3:24-cv-03010
N.D. Tex.
Jul 25, 2025

ROBERT ALLEN BAUTISTA v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, et al.

Case No. 3:24-cv-03010-N-BT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

July 25, 2025

Document 38 Filed 07/25/25 Page 1 of 17 PageID 249

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are separate motions to dismiss this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Capital One, N.A. (Capital One) and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (Experian) and Trans Union LLC (Trans Union). As explained below, the District Judge should GRANT Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 20 and 33) and DISMISS Plaintiff‘s claims with prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff Robert Allen Bautista, proceeding pro se, initially filed this civil action in a Dallas County District Court asserting claims against Capital One1 for alleged violations of numerous federal and state statutes, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Fair

Reporting Act (FCRA), Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Texas Fair Lending Act, the Texas Securities Act, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). See Notice of Removal, Ex. 1-B (ECF No. 1). Capital One timely and properly removed the case to federal court. See Notice of Removal; see also Order (ECF No. 34) (accepting the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation (ECF No. 29) to deny motion to remand because action was properly removed).

Bautista subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (FAC), adding Equifax Inc., Experian, and Trans Union (the Credit Reporting Agencies or “CRAs“) as defendants, adding claims for breach of contract and seemingly dropping his claims under the FHA and the Texas Fair Lending Act. FAC 3 (ECF No. 9). The Court reminded Bautista that he “must effect proper service of the Amended Complaint on the newly added Defendants.” Order 2 (ECF No. 11).

Bautista then filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC), adding a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. SAC 5 (ECF No. 16). After the Court again reminded Bautista of his responsibility to serve all Defendants, see Order 2 (ECF No. 17), Bautista filed a purported proof of service showing that a process server sent summons to Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax by certified mail. See Reply (ECF No. 23). However, the proof of service forms are incomplete, do not show where the certified mail was sent or delivered, and do not include a copy of the complaint.

Capital One filed a motion to dismiss Bautista‘s SAC (ECF No. 20), Bautista filed a response (ECF No. 22), and Capital One filed a reply (ECF No. 25). Experian

and Trans Union also filed a joint motion to dismiss Bautista‘s SAC (ECF No. 33). Bautista did not file a response and the time for doing so has passed. Equifax has not appeared in the case.

Legal Standards

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff‘s complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. . “To be plausible, the complaint‘s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.‘” (quoting ).

This pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it does demand more than an unadorned accusation devoid of factual support. (quoting ). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” at 678 (citing ). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (citing ). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” at 679. Where the facts do not permit the Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has stopped short of showing that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. at 678 (citing ,

).

When applying the plausibility standard, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But a court may not look beyond the pleadings. . Review is “limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the [motion to dismiss] that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” (citing ); see also (“In ruling on [a Rule 12(b)(6)] motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings.“) (citing ), aff‘d, .

The Court liberally construes Bautista‘s SAC with all possible deference due a pro se litigant. See (pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.“) (citing ). But such liberal treatment does not require the Court to “create causes of action where there are none.”

). And pro se status does not provide an “impenetrable shield,” “for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” .

Analysis

1. Bautista‘s Claims as to Capital One

In his SAC, Bautista alleges that Capital One wrongfully refused to accept his “Bills of Exchange” as valid forms of payment to settle outstanding debts on “the Principal‘s account.” See SAC § III, ¶ 6. Bautista alleges that he “made numerous attempts to set off the outstanding debt on behalf of the Principal, yet the Capital One Defendants have consistently failed to honor these requests.” Id. ¶ 7. Bautista alleges that he is “the duly authorized agent and attorney-in-fact for the Principal.” Id. ¶ 5.2 Bautista also alleges that Capital One discriminated against “the Principal” by “unlawfully treat[ing] the Principal‘s account as though the Principal were a minor or otherwise incapable of contracting, based on erroneous assumptions of the Principal‘s legal incapacity.” Id. Bautista adds that, along with this purported refusal “to recognize the Principal‘s legal rights,” Capital One‘s alleged “continued

failure to honor lawful attempts to discharge debt, represents clear discriminatory behavior.” Id. ¶ 8.3

