Barth v. BarthBarth v. Barth
Norman L. Folwell, Marietta, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
James Addison, Addison & Funk, Marietta, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
McFarland, P. J.:
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jackie Barth, appeals the decision of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas awarding her husband, Plaintiff-Appellee, Christopher Barth, certain real property in their divorce action. Appellant states the trial court erred in 1) finding the parties had entered into a valid, binding premarital agreement; and 2) finding the funds for building a home, and thus the home itself, were the separate property of Appellee. Because the validity of the premarital agreеment was primarily an issue of fact best determined by the trier of fact, we can not say the court below abused it’s discretion in determining the premarital agreement was
I. Facts
{¶2} Appellant, Jackie Barth, and Appellee, Christopher Barth, were married on November 24, 2001. Two days before the marriage took place, Appellant signed a premarital agreement which had been prepared by Appellee‘s father, Melvin Barth. The enforceability of that document is the core of this appeal.
{¶3} The premarital agreement concerned real property and a residence that was to be built following the marriage. The real property in question was transferred to Appellee by fаmily members in 1999, more than two years before the marriage took place. Melvin Barth testified that he drafted the premarital agreement in order to protect Appellee‘s interest in the real property and the money for the proposed residencе, which was to be provided by Melvin‘s relatives.
{¶4} After Appellant and Appellee were married, Melvin Barth coordinated a series of transfers of money from his wife‘s mother, Mary
{¶5} In November 2007, Appellee filed for divorce. Through mediation, the parties resolved all issues concerning pеrsonal property and Appellee was ordered to pay Appellant approximately $15,000 to equalize the personal property division. The only remaining issue was the disposition of the real estate mentioned above, including the residence. After a full hearing, the magistrate issued a decision finding that the prenuptial agreement was valid. The decision also stated that all of the monetary transfers from Appellee‘s relatives used to construct the home were gifts to Appellee alone, except for thrеe $10,000 payments the court construed as gifts to Appellant. The decision further ordered Appellee to pay Appellant $30,000 and found the real estate to be the separate property of Appellee. After review, the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision. Following the trial court’s judgment entry, Appellant timely filed the current appeal.
- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PREMARITAL AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO FREELY WITHOUT FRAUD, DURESS, COERCION OR OVERREACHING, WITH FULL DISCLOSURE OR FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE, VALUE, AND THE EXTENT OF THE PROSPECTIVE SPOUSE‘S PROPERTY AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE VALID AND BINDING.
- IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE FUNDS PROVIDED TO THE JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLEE AND THE APPELLANT WERE THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEE AS SUCH A FINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. AS IT WAS ERROR TO FIND THAT THE FUNDS WERE SEPARATE, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO DIVIDE THE VALUE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE.
III. First Assignment of Error
{¶6} Appellant’s first assignment of error states the trial court erred in determining that the premarital agreement was valid and binding. She argues that decision was error both becаuse there was not a full disclosure of the nature, value and content of the prospective spouse’s property before the agreement was executed, and because she did not sign the agreement freely, without fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching.
{¶7} It is well settled that prenuptial agreements are enforceable under Ohio law. Fletcher v. Fletcher (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 464, 466. However, such agreements must meet the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Gross v. Gross (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 99, 464
{¶8} We review a trial court’s decision regarding the validity of a prenuptial agreement under an abuse of discretion standard. Bisker v. Bisker, 69 Ohio St.3d 608, 609-610, 1994-Ohio-307, 635 N.E.2d 308. See, also, Zawahiri v. Alwattar, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-925, 2008-Ohio-3473, at ¶21; In re Estate of Gates v. Gates, 7th Dist. No. 06 CO 60, 2007-Ohio-5040, at ¶13. An abuse of discretion constitutes more than an error of law or judgment. Rather, it implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 218, 450 N.E.2d 1140. Further, determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement “is a question of fact best left to the trial court.” Bisker at 610. Thus, the relevant inquiry in the case sub judice is whether the trial court abused its discretion in enforcing the premarital agreement.
