*1 371 to to it.” 11 Ark. at didn’t want do with nothing App. at 891. I that
S.W.3d Robinson dissenting agree judge the evidence was insufficient to make the status of these witnesses for the to decide. question jury Here, Caleb in connection guilty forgery Johnson with a check that Hickman stole from Haddad’s house. using was not with residential His charged burglary. testimony, Johnson corroborated was that he watched Benton young Sammy, pass Hickman; the television over the fence further testified Johnson he that “didn’t want to be involved” and went back inside Ruby home once he saw the Douglas’s television loaded into being van. had no this crime to authorities. The duty report Johnson — evidence saw other presented persons pass Johnson van, television over the fence and load it into the that he knew van, the television and the checks were in the and that he was — when the television was sold does not present suggest any way in which he aided or abetted the crime of residential burglary. Thus, there was for the to decide nothing about jury status as an and the circuit accomplice, court did not err Johnson’s I refusing give AMCI 403. would affirm jury Hickman’s conviction.
Gladwin, J., joins. Dawn Michelle SINGLETON v. Michael Larue SINGLETON CA 06-1070 260 S.W.3d756
Court of of Arkansas Appeals 29, 2007 delivered Opinion August *2 for appellant. Pratt, M. Jr., James Thomason, for appellee. Mary Griffen,
Wendell L. Dawn Singleton Judge. Appellant order from an Ouachita brings County appeal erred in not Circuit Court trial court awarding contending and we her an share of marital assets.We disagree, affirm. Michael married in Appellant appellee Janu- 1990 and filed her 2005.
ary separated Appellant complaint divorce and filed a The counterclaim for divorce. three
had minor children on the issues agreed concerning visitation, the children. owned custody, support salon, which, her own hair operated according appellant, had lost the last three years marriage. Appellee *3 worked for a and a had small retirement account. paper company
The issue at trial was major the distribution of the marital assets because was division of the appellant seeking in her favor. The revealed the follow- testimony 2003, facts. In October ing received a settlement of a appellant $304,000. claim in excess of received a Appellee settlement of his derivative claim in the $3100. amount of The settlement funds into parties placed a bank ac- appellant’s joint count. also his Appellee into the same account. paycheck trial, the time of the By had all of the settlement parties spent proceeds. The $85,000 a home for parties purchased and made im- $30,000. $116,000 valued at
provements The home at was valued at of the time trial. The furniture and for the home furnishings were at $30,000 $4000. valued The also a used parties purchased Yukon $18,500 Denali for The vehicle was worth the appellant. at time of trial. twice borrowed Appellant her vehicle to against pay truck, various bills. $14,000, a Appellee valued at purchased and a financed, ski boat and accessories. The boat was a and balance of $4900 remained. that the boat opined was worth more Appellant $6500. than A travel was also for camper $8500. purchased testified that it was worth more than $4500 the value given by appellee. of Some the settlement funds were in a account placed joint 2005, at a house. In March brokerage the withdrew appellant $53,000 balance of from that
remaining account because she believed was 'to remove the first. That appellee going money $14,500 was a money spent vehicle the purchasing for parties’ insurance, $2100 for daughter; paying subsequently repaid part machine; a washing purchasing new purchasing appellee; lawnmower; four-wheeler; $3000 spending $2000 riding $3000 and her paying for girlfriends;
for weekend getaway appellant the to bills; of and some medical giving some simply these seek recover of did not any friends. Appellee appellant’s funds. 2006, a letter trial court issued opinion
On February of the marital to the its disposition containing findings relating the factors contained that it had considered After stating property. in the court awarded 2002), Ann. 9-12-315 (Repl. Ark. Code § four-wheeler, vehicle, the furniture appellant residence, as fixtures as well in the marital located appliances truck; the ski his was awarded from her boat, motor, pick-up shop. Appellee trailer; mower; trailer; the travel lawn riding ac- retirement items and other property. Appellee’s personal was between count was divided parties. Appellant equally debts, for the for certain while responsible responsible The were of the debt on boat. parties equally payment medical bills. Pursuant certain responsible payment court awarded alternative appellant posses- request, child residence until sion of the marital youngest or with an adult or remarried cohabited turned eighteen appellant male, be sold at which time the home would to own the home as tenants divided. The were equally common. After these of a decree findings, memorializing entry *4 followed.1 appeal v. are reviewed de novo. Skok'os On divorce cases appeal, 420, the
Skokos,
Ark.
