Janice Duffner, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. City of St. Peters, Missouri, a municipality and political subdivision of the State of Missouri, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 18-1966
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit
Submitted: January 16, 2019 Filed: July 18, 2019
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
Janice Duffner, along with her late husband Carl, sued the City of St. Peters, Missouri, to challenge a city ordinance that requires at least fifty percent of their residential yard to contain turf grass. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the Duffners failed to show that the ordinance violated the Due Process Clause of the
In 2002, the Duffners purchased a residential property in St. Peters. Soon after their purchase, the Duffners converted their yard into a garden of flowers and ornamental greenery. Six years later, the City enacted an ordinance requiring, among other things, that turf grass cover at least half the area of a residential yard. Violation of the ordinance is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of ten to two hundred fifty dollars, ten days’ imprisonment, or both, for each day that the violation continues.
In 2014, a city official sent the Duffners a letter, notifying them that their lawn apparently did not comply with the turf grass ordinance. The Duffners applied for a variance to exempt their property from compliance. The City granted
The Duffners sued the City in state court, alleging that the ordinance violated the
The Duffners later sued the City in the federal district court, filing a five-count complaint that alleged a substantive due process claim, an Eighth Amendment claim, and several state-law claims. The City moved for summary judgment on all
We first address Duffner‘s substantive due process claim. The City contends that res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars Duffner from filing the same claim that was already dismissed in Missouri state court. To determine whether Duffner‘s claim is barred by res judicata, we look to the law of Missouri, the forum that rendered the first judgment. See C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012). Under Missouri law, principles of res judicata bar a claim if “a final judgment on the merits has been rendered involving the same claim sought to be precluded in the cause in question.” Brown v. Simmons, 335 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). “The dismissal of a petition for failure to state a claim, without prejudice, does not preclude a plaintiff from reasserting the claim on new factual allegations.” Bachman v. Bachman, 997 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added). But Missouri law “does not . . . permit refiling of a petition previously determined not to state a claim.” Id. at 26. In other words, a judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim, even without prejudice, bars another trial court from considering a subsequent petition when “the petition in the second action was in all material respects the identical petition which was previously dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Id.
Duffner contends that res judicata does not bar her substantive due process claim because the decision of the state court of appeals affirmed a dismissal without prejudice, and the Duffners attempted to amend their petition during the state court proceeding. To be sure, when a plaintiff suffers a dismissal without prejudice and then elects not to plead further, the dismissal amounts to an adjudication on the merits and precludes relitigation of the claim that was dismissed. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Mo. 1991). But electing to plead further does not necessarily avoid preclusion: even when a dismissal is without prejudice, “the doctrine of res judicata precludes a plaintiff from re-filing a petition that was dismissed for failing to state a claim when it relies on the same substantial facts as those previously alleged.” Dunn v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 413 S.W.3d 375, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); see Bachman, 997 S.W.2d at 25-26. Duffner‘s unsuccessful attempt to amend her pleadings in state court, therefore, does not avoid the bar of res judicata if her claim in federal court merely repackages the same petition that was previously dismissed in state court for failure to state a claim.
Duffner argues that the federal court complaint “added dozens of additional allegations to provide a factual basis” that the ordinance is truly irrational, but a comparison of the state court petition and the federal court complaint does not bear out this assertion. The “additional allegations” that Duffner cites either recharacterize previously alleged facts, state or explain legal conclusions, or provide facts irrelevant to the substantive due process claim.
Duffner argues alternatively that if the court does not declare the turf grass requirement unconstitutional, then the ordinance‘s penalty provision violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments. The City argues that this claim is not ripe for review because no fines or penalties have been assessed against Duffner.
To determine whether a claim is ripe for judicial review, we evaluate “(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Nat‘l Park Hosp. Ass‘n v. Dep‘t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). In United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1242 (8th Cir. 1997), this court held that a prisoner‘s Eighth Amendment challenge to a restitution statute was not ripe, because he did not assert that he had suffered or was about to suffer the disputed punishment—i.e., imprisonment for nonpayment of restitution obligations. Id. Williams relied on Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir. 1995), which opined that “Eighth Amendment challenges are generally not ripe until the imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment or fine.” Id.
Because it is unknown whether the City will impose sanctions on Duffner or, if sanctions are imposed, what they might be, Duffner cannot establish that her Eighth Amendment claim is “fit” for judicial decision. The City previously threatened that Duffner‘s failure to comply with the variance by December 16, 2016, would “result in a summons to court.” But over two years later, there is no record that any summons has issued, and it is not clear whether the City will actually assess a penalty for noncompliance that occurred before the conclusion of this litigation. If the City does proceed against Duffner for violating the turf grass ordinance, then the law prescribes a range of possible sanctions, and the merits of an Eighth Amendment claim would depend on the specific penalties, if any, that are imposed. This case would thus “benefit from further factual development” before the court attempts to resolve Duffner‘s constitutional claim. Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 867 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003)). The potential hardship to Duffner here is not sufficient reason to engage in otherwise premature judicial review. The City should be in a position to determine promptly whether it will seek any sanction against Duffner, and Duffner will have an opportunity for judicial review of any penalty imposed. We thus conclude that Duffner‘s Eighth Amendment claim is not ripe for review.