Capital One argues that Bautista‘s SAC is “entirely bereft of even the most rudimentary facts” and even assuming Bautista pleaded rudimentary facts, fails to plead facts sufficient to plead every element of every cause of action. Capital One‘s Mot. 4-5. In particular, Capital One argues that “the SAC does not provide any information regarding the Principal‘s outstanding debts, identity of any debt accounts at issue if they exist, nature of the purported Bills of Exchange, whether a contract existed between [Bautista and Capital One], [or] why Capital One had a duty at all, let alone a fiduciary one . . . .” Id. at 5.

To prevail on a breach of contract claim under Texas law, Bautista must show “(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by [Bautista]; (3) breach of contract by [Capital One]; and (4) damages sustained by [Bautista] as a result of the breach.” (citing ). Here, Bautista fails to sufficiently plead the existence of a valid contract or any contract provisions that were breached by Capital One. See

(“Under Texas law, . . . a plaintiff suing for breach of contract must point to a specific provision in the contract that was breached by the defendant.“), adopted by, , aff‘d by, .

Bautista also fails to sufficiently plead damages sustained as a result of the alleged breach. He requests damages “for the significant emotional distress, financial harm, and reputational damage caused by Defendants’ unlawful actions,” see SAC § VI, ¶ 3, but fails to allege what damages he actually suffered. See (“Because [p]laintiff has not pleaded that he suffered damages as a result of [d]efendant‘s alleged breach of [contract], [p]laintiff‘s breach of contract claims against the [d]efendant should be dismissed.“), adopted by, .

Further, the sovereign citizen theories that underlie Bautista‘s suit have never succeeded in court.4 See

) (“These teachings have never worked in a court of law—not a single time.“), adopted by, (internal citations omitted). And the Bills of Exchange legal theory has been consistently rejected by the courts as frivolous. See (“From coast to coast, claims that debts have been paid under the redemption theory by the plaintiffs’ issuance of ‘bills of exchange’ have been dismissed as frivolous.“), adopted by, (internal citations omitted).

Even under the liberal construction due to pro se plaintiffs, Bautista‘s SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Capital One. Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss with prejudice Bautista‘s SAC as to Capital One pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

2. Bautista‘s Claims as to Experian and Trans Union (the CRAs)

When Bautista‘s deadline to respond to their motion passed, the CRAs urged the Court to “consider [their] [m]otion unopposed and grant [them] the relief

requested.” See Reply (ECF No. 35). This Court‘s Local Civil Rule 7.1(e) instructs that “[a] response and brief to an opposed motion must be filed within 21 days from the date the motion is filed.” N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 7.1(e). And “a party‘s failure to defend a claim in [his] response to a motion to dismiss constitutes abandonment.” . However, the Fifth Circuit has “approached the automatic grant of a dispositive motion, such as a dismissal with prejudice based solely on a litigant‘s failure to comply with a local rule, with considerable aversion.” . And courts in this District granting a motion to dismiss based on a pro se plaintiff‘s failure to respond to the motion generally only do so without prejudice. See, e.g., (granting the government‘s motion to dismiss without prejudice because plaintiff failed to respond to the motion and thus abandoned his claims); see also (same). Accordingly, the undersigned addresses the merits of Experian and Trans Union‘s motion requesting dismissal with prejudice despite Bautista‘s failure to respond.

In his SAC, Bautista generally refers to “Defendants” in his causes of action, see SAC § V, but does not specifically mention Experian and Trans Union until the last page, alleging that:

Equifax Inc., Experian Corporation, and TransUnion, the credit reporting agencies, each of which have contributed to the improper and inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff‘s credit information, in violation of the FCRA and FACTA, and have failed to ensure the accuracy of the

information they provided to Defendants, contributing to Plaintiff‘s financial hardship.

SAC § VII.

