GROSS v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; MCLAIN v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Docket Nos. 98045, 98046, 98806
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued October 5, 1994. Decided March 8, 1995.
448 Mich 147; 528 NW2d 707
Sharyn A. McLain brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against General Motors Corporation and others, alleging that a defective fuel system of the 1987 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer contributed to the death of Dawn McLain-Sutherland when it collided with a tractor-trailer in Oakland County. The court, John H. Hausner, J., granted the defendant‘s motion for change of
In an opinion by Chief Justice BRICKLEY, joined by Justices RILEY and MALLETT, the Supreme Court held:
Under
- Lorencz v Ford Motor Co held that under
MCL 600.1629(1) ;MSA 27A.1629(1) venue is proper where part or all of a cause of action arises, not merely at the situs of the injury. While the places of design and manufacture are additional locations from which a cause of action may arise, the place of approval of a particular design concept has little to do with the place of its actual design. What makes a design defect actionable is not its approval, but its tangible design. Thus, the county that is most tangibly related to an alleged defect in design is the location where a design defect cause of action arises. In these cases, that location was Macomb County, where General Motors Warren Technical Center is located and where the subject vehicles were designed. - Establishing the place where a plaintiff experiences pain and suffering as a proper place for venue would make
MCL 600.1629(1)(c) ;MSA 27A.1629(1)(c) a venue provision of first priority, rather than being subordinate to subsections a and b. Lorencz, in discussing, in dicta, such a place as proper, overstated the limits of tort venue. Rather, underMCL 600.1629 ;MSA 27A.1629 , venue is proper only at the situs of injury or in the place or places where the breach of a legal duty occurs that subsequently causes a person to suffer damages. Tangential damages that occur other than at such places are irrelevant to venue determination.
Justice BOYLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that when the product designer and the product manufacturer are the same entity, a cause of action for an alleged design defect arises for venue purposes either in the county in which the injury occurs, or in the county in which the product enters the stream of commerce or is purchased by the injured consumer.
Venue for a tort claim may be proper in multiple counties. Primary venue for tort claims lies in a county in which all or
A design defect cause of action is not a separate or unique theory of recovery, but simply a particular type of negligence action. A negligence cause of action has four elements. To prevail, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a legal duty by the defendant to the plaintiff, the breach of the duty, the proximate causal relation between the breach and an injury to the plaintiff, and damages. Because there is no free-standing duty not to design a defective product, no part of a cause of action for defective design occurs in the county where a product is designed. The duty arises and is breached no earlier than when the defective design becomes a defective product in the stream of commerce.
The proximate cause of the injury and the injury itself can only arise in the county in which the product causes harm. Determining that the designer/manufacturer breaches its duty in the county in which the product is sold or received by the injured party not only comports with the general concepts of negligence-based products liability, but decreases vexatious discovery litigation and fulfills the principles underlying the venue statute.
Determining which county is most tangibly related to the alleged defect in design introduces complexity into design defect litigation. Proper venue must be established before extensive discovery has taken place. The choice of venue must be based on fact, not speculation. Determining which county is most tangibly related to the design of the product may well depend on evidence plaintiffs do not have access to when the action is filed. Plaintiffs, however, can establish with relative ease where the product entered the stream of commerce or where the product was purchased by plaintiff. The defendant should bear the burden of establishing a more convenient forum in an alleged design defect case because it is in complete control of the data necessary to establish a more appropriate county.
Justice LEVIN, dissenting, stated that although a part of these causes of action for product design failure did not arise, for venue purposes, in Wayne County, further discovery may show that the ultimate design decision was made in Detroit. Thus, both cases should be remanded for additional discovery and fact finding regarding the role of General Motors Product
Ordinarily venue decisions are reached without extensive discovery, and there are advantages to bright-line rules. However, bringing this venue war to a conclusion, as desirable as closure would be, is not justified without providing the plaintiffs an opportunity for complete discovery and development of the facts and further fact finding by a circuit judge concerning General Motors’ actual design decision-making process. The record is not sufficiently developed for the Supreme Court to rule, as a matter of law, that design decisions invariably occurred in Macomb County.
