length of the airport‘s runway. See id. at 68–69. The Attorney General in that case argued that the airport lacked standing because it had not extended its runway beyond the statutory length and because “Connecticut has made no overt threat to enforce the Statute.” Id. at 70.
Rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit reasoned that “[w]here a statute specifically proscribes conduct, the law of standing does not place the burden on the plaintiff to show an intent by the government to enforce the law against it. Rather, it [has] presumed such intent in the absence of a disavowal by the government or another reason to conclude that no such intent existed.” Id. at 71. The Second Circuit concluded that “an actual ... enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging the law; a pre-enforcement challenge is sufficient.” Ibid.
Indeed, Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law creates no more than an inchoate “claim” against Llorens. See
As Judge Hall has suggested, “[t]he proper time to raise a challenge to the Connecticut costs of incarceration statute would be when the State of Connecticut is enforcing it against a settlement or award of damages.” Paschal v. Santili, 2017 WL 2908867, at *2 (D. Conn. 2017). “Unless and until [the plaintiff] receives a settlement or monetary damages from the pending action, and the State of Connecticut enforces the costs of incarceration statute against him, [the plaintiff] has neither an ‘actual’ or an ‘imminent’ harm to redress, and therefore does not have standing to bring this claim.” Ibid.
Despite the fact that there has been no action to enforce a claim against him, Llorens further argues that he has standing “because he is unsure how to value his claim to account for
In any event, the fact that Llorens is “unsure how to value his claim” is at best a speculative injury.50 As Judge Rakoff has explained, “while a plaintiff‘s uncertainty about whether he will suffer an immediate harm may present a cognizable injury in some circumstances, subjective fears about future contingencies do not confer standing unless they have an objectively reasonable basis sufficient to render them more than speculations about non-imminent events.” Hakim v. Chertoff, 447 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citation omitted); see also Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402, 411 (9th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff had no standing to challenge the government‘s hostage response policy on the ground of “his uncertainty about how the government will respond if he were to be taken hostage” and that this “deters him from seeking employment as a contractor,” because this “feeling of deterrence is based on a fear of speculative future injury“); Lanza v. Client Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 17787465, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (plaintiff lacked standing to complain about debt collection letter that merely “caused confusion and uncertainty about her rights” because that “reflect[ed] only hypothetical, speculative concerns“); Media Rsch. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 12917195, at *3 (E.D. Va. 2014) (plaintiff‘s “subjective uncertainty over whether [its injury] falls within an exemption” to a mandatory law “is not Article III injury-in-fact“).
On top of all this, Llorens’ claim is not ripe. “Constitutional ripeness is a doctrine that, like standing, is a limitation on the power of the judiciary in that it prevents courts from
Llorens alleges that he has been subject to an excessive fine. But as the Second Circuit has explained, “constitutional challenges by defendants to a particular punishment are generally not ripe until the imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment or fine.” United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 2002). There has been no imposition or immediately impending imposition of a fine against Llorens here.
The Second Circuit in Quinones further advises that “in addressing any and all ripeness challenges, courts are required to make a fact-specific determination as to whether a particular challenge is ripe by deciding whether (1) the issues are fit for judicial consideration, and (2) withholding of consideration will cause substantial hardship to the parties.” Ibid. For Llorens, the issues are not yet fit for judicial consideration. It is unclear that he will recover anything at all from his lawsuit against the police, much less that he will recover more than the pay-to-stay statute‘s exemption for up to $50,000 of a prisoner‘s property. See
Plenty of precedent rejects unripe Excessive Fines Clause challenges by plaintiffs who have yet to be subject to a demand that they pay any purported “fine” at all. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 2022 WL 2966396, at *11–12 (6th Cir. 2022) (the “Excessive Fines challenge is not ripe for the simple reason that the City has yet to impose or seek any fine against them“); Duffner v. City of St. Peters, Missouri, 930 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 2019) (plaintiff “cannot establish that her Eighth Amendment [Excessive Fines] claim is fit for judicial decision”
Alas, it is a fact of life that we routinely engage in conduct that can be said to generate a “claim” by someone else against us. Does that mean we may sue that someone else even if the someone else does not bother to assert or enforce the claim against us?
Suppose, for example, that a person goes for emergency treatment at a hospital but the hospital does not send a bill. No doubt the hospital has some type of “claim” against the patient for services rendered. Under the plaintiffs’ sweeping theory of standing and ripeness, the patient need not wait to see if the hospital will ever try to bill him. Instead, he can sue the hospital now for fear that the hospital might one day send a bill for more than he should pay.
Or suppose that a homeowner cuts across her neighbor‘s lawn without consent. No doubt the neighbor has some type of “claim” for trespass. Under the plaintiffs’ sweeping theory of standing and ripeness, the homeowner need not wait to see if the neighbor will ever make a demand for damages or file a trespass action. Instead, the homeowner can sue the neighbor now for fear that the neighbor might one day assert a claim for excessive trespass damages.
Or suppose that a driver zooms well above the speed limit through a police speed trap, but the police do not pull him over. No doubt the police have some type of “claim” that they could later assert against the driver for speeding. Under the plaintiffs’ sweeping theory of standing and ripeness, the driver need not wait to see if the police will ever serve him with a
All these examples show the basic problem with the plaintiffs’ theory that somehow every prisoner or former prisoner in Connecticut has standing and a ripe claim now to file a lawsuit to challenge Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law even if there has been no effort at all to enforce the law against them. Federal courts require more in order to allow a lawsuit to proceed.
To summarize, all three plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims against the Attorney General. In addition, the Eleventh Amendment forecloses the claims of Beatty and Weissinger, and Llorens’ claim is not ripe for resolution. Because there are multiple reasons why the Court lacks jurisdiction over any of the plaintiffs’ claims, there is no need at this time for me to address the Attorney General‘s other arguments for dismissal.
Amended complaint
In light of the plaintiffs’ request for leave to file an amended complaint, this order granting the motion to dismiss is without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint that may name additional plaintiffs and defendants as appropriate. I note that Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law was amended in May 2022 by Public Act No. 22-118, and these amendments were understood at the time—apparently even by co-counsel for the plaintiffs—to have greatly narrowed the law‘s application so that the State could only enforce a claim against civil lawsuit proceeds of prisoners who have been convicted of certain murder and sexual assault crimes.51 The current Westlaw version of the law similarly reflects this narrowing amendment. See
Nevertheless, in the event that the plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, I trust that they will carefully consider whether it serves their interests—and the interests of the class as a whole—to seek to negate an apparent legislative victory not questioned by the Attorney General and that would vastly narrow the application of Connecticut‘s pay-to-stay law in prisoners’ favor. I trust as well that if the law has been narrowed as the Attorney General claims, then the Attorney General—in his capacity as a legal counselor to state agencies and officials such as the Commissioner of Correction and the DAS—will make clear that previously filed liens and other claim enforcement efforts should be withdrawn against those prisoners who are no longer within the scope of the statute. My hope is that counsel will consult to ensure that the future course of this litigation focuses on issues that are genuinely in dispute and that require a court to decide.
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS without prejudice the motion to dismiss (Doc. #23). In view of the plaintiffs’ request for leave to file a second amended complaint, the plaintiffs may do so by April 6, 2023. In the event that the plaintiffs do not file a timely amended complaint, the Clerk of Court shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 6th day of March 2023.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge