Barron v. BarronBarron v. Barron
This is an appeal between divorced parties, appellant William Paul Barron, Jr., and appellee Mendy Lynn Barron. William contends that the trial court clearly erred in not finding the value of three financial accounts to be his sole nonmarital property, and alternatively, in not unevenly dividing the financial accounts in his favor. Mendy argues that the trial court did not clearly err on either point, and she also contends that William failed to appeal the amended divorce decree, depriving our court of jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We hold that William timely and properly appealed the trial court‘s July 2014 divorce decree, reaching the merits. After de novo review, we affirm.
The parties were married on December 31, 2009, separated in August 2013, and their divorce was granted by a decree filed in Boone County Circuit Court in July 2014. There were no children born of the marriage, and there was no marital real property to be divided,
The primary issue at the bench trial was the character and ownership of the following financial accounts, all titled in both Mendy and William Barron‘s names: a savings account at Community First Bank, a checking account at Community First Bank, a savings account at First Federal Bank, and an investment account at Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. The Community First Bank accounts held approximately $186,000, although Mendy withdrew approximately $50,000 during the process of separating from William. The First Federal Bank account held approximately $80,000 during the marriage, but $50,000 of that went into the Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. account. The remainder of the First Federal Bank account was spent prior to the divorce becoming final, leaving only $10.13 at the time of the divorce. Thus, the accounts of primary interest were the checking and savings accounts at Community First Bank and the Raymond James investment account.
There was no dispute that the source of the bulk of the funds in these three accounts was from William‘s mother or from the proceeds of life-insurance policies cashed in by William. Nonetheless, the money was placed, during the marriage, in the above-noted
William did not testify during this divorce hearing; the only witnesses were Mendy and her daughter. Mendy testified to the existence of these financial accounts, their being titled in both her and William‘s name with right of survivorship, their mutual access to and use of the money in these accounts, and the fact that they both treated the accounts as “our money.”
In a posttrial brief, Mendy requested the trial court to deem the financial accounts as marital and divide them evenly, where the evidence created the presumption that they were marital, and William failed to rebut that presumption in any manner and certainly not by clear and convincing evidence. In his posttrial brief, William requested that these accounts be deemed his separate nonmarital property because of the source of the funds, or in the alternative, that the trial court find that equity required that the accounts be unevenly divided in his favor.
The judge found that William failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the joint accounts used during the marriage were marital. Mendy was required to remit $25,000 to William as a consequence of her having taken $50,000 out of the financial accounts prior to the divorce to reimburse William for his marital half of those funds. In summary, the Community First Bank accounts, the minimal funds in the First Federal Bank account, and the value of the Raymond James investment account were divided evenly. The trial court rejected William‘s request to unequally divide the accounts. This appeal followed.
Moving to the merits, William first contends that the trial court clearly erred in deeming the Community First Bank accounts and the Raymond James investment account to be marital property. We disagree that William has shown clear error.
In reviewing the division of property in domestic-relations appeals, our court reviews the evidence de novo, but we do not reverse a finding of fact by the trial court unless that finding is clearly erroneous. Carroll v. Carroll, 2011 Ark. App. 356, 384 S.W.3d 50. Division of property at the time of divorce is governed by
William‘s contention is that, although the financial accounts were undoubtedly held in the parties’ joint names during the marriage, making them presumptively marital, there was undisputed tracing of the source of those funds such that he provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that a gift was made to Mendy. William concedes that he
Mendy‘s testimony confirmed that these financial accounts were titled in both of their names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, that the source of the funds was from William‘s mother or from life-insurance policies he cashed in, and that both parties had access to and used what they both called “our money.” Mendy stated that she had a debit card that she used for the Community First Bank checking account. She took out substantial funds from the Community First Bank savings account. She said that they used the funds in the First Federal Bank account to establish the investment account in the spring of 2013 with both of their names on it, and they used the remaining funds from the First Federal Bank account to buy a car and take a vacation. The source of the funds is of minimal value here because the moneys were converted into marital funds by virtue of their placement in joint accounts and by virtue of their joint access and usage. See Barnes v. Barnes, 2010 Ark. App. 821, 378 S.W.3d 766; Singleton v. Singleton, 99 Ark. App. 371, 260 S.W.3d 756 (2007); Jablonski v. Jablonski, 71 Ark. App. 33, 25 S.W.3d 433 (2000). We affirm on this point as not clearly erroneous.
William‘s alternative argument on appeal is that, if these accounts were marital, then the trial court clearly erred in not making a division of these assets unequally in his favor. We hold that the trial court did not clearly err.
In response to William‘s request of unequal division, the trial court‘s decree noted that it was “troubling” and “doesn‘t seem quite fair” that Mendy would receive half of the value of those accounts “having contributed little to the accumulation in the accounts. Be that as it may, the court can‘t just do as it pleases.” The trial court‘s decree recited the applicable statute,
Thus, the law requires that the court justify any unequal distribution of marital property. In this case, other than the length of the marriage and the source of the majority of the contributions to the accounts, the court was presented with insufficient evidence to apply and address the statutory factors set out in
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315 . It may have been that there was no additional evidence which would have changed the equity of property division. Consequently, the law requires that the accounts be distributed one-half (1/2) to each party.
Here, William simply failed in his burden to present sufficient evidence to divide the marital accounts in any other manner than one-half to each party. The overriding purpose of
We affirm.
VIRDEN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.
Ethredge & Copeland, P.A., by: David L. Ethredge, for appellant.
James E. Goldie, for appellee.