Justices CAVANAGH and WEAVER took no part in the decision of these cases.
Gross, reversed and remanded.
McLain, remanded.
VENUE — TORTS — DESIGN DEFECTS.
Venue in a tort action is proper only at the situs of an injury, or in the place or places where the breach of a legal duty occurs that subsequently causes a person to suffer damages; tangential damages that occur other than at such places are irrelevant to venue determination (
Goodman, Lister & Peters, P.C. (by Richard M. Goodman and Darrel Peters); Bendure & Thomas, of counsel (by Mark R. Bendure), for plaintiff Gross.
Chambers, Steiner (by Angela J. Nicita, Courtney E. Morgan, Jr., and Jeffrey T. Meyers) for plaintiff McLain.
Reynolds, Beeby & Magnuson, P.C. (by Frank K. Mandlebaum and Michael C. McKinnon), and Frank Nizio for defendant General Motors Corporation in Gross.
Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. (by Mark Shreve and Mark C. Smiley), for defendants-appellees Noran Transportation, Inc.,
Feeney, Kellett & Wienner, P.C. (by James P. Feeney, Peter M. Kellett, and David N. Goltz), for defendant-appellee General Motors Corporation in McLain.
Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Clark & Hampton (by Michael L. Updike) for defendants-appellees American Marine Shore Control and Mini in McLain.
Amicus Curiae:
Mark Granzotto and Monica Farris Linkner for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BRICKLEY, C.J. These cases present two issues for discussion. The first issue is whether the county in which executives may have approved product designs provides venue in a design defect case. We hold that it does not. The second issue is whether a plaintiff‘s experience of damages within a county properly establishes tort venue therein. We hold that it does not.
I
These consolidated appeals concern two accidents involving General Motors vehicles. The facts concerning the accidents are not in dispute. Wilson Gross was seriously injured when his 1984 Chevrolet CK pickup truck overturned in Washtenaw County. Dawn McLain-Sutherland was killed when her 1987 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer collided with a tractor-trailer on M-59 in Oakland County. As a consequence of these accidents, design defect suits were brought against General Motors. Plaintiffs in
The procedural histories of these cases are more complicated, especially Gross v General Motors. In summary, plaintiff Gross filed suit in Wayne County. Pursuant to
The parties appealed in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the venue transfer of the Washtenaw Circuit Court, and, retaining jurisdiction, returned the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reconsideration of defendant‘s original motion for change of venue in light of this Court‘s decision in Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). On reconsideration, the Wayne Circuit Court determined that venue was proper in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals then peremptorily affirmed the denial of defendant‘s motion for change of venue. Defendant subsequently appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff McLain also filed suit in Wayne
II
We are asked in these cases to further construe the meaning of
It is clear that a breach of duty can occur in a different venue than the injury in a tort case. For example, in a products liability action, the product can be designed in one county, manufactured in another, and the injury may occur in yet a third. A plaintiff, alleging proper facts, can file suit in any one of these places because all or a part of the cause of action arose in any one of them. Under the plain language of
MCL 600.1629(1)(a) ;MSA 27A.1629(1)(a) , venue would be properly laid in any one of them. [Id. at 375. Citations omitted.]
In accordance with Lorencz, the parties to these design defect actions do not dispute that the county in which a product is designed is a proper place for venue. However, they disagree with regard to the meaning of the term “design” and accordingly with regard to the place or places where the subject vehicles were designed.
