Baton Rouge Etc. v. Gen. Truck, Etc.Baton Rouge Etc. v. Gen. Truck, Etc.
The issues are: (1) whether
Plaintiff, Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Ltd., filed a petition for a temporary restraining order. Named as defendant was General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 5, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The trial court granted the temporary restraining order, which prohibited the defendant Union from engaging in certain activities and imposed limitations on the location and number of pickets at the entrance to plaintiff‘s plant. The Union filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and asked damages, alleging that the order was wrongfully issued. Alternatively, it sought an increase in the $1,000 bond which Coca-Cola had been required to provide. The court denied the motion to dissolve, granted a preliminary injunction and increased the bond to $2,500. The court of appeal affirmed and a writ was granted to review the decision. 394 So.2d 1246 (La., 1980).
Coca-Cola‘s petition stated that the Union had been recognized by the NLRB as the bargaining representative for employees at Baton Rouge Coca-Cola. Because negotiations were unsuccessful, some of these employees had gone on strike. Defendant had established picket lines at the two employee entrances to the plant.
Coca-Cola‘s petition alleged that:
“... mass picketing and congregation of pickets have occurred, intimidation of persons seeking lawful ingress to and egress from the plant has occurred, said picketers have used threatening, vile, and abusive language, ingress to and egress from said plant has been obstructed and hindered....” (Tr. 5)
Additionally, Coca-Cola contended that participants in the picket line had spit upon those entering and leaving the plant and had disrupted traffic on U.S. Highway 61 (Airline Highway).1
Plaintiff‘s petition asserted that the mass picketing violated its constitutional rights, posed a continuing threat to peace and interfered with operation of its business.
The restraining order issued by the district court provided in pertinent part, as follows:
“... Teamsters Local No. 5, and all persons in active concert or participation with the said Teamsters Local No. 5, be, and they are hereby, temporarily restrained, enjoined and prohibited from all of the following:
“A. Threatening, intimidating, cussing, using vile, indecent and vulgar language, molesting, restraining, coercing, committing acts of violence and compulsion against, or in any way interfering with petitioners, their agents or employees as they enter or leave or work about the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, or as they
make their deliveries or perform their services in the Greater Baton Rouge area. “B. Massing or congregating within four hundred feet (400‘) of the entrances to the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, or in any way interfering with or obstructing the free access of Baton Rouge Coca-Cola‘s employees, suppliers, and deliverymen at said plant.
“C. Engaging in any picketing, patrolling or congregating, forming a physical barrier of any kind whatsoever at or near the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola entrances to the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant, except that defendants may station not more than three (3) persons at each entrance to the plant, on public property, for the purpose of picketing or other peaceful activities not prohibited hereby except that no picket shall remain stationary but shall continuously walk in a straight line the entire width of the roadway, an interval of ten feet (10‘) shall be maintained between walking pickets.
“D. Spitting, kicking or striking the vehicles or persons of petitioners agents or employees as they enter, leave or work at the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant or as they make their deliveries or work in the Greater Baton Rouge area.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by this Court that the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish and all law enforcement agencies shall enforce this order and require compliance by defendants with the terms hereof....” (Tr. 10-11)
The preliminary injunction differs in some respects from the temporary restraining order. The injunction reduces the area of restriction from 400 to 200 feet, prohibits picketing within 25 feet of U.S. Highway 61, and omits the provision which directs law enforcement agencies to enforce the order.
The trial court found that this was not a case of peaceful picketing. The trial court concluded that:
“... there is an extreme possibility that violence will be provoked and intimidation will be engendered.” (Tr. 448)
The Union contends that the lower courts failed to apply the provisions of
The trial court held that the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable where injunctive relief is sought to prevent violence. The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying primarily on Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954).
In Douglas plaintiff sought injunctive relief against its striking employees. Defendants filed exceptions based on plaintiff‘s failure to comply with the provisions of
Douglas concluded, without supporting reasons, that compliance with the statute denied due process.5 As Justice Hawthorne noted in dissent, any due process infirmity in our statute is shared by the federal act. In fact, neither law denies due process.
Both acts are legislative determinations of how the conflicting interests of employers and employees should be accommodated. Rather than denying due process,
The statute is not an unconstitutional infringement on the courts’ jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Injunctions are not prohibited in labor disputes, but preclusive procedures and guidelines must be followed before that relief is available.