The CRAs argue that Bautista‘s SAC is a “shotgun pleading” that fails to distinguish the actions of each named defendant—instead lumping them together—and makes conclusory allegations that do not give them notice of the alleged claims against them. CRAs’ Joint Mot. 6. They also argue that Bautista fails to allege the elements of his FCRA and FACTA5 claims because he does not allege an inaccuracy in his credit report or that he disputed an alleged inaccuracy with the CRAs. Id. at 8–9.

Pleadings are shotgun pleadings when they “fail to definitively attribute particular conduct to specific defendants, thereby falling short of the federal pleading standard.” , adopted by, (citing (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff‘s complaint to “notify the defendant as to the nature of the claim against it and the grounds upon which that claim rests“)). And “[s]hotgun pleadings

are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” . Here, Bautista alleges multiple claims against all defendants without specifying each defendant‘s role or conduct in the various alleged violations. See SAC § V. Accordingly, his allegations suffer from shotgun pleading deficiencies.

Even assuming that Bautista‘s FCRA allegation—that “Defendants failed to ensure the accuracy and correctness of credit reports“—refers to conduct by the CRAs specifically, the SAC still fails to state a claim that is plausible on its face. SAC § V; see also id. § VII. For example, “to state a plausible claim under § 1681e(b)6 and § 1681i7, [Bautista] must plead that [the CRAs‘s] credit report[s] contained a factual inaccuracy.” . “The law is well-settled that an inaccuracy in the report is required.” (citing ). The full extent of Bautista‘s FCRA allegation is that there was “improper and inaccurate reporting of [his] credit information” and that the CRAs “failed to ensure the accuracy of the information they provided to

Defendants.” SAC 5, 7. Bautista does not identify what on his credit report was inaccurate or how it was inaccurate, thus failing to sufficiently plead a FCRA claim.

Accordingly, Bautista‘s SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the CRAs, and the District Judge should dismiss with prejudice Bautista‘s SAC as to the CRAs pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

3. Bautista‘s Claims as to Equifax

Even though Equifax did not appear in the case, Experian and Trans Union argue that the Court can apply their arguments to the claims made against Equifax “because the claims factually and legally overlap.” CRAs’ Joint Mot. 2 n.2. Experian and Trans Union cite to for this proposition, but in , Equifax moved to join Trans Union and Experian‘s motion to dismiss and the Court found “it was appropriate to grant Equifax‘s motion and apply the same arguments to Holloway‘s claims against Equifax as are applied to her claims against TransUnion and Experian.” . Here, Equifax has not moved for such relief.

But because the arguments made in the joint motion to dismiss apply equally to Equifax, the Court “may expand the grounds of a motion and sua sponte dismiss non-movants, as long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to respond.” , adopted by, ; see also , Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation (“In sum, the motions to dismiss

should be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) and all claims that Bautista may make in the operative complaint against all defendants named in that pleading (regardless of whether they have appeared or not) should be dismissed. And, to the extent this effects a sua sponte dismissal, Bautista is now on notice and may respond to this recommended disposition through timely objections.“). This recommendation provides Bautista notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.

Accordingly, as discussed in the above section, Bautista‘s SAC similarly fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Equifax and the District Judge should dismiss with prejudice Bautista‘s SAC as to Equifax pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Opportunity to Amend

In his response to Capital One‘s motion, Bautista argues he “should be granted the opportunity to amend the SAC as necessary.” Resp. 1. He argues that dismissal without leave to amend would unduly prejudice him because “he has not had a fair opportunity to present his case in full.” Id. at 7.

Leave to amend is “entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court[,]” , abrogated on other grounds by, (quoting ), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires that courts freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also

(motions for “leave to amend [should be granted] ‘freely,’ and the language of this rule ‘evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.‘“). The Court considers five factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” (citing ).

The Fifth Circuit is inclined to give pro se plaintiffs several opportunities to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See ; . Courts therefore typically allow pro se plaintiffs to amend their complaints when the action is to be dismissed pursuant to a court order. See ; .