Defendants argue that the subject vehicles were designed at General Motors Warren Technical Center in Macomb County. Plaintiffs counter that the subject vehicles were designed in Macomb and Wayne Counties. They contend that in addition to the actual design work performed at the Tech Center, decisions that affected product design were
A
Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most convenient forum. Peplinski v Employment Security Comm, 359 Mich 665, 668; 103 NW2d 454 (1960). Neirbo Co v Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp, 308 US 165, 168; 60 S Ct 153; 84 L Ed 167 (1939); 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3801, p 4. Courts evaluate convenience primarily in terms of the interests of the parties and any relevant witnesses. However, the primary goal is to minimize the costs of litigation not only by reducing the burdens on the parties, but also by considering the strains on the system as a whole. See Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno, 454 US 235, 256-257; 102 S Ct 252; 70 L Ed 2d 419 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 507-509; 67 S Ct 839; 91 L Ed 1055 (1947).
In Michigan, plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing the propriety of their venue choice, and the
The venue issues presented in these appeals, however, are different. The parties have argued contentiously regarding the facts surrounding the design of the subject vehicles. They have sought significant discovery and presented complicated factual issues for the trial court to resolve in determining proper venue. Greater discovery for the purposes of venue determination would help remedy this problem, but this would further burden trial courts with “venue trials.”
In resolving these disputes, we approach our task bearing in mind that venue is simply the location of trial, and its determination should only concern the selection of a fair and convenient location where the merits of a dispute can be adjudicated. Rogoski v Streeter, 364 Mich 115, 119; 110 NW2d 617 (1961); Peplinski, supra at 668. Battles over venue that endure for years and are a great expense should be discouraged and avoided when there are convenient and fair locations for trial that fulfill the venue requirements of Michigan statutes and court rules.
B
In Lorencz, we concluded that
In 1986, the Michigan Legislature passed the tort reform act4 and in so doing modified Michigan‘s venue statutes for tort proceedings. One of the Legislature‘s remedial goals was to limit venue shopping by plaintiffs. In its report to the Legislature, the House Special Committee on Liability Insurance5 specifically identified the problem of
The former tort venue statute,
As stated above, the primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature through reasonable con-
Under plaintiffs’ interpretation of
In addition to promoting greater venue shopping, plaintiffs’ proposed rule does violence to
Certainly, there is no question that a manufacturer is accountable and liable for negligent decision making that causes injury to its customers, regardless of where these design decisions are made. However, what is at issue here is not liability, but venue. We hold that the county most tangibly related to an alleged defect in design is the location where a design defect cause of action arises. In Gross v General Motors and McLain v General Motors, that location was Macomb County, where General Motors Warren Technical Center is located.
III
Plaintiff Gross also argues that there is no need for this Court to reach the general issue of venue in design defect cases because the facts of his case provide an alternative and independent ground for
In Lorencz, we described the various locations where a products liability suit might arise, specifically referring to the elements of such a cause of action. We stated:
In a cause of action arising from a tortious injury, there are four elements:
“1. The existence of a legal duty by defendant toward plaintiff;
2. the breach of such duty;
3. the proximate causal relation between the breach of such duty and an injury to the plaintiff; and
4. the plaintiff must have suffered damages.” [Id. at 375. Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
We then concluded:
It is clear that a breach of duty can occur in a
eight pages, the argument is presented in less than one page. Moreover, defendants have not briefed the question at all. Failure to properly brief an issue on appeal constitutes abandonment of the question. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959); City of St Ignace v McFarlane, 45 Mich App 81, 86; 206 NW2d 226 (1973). Second, and explaining defendants’ failure to brief the issue, plaintiff did not argue this theory below. When a cause of action is presented for appellate review, a party is bound to the theory on which the cause was prosecuted or defended in the court below. Dwelley v Tom McDonnell, Inc, 334 Mich 229, 233; 54 NW2d 217 (1952). While McLain did plead a failure to recall theory, she did not argue that theory in response to defendants’ motion to change venue. Moreover, when plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the trial court‘s order to transfer venue, she relied exclusively on the design decisions theory. It was only when plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals that she argued the failure to recall theory.