The legislature has the power to define the substantive and procedural rights of citizens. The Code of Civil Procedure articles on injunctions are representative examples of the exercise of this power.7 The Little Norris-LaGuardia Act is no less valid than the Code articles. Because of the special considerations present in labor disputes, it establishes a set of special rules. Neither the Code of Civil Procedure articles on injunctions nor
Coca-Cola argues, in reliance on Douglas, that
The legislature has seen fit to regulate injunctive relief in other areas.8 One example is
Courts in other states have concluded that the legislature may regulate such proceedings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that its Little Norris-LaGuardia Act did not diminish the jurisdiction of its constitutionally created courts but simply changed the substantive law. American Furniture Co. v. I.B. of T.C. and H., Etc., 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936). In Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937) the New York Little Norris-LaGuardia Act was upheld against constitutional attack. A New Jersey court has rejected the contention that procedural requirements for the issuance or labor injunctions breach the constitutional equity jurisdiction of the courts. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers, 59 N.J.Super. 240, 157 A.2d 542 (1960). In Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers’ International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934) the Illinois Supreme Court held that forbidding the enjoining of peaceful picketing does not curtail the inherent power of equity courts.
Laws which limit or regulate the courts’ power to issue injunctions are not unconstitutional limitations upon a court‘s power to do what is necessary to aid or preserve its jurisdiction.
Since
The Union asserts that Coca-Cola failed to allege and prove the sixth requirement of
“(6) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant‘s property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection.”
A review of Coca-Cola‘s petition and of the transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing supports this contention. Coca-Cola‘s petition fails to allege that public officers charged with the duty to protect the company‘s property (i. e., city police and the sheriff‘s department) have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection. The transcript of the hearing on the preliminary injunction reveals that Coca-Cola failed to undertake proof of this element.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. The preliminary injunction issued by the district court is vacated and dissolved. The case is remanded for disposition consistent with this decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MARCUS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
BLANCHE, J., dissents for reasons assigned.
MARCUS, Justice (concurring).
While I agree with the majority that
BLANCHE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons. In my
I note at the outset that the doctrine of federal preemption operates in the labor relations area to preclude a state‘s exercise of its jurisdiction. However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, et al., 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976):
“`The national ... Act ... leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.’ Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 74 S.Ct. 161, 164, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953). Federal labor policy as reflected in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, has been construed not to preclude the States from regulating aspects of labor relations that involve conduct touch[ing] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that ... we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.’ San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen‘s Union v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 779, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Policing of actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property has been held most clearly a matter for the states.12” (96 S.Ct. at 255)
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The Court has apparently recognized the strong interest a state has in regulating such activities and sanctions the exercise of state injunctive powers to restrain these picket line tactics. However, a state court may not enjoin the peaceful aspects of picketing although accompanied by non-peaceful picketing, merely because of the existence of some non-peaceful picketing, unless there is established a pattern of violence which would inevitably reappear in the event picketing were later resumed. Youngdahl, et al. v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 2 L.Ed.2d 151, 78 S.Ct. 206 (1957), citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoore Dairy, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 85 L.Ed. 836, 61 S.Ct. 552, 132 ALR 1200.
After the trial of the motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial judge emphasized that “The court has not before it an incidence where an injunction is being sought to prevent a peaceful picket. This is not what is before the court.” Based upon the testimony and affidavits which were admitted
The court of appeal affirmed, ruling that the “findings of the trial court that the picketing was not peaceful, and that there were threats, violence and intimidation by the picketers, are clearly substantiated by the record.” My review of the record shows that these findings of fact of the trial court are not clearly erroneous. In light of these findings of fact, I would further hold that the trial court was not preempted by the federal system from exercising its jurisdiction to enjoin the non-peaceful picketing occurring at the Coca Cola plant. In a factually similar case, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdiction of a state court to enjoin threats, intimidation or coercion of employees of the picketed employer by the union, and obstruction or attempts to obstruct the free use of streets adjacent to the employer‘s place of business, and the free ingress to and egress from employer‘s property. Youngdahl, supra.
The more difficult issue presented to this Court in this case is not whether a Louisiana court can exercise its jurisdiction to enjoin non-peaceful picketing, but whether the court could issue the particular injunction in this case under existing state law based upon the above indicated findings of fact.