But leave to amend is not automatic and may be refused where it would be futile. See (citing ). “The court may deny leave to amend . . . if the defects are incurable or the plaintiff[ ] ha[s] already alleged [his] best case.” (per curiam) (citing

; (per curiam)).

Here, the District Judge should not allow Bautista to amend his pleadings. Although Bautista is proceeding pro se, he has already been given three opportunities to adequately plead his claims and he does not direct the Court to factual allegations he would include to overcome the pleading deficiencies identified here. It appears that he has pleaded his best case and the Court should deny him another opportunity to try again. See (“The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing [p]laintiffs [a third] opportunity to plead their case and dismissing [p]laintiffs’ federal claims with prejudice.“); see also (“[J]udges have the power to control their dockets by refusing to give ineffective litigants a second chance to develop their case.“) (citations omitted).

Additionally, Bautista is a familiar litigant in the Northern District of Texas having filed at least four other lawsuits in a five month period. See (in case raising similar claims against similar or same defendants, Judge Horan recommended dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6)); (pending case for similar claims or under similar legal theories); (pending case for similar claims or under similar legal theories); Bautista

(case for alleged civil rights violations, but based on similar legal theories). Although he has not yet been sanctioned or admonished, he has yet to demonstrate that he can bring a plausible claim against any defendant.

Recommendation

The District Judge should GRANT Capital One‘s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20), GRANT Experian and Trans Union‘s Joint Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33), DISMISS Bautista‘s claims with prejudice as to all Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6), and DENY further leave to amend.

SO RECOMMENDED.

July 25, 2025.

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge‘s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See .

Notes

1
Bautista sued Defendant Capital One, N.A. as three separate entities: “Capital One Financial Corporation,” “Capital One, National Association,” and “Capital One Services, LLC.” See Notice of Removal 1 (ECF No. 1).
2
In his response to Capital One‘s motion to dismiss, Bautista states that the Principal “is ROBERT ALLEN BAUTISTA™, a trademarked sole proprietorship and the Principal for the account. Plaintiff, Bautista, Robert-Allen, a Free man of the Union, domiciled in the Republic of Texas, is the duly authorized sole Agent authorized to act for the Principal.” Resp. to Capital One‘s Mot. 2 (ECF No. 22).
3
In his response to Capital One‘s motion, Bautista argues that Capital One “failed to adhere to explicit instructions outlined in the Principal‘s Durable Power of Attorney. These instructions included the lawful acceptable of Bills of Exchange as payment to settle outstanding debts and the recognition of the Principal‘s legal capacity to contract.” Resp. to Capital One‘s Mot. 2.
4
Even though Bautista does not use the specific words “sovereign citizen,” his claims are clearly based in that ideology. “So-called sovereign citizens argue that, though they are born and reside in the United States, they are their own sovereigns and are not United States citizens.” , adopted by, (citing ). “They claim as grounds for this belief: the Uniform Commercial Code, maritime and admiralty law, the idea of strawman trusts, and Bible verses.” (internal citation omitted). And sovereign citizens often attempt to use their beliefs to, among other things, “extinguish debts.” “It is common for sovereign citizens to utilize particular frivolous legal theories, such as claiming to copyright their own names and filing supposed UCC financing statements that exempt them from taxation by becoming a ‘secured party’ or ‘secured creditor.‘” But sovereign citizen legal arguments and theories “are not valid in the courts of the United States” and have been overwhelmingly rejected for years as frivolous and “indisputably meritless.” ; see also (per curiam). Further, claims that “seem to derive from the so-called ‘sovereign citizen movement’ are legally frivolous.” , adopted by, (internal citations omitted); see also , adopted by, ; see also .
5
See (“While the FACTA provides the basis for plaintiff‘s claim, the [FCRA] provides the right to sue: ‘Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer . . . .’ 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. (‘FACTA does not contain a separate provision establishing a private cause of action; the right to sue is granted under the FCRA.‘).“).
6
Section 1681e(b) governs reasonable procedure FCRA claims and provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
7
Section 1681i governs reinvestigation FCRA claims and provides that “[i]f the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer‘s file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly through a reseller, of such dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).
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