Plaintiff states that because damages are an element of a tort action, they too must provide a place or places where a tort action arises. If this argument is accepted, the place or places where a person suffers any damages is a proper location for venue pursuant to
In support of this argument, plaintiff cites Witt v CJ Barrymore‘s, 195 Mich App 517; 491 NW2d 871 (1992). In Witt, the plaintiff was injured in a Toledo, Ohio, bar when an intoxicated customer assaulted and beat her. The plaintiff was from Monroe County, Michigan, and the defendant was a Michigan corporation based in Macomb County. In interpreting and applying
Moreover, courts are bound to construe statutes so as to give them validity and a reasonable construction; seeming inconsistencies in the various provisions of a statute should be reconciled, if possible, so as to arrive at a meaning that gives effect to all parts of the statute. People ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Society of Good Neighbors,
Under the controlling venue statute, venue is proper in Monroe County. . . A portion of plaintiffs’ claimed economic, noneconomic, and loss of consortium damages appear to have arisen in Monroe County. The lower court did not rule on venue in Monroe County, although defendant had posed it as an option. However, the lower court did not have the benefit of the Lorencz decision when it ruled. Accordingly, we remand for transfer of this case to Monroe County pursuant to
In our discussion of damages, in dicta, in Lorencz, we allowed an interpretation of
IV
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gross v General Motors and remand the case to Wayne County for further disposition consistent with this opinion. In McLain v General Motors, we remand the case to Oakland County for trial.
RILEY and MALLETT, JJ., concurred with BRICKLEY, C.J.
BOYLE, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with parts I and III of the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority‘s adoption of the venue test for design defect cases. I would hold that a design defect
Venue for a tort claim may be proper in multiple counties. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Primary venue for tort claims lies in a county in which all or part of a cause of action arose and in which the defendant resides, has a place of business, conducts business, or has a registered office.
In Lorencz, the defendant argued that venue was only proper in the county in which the injury occurred because that was the only county in which the cause of action arose. We rejected this argument and held that “a cause of action may arise in more than one place, making venue proper in more than one jurisdiction....” Id. at 377. To illustrate how a breach of duty could arise
in a different jurisdiction than the injury, we discussed a products liability action as an example:
[I]n a products liability action, the product can be designed in one county, manufactured in another, and the injury may occur in yet a third. A plaintiff, alleging proper facts, can file suit in any one of these places because all or part of the cause of action arose in any one of them. [Id. at 375.]
Lorencz involved two competing venues, Gratiot County, the place of the accident, and Wayne County. It was specifically claimed that venue was proper in Wayne County because “the car was defectively designed, manufactured, and assembled at Ford‘s Wayne County facilities.” Id. at 372. Lorencz thus established only that a cause of action could arise in multiple counties. Venue is only proper in multiple counties, however, if all or part of the cause of action arose in different counties. Thus, the first step in determining where venue is proper is to identify the elements of the particular cause of action.
In Michigan, a manufacturer is liable for a defective design if the risk of harm occasioned by the design of the product outweighs the design‘s utility. Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 421 Mich 670; 365 NW2d 176 (1984). The risk-utility analysis adopted in Prentis is a pure negligence cause of action. Id. at 691. A design defect cause of action is not a separate or unique theory of recovery, but simply a particular type of negligence action.
The majority‘s failure to identify the elements of a design defect cause of action leads to an improper focus on the perceived need to define “design.” The majority concludes “that the county most tangibly related to an alleged defect in design is the location where a design defect cause of action arises.” Ante at 160. This test is ambiguous
The proper focus is identifying the elements of the cause of action and deciding where each of them arose. A negligence cause of action has four elements. To prevail, a plaintiff must prove “(1) [t]he existence of a legal duty by defendant toward plaintiff; (2) the breach of such duty; (3) the proximate causal relation between the breach of such duty and an injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff must have suffered damages.” Lorencz, supra at 375; Roulo v Automobile Club of Michigan, 386 Mich 324; 192 NW2d 237 (1971).