Relator-union contends that the grant of the preliminary injunction in favor of Coca Cola was erroneously affirmed by the court of appeal for several reasons. The union‘s main contention is that both lower courts failed to apply the provision of
This statute is almost identical to
Part 5 of
The trial judge ruled that the “Little Norris LaGuardia” provisions were not applicable where injunctive relief was sought to prevent acts or threats of violence, intimidation, coercion, to the extent that the public‘s health, safety and general welfare is at stake.” The court of appeal affirmed this ruling, citing Good Hope Refineries v. Oil, Chemical, etc., 386 So.2d 378 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980); Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954); Godchaux Sugar v. Chaisson, 227 La. 147, 78 So.2d 673 (1955).
In Douglas Public Service Corp., et al. v. Gaspard, et al., 74 So.2d 182 (La.1954), this Court adopted the reasoning of a court of appeal opinion, which differentiated between the constitutionality of the federal “anti-injunction statute” as opposed to the Louisiana counterpart:
“In a recent well-considered opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Parish of Orleans pointed out that Congress, under the authority specifically granted it by the Constitution of the United States to create and regulate the jurisdiction and powers of all inferior federal courts, was well within its right to effectively prohibit these courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes by the enactment of the Norris LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. , while the power and jurisdiction of the courts of this state flows from constitutional grants 3 and the legislature is powerless to interfere with their prerogatives except as specifically authorized by the constitution, concluding that `The powers granted to the trial judge by the Constitution must take precedence over any provisions of any sort of legislation which runs counter thereto, whether such legislation pertains to capital, labor, or any other subject.’ The decision in that case—Twiggs v. Journeymen Barbers, etc., La.App., 58 So.2d 298, 302—received the approval of this court when we refused the writs sought for its review with the comment that `The judgment is correct‘.”
3 Under the constitution of 1921 the district courts are vested with original jurisdiction in all civil matters,
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The wording of
Again, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the policing of actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property is a matter for the states, and a state may appropriately regulate such “conduct touch[ing] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.” San Diego Building Trades Council, supra at 779.
In Kohler Company v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 486 F.Supp. 1016 (1979) at 1018, the court held that “A purpose of the Congress, in adopting the Act, undoubtedly was to leave in the hands of state and local authorities those problems of public order which they [are] capable of handling ...“, Cimarron Coal Corp. v. District 23, United Mine Workers, C.A. 6th (1969), 416 F.2d 845 at 847, cert. den. 397 U.S. 919, 90 S.Ct. 928, 25 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970). “This Court will not act precipitately to enforce private property rights hindered by a labor-management dispute while there is hope that the state judicial and law enforcement institutions may enforce the decrees of the state courts ...“.
However, according to the majority in this case, when the Louisiana Legislature adopted the Little Norris LaGuardia Act the local state courts were stripped of their power or authority to issue such decrees in a labor dispute until there was proof of a breakdown of police law enforcement protection. The practical problem with such a requirement was addressed by the Supreme Court of Washington in 1936 in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewery Co., 63 P.2d 397 at 407, and is discussed below. That court pointed out that one whose rights are being invaded is not required to seek the grace or await the pleasure and consequent delay of police intervention nor is he required to argue his case to a policeman. The proper forum for such matters is a court (emphasis added).
I also find legal problems with the majority position. Aside from a possible violation of constitutionally mandated separation of powers, a statute which precludes a Louisiana state court from issuing an injunction in a labor dispute setting infringes upon the constitutional authority granted a Louisiana court in
The Douglas majority accurately perceived this infringement in 1954 and consequently did not apply the provisions of § 844 of the Little Norris LaGuardia Act, ruling them unconstitutional. Douglas was correct in recognizing that a state court should have the authority to enjoin certain activities incident to a labor dispute and in holding that a statutory limitation on this authority could not be sanctioned. In my view, the majority erred in overruling Douglas.
The Douglas opinion stipulated that:
“For the courts to function in an orderly manner, and with equal protection to all, the Constitution not having provided otherwise, it became necessary for the legislature to establish the rules and regulations that would govern the procedure to be followed by those seeking this guaranteed protection, including the issuance of all needful writs and processes. Such procedural statutes will be upheld in our courts so long as they do not violate our basic law. However, any act of the legislature, whether procedural
or substantive, that infringes or trenches upon the constitutional prerogatives of the courts, cannot stand. 74 So.2d at 187.
