BARNES v INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
Docket No. 171240
Court of Appeals of Michigan
Submittеd March 8, 1995, at Detroit. Decided July 21, 1995, at 9:05 A.M.
212 Mich. App. 223
The Court of Appeals held:
An action under the Civil Rights Act may be brought in the circuit court for the county where thе alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the defendant resides or has its principal place of business.
Reversed.
REFERENCES
Am Jur 2d, Job Discrimination § 2154; Venue §§ 36, 37.
See ALR Index under Equal Employment Opportunity; Venue.
CIVIL RIGHTS — CIVIL RIGHTS ACT — ACTIONS — VENUE.
Venue of an action under the Civil Rights Act for unlawful discriminatory decisions by an employer against an employee is proper in the county in which the decisions were made or in which the employer has its principal place of business, but not in a county in which the employee only felt the effects of the decisions or sustained damages (
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. (by Joseph A. Golden, Gary E. Abeska, and Patrick Burkett), fоr the plaintiff.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone (by Donna J. Donati and Megan P. Norris), Covington & Burling (by Jeffrey G. Huvelle, Anthony Herman, and Eric Dodson Greenberg) (Adam Pomerantz, of Counsel), for the defendants.
Before: WHITE, P.J., and BANDSTRA and W.P. CYNAR,* JJ.
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff sued his employer in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging racial discrimination,
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for а change of venue. They also argue that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of submitting credible factual evidence that venue was proper in Wayne County. We agree.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
It is undisputed that venue in this case would be proper under either statute in Oakland County because that is the location of defendants’ corporate headquarters in Michigan and where the allegedly discriminatory and tortious decisions were made. Plaintiff argues, however, that venue is also proper in Wayne County because that is where he experienced at least some of the effects of defendants’ decisions and where he suffered resulting damages. Wе disagree.
Plaintiff‘s position is based upon Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 375, 377; 483 NW2d 844 (1992), and Witt v CJ Barrymore‘s, 195 Mich App 517, 521-522; 491 NW2d 871 (1992).1 In Lorencz, our Supreme Court held that the “all or part of the cause of action” language meant that an action could be brоught where any of the elements of the cause of action arose. Lorencz, supra at 375. The Court listed “damages” as one of the elements
The Supreme Court has recently clarified its decision in Lorencz and implicitly overruled Witt. The Court held that, in determining where a tort action accrues, thе place where damages were sustained (if different from where the injury or the breach of duty occurred) does not constitute a proper venue. Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147, 165; 528 NW2d 707 (1995). Plaintiff therefore may not pursue his tort action in Wayne County because he has alleged only that damages resulted in that county.2
Although the Supreme Court‘s decision in Gross does not technically apply to discrimination cases, we believe that its reasoning does. As noted by the Court, allowing an action to be brought where its effects or damages occur would encourage forum shopping in contravention of the goals of the venuе provisions. Id. at 164. Further, the civil rights statute clearly provides that venue is proper where “the alleged violation occurred,” not where its effects were felt or where the damages accrued. See
WHITE, P.J. (concurring). I join in the opinion per curiam but write separately to stаte that I do not do so on the basis that venue of a civil rights action is proper only in the county where the discriminatory decision is made. Disсrimination also “occurs,”