The elements of the design defect cause of action in this case can only arise in two possible counties. The duty, most easily stated in the negative, is not to provide a product if the product creates an “unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.” Prentis at 693; Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413, 425; 326 NW2d 372 (1982). That duty and its breach may arise in the county in which the product was manufactured or the county in which the product was placed into the stream of commerce. However, since there is no free-standing duty not to design a defective product, no part of a cause of action for defective design occurs in the county where a product is designed. To state it otherwise, a design is necessary to a products liability action, but it is not sufficient to all or any part of the cause of action.2
There is no liability in the abstract for negligently designing a product or even manufacturing
The second county where venue is proper is the county in which the accident occurs. The proximate cause of the injury and the injury itself can only arise in the county in which the product causes harm.
The Restatement of Torts and the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (UPLA) reach the same conclusion, but through different analyses. Neither the Restatement or the UPLA consider an object a product until it is introduced into the stream of commerce. In order for an object to be considered a product under the Restatement, the object must be sold. Restatement Torts, 2d, § 402A, pp 347-348. Pursuant to the UPLA, the object must be produced for introduction into trade or commerce. UPLA, § 102(C). A product must be released in some manner to the consuming public or purchaser before it can be said to have entered the stream of commerce. Thomas v St Joseph Hosp, 618 SW2d 791 (Tex Civ App, 1981).
Determining that the designer/manufacturer breaches its duty in the county in which the product is sold or received by the injured party not only comports with the general concepts of negligence-based products liability, but decreases vexatious discovery litigation and fulfills the principles underlying the venue statute. As the majority
While the majority attempts to discourage “[b]attles over venue that endure for years and are a great expense,” ante at 156, its test will escalate the war and shift the battle‘s focus. Resources will be diverted from the complicated and often formidable task of unearthing evidence regarding a defendant‘s knowledge of the defective nature of the product. The fight will continue over which county is “most tangibly related” to the design defect, an inquiry that necessarily will trace the entire history of the decision-making process and will require subsidiary contests about whether a given action in that process was a “decision” or merely a recommendation and whether the question is to be resolved by an objective standard or a subjective standard. Indeed, the dissent has already suggested a predictable gloss on the test by alluding to “the most meaningful design decisions,” post at 174. Discovery litigation and venue hearings will continue along the tortured path that has forestalled the trial of these cases.
Proper venue must be established before extensive discovery has taken place. The “plaintiff must determine which county is proper for venue purposes before the complaint is filed on the basis of
Generally, the county in which the plaintiff purchases a product is geographically closer to the plaintiff than the county in which the product was designed. Because “[v]enue is primarily a matter of convenience,” Peplinski v Employment Security Comm, 359 Mich 665, 668; 103 NW2d 454 (1960), and equity, Burlington NR Co v Ford, 504 US 648, 651; 112 S Ct 2184; 119 L Ed 2d 432 (1992), a county that is in proximity to the plaintiff is a more appropriate forum. With regard to the defendant‘s interests, it is not inequitable to force the designer/manufacturer to defend a claim in such a county because a designer/manufacturer should expect to defend a lawsuit in any county in which its products enter the stream of commerce or are transferred within it.
The defendant‘s interests are further protected in that the plaintiff‘s venue selection is not absolute. If the defendant believes that another county is a more convenient forum, it can file a motion to transfer the action.
This dispute can be resolved without recourse to an ambiguous and unwieldy definition of “design.” Accordingly, I would hold that when the product designer and the product manufacturer are the same entity, a cause of action for an alleged design defect arises for venue purposes either in the county in which the injury occurs, or in the county in which the product enters the stream of commerce or is purchased by the injured consumer. Accordingly, I would remand both cases to the trial court to determine the appropriate venue.
LEVIN, J. (dissenting). I agree with the majority that “a part” of the instant causes of action for product design failure did not arise, for venue purposes, in Wayne County on the rationale that the decision to manufacture and market products containing the alleged design defects was necessarily made in Detroit because the World Headquarters of General Motors is located in Detroit. Further discovery, however, may show that the ultimate design decision was made in Detroit.