In that case, this Court affirmed that grant of a temporary restraining order against certain union actions incident to picketing although, according to the dissent, the plaintiff seeking the restraining order “made no effort to comply with the procedural requirements set out for obtaining injunctive relief in a labor dispute.” In Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Chaisson, et al., supra, this Court again refused to require the listed findings of fact in
In Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936), the Supreme Court of Washington struck down an “anti-injunction” statute practically identical to our own (that statute, like the federal counterpart, also did not include a provision parallel to (5) of our statute). That Court noted that:
“... by the Constitution, and independently of any legislative enactment, the judicial power over cases in equity have been vested in our courts, and, in the absence of any constitutional provision to the contrary, such power may not be abrogated or restricted by the legislative department. Any legislation, therefor, the purpose or effect of which is to divest, in whole or in part, a constitutional court of its constitutional powers, is void as being an encroachment by the legislative department upon the judicial department.” 63 P.2d at 405.
The court distinguished the “anti-injunction statute” from reasonable regulations governing court procedure, stipulating that the courts will always recognize reasonable regulation prescribed by the legislature, but the courts are not required to recognize a legislative restriction which has the effect of depriving them of a constitutional grant of one of their inherent powers. The Washington court particularly attacked certain areas of the Washington “anti-injunction statute“, including the counterpart to Louisiana‘s
“One whose rights are invaded and who is faced with an irreparable injury is not required to seek the grace, or to await the pleasure and consequent delay, of public officers. He is not required to argue his case or to address his importunities to a policeman, nor is such officer to be expected to determine the civil rights of a litigant. The proper forum for such matters is a court.” 63 P.2d at 407.
In Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail E. Union Local 830, 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E.2d 320 (1939), the Court of Appeal of New
Chapter 2 of Title I of Book VII of the Code of Civil Procedure sets out procedural rules for the issuance of injunctions in Louisiana. The last article in this chapter specifically recognizes that “The provisions of this Chapter do not limit the issuance by a court of any writ, process, or order in aid of its jurisdiction.”
In 1959, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that
Once again, we emphasize that the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized the overriding interest of a state court in preventing threats, intimidation or coercion of employees, obstruction of the free use of streets adjacent to an employer‘s place of business and free ingress and egress to and from employer‘s plant, Youngdahl, supra, and where such situations are found to exist, allows the state to act despite federal preemption in the area of labor relations. As discussed above, one of the provisions of the Little Norris LaGuardia Act itself seems to contemplate the issuance of injunctions where picketing is non-peaceful. The trial court found such a situation to exist and granted employer‘s request for a preliminary injunction to prevent such actions. As I have noted above, the court rightfully exercised its jurisdiction and, in view of its findings of fact, I would hold that the court had the power to issue an injunction against the non-peaceful picketing. A review of the terms of that injunction shows that it is reasonably designed to prohibit only “non-peaceful” picketing. I would affirm the court of appeal ruling upholding this injunction.
In reaching this result, I would rule that the provisions of
I fully recognize the vitally important right of an individual to join a labor union and for that individual and union to pursue legal channels for the expression of its views and of grievances it may have with a particular employer. I further recognize that picketing is a valid, legal means for the communication of union grievances. However, I do not recognize a right to engage in non-peaceful picketing which threatens the physical safety and property of persons
I would not, however, sanction the grant of an injunction in a labor dispute without proof of recurrent and serious, rather than isolated and minor, instances of non-peaceful picketing. The record shows that instances of non-peaceful picketing in the present case were recurrent and serious. I would, therefore, affirm the terms of the injunction as did the court of appeal.
DENNIS, Justice, concurring in denial of rehearing.
I respectfully concur in the denial of a rehearing.
Although I am inclined to believe that the “Little Norris-LaGuardia Act‘s” mandatory requirement of the forty-eight hour delay before a temporary restraining order may be granted is an unwarranted restriction upon the court‘s power to grant a conservatory writ of injunction in a case in which all other statutory requisites have been met, that issue is not presented in this case; nor do I think that the invalidity of that provision would prove fatal to the remainder of the statute.
MARCUS, Justice (concurring in denial of rehearing).
I concur in the denial for rehearing for reasons assigned in my concurring opinion.
LEMMON, Justice, concurring in denial of rehearing.
I concur for the reasons stated by Justice Dennis. While the 48-hour delay is a statutory rule that should be adhered to in almost every case, the Constitution authorizes issuance of needful writs in an exceptional case.
BLANCHE, Justice (dissenting from denial of rehearing).
This writer would grant a rehearing for reasons stated in his dissent, and further notes that, henceforth, our citizens will be unable to protect their property rights in a labor dispute for a period of 48 hours, and then only after a showing that the police have not acted to protect these rights.
Non-peaceful picketing is all this case is about. It is wrong and we should not limit our right to enjoin it at any time.