375
lists the
her
settlement.
factors contained in
injury
Appellant
section
in favor of an
9-12-315(a)(l)(A)
argues
they weigh
However,
division
her favor.2
offered no
unequal
appellant
evidence, other than
tax
2003
2004
returns
“uninsurable,”
own statement that she was
on
having any bearing
Nevertheless, the
factors.
trial court indicated that it consid-
these
ered the
factors. The
of these factors is factual
proper
application
determination; therefore, this
not
court will
reverse the division of
marital
unless that
division
property
clearly against
prepon-
Russell,
193,
derance of the evidence.
Russellv.
275
See
Ark.
628
S.W.2d 315
We will not
(1982).
substitute our
on
judgment
appeal
as to the exact interest each
should have but will
decide
party
Coombe,
whether the order is
Coombe
89
clearly
v.
Ark.
wrong.
114,
Appellant’s funds argument home, vehicles, used to and other purchase came property from her settlement. The trial court could have that, decided because the settlement into accounts and was used to joint other purchase, among things, names, house titled in both it lost its character as appellant’s 171, See v. separate 340 Ark. McKay McKay, 8 S.W.3d 203, 525 v. 23 (2000); Ark. Lofton, 745 635 App. S.W.2d Lofton (1988). funds from her settlement into Placing accounts joint created presumption intended to amake appellant gift of one-half of the settlement proceeds. offered to rebut testimony seeking and it was her presumption, Davis, burden to do See v. so. Davis Ark. 84 S.W.3d App. Moreover, 447 (2002). one spouse’s contributions to unequal need not divorce. recognized upon McKay, supra. assertion, to the
Finally, dissent’s contrary does equity not division compel favor where she the settlement commingled where she proceeds, voluntarily spent although These length factors, not include marriage; age, exhaustive, *5 health station in life of the amount and sources of parties; occupation parties; vocational income; skills; estate, liabilities, and needs of each employability; party of each for further of assetsand income; of opportunity contribution each acquisition capital in or marital including of services party acquisition, as a preservation, appreciation property, homemaker; and the federal income-tax of the court’s division of consequences property. on non-essential items those amount of proceeds considerable there and that she was “uninsurable” full that
with knowledge her future medical with which be more pay would in she had suffered losses full that and with knowledge expenses, to the divorce.3 of last three business in each the years prior her in its trial was the court clearly wrong We cannot that say Therefore, we affirm. estate. division of the marital parties’ Affirmed. JJ., agree. Heffley, Robbins, Glover, C.J.,
Pittman, Hart, J., dissents.
Josephine Linker I am baffled dissenting. by Hart, Judge, In in this case. Single- the rejecting majority’s opinion assert that there is a of evidence ton’s regard- argument, they paucity us factors that making statutory guide ing that “of- of state she marital Specifically, they disposition evidence, other 2003 and 2004 tax returns fered no than parties’ ” ‘uninsurable,’ she that had and her own statement that “any on these factors.” This not true. Given simply patently bearing statement, I that esteemed incorrect must conclude my colleagues colleague to be our to affirm the trial dissenting Our “baffled” decision professes controlling law are clear. Nevertheless, decision. the record court’s unmistakably knowingly injury settlement into a marital bank account. her personal affirming In funds from that account for numerous She and deducted purchases. concerning and the rulings legal effect of decision trial court’s subsequent following settled law judge, on the marital like the trial are Arkansas account, we, transactions commingling creates of funds into marital accounts a rebuttable that such voluntary separate make that gift that as the intended to of owner separate presumption property, appellant, in the Davis, to the marital See We must affirm other partner. McKay, supra; supra. rebut this instant case because failed to appellant presumption. colleague’s residence, for of the marital we note that As our preferred disposition colleague has nor our esteemed cited neither counsel for any authority appellant life in the residence that is entided to a estate because contention appellant distress. spending the setdement resulted financial choices about voluntary is entided to share of the value of the marital residence now that his Clearly, appellee trial is entided to have divorced. The court ruled correcdy appellant occupy grant life majority. their To estate in the until the children reach residence appellant to an and unwarranted seizure and would amount unauthorized residence beyond point give relief did legal interest in and would that she transfer appellee’s property, appellant not request.