General Motors contends that the vehicles were designed at its Warren Technical Center in Macomb County. McLain contends, with some evidence to support, that the design was approved by General Motors Product Policy Group, an executive management committee that met at the World Headquarters in Detroit. In Gross, discovery on the venue issue, although voluminous, may be incomplete, possibly because the circuit judge initially ruled for General Motors, and, on remand,
I would remand both cases for additional discovery and fact finding regarding the role of the Product Policy Group and executive management in the design decisions concerning the vehicles. Although the design and alternative designs may have been formulated and developed in Warren, the ultimate decision may have been made in Detroit.
I recognize that ordinarily venue decisions are reached without extensive discovery, and that there are advantages to bright-line rules. In the instant cases, however, the parties appear to be willing to devote considerable resources to winning this venue war, which both sides appear to regard as worthy of that effort. We are not justified in bringing this venue war to a conclusion, as desirable as closure would be, without providing the plaintiffs with the opportunity for complete discovery and development of the facts and further fact finding by a circuit judge concerning General Motors’ actual design decision-making process.
If evidence developed on further discovery were to show, and the judge were to find, that the Product Policy Group or other high level management are meaningfully involved in the design decision, a part of the cause of action may have arisen in Detroit.
The difference between analyzing a problem, and developing a recommendation for its resolution, on the one hand, and choosing between alternative resolutions, on the other hand, is one that the members of this Court deal with on a daily basis. The commissioner‘s staff, located in the Business and Trade Center Building, reviews applications for leave to appeal, reports to the Court concern-
Although commissioner reports and recommendations are generated in the Business and Trade Center Building, decisions on applications for leave to appeal are not made in that building. They are made elsewhere, by the justices, at their offices, their homes, or during telephone or formal conference discussion at the Law Building. Although the justices and the Court often adopt commissioner recommendations without holding them for conference discussion, the decisions in those cases are not made in the Business and Trade Center Building simply because work was done and a report and recommendation were there generated.
Similarly, in the instant cases, it may be that the Product Policy Group or another executive management committee or persons located in the World Headquarters, including persons located in Macomb County who report to persons located in Detroit, make the most meaningful design decisions when they decide which designs to adopt and which to reject. The record is not sufficiently developed for this Court to rule, as a matter of law, that design decisions invariably occurred in Macomb County.
I would remand to the circuit courts for further proceedings on the venue issue.
I also disagree with the majority‘s disposition of Gross’ alternative argument that venue was properly transferred on grounds of hardship or inconvenience by the Washtenaw Circuit Court to the Wayne Circuit Court pursuant to
Before Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992), was decided, venue had been changed by the Wayne Circuit Court to Washtenaw, on the basis that venue was improper in Wayne. The Wayne Circuit Court ruled that the proper venue was Washtenaw. The Washtenaw Circuit Court—the “proper venue“—changed the venue back to Wayne “for purposes of convenience” as provided for in the statute.3
The Court of Appeals ruled on the first appeal to that Court that the Washtenaw Circuit Court “did not have authority to transfer the action to Wayne County for purposes of convenience,”4 but remanded to the Wayne Circuit Court for reconsideration in light of Lorencz of General Motors’ motion for a change of venue. On remand, the Wayne Circuit Court decided to retain jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals, by order, affirmed, one judge dissenting.
I am inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals, and to the view that the Washtenaw Circuit Court did not, because the case had been “improperly” commenced in Wayne, have less authority to change venue to Wayne “based on hardship or inconvenience” than it would have had if the case had been commenced in Washtenaw.5
Nor is a litigant required to file a cross appeal to advance an alternative argument for affirming a decision of the Court of Appeals.7 A cross appeal is required when a litigant asks this Court to change the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals decided on the second appeal in Gross to affirm the decision of the
CAVANAGH and WEAVER, JJ., took no part in the decision of these cases.
Notes
Subject to subsection (2), in an action based on tort, the following provisions apply:
(a) A county in which all or a part of the cause of action arose and in which either of the following apply is a proper county in which to commence and try the action:
(i) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The registered office of a defendant corporation is located in that county.