{¶9} The document at issue was created by Melvin Barth with a computer program and without consulting an attorney. Under cross-
{¶10} Though the provisions of the document itself were not in dispute, the parties’ testimony concerning the circumstancеs surrounding the document’s execution was vastly different. Appellee and Melvin Barth testified that: Appellant willingly provided information for the creation of the agreement, namely her debts and assets; she was given a copy of the full agreement for her review prior to the day she signed it; she understood the terms of the agreement, including that it was to protect the money being transferred to Appellee for the construction of the house; she was told that, if she did not sign the agreement, the money to build the house would not be forthcoming, and she had а discussion with Melvin Barth to that effect; and Melvin Barth specifically told her the document was a premarital agreement.
{¶12} As the parties do not contest the terms of the agreement itself, but rather the circumstances surrounding its execution, thе validity and enforceability of the agreement are issues of fact. The magistrate determined that while the testimony of both parties could be seen as self-serving, Appellant’s version of events was less credible than Appellee’s. The magistrate found that the agreеment contained both detailed information regarding the parties’ respective assets and an acknowledgement concerning each party’s right to seek the advice of counsel, which was located
{¶13} As previously stated, determining the validity of a рrenuptial agreement is primarily an issue for the trier of fact. That deference is particularly appropriate in the present case, where the parties’ testimony is factually contradictory on a number of vital issues, including whether Appellant was providеd with a copy of the document prior to the day of signing, and whether the document was understood to be a premarital agreement. “The underlying rationale for appellate courts to defer to the trier of fact on matters of evidence weight and witness credibility is that the trier of fact is best positioned to view the witnesses and to observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections and to use those observations to weigh credibility.” Cox Paving, Inc. v. Indell Constr. Corp., 4th Dist. No. 08CA11 at ¶11, citing Myers v. Garson (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 610, 615, 614 N.E.2d 742; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273.
IV. Second Assignment of Error
{¶15} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in determining the funds used to construct the residence in question were Appellee’s separate property. Instead, she states that money, and thus the home itself, should have been classified as marital property.
{¶16} Funding for the construction of the home ultimately came from Appellee’s grandmother, Mary Niceswanger, and his great-aunt, Alice Lauer. Melvin Barth testified that hе formulated a plan to transfer the funds from Niceswanger and Lauer to Appellee in an attempt to reduce federal gift tax, which is why there were multiple transfers, to multiple parties, in $10,000 increments. A total of $190,000 was transferred for the building of the residence. Most of that money was deposited, at some point, in two accounts held jointly by Appellant and Appellee.
{¶18} The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the donators’ intеnt cannot be determined solely from the deposit slips, and because almost all the transfers were made into accounts which were held jointly by Appellant and Appellee, the money was marital property, not separate. However, because the exhibits upon which the trial court based its decision are not in the record before us, we are unable to consider the argument.
{¶19} It is an appellant’s responsibility to provide the appellate court with a record of all evidentiary matters which are necеssary to support his or her assignments of error. State v. Kimes, 4th Dist. No. 02CA11, 2003-Ohio-3752, at ¶17; Volodkevich v. Volodkevich (1989), 48 Ohio App.3d 313, 314, 549 N.E.2d 1237, 1238. Because of the absence of the relevant exhibits in the record before us, unlike the trial court, we are unable to review the multiple deposit slips and the various transactions. Accordingly, we are unable to undertake a meaningful review of the trial court’s determination
V. Conclusion
{¶20} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule both of Appellant’s assignments of error. Because the validity of the premarital agreemеnt was an issue fact, and because the court below was in a better position to weigh witness testimony and credibility, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in enforcing the agreement. Further, because the record lacks the exhibits necessary for us tо conduct a meaningful review of Appellant’s second assignment of error, we must presume the validity of the decision below. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee recover of the Appellant costs herein tаxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Kline, J. and Harsha, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY:
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.