377 abstract; have misunderstood the otherwise nineteen-page they would not make such an obvious mistake of fact. The testimony ex-husband, Ms. and her addressed all of the Singleton statutory factors enumerated in Arkansas Code 9-12- Annotated section. 315(a)(1)(A) of whether there 2002), (Repl. exception would be detrimental income-tax of a consequences particular prop- division. While I am mindful that we defer erty to the trial judge’s determine of witnesses “superior position credibility to be see, their weight v. given testimony,” e.g., Myrick Myrick, 1, 2 Ark. S.W.3d 60 this case (1999), does not on Ms. hinge Indeed, there are Singleton’s credibility. facts virtually disputed to the section relating 9-12-315(a)(l)(A) factors. note, dissent,
It is if important there is evidence that relates to each of the factors. These are as statutory follows:
The of the The length were married for marriage. parties sixteen to be years, considered a long enough of substan marriage tial duration. standards of Consequently, of both likely living should be if post-divorce equalized possible. health, and station in Age, life of the Ms. parties. thirties, is still in her Singleton but she has had back and has surgery heart that were problems severe to result in her enough receiving $300,000 settlement in her case. Conversely, evidence, there is no save for Mr. use Singleton’s of illegal drugs, that he has suggest to his any health. impairments Occupation Ms. runs her parties. Singleton own barber and has waited on tables and shop worked in a flower shop. With this but for her experience, health she should problems, able to attain at least However, a minimal standard of Ms. living. health issues Singleton’s overshadow this factor. By comparison, Mr. is an Singleton experienced who has supervisor, demonstrated to earn several ability times what Ms. has been able Singleton to realize from her His employment. earning potential continue to increase.
Amount and sources notes, of income. As the majority Mr. has demonstrated the Singleton to earn ability approximately $40,000 over the year last three per while Ms. years, Singleton’s has resulted employment of her health in a loss. As noted the onset previously, does not problems that her suggest earning potential will increase. trained barber and is a skills. Ms. Singleton Vocational Even without
Mr. experienced supervisor. *7 this factor should not weigh equally health Singleton’s problems, did the fact that she I cannot present for the ignore parties. that she could work that she doubted unrebutted testimony herself, Mr. and allow her to kind of hours that would support this assessment. did not really dispute Singleton health has serious Ms. problems Singleton Employability. Mr. less attractive to future that will make her employers. certainly new to secure demonstrated ability conversely, Singleton, International his Paper, when employer, employment previous its discontinued operations. liabilities,
Estate, each and needs of opportu party of assetsand income. Ms. of each for further nity acquisition capital Her chance of another home. has securing Singleton virtually her a did while eventually debilitating, give personal injury, of her own home. Mr. chance at the comfort Singleton securing so his his years, opportunities entering prime earning presumably in the to to accrue more only greater years property come. of each party acquisition, preservation, Contribution as a home of marital services
or including appreciation property, her unfortunate with a maker. Ms. experience Singleton, through settlement, was and her diet drug consequent personal-injury all of the to significant bringing marriage responsible consider that the marital marital assets. I believe it is proper existed for about one of the estate in its form year present Moreover, if Ms. had been more sixteen-year marriage. selfish, settlement none of the of her proceeds marital Mr. on would even have become Singleton, hand, Ms. settle other Singleton’s personal-injury helped spend trailer, boat, a ski ment foot travel thirty-two purchasing truck, of illicit I a new not to mention use drugs. certainly bench, bar, from the or street would cannot imagine why anyone trouble these factors. I do not understand weighing why chooses to the obvious. majority ignore evidence, In fails to addition missing majority the essence of Ms. Instead they Singleton’s argument. spend grasp a full that the of their rather limited analysis speculating paragraph that, because the settlement trial “could have decided judge into accounts and was used to purchase, joint names, in both it lost its other a house titled among things, how- character as appellant’s separate property.” Singleton, ever, not make a here. it was does tracing argument Again, that almost of undisputed every single piece significant lawnmower, of a barbecue exception grill came from of Ms. settle- Singleton’s personal-injury ment. This fact to section 9-12- undisputed directly corresponds viii, factors vii and 315(a)(1)(A) relating “opportunity each for further assets and income” acquisition capital “contribution of each . . . of marital party acquisition property,” I would this failure on the respectively. regard part majority fact, as a mixed mistake of law and their earlier erroneous given statement that there was no evidence on these having “bearing” factors. I that our review in traditional recognize cases has equity *8 deferential; however,
become
our review is
increasingly
still de
Skokos,
420,
novo.
v.
Skokos
344 Ark.