(b) If no county satisfies the criteria under subdivision (a), a county in which all or part of the cause of action arose and in which either of the following apply is a proper county in which to commence and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county.
(ii) The registered office of a plaintiff corporation is located in that county.
(c) If no county satisfies the criteria under subdivision (a) or (b), a county in which both of the following apply is a proper county in which to commence and try the action:
(i) The plaintiff resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or the registered office of a plaintiff corporation is located in that county.
(ii) The defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business in that county, or the registered office of a defendant corporation is located in that county.
(d) If no county satisfies the criteria under subdivision (a), (b), or (c), a county which satisfies the criteria under section 1621 or 1627 is a proper county in which to commence and try an action. It is possible to imagine a situation in which the design defect is the faulty design itself. Imagine that a defendant‘s business is selling plans for building go-carts to the general public. The hypothetical example does not detract from the point. Although the design itself is “the product,” there is no breach of duty until it is offered for sale. Ante, p 161, n 8.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary and therefore, precluded. However, if construction is necessary, the Court is required to determine and give effect to the Legislature‘s intent and employ the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the words used by the Legislature... Our reading of the statute,
The remand for further proceedings prevented the judgment from becoming final. This is the first occasion this Court has had to consider on plenary review the conclusions and determinations of the Court of Appeals. We are not precluded by the earlier determination of the Court of Appeals from reaching a conclusion contrary to that expressed in its first opinion.
In a tort action, venue shall be determined in the following order of priority:
(A) The county in which all or a part of the injury occurred.
(B) The county in which a defendant resides.
(C) If none of the defendants meets any of the criteria in subdivision (B), the county in which any plaintiff resides. An appellee not taking a cross-appeal may nevertheless urge in support of the judgment in his favor reasons other than those adopted by the lower court, or reasons rejected by the trial court. [7A Callaghan‘s Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed), § 57.54, p 334.] See Burns v Rodman, 342 Mich 410, 414; 70 NW2d 793 (1955); Fass v Highland Park, 321 Mich 156, 158; 32 NW2d 175 (1948).
Second, Gross argues that intervening-plaintiff Blue Cross and Blue Shield establishes proper venue in Wayne County. Blue Cross, a Wayne County corporation, has paid money damages on plaintiff‘s behalf to health care providers in Wayne County. He argues that these damage payments are the basis of Blue Cross’ suit and therefore Blue Cross’ cause of action arises in Wayne County under
Third, Gross argues that the venue transfer of the Washtenaw Circuit Court for the convenience of the parties, ruled improper by the Court of Appeals, was a legitimate and permissible transfer. Like the Court of Appeals, we find this argument to be without merit. Moreover, plaintiff had several opportunities to appeal the Court of Appeals decision and failed to do so. Plaintiff could have appealed to this Court within twenty-one days of the issuance of that decision pursuant to MCR 7.302. Plaintiff also could have filed a cross appeal after defendant-appellant filed the present appeal, but did not. Therrian v General Laboratories Inc, 372 Mich 487, 490; 127 NW2d 319 (1964).
Finally, McLain argues that venue is proper in Wayne County because General Motors failed to order a recall upon receiving notice that the fuel system of the S-10 Blazer was defective and inherently dangerous. Plaintiff contends that the decision to recall a product or the failure to do so occurs at the highest echelons of a company. Because General Motors’ executives are based in its world headquarters in Detroit, venue is allegedly proper pursuant to
In a cause of action arising from a tortious injury, the plaintiff must establish the defendant‘s legal duty to the plaintiff, the breach of that duty, proximate causation between the breach of duty and the injury, and resultant damages. Plaintiff‘s premises liability and dramshop claims appear to arise from duties owed in Ohio. Additionally, questions concerning breach of duty and proximate cause involve events that transpired in Ohio. Plaintiffs’ damages arose either in Ohio or